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Representing Torture: The Struggle for the Masculine Self in the Historia von D. Johann Fausten

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Writing about torture is a painful undertaking. It involves dealing with monstrous cruelty, unimaginable bodily pain and very often murder. And yet, in torture the infliction of physical pain is not an end in itself. The following essay discusses torture as a technique of subjection - as a technique of regulating and formulating the self; I argue that the "disputations" between Mephostophiles and Faust in the Historia von D. Johann Fausten represent torture in that they appropriate the structure and logic of torture as far as the violent construction of Faust's identity as irredeemable sinner is concerned. My argument has four parts: After some introductory remarks about the problem of identity in the Historia (1), I discuss the structure and function of torture with regard to the construction of identity (2), and its representation in the Historia (3). I conclude with a discussion about the construction of masculinity in this context (4).

Identity Politics

The Historia claims to tell the "true" story of Doctor Johann Fausten, a gifted Doctor Theologiae (14) who turns to magic and a pact with the devil in order to open up new, hitherto forbidden sources of knowledge. But Faust's curiosity has its price: The contract with the devil stipulates that after 24 years - which Faust spent in part doing scientific research, in part whoring, drinking, and jesting - the devil comes to get his soul. Unlike his famous literary predecessors Theophilus and Jutta, Faust is not able to repent his sins and be saved; therefore, his soul will be tortured in hell forever. The relentless character of the ending as well as the fact that Faust's research activities do not exceed - as many critics have observed - common knowledge (sometimes he is not even up-to-date) have led critics to characterize
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the text, in the words of Hans-Joachim Kreutzer, as “ein altmodisches Buch, gar nicht renaissancehaft gemeint” (334). Apart from the fact that this critique is based on a questionable concept of period designations - drawing on Jacob Burckhardt’s influential characterization of the Renaissance as an era devoted to the development of the free, autonomous individual - I would like to argue that the Historia is a product of the Renaissance precisely because of its emphasis on and concern with the making of identity (Greenblatt 1982).

Undoubtedly, Faust’s identity is one of the central concerns of the Historia. For the narrator, his identity seems beyond doubt: Faust is an incorrigible criminal (Schatzkuenschler, Teufelsbeschwerer) and a sinner, an early modern Cain or Judas, as it were, who deserves to be murdered by the devil. To account for Faust’s criminal/sinful self the narrator offers a quasi-psychological explanation: “Als D. Faust eins gantz gelernigen vnd geschwend Kopffs / zum studiern qualificiert vnd geneiget war.... Daneben hat er auch einen thuhmen / vnnsinnigen vnnd hoffertigen Kopff gehabt / Wie man ja dann allzeit den Speculierer genennet hat” (14). Because of this psychological disposition Faust’s fate is predetermined: “Aber es ist ein wahr Sprichwort: Was zum Teuffel will / das laefh sich nicht auffhalten / noch jm wehren” (14).

Four hundred years later, Barbara Könneker suggests a psychological reading as well: “Was theologisch als Kains- oder Judasreue gefaßt wird und Gipfel teufischer Verführungskunst ist, stellt sich gleichzeitig auf psychologischer Ebene als ein in Fausts Seele verwurzelter Trieb zur Selbstzerstörung dar....” (196, emphasis is mine). Accordingly, part of the text represents “das Seelendrama eines Menschen, der sich vor den unlosbaren Zwiespalt zwischen Wollen und Können gestellt sieht und an diesem Zwiespalt zugrundegeht” (196). Another two decades later, Maria E. Müller explains Faust’s criminal biography with his “melancholia” (1986), thus, suggesting that Faust’s self as well as his fate is regulated by the fluids of his body. Interestingly, Könneker and Müller agree with the narrator that Faust’s “problematic” identity is responsible for his gruesome destiny. They presume that Faust’s self is the result of his psychic and bodily nature, and they both find good arguments for their theses in early modern theology and medicine. And yet, this approach renders the literary text silent, since it seems to be reduced to a mere illustration of “history.” As concerns the Historia this approach results in the reproduction of the narrator’s logic whose intention it is to prove that failure before God is a matter of the individual’s psyche/soul. To avoid this impasse Stephen Greenblatt has called for a “cultural poetics” which does not take for granted concepts like “history” or “author” but which analyzes the practices, norms, and institutions which constitute the conditions of possibility for literature. Regarding the Historia von D. Johann Fausten cultural poetics means to question the narrator’s theory about Faust’s horrible biography as well as to ask for the social practices and institutions that might have shaped it. In their reconstruction of Faust’s self both Könneker and Müller do not reflect upon the fact that this self is not given but rather produced throughout the narrative. In their readings the individual as well as the self are considered as the cause rather than the effect of a life story. That is to say, that the process of becoming an individual and a self is not taken into consideration.

Postmodern theories, most of all the works of Michel Foucault, have challenged this “identity politics.” One of the central insights of Foucault’s work is that the self is not the result of the individual’s psychic structure, a psychic necessity as it were, but an effect of discourses, institutions and disciplinary practices, of what Foucault has called “power/knowledge.” Power not only acts on the individual as a form of domination but also activates or formulates the subject. In this sense, the formation of the self is made possible by procedures of subjection. Summarizing Foucault’s theory of subjection by power Judith Butler draws attention to its psychic effects as well:

Subjection signifies the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a subject. ...the subject is initiated through a primary submission to power. ...power that at first appears as external, pressed upon the subject, pressing the subject into subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject’s self-identity.

(1997, 3)

In other words, the subject’s self is a cultural artifact, the discursive product of the relations and articulations of power in a
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particular society. To claim that selves are constructed is not to say that selves do not exist. Quite on the contrary, to emphasize the constructedness of selves is to analyze the historically and culturally specific discourses, norms, and power relations involved in their construction.

However, subjection is not to be understood as a determining power that inscribes itself on an otherwise passive individual, thereby depriving the subject of every kind of agency. Rather, the relationship between subject and social structure is to be conceived as a dynamic interaction, in which, as Norbert Elias has argued, "[b]eide den Charakter von Prozessen [haben]" (XVIII). But if selves are constructed through subjection how is agency possible? In order to account for the subject's agency Judith Butler has introduced the concept of "performativity" or "reiteration" (1997). The subject can only exist if the discourses and conditions of power that brought it into being are reiterated continually. The performative formulation of the subject leaves room for agency and change, because, as Butler argues, reiteration "involve[s] an alteration of power such that the power assumed or appropriated works against the power that made that assumption possible" (13). The notion of reiteration points to the paradox that selves are always already subjects but must nevertheless continually reiterate both their subjection and their selfhood.

In what follows, I shall suggest that the Historia constitutes a narrative of the struggle for the self. There are conflicting forces and discourses struggling to gain control throughout the narrative about who Faust really is, or rather, who he is to become. Yet, the text also lays open the process of producing this self by showing the mechanisms involved in the making of a criminal/sinner.

Once Faust has signed the pact with his ghost, the implications for his identity are far-reaching. The fundamental condition of the contract reads "daß er allen Christgläubigen Menschen woelle feind seyn" (20). As a consequence, Faust must become an outsider; he must disclaim all social relations, such as family, religion/God, or professional organizations. But, as Natalie Davis has pointed out, the fashioning of early modern selves took place in relation to social groups and institutions. By becoming the enemy of every human being, of all that is human as it were, Faust is not only stripped of his social life, he is stripped of his self as well. The devil turns out to be

Faust's only peer "dieweil er nicht zweyen Herrn / als Gott vnd ... dem Teuffel / dienen koennte" (28). It is Mephostophiles he must turn to in order to find out who he is. In the disputations that start right after his failed attempt at marriage, he seeks to position himself in relation to the devil. His first question, "Wes Geist bistu" (29), actually aims at getting to know himself. The same holds true for all the other questions in the disputations of "Book I." They are all concerned with getting to know the community Faust has agreed to belong to. The belief that he will turn into a good Protestant and eventually be saved from eternal punishment if only he discussed these matters with his ghost shows Mephostophiles's significance for his identity: "vnd meynet immerdar durch oft vnd viel disputieren / Fragen vnd Gespräch mit dem Geist / woelle er so weit kommen / daß er einmal zur Besserung / Rew vnd Abstinenzt gerathen moechte" (36). Of course, this relationship is not one characterized by equality. Right from the start, Mephostophiles has made it quite clear who is in control. When Faust tries to establish a social identity by wishing to get married, this desire is immediately squashed by the devil's intimidation:

Vmb jhn gieng allenthalben das Feuwer auff / als ob er Verbrennen wolte Er schrey seinen Geist vmb Huelff an / er wolte nach allem seinem Wunsch / Raht vnd That leben. Da erschien jhm der Teuffel Leibhaftig / doch so grawsam vnd erschrecklich / daß er jn nicht ansehen kundt" Jm antwort der Teuffel / sagende: Nun sage an / was Sinns bistu noch? D. Faustus antwort et jhm kuertlich / Er habe sein Versprechen nicht geleystet . . . bate vmb Gnade vnd Verzeihung. (28)

Clearly, their relationship is characterized by a struggle for Faust's self. This struggle has a structure as well as a function. The rest of my remarks will explore the context in which Faust’s identity is fashioned as well as the strategies employed and the goals pursued. I argue that the struggle for Faust’s self represents torture. That is to say, that the relationship between Faust and Mephostophiles displays the logic and structure of torture, but, of course, is not torture. The term representation does not mean mimesis or reflection. By repre-
sentation I mean the appropriation and symbolic articulation of discourses. The relationship between text and social practice is not one of origin and reflection, meaning that literary texts reflect original social practices. Rather, as Stephen Greenblatt (1988) has argued, there is no claim to center or origin, but both social context and literary text are manifestations and articulations of discursive material that circulates in a specific culture. The appropriation of this material by different media and institutions entails its continual negotiation and renegotiation. To trace representations in literary texts is to connect these texts to various social and cultural practices and to reconstruct their common historical context.

The textual traces that have survived from the Renaissance ... are the products of extended borrowings, collective exchanges, and mutual enchantments. They were made by moving certain things - principally ordinary language but also metaphors, ceremonies, dances, emblems, items of clothing, well worn stories, and so forth - from one culturally demarcated zone to another. We need to understand not only the construction of these zones but also the process of movement across the shifting boundaries between them. (Greenblatt 7)

I intend to pursue the traces that torture as a technique of subjection has left in the HISTORIA VON D. JOHANN FAUSTEN. I shall focus on the so called "disputations" after the endorsement of the pact in "Book I," where Faust "learns" about Heaven and Hell (29-43) and on Faust's lamentations (Weheklagen) in the very last chapters, when he prepares to die (113-123). I will start with a brief summary of the structure and practice of torture.

Torture
There can be no doubt that torture is the most violent technique of imposing a self on someone. In early modern Germany, torture was omnipresent (Helbing/Bauer, van Dilmen). The tribunals of the Inquisition tortured thousands and hundred's of thousands of mostly women and some men, making them confess against themselves and even making them urge their own death penalty:

Anton Praetorius, an outspoken critic of early modern criminal proceedings, writes: "Nun leget jhr vnberuechtigte Leute zwar gefangen / vnd dannach wollt jr erst forschen / ob sie es verdienet haben / oder nit ... ist das nicht verkehret Ding? Jhr spannet die Pferde in Wage / lasset dannach erst Rader machen / daβ ihr fahren koennet" (232). Moreover, he continues: "Worumb rettet jhr dieselben nicht allein nicht / sondern leget jnen selbst noch groessere Last auff den halβ / vnd beschweret sie so lang vnd weit / daβ sie darunter zermalmet werden?" (255). Torture — even though it was executed in secret places — was a legal and legitimate practice in early modern criminal proceedings, which was not confined to the juridical realm. For Francis Bacon torture served as the role model for the inquisition of nature: "For like as Mans disposition is neuer well knowen, till he bee crossed, nor Proteus neuer changed shapes, till he was straightened and held fast: so the passages and variations of Nature cannot appeare so fully in the libertie of Nature, as in the trialls and vexations of Art" (10).

In contemporary juridical literature torture is usually defined as the infliction of pain for the purpose of "discovering" the "truth."

Vnd ist die peinliche frag nichts anderst / denn ein erkundung der Warheit / an dem Menschlichen Coerper / durch peinlichen Zwang / als den daumstock / Leyter / Brandt / oder ander Peyn / durch welche der Mensch mit peinlichkeit vnd schmerzen angegriffen wirt / daβ es jm wehe thut. (Torturalis Quaestio 1)

This truth was expressed by the confession — the so called "queen of proofs" in Roman Law — which was an indispensable prerequisite for the condemnation of the accused: "Nulla est maior probatio, quam propria ovis confessio, quae dicitur plenissima probatio" (Sawr 40). The confession functioned in two ways: It documented the victim's guilt justifying the usually fatal punishment, and it signified the confessor's criminal self. Since the confession is so crucial to torture it is important to explore these functions. The OED defines confession as "the disclosing of something the knowledge of which by others is considered humiliating or prejudicial to the person confessing;" in a more juridical sense a confession is "a making
known or acknowledging of one's faults, wrong, crime, weakness, etc." According to this definition confessions express a truth which will have negative, i.e. punitive consequences for the confessor. What this definition does not elaborate on, however, is the fact that the truths disclosed might be regarded as being true but do not necessarily have to be true. Elaborating on the question truth Michel Foucault in the History of Sexuality identifies confessions as "one of the main rituals [Western Societies] rely on for the production of truth" (58). They are "rituals of discourse" which "unfold [and are produced; addition is mine] within a power relationship" (1990, 60). Confessions are required from and made in the presence of and for an authority who evaluates, judges, or even punishes its contents. If this is true for all kinds of confessions, it is especially true for confessions extorted under torture, because torture is the most violent and powerful technique of producing guilty and criminal subjects. The self that expresses itself in the confession actually is the product of a power relationship. In that sense confessions induce the constitution of women and men as subjects in both senses of the word: as individuals subjected to an authority, as well as selves that have emerged out of this subjection (Foucault 60). The following report from an early modern torture chamber speaks of this subjection: Abraham Sawr recounts the case of a wealthy merchant of the city of Metz in 1500, whose family had been slaughtered by the city's hangman while he was abroad. When he returned home he was accused of having committed the murders and put into jail:

> daß der arme Mann . . . nit allein gefänglich wirt eingezogen / sondern auch auf alle vorgehende erkannten ist der Rechts / demassen mit Peinlicher Frage angegriffen / da er bekennet / er habe sein Weib / Kind vnd Gesind selber erwurget / auf welche bekannet sich er auch / als einem solchen Vbelahter gebuert / vom Leben zum Todt ist gericht worden. Vnnd hat der hencker [who is the murderer, addition is mine] weidlich sich gebrauchet / vnnd den armen Mann so viel desto haertet angegriffen / damit er mutig bekennet / vnnd sich zum Thätet machen / auf daß er [der Henker, BM] sicher were / vnnd man niemandt weiter darumb in verdacht haben doerft.

(Tortutalis Quaestio, emphasis is mine)

Clearly, to confess means "sich zum Thaeter machen," i.e. to fashion oneself as a criminal and guilty subject. Even though early modern defenders of torture claimed to save the accused person's soul by making her confess her sins so that she might be pardoned (van Dülmen). It is not the soul but the self that is at stake in torture. Torture, therefore, is not just a disciplining practice but, as Michel Foucault has argued in Discipline and Punish, a system and mechanism of social control that simultaneously imprints the regime's power onto the body and into the self of the prisoner. Torture is a technique designed to subject individuals by making them the agents of their own subjection and eventual destruction: "torture is not punishment; it . . . violates the subject's body and mind in ways that newly inscribes the subject in a regime of control" (Dubois 185). This inscription is the result of a "struggle for truth" (Foucault 1977) in which the victim is defeated by the torturer. Despite the clearly repressive function of power in torture, it is important to consider its productive side as well: It is the confession in which control and productivity materialize.

Elaine Scarry has pointed out that one of the fundamental structures of torture is the "translation of pain into the fiction of power" (27). This translation serves as the prerequisite for the eventual silencing of the prisoner's voice, which in turn implies the doubling of the regime's voice. That is to say, that the selves fashioned by torture have been forced to achieve their selfhood by eliminating their own voice. Given the close relationship between voice and self the elimination of the victim's voice and its substitution by the regime means the elimination of part of the victim's self.

> "Daß doch der Teuffel selbst zum hencker und den Schwartzkünstlern worden" (10): The representation of torture in the Historia

The disputations between Faust and Mephostophiles are all concerned with the history and nature of the devils and the place they inhabit - hell. They are Faust's method to find out who he is, now that he must not belong to human society anymore. The term disputations is misleading, because Faust and Mephostophiles do not just talk or discuss in a scholarly manner. While they talk, Faust is
considered an accused whose guilt will be established and whose confession will be extorted. At the beginning, Faust himself does not feel guilty; on the contrary, he has decided to become an Epicurean and not bother about God, sin, and guilt anymore: "lebt also im Epicurischen Leben Tag und Nacht / glaubet nit dafi ein GOTT / Hell oder Teuffel ware / vermeinet Leib und Seele stuerbe miteinander ..." (27). This brief characterization is indeed the nucleus of Epicurus's philosophy who postulated, among other things, a universe without gods, the mortality of the soul, and the ideal of a life without pain and fear. Faust's adoption of this philosophy would affect his whole existence and challenge the power structure of his relationship to Mephostophiles. Because if Faust does not believe in God, the devil, hell, and life after death, his pact loses much if not all of its threatening power. Faust's conversion to Epicurus's philosophy poses a threat to the authority of the powers of hell. Therefore, the fearless Epicurean shall be turned into a fearful Christian. Torture provides the necessary strategies for such a "conversion." Elaine Scarry has observed that "it is, of course, precisely because the reality of that power is so highly contestable, the regime so unstable, that torture is being used" (27). Mephostophiles, indeed, is an expert concerning the execution of torture. In the "Vorrede" the narrator points out: "DaB doch der Teuffel selbst zum Henker an den Schwartzkuenstlern worden" (10). It seems, moreover, significant that Mephostophiles appears in the guise of a "Franziscaner-Muench" (21), that is, as a representative of the very order that controlled the confessional practice, including the Inquisition and its use of torture, up to early modern times. Yet, there seems to be one fundamental difference between their disputations and the interrogations of torture. In the HISTORIA it is Faust who wants to know; Faust who asks his ghost to share his knowledge with him. Whereas in torture it is the torturer and the court who demand information. This reversal of roles seems to challenge my thesis that it is torture which is represented in the HISTORIA. However, Faust's questions are not entirely voluntary for two reasons. First, he has no choice but to turn to Mephostophiles to find out about himself. Second, Mephostophiles controls his dreams and thoughts, thus making him demand information that, eventually, makes him confess what Mephostophiles wants him to confess: "Dem Doct. Fausto / wie man zusagen pflegt / Traumete von der Helle / vnd fragte darauff seinen boesen Geist / auch von der Substantz / Ort vnd Erschaffung der Hellen" (30). Furthermore, the reversal of roles serves as a device to conceal the power relations at work in the text. Just like the pact structure disguises the non-judicial nature of torture.6

The first questions (29-31) deal with Lucifer's fall and the devil's regime, establishing the history and hierarchy of the community of hell. At the beginning Faust listens to Mephostophiles's reports rather indifferently. But his attitude abruptly changes when he hears about the immense pain and suffering that God inflicted upon Lucifer who "ward [...] von Gott auf der Wohnung dess Himmels vertilget / vnd von seinem Sitz gestossen in einen Feuerstein / der ewig nit erlisch / sondern immerdar quellet" (32). Overwhelmed by so much suffering, Faust "gieng auch also dauff stillschweigend vom Geist in seine Kammer / leget sich auff sein Beth / hub an bitterlich zu weinen vnd seufzten / vnd in seinem Herzen zu schreycn" (32). It is at this point that he identifies with Lucifer's destiny, which is expressed in his subsequent confession:

... ich bin gleich so wol ein Geschopf Gottes / vnd mein vbermuethig Fleisch vnd Blut hat mich / an Leib vnd Seel in Verdammlichkeit gebracht / mich mit meiner Vernunft vnd Sinn gereizt / dass ich als ein Geschopf Gottes von jme gewichen bin / vnd mich den Teuffel bereden lassen / dass ich mich jhme mit Leib vnd Seele ergeben / vnd verkauft habe. (33)

The next disputuation confronts Faust with the devil's power over human beings:

So soltu wissen / dass so bald der verstossene Engel in Fall kam / ist er Gott vnd allen Menschen Feind worden / vnd sich ... unterstanden allerley Tyrannie am Menschen zu subven ... Vnd sind also vnser geister vnezehlich vil / die den Menschen beykommen / sie zu Suenden reizten vnd bringen / Also theilen wir vns noch in alle Welt auß / versuchen allerley List vnd Schalkheit / werffe die Leuth ab vom Glauben / vnd reizten sie zu Suenden / vnd staercken vns
Mephostophiles not only cites biblical figures such as Cain or David to prove his point. He also declares that Faust himself is under the devil’s control.

Siehe so machten wir deine Gedancken vnd Nachforschen noch frecher vnd kecker / auch so begierlich / daß du Tag vnd Nacht nicht Ruhe hettest / Sondern alle dein Tichten vnd Trachten dahin stünde / wie du die Zaeuberey zu wegen bringen moechtest. . . . Letzlich brachten wir dich dahin / daß du dich mit Leib vnd See! vns ergabest / das kanst du alles / Herr fauste / bey dir abnemmen. (34)

Again, Faust identifies with this report, believes that he is possessed by the devil, and surrenders to this apparently incontestable power: “Es ist leider war / sagt D. Faustus / nun kan ich jm nimmermehr thun / Auch habe ich mich selbst gefangen . . . . Also ging Doct. Faustus trawrig von jme” (35). When Faust demands more information about the forces of hell, his pain and suffering is once more intensified. Mephostophiles’s report of “was die helle seye” (37) reveals in unbearably painful detail and from every perspective the eternal bodily torture that the condemned will have to endure in hell. This chapter is by far the longest in the whole text. I shall only quote one passage, but there are many similar ones:

Die Verdampten werden auch klagen vber die vnleidliche kaelt / vber das vnausseschliche Fewer / vber die vntraegliche Finsternuß / Gestanck. vber die ewige Ruten / vber die Gesichter der Teuffel / vber die Verzweiflung alles Guten. Sie werden Klagen mit weinenden Augen / Knirschen der Zaenen / Stanck der Nasen / Jammern der Stimme / Erschreckung der Ohren / Zitern der Haend vnd Fueß. Sie werden fuer grossem Schmerzen jre Zungen fressen / sie werden jhen den Todt wuenden / vnd gerne Sterben woellen / Sie moegen aber nit / denn der Todt wird von

Overwhelmed by hell’s eternal torment, Faust finally surrenders to the devil’s verdict: “aber es ist nun zu spat / vnd ruhet Gottes Zorn vber dir” (43).

I have cited these passages at length because they disclose the disputation’s major goal: the fashioning of Faust’s self as irredeemable sinner. The strategy the disputations employ consists of what Elaine Scarry has called the “translation of pain into the wholly convincing spectacle of absolute power: The physical pain is so incontestably real that it seems to confer its quality of ‘incontestable reality’ on that power that has brought it into being” (27). In Faust’s case, the pain is incontestable even though it is not actually inflicted on his body but only mapped out before him. Nevertheless, the spectacle of this unbearable bodily pain leads him to believe in and to surrender to the devil’s absolute power. It is important to keep in mind that both pain and absolute power are enabling fictions. That is to say, they possess no material reality but nevertheless constitute Faust’s world. Repeatedly, the narrator informs the reader that if only Faust repented unconditionally, he could be saved, but Faust has submitted to the fiction of absolute power and is unable to find his way out: “. . . . er sahe wol gen Himmel / aber er kondte nichts ersehen” (36). There is no need for Mephostophiles to physically torture Faust, when the citation of torture scenarios already serves his purpose. That Faust so readily surrenders to the devil’s manipulations is due to the suffering of thousand’s of women and men who indeed were victims of torture, and whose suffering circulated in writing or in pictures. As Jan Philipp Reemtsma observes: “Nicht jede Gewaltaet muß begangen werden, wenn man mit dem bloßen Verweis auf die anderswo schon begangene Tat sein Ziel erreichen kann” (21).

During the course of their conversations, Faust becomes increasingly silent. It is Mephostophiles who formulates Faust’s personal truth, while Faust acknowledges and confirms the truthfulness of those words with a short: “Ja diß ist leider war.” As Elaine Scarry points out, the silencing or even annihilation of the prisoner’s voice is another fundamental “achievement” of torture. Annihilation does
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not necessarily mean absolute silence it might also result in the substitu-
tion of the prisoner’s words by those of the torturer.

The question and answer also objectify the fact that while the
prisoner has almost no voice – his confession is a halfway point
in the disintegration of language, an audible objectification of the
proximity of silence – the torturer and the regime have doubled their
voice since the prisoner is now speaking their words (Scarry 36).7

Thus, Faust’s confessions do not speak so much about his
true self, but, rather permit an understanding of the “procedures of
individualization by power” (Foucault 1990, 59). Regarding the close
relationship between confession and self, Faust becomes what he
confesses. This “new” guilt-ridden self is the result of a subjection in
which Faust has been forced to become the agent of his own subjec-
tion. At this point the disputations are interrupted, Faust must not
ask any more questions about the relationship between Heaven and
hell.

And yet, the interplay between power, truth, and self is more
complicated than my analysis of the disputations in “Book I” has
suggested so far. Faust is not only the passive victim of the devil’s
manipulations; he repeatedly tries to regain control over his self.
Furthermore, it is not the devil alone who strives to gain control
over Faust’s self. The narrator is a powerful accomplice. The most
dramatic incidence of this struggle for Faust’s self takes place in the
final chapters, when Faust prepares for his death.

Very shortly before his death Faust is seen to be moaning
and lamenting in great despair. He is frightened by the suffering await-
ing him and blaming himself for having brought about his gruesome
fate. What is striking in these lamentations is the use of the personal
pronouns “I” and “you.” Faust begins in the first person but very
soon switches to the second person:

Ach / ach / ich arbeitsseliger Mensch / O du betriebter
vnselig Fauste / du bist wol in dem Hauffen der Vnseligen
/ da ich den vbermaessigen schmerzen des Todtes erwarten
muß... O du verfluchtes vnd vnbestaendiges Leben / O du
blinder vnd Vnachtsamer / der du deine Glieder / Leib vnd
Seel / so Blind machest / als du bist. (114)

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Faust identifies with his miserable situation but does not re-
gard himself the originator of this situation. By using the second
person singular Faust rejects the identification with the guilt-ridden self
that the devil has forced him to adopt. Instead of confessing: “I am a
sinner,” he says: “You are the sinner.” The “I” reappears when Faust
talks about his situation: “Ja / ich seye wo ich woelle / so bin ich
gefangen” (115). Mephostophiles cannot tolerate such an act of disen-
gagement. In an extensive monologue (chapter 65), he confronts him
with a long list of proverbs all aiming at making Faust acknowledge
himself as the originator of his deeds and sins as well as at acknowled-
ging that there is no escape for him: “hettetu Gott vor Augen
gehabt / vnd dich mit denen Gaben / so er dir verliehen / begnuegen
lassen / doerftest du diesen Reyen nicht tanzen ... du hast dich
zum Buergen gesetzt / mit deinem eigenen blut / so sol man Buergen
wuergen” (116). At the end, he identifies with his sins and acknowl-
edges his responsibility. In the famous “Oratio ad studiosos” which is
the last chapter of the Historia, he makes a confession. In this mov-
ing speech Faust publicly confesses his sins and crimes, advises his
students to stay away from crime and sin, and accepts his punish-
ment as just. However, in one major point he dares to disagree with
his ghost and the narrator. When talking about his status as a sinner,
he states: “Dann ich sterbe als ein boeser vnd guter Christ / ein
guter Christ / danllnb daB ich cine hertzliche reuwe habe / vnd im
Hertzen immer umb Gnade bitte ... Ein boeser Christ / daß ich
weiß / daß der Teuffel den Leib wil haben / vnd ich wil jhme den
gerne lassen / er laß mir aber nur die Seele zu frieden” (121). Here,
without the continual interventions of his ghost and the narrator and
despite that by signing the contract he has promised his soul to the
devil, Faust states that he does repent and will be saved. This state-
ment is almost simultaneously overruled by the narrator stating “Ju-
das Rew” (121), thereby disqualifying Faust’s remorse as false and
ineffective. And indeed, when he tries to communicate with God he
invariably fails: “er wolte beten / es wolte jhme aber nit eingehen /
wie dem Cain / der auch sagte: Seine Suende weren grosser / denn
daß sie jhme moechten verzirhen werden” (122). This failure is en-
tirely the result of the authoritative intervention of the narrator who
for reasons concerning his own self-fashioning as an upright Protes-
tant cannot allow Faust to repent and save his soul from the devil’s
Although this intervention is the most dramatic one, it is not the only one. Already in the “Vorred an den Christlichen Leser” the narrator characterizes Faust’s sinful state of mind as “gewilliche verstrockung” (12), which Grimm’s Wörterbuch, referring to Luther, defines as “ein zustand der vorsaetzlichen unempfindlichkeit gegen alle heilsamen besserungsmittel” (Vol. 25, 1764). The term verstrockung emphasizes the individual’s free will to sin, that is the explicit and voluntary rejection of redemption. The narrator more than once describes Faust’s miserable situation as the result of his evil will, rather than the manipulations of his ghost. Regarding the disputations in “Book I” the narrator declares that Faust - like Cain! - deliberately chooses not to repent but rather stay with the devil: “Er wolte aber keinen Glauben noch Hoffnung schoepfen / daß er durch Buß moehete zur Gnade Gottes gebracht werden” (33, emphasis is mine). This statement contradicts the dynamics of the disputations: Faust’s inability to break free from the devil is — as I have pointed out — entirely the product of the devil’s violent manipulations, rather than a matter of his free will. In fact, the narrator’s deterrence strategy depends on Faust’s Verstocktheit, that is on his deliberate rejection of God’s mercy. Moreover, during books “I” and “IV” the narrator continually disqualifies Faust’s remorse as “Cains vnnd Jude Renu vnd Buß” (36). As far as disciplining Faust’s self is concerned, the narrator becomes the devil’s accomplice. Both strive at making Faust another Cain or Judas. Both seek to gain control over his mind and self. The means they apply are different: The devil uses images of pain and suffering, whereas the narrator defines Faust’s state of mind and/or autoritatively overrules his voice.

Let me summarize: During the disputations and in the final chapters Faust has been forced to internalize and express a truth about himself that is the result of a painful subjection. His struggle for the self follows the structure and logic of torture without ever directly or explicitly applying torture. By making Faust an early modern Judas, the Historia undeniably reveals the subversive elements not only of torture but also of the function of such Christian essentials like the existence of hell and the soul’s immortality. Just like torture produces the enemies with which the authorities justified their rule, so hell is a construct without which the Christian regime would not be able to control the minds of their followers. Obviously, the real threat to Christianity is atheism and not, as the Historia claims, magic, curiosity, and pacts with the devil. And finally, by emphasizing the repressive function of power the text renders its productive potential invisible to the contemporary reader.

“Eyvn Mann sol ein Mann seyn:” The Construction of the Masculine Self

Talking about the self invariably implies talking about gender. I would like to conclude with some brief remarks about the place and function of gender in the fashioning of Faust’s self. Torture, as a technique of fashioning selves, is not gender-specific. Both women and men were and are subjected to and by torture. However, in Western Societies social, institutional, and cultural practices have been profoundly engendered. In the Historia the narrative of making a criminal/sinner cannot be separated from the narrative of the constitution of masculinity. Maria E. Müller and Barbara Becker-Cantarino have claimed that the Historia affirms gender stereotypes, because as a man Faust has the privilege to become the protagonist of an extremely influential story, whereas women are denied such representations. But gender is more than the ascription of different roles and attitudes to women and men. Far from resting on a “natural” basis, bodies and selves are engendered by continually performing what counts as masculine or feminine (Butler 1990, 134-41). Gender is a “doing” (West/Zimmerman), that is to say, to use a well known phrase by Judith Butler, “there is no gender identity behind the expression of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its results” (1990, 25). The notion of gender as an accomplishment or doing also implies that it is a “situated doing,” carried out in gendered spaces and contexts (West/Zimmerman 14). The notion of performativity, furthermore implies that gender identification is never completed and gender identity is always contested.

“Eyvn Mann sol ein Mann seyn,” demands Abraham Sawr in his Straffbuch published in 1593. His request — expressed by the word “sol” — only makes sense if gender is understood as performative, as a doing rather than a being, because a man as a man would always already be a man and Sawr’s request would be unnecessary. In what
way is Faust doing gender? Which performances constitute his masculinity? First of all, the form of discourse in which Faust's self-fashioning takes place is profoundly gendered. The encounters between Faust and Mephostophiles are called Disputationen, rather than interrogations or Anfechtungen. In early modern Europe disputations were part of a learned, scholarly discourse. A disputation was considered a "logisch argumentierende Erörterung" (Baufeld), and as such required (and established) a masculine subject position. With regard to women Francesco Barbaro in De re uxoria notes; "By silence indeed women achieve the fame of eloquence" (Jones 299). Johann Weyer drawing on Chrysostomos writes: "Das Weibliche geschlecht (spricht er) ist vnbesinnet . . . von deß wegen / das die Weiblin nicht alles was sie sehen oder hoeren / mit Weißheit vnd vernunfft erwegen . . . Quintilianus nennt das Weib auch ein gantz bloed ding." The subject that spoke in a disputation, obviously, was masculine. The term denotes a masculine practice. Women could engage in this practice if they "accomplished" a masculine subject position, which meant the transgression or denial of their femininity. The "feminist" defense of women so fashionable among Renaissance humanists is thus a defense of masculinity, since they praised women for their masculine virtues (Jordan 1986). To the extent that gender is performative, performing a disputation not only requires but also constitutes the masculine subject.

I have characterized the disputations as a struggle for Faust's self - a struggle, that is, which denotes yet another gendered practice. Early modern constructions of gender were based upon the notion of 'masculine strength' as opposed to 'feminine weakness.' Both categories referred to the "nature" of women and men. Drawing on Galen Ambroise Paré, one of the most famous and most influential physicians in early modern Europe, states:

Das Geschlecht bedeutet nichts anders denn der Unterscheid zwischen Mann vnd Weib / vnd . . . daß / was anlangt die Gliedmassen deß Leibs / vnd der selbigen Ort oder Stelle / ein kleiner vnd geringer Unterscheid sey; jedoch ist die Waermbde der Manner in grosser menge / an jrer selbst staercker / denn der Weiber. Derohalben / so sind auch diejenige Glieder / welche allein auf dem Samen herkommen

Masculine strength involved heat, activity, reason, determination, and discipline. Feminine weakness involved coldness, endurance, less reason, and less control. Therefore, Johann Weyer, early modern physician and one of the most outspoken opponents of witch trials, declared that women should not be accused of witchcraft because they exerted no authority over their selves, and accordingly could not resist the devil's temptation; they were "wanckelmuetig / vnbestendig / leichtglaeubig / boßhaftig / seiner selbst nit maechtig . . ." (my emphasis). Clearly, being a woman meant to possess little or no control over one's self. Men as the stronger gender, on the other hand, were believed to be better equipped to fashion their own selves and to fight negative influences. Accordingly, they were regarded as being fully responsible for their deeds and were to be punished harder than women, at least according to the law (Koch 160-67). The HISTORIA frequently stresses Faust's will power and determination to explain his relationship to Mephostophiles; in fact, Faust himself confesses that it was his "Halßstarriger vnd Gottloser Willen" (120) which had made him want to conjure the devil in the first place and is responsible for his miserable situation: "Ach / ach Vernunft / Mutwill / Vermessenheit vnd freyer Will . . . in was Muehseligkeit hastu mich gefuehret" (114). However, his accusations not only incriminate himself, they also make him a man, because "Vernunft vnd freyer Will" are masculine virtues.

Moreover, gender differences were said to determine the relationships between humans and the devil. Johann Weyer believed that women were nothing but passive victims of the devil's vexations, whereas men engaged in an active though not equal relationship with the devil (415). From the very beginning Faust's relationship with the devil is characterized by struggle and negotiations: "Denn als D. Faustus den Teuffel beschwur / da ließ sich der Teuffel an / als wann er nicht gern an das Ziel vnd an den Reyen kaeme" (16):

... wie dann der Teuffel im Wald einen solchen Tumult anhub / als wolte alles zu Grund gehen.... Es ließ sich sehen
But is Faust not the victim of Mephostophiles’s machinations? Isn’t he weak and powerless, lacking masculine strength and determination? Just like femininity, masculinity is not a monolithic concept. As R. W. Connell has pointed out, masculinity involves two structural aspects: It is both a hierarchical system in which men dominate women, and a system of dominance and competition among males. Therefore, rather than speaking of masculinity, one should speak of different types of masculinity: Some are hegemonic, some marginalized, and some subordinated (Connell 87-182). Clearly, Faust’s gender status at the end of the HISTORIA might be characterized as “subordinated masculinity.” That is to say that Faust did not succeed in participating in the hegemonic discourse of the devil and the narrator; he did not succeed in making himself a master-subject capable of ruling himself as well as others. That his masculine identity remains in control of Mephostophiles and the narrator is not only the results, but first and foremost the means applied and the positions assumed that are involved in the construction of masculinity and femininity. The HISTORIA represents the early modern sex/gender system not only because Faust is a man, but because the text discloses the elements and processes involved in the constitution of masculinity. It is significant that none of the very few women that appear in the text even possess a self. They are mere creations of the masculine mind and are used as commodities. Although far more women than men have been subjected to torture, literary representations of this struggle for the self have been, or so it seems, entirely reserved to men.

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Notes

1 This article is the revised text of a paper given at the 2nd annual FOCUS ON LITERATUR Graduate Student conference, at the University of Cincinnati, Oct. 10/11th 1997. I would like to thank all participants for productive discussions, criticism, and encouragement. Thanks to Andrea Grosse for helping with the English language.

2 I depart from Elias, however, in his predominantly psychic explanation of social and individual change as well as in his evolutionary thinking. I believe that cultural and discursive forces are responsible for the individual’s self.

3 About the relationship between agency and power Butler remarks:
“Agency exceeds the power by which it is enabled. One might say that the purposes of power are not always the purposes of agency. To the extent that the latter diverge from the former, agency is the assumption of a purpose unintended by power, one that could not have been derived logically or historically, that operates in a relation of contingency and reversal to power that makes it possible, to which it nevertheless belongs. This is, as it were, the ambivalent scene of agency, constrained by no teleological necessity” (15).

Indeed, Faust is speaking Mephistophiles’s words. When he reflects upon the terrors of hell shortly before his death he does so in the exact words of his ghost (40 and 117).

This holds true not only for the encounters I have discussed in this paper but for almost all the encounters between Faust and the devil, before and after the pact.

Abraham Sawr in Straffbuch writes: "Eyn Mann sol ein Mann seyn. Viri namque gravis sunt puniendi, quam mulieres, cum tanto gravis delictum viri sit, quanto magis ades pertinet, et virtute vivere, et exemplo regere foeminas" (75).

Consult Foucault, Horkheimer/Adorno, Maihofer.

Faust’s struggle with the devil before the pact pursues a different goal. He strives to negotiate the "terms of trade" of their relationship, rather than the constitution of his selfhood.

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The Constancy of Change: The Role of the Paternoster in Grass's Ein weites Feld

David Pickett

Ein weites Feld is Grass's examination of German reunification within the context of Germany's turbulent history. By analyzing historical parallels to the history-making events of 1989-1991, Grass demonstrates that Germany's future is not Ein weites Feld. Events are not fated to repeat themselves time and again. Of course, to find a new path, "den Dritten Weg" (409), one should approach the reunification with a strong dose of Grass's doubt. To this end, Grass reinvents the literary icon Theodore Fontane and translates Fontane's Gründerzeit ambivalence to the person of present-day historian Theo Wuttke. Wuttke, called "Fonty" by all, has a career that spans from the Third Reich and serves above all as a model of historical parallels to the history-making events of 1989-1991, Grass reinvents the literary icon Theodore Fontane and translates Fontane's Gründerzeit ambivalence to the person of present-day historian Theo Wuttke. Wuttke, called "Fonty" by all, has a career that spans from the Third Reich and serves above all as a model of the image of the Paternoster which is housed in the Reichsfahrtministerium. From the twelve years of the Reich to forty years of the DDR to the present-day Treueband, Fonty and Hofstaller consider the building a second home. As Fonty maintains, "Mir gibt das ne gewisse Festigkeit. Weiß jedesmal, wenn ich hier antrabe, wohin ich gehöre . . . " (67). On a large scale, the Paternoster symbolizes the machinery of time that will not stand still. For protagonists Fonty and Hofstaller, the Paternoster squarely symbolizes a sense of personal survival within the system, regardless of the powers that be.

The reader is first introduced to the Paternoster in the fourth chapter, entitled "Viele Vaterunser lang":

Sogleich rückt ein Transportmittel ins Blickfeld, das seit Anbeginn in Betrieb war. Wir stellen uns den Aktenboten

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