Issues in Race & Society

Volume 11| Spring 2023

In this Issue:

University of CINCINNATI PRESS

ISBN 978-1-947603-69-1

781947 603691

Race & Society

Volume 11| Spring 2023

Issues in Race & Society

An Interdisciplinary Global Journal

ABS ASSOCIATION OF BLACK SOCIOLOGISTS

Volume 11 | Spring 2023

Issues in Race & Society

An Interdisciplinary Global Journal

Volume 11 | Issue 1

Spring 2023

Association of Black Sociologists
3473 South Martin Luther King Drive, #495
Chicago, IL 60616-4108
e: executiveofficer@associationofblacksociologists.org
p: 312-342-7618 | f: 773-955-8890

University of CINCINNATI PRESS

ISBN 978-1-947603-69-1
ISSN 2330-4359

Subscription Rates Per Annum

Per Issue:	$25
Individual:	$50
Institutional:	$250

Issues in Race & Society is owned by the Association of Black Sociologists.
Special thanks to the University of Texas at Austin for their very generous gift to fund this volume of *Issues in Race & Society*.

Published by University of Cincinnati Press | ucincinnatipress.uc.edu

ISSUES IN RACE & SOCIETY

Volume 10, Issue 1

ARTICLES

Editors' Note

Eclectic. That's the one word that captures the essence of this issue of the ABS Journal, Issues in Race and Society. This issue not only displays the heterogeneity but also the creativity of intellectual thought that is characteristic of the scholars attracted to this international journal. Each article makes a distinct and important contribution to the specialty area of race and ethnicity.

In the first article, Breznau and Fitzpatrick present a study in the area of public sociology. They employ case study methodology and structural equation modeling to examine the differential effects of emergency management on black and white households in municipalities in the state of Michigan. Their findings have broad implications for the impact of racism in state government in the United States.

Carter presents an interesting study on intersectionality. She introduces the concept, SWANS (Single Women Alone with No Stabilizers). Employing the Integrated Health Interview Series (IHIS) and logistic regression analysis, she explores the impact of racism on black women's reported health outcomes. Her study contributes to the areas: race, class, and gender; marriage and the family; as well as the demography of racial disparities in health.

Brown's study focuses on the plight of black women in academia. Utilizing black feminist theories, critical race theories, and autoethnography, she highlights the misogynoir, i.e., the anti-blackness and sexism that black women face in higher education. Highlighting the problems and perils of black women as

they face racism, microaggressions, and isolation in tenure-track positions, she also emphasizes the unique ways that they overcome these dilemmas. Brown particularly underscores how the COVID-19 pandemic presented distinctive challenges for black women in the academy.

Carney presents a transnational study of Haitian women. She uses ethnographic research to examine the manner in which race and ethnicity are constructed focusing on Haitian women in Boston, Montreal, and Paris. Using the workplace as the social context, she finds marked differences in how race is manifested based upon the distinct social structures and histories of these places. She makes an argument for the nuanced contribution of transnational analysis to the area of race and ethnicity.

Martin's article makes a significant contribution to the study of the demography of racial inequality. She focuses on the concept of "Black Meccas" in the South to examine black-white differences in housing and home ownership. Utilizing the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series across multiple years and multivariate modeling, she finds the effects of racism continue to deny blacks equity in home ownership and housing values—irrespective of socio-demographic characteristics. Moreover, her findings bring into question the ideas of "Black Meccas" as well as the utility of respectability politics.

Kelly's study examines the impact of racism and sexism on the educational achievements of girls cross-nationally. Employing feminist theory and a socio-historical analysis, she underscores how minority girls have experienced racism and sexism in education as well as the problems associated with large-scale datasets relative to the accurate assessments thereof. She calls for policies of educational equity for girls across the globe as well as data collection transparency to accurately document their experiences.

Jenkins employs a multi-method approach of observation, ethnography and unstructured interviews to assess the manner in which black women redefine the work-parenting paradigm. She finds black mothers use collective parenting techniques to nego-

tiate present-day realities of parenting and working while reconceptualizing motherhood in the process. Finally, she argues that black women may represent a model for parenting in the context of the modern workplace in general.

Hanley and Branch present a study of race and gender pay inequities in the pre- and post-Civil Rights eras. Utilizing the CPS-MORG data from 1997-2016, they find that despite significant improvements in wages for blacks, they have yet to achieve parity with whites. Moreover, gender and occupational, industrial, and workplace organizational contexts continue to play dominant roles in the persisting inequality. The study makes a significant contribution to the intersectionality literature.

Finally, Forde, Martin, and Finley's study contributes to the areas of race and ethnicity as well as the sociology of religion. They investigate the issue of racial reconciliation and the role of religion as both a context and a facilitator thereof. Employing primary data, they reinforce prior studies of the distinctions between black and white Christianity as it relates to America's racist past and present. Moreover, they underscore the fact that racial reconciliation via religion may be more aspirational than realistic given the complexities of racism, white privilege, and white supremacy in the United States.

To reiterate, this issue is quite eclectic. It also exemplifies the richness and vibrancy of the sociology of race and ethnicity. We encourage you to engage in these studies, debate these issues, and continue the proud legacy of Issues in Race and Society with your own future contributions.

Hayward Derrick Horton
John Sibley Butler
Melvin Thomas

Urban Fiscal Crisis and Local Emergency Management: Tracking the Color Line in Michigan

Nate Breznau and L. Owen Kirkpatrick

ABSTRACT

The usage of emergency management by United States' state-level governments to resolve troubled municipal finances increased dramatically over the past four decades. Layoffs, school closings, pension renegotiations, and sale of public assets are products of such policies, and these policies unevenly affect residents racialized as Black. Recent legal decisions argue this is an innocent byproduct of Black concentration in fiscally distressed cities, suggesting that targeted emergency intervention is colorblind in its application. If true, any race-bias is mere statistical discrimination among fiscally-challenged areas. We investigate this assertion, asking if racially inequitable outcomes signal differential impact on, or differential treatment of Black people. We investigate Michigan, the site of the country's most intensive emergency management deployments. Using all politically incorporated units in Michigan, 2007-2013, we develop a counterfactual test using the state's own fiscal distress scale and adjusting for percentage Black and median household income of each unit. We find a net statistical effect of the percentage of Black residents on the likelihood of emergency management after adjusting for fiscal distress. If correctly specified, our model gives evidence that racial bias was a factor in the application of emergency management – that units in Michigan with similar fiscal distress levels were more likely to get emergency management if they had higher Black populations, all else equal. We cannot identify the specific micro-mechanisms at play, meaning we cannot conclude if any actors in the process had race-biased intentions. We discuss the meaning of our findings in light of this.

KEYWORDS: emergency management, fiscal distress, Michigan, urban fiscal crisis

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, an increasingly popular governance technique in the United States is emergency management (EM) of local municipal fiscal affairs by state governments. In these scenarios, a state assumes control of all or part of a local government, usually a city. The state appoints a receiver to take over city leadership, at least in all fiscal matters. As there are very few fiscal decisions without widespread social implications, emergency managers wield exorbitant powers. These leadership takeovers are predominantly applied to cities as opposed to smaller political units such as townships. As historical processes led to the demographic and geographic concentration of African Americans in urban centers, EM disproportionately falls on Black[1] communities. The open question we address in this paper is whether this disproportionality is merely an unfortunate byproduct of urban fiscal distress, or if race bias plays a causal role in the targeted application of emergency management. To do this we investigate the case of the State of Michigan between 2007 and 2013, and attempt to test if race retains a significant statistical association with the application of EM law after taking into account the economic distress of potential EM targets.

Dating back to the 1800s, states used various mechanisms to prevent or counteract fiscal emergencies in their municipalities. We focus on Michigan because it represents the most extreme case in quantity— number of cities taken over, and quality— extent of powers exercised by emergency managers. Michigan is a good example of what other states could become if their governing bodies were to ramp up laws and fiscal takeover efforts. In Michigan, multiple governors from both political parties enacted EM, and this case provides unambiguous examples of the damaging social effects of EM-enforced austerity, for example the deaths and severe illnesses resulting from the Flint Water Crisis, the loss of public pensions in Detroit and Benton Harbor, and the closure of schools and firing of teachers throughout the state. Important for our investigation is the racial variability of munici-

palities placed under EM rule, ranging from less than 20% Black (Allen Park, Hamtramck, and Three Oaks) to those around 40% Black (Ecorse, River Rouge, and Pontiac), to cases upwards of 90% Black (Benton Harbor and Highland Park). Moreover, from 2007 through 2013, roughly 10% of the Michigan population (~ 1 mil. persons) were subject to EM rule for at least one year, often for many years. A *staggering 51% of this group were Black, despite the population of Michigan itself being 10.1% Black*.[2]

This case demands the attention of social science to adjudicate if what was obvious to the participants of myriad social movements in reaction to local takeover is borne out empirically: namely, that EM application was racially biased beyond the well-known association of race and economics. Certainly, Michigan cities placed under EM had fiscal problems warranting serious attention during this period.

A SOCIOHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND RACISM

The economic crises of the mid- to late 1800s led to various new state laws paving the way for state takeovers of local democratic self-governing political entities such as cities. This led to the first instance of EM in Memphis by the state of Tennessee in 1880. A controversial act, its challengers took the case all the way to the Supreme Court, which upheld a state's right to take over municipalities in emergencies (*Memphis v. Garrett 1880) (*Nickels., Viswanath, & Lebovits 2021). Over time, the shift from manufacturing to services to overseas and Sun Belt production, and the mass outmigration of middle-class Whites to the suburbs ("white flight") left behind broken and battered cities across the U.S. Rust Belt. Most recently in the Great Recession, around 2008, a watershed of laws and emergency takeovers took place, white flight was more intense, and this time takeover was employed in a handful of West Coast and Southern Border states.[3] The problem is not limited to municipalities. School districts too have been the target of state takeovers. Public schools are sites of large public

expenditures and, although built on local tax bases, particularly underprivileged school districts have more or less backing from state and national public monies. Thus, in 1989 it was not surprising that school district takeover became a new form of EM, starting in New Jersey and spreading to twenty-nine states in some format (Oluwole and Green 2009).

Historical factors starkly affected the incomes and sociospatial mobility of urban persons racialized as Black (Sugrue 2014; Pager & Shepherd 2008; Parcel 1979; Sloan 1969). Thus, Black people were left concentrated in municipalities and school districts in economic double jeopardy, both as post-industrial cities and as a result of (white) capital flight. This could provide a practical explanation for the racially inequitable distribution of EM, a happenstance event stemming from historical factors leading Black people to live in fiscally worse-off locations (e.g. Hill 1974) that arguably need state intervention to fix their economic woes. If so, EM laws would be legally colorblind in their immediate application. However, if racial factors explain the biased distribution of EM outcomes beyond fiscal factors, then the situation in Michigan is not merely an unfortunate historical artifact, but a form of institutional and legal discrimination.

Many scholars and members of the public point to race as a key element in the emergency control of local affairs (Fasenfest & Pride 2016; Lee et al. 2016; Massey & Denton 1988; Sands 2013; Urahn et al. 2016). If policymakers were racially biased in their intentions, fiscal emergency could provide an opportunity to enact racially biased laws with much less resistance from the public. In many cases, the opportunity to enact otherwise unpopular policies occurs when the public perceive the situation as dire—an exception to "normal life" (Birkland 1998). Such a perceived emergency leads to policymaking processes with far less oversight or accountability. This is how governments are able to temporarily suspend the right to democratic self-rule, and would be an opportunity to enact policies intended to favor or disadvantage certain populations. In particular, state review of municipalities could come from any number of sources, sometimes including simply

letters from citizens or business leaders. For example, this means that racially motivated persons or interest groups could lead the state to check on the fiscal situation of predominantly Black communities more often than of predominantly White communities.

The first-ever administrative and legal findings suggesting that EM was racially biased came in the case of Michigan. A House Judiciary Committee in 2012 concluded that there were Constitutional violations in the practice of EM; in particular regarding race (HJC 2012). In *Philipps et al. v. Snyder et al.*, the prosecution alleged that the Michigan governor violated the equal protections clause of the U.S. Constitution through the application of EM law. These were, at the time, exceptional developments in the history of EM application. They appeared as the first evidence of what the public in many cases felt sure of—that EM was at least partially racially motivated. However, on September 12, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ruled that there was no suppression of equal voting protection, either by race or by wealth. Judge Rogers wrote the majority opinion, finding that:

> Plaintiffs cite no case law that brings their facts anywhere near the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment. The state's remedy for financially endangered communities—passed by state-elected bodies for which African-Americans have a constitutionally protected equal right to vote, and facially entirely neutral with respect to race—are far removed from being a "badge" of the extraordinary evil of slavery (15-2394:18).[4]

This "badge" is a reference to a precedent set in *Memphis v. Greene* that allows a given policymaking action to have unintended racially inequitable outcomes; "'[A] regulation's adverse impact on a particular neighborhood will often have a disparate effect on an identifiable ethnic or racial group' due to urban neighborhoods' being often 'characterized by a common ethnic or racial heritage,'" and this was what happened in the Michigan case, ruled the court (ibid.; with inside quotation referencing *Memphis v. Greene*). While

the court's decision acknowledges the racially biased distribution of EM outcomes, it categorically rejects the claim that race played a causal role in the law's origin or applications. These events motivate our selection of the case of Michigan.

Although the deployment of EM measures in the U.S. thus far withstood judicial scrutiny, we put the case up to scientific inquiry. According to its legal and political advocates, whether or not EM measures are implemented is a determination made *solely* in terms of the objective fiscal distress of a given city; race should only be indirectly related to the EM process via the long-term social construction of race and race bias, and demographic and sociospatial trends that create the conditions for racially disparate outcomes. We conclude, therefore, that if race has a measurable statistical effect on the likelihood of emergency management after adjusting for objective fiscal distress, then *racial bias is a causal factor* in the deployment of emergency management measures in Michigan. On the other hand, the absence of any measurable impact indicates instead that *racial disparity is simply a side effect* of the fair and objective application of the law in an imperfect world.

We use the word "causal" here in reference to total causal effects, something we will return to discuss more in the conclusion; however, the point that cannot be overstated in this particular research design is that *we cannot say whose decisions were motivated by race bias* because we do not observe decision-making, and many different persons and groups take part in the decisions and implementations involved in placing a municipality under emergency management.

A CASE STUDY OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: MICHIGAN

Legally speaking, the governor of Michigan alone has the power to declare EM and appoint an emergency receiver of any local government unit (city, county, township) or school district that exhibits fiscal distress; we refer to these diverse political entities as "cities" and the various receivers as "emergency manag-

ers." Nonetheless, the governor must follow a certain protocol to declare EM. This includes consulting with the State Department of Treasury, appointing a review board and, if deemed necessary, placing cities into a consent agreement. We consider the external implementation of force on a city— whether through direct takeovers or through what we will describe as coercive "consent" agreements—as an instance of *emergency management* (again, "EM" throughout this paper).

The first instances of EM in Michigan occurred in 1986 in Ecorse and 1988 in Benton Harbor. State legislators passed PA 101 in 1988 to give a legal form to this new phenomenon of state-level intervention into city-level fiscal affairs. A revision in 1990, resulting in the "Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act" (PA 72), extended the legal reach of EM to include school districts and increased the emergency authority of the State Government (Citizens Research Council 2010). Signed into law by a Democratic governor, PA 72 solidified the legal basis for fiscal crisis management. Further amendments occurred in 1992, 2002, 2003 and 2009. During this time, the duties of the emergency manager were largely confined to fiscal and financial matters.

In 2011, the State Government passed another iteration of the law (PA 4, later re-written as PA 436), which expanded the scope of EM to include political, administrative, and curricular matters. These expanded powers included several "martial" provisions allowing an emergency manager to "assume complete control over local governments" (Mahler 2011). Emergency managers gained the power to modify and nullify public union contracts, ban new collective bargaining, negotiate new binding contracts on behalf of the city, dispose of (sell, lease, or give away) municipal assets, and in general, to "exercise any power…of any officer, employee, department, board, commission, or other similar entity of the local government, whether elected or appointed" (ibid.; see also Wilde-Anderson 2016).

Although the scope of EM powers grew markedly in 2011, the underlying process whereby a governor implements EM did not

radically change since 1990. The first step in the process is to place a city under fiscal review. A formal written request is sufficient to trigger a state review, so long as the governor decides it has merit. This request can come from a local government administrator, a creditor, a petition signed by 5% of the total votes cast (it was 10% before 2011), or *any notification* that the local government failed to behave in a fiscally responsible manner with respect to salaries, benefits, pension fund contributions, or outstanding debt payments.[5] In 2011, a falling credit rating and an ill-defined clause referencing "other circumstances" worthy of review joined the list of possible triggers (Citizens Research Council 2011). By 2011, state officials have full discretion in determining which cities are subjected to state review and which are left to their own fiscal and political devices.[6]

A fiscal review necessitates the formation of a governor-appointed review team including the treasurer.[7] The law grants the city an initial "choice" over its fate. This choice is a *consent agreement*—an imposed, binding contract with local officials that mandates local governments or school districts to punctually meet predetermined austerity goals. This can take the form of either a continuing operations plan (drafted by local officials) or a recovery plan (drafted by state officials); both are legally binding agreements that entail reporting and oversight. Consent agreements give local officials powers similar to EMs, such as dissolving contracts, firing city employees, and privatizing public assets. The local government must formally agree to the consent agreement, as failure to do so automatically results in EM assignment. Essentially, local officials must "choose" to voluntarily implement EM, or it will be implemented for them, meaning any "choice" is illusory (PA 436: Step 11).

Once the governor makes the decision that EM is necessary, the Emergency Loan Board of Michigan takes over much of the process of hiring an emergency manager. This Board is an ex officio group of the governor's appointed cabinet members, including the treasurer and the directors of the various executive offices. Critically, the Loan Board also decides when the crisis is over and

EM is no longer necessary, a decision that can take place at any point (or in the case of school districts, at the end of a one-year term). Ultimately, the deployment of EM measures is subject to oversight by the governor, who is the boss of the members on the Loan Board. At any moment, the governor has the power to enact EM, do nothing, or push for EM removal.[8] Suffice to say that the governor is a crucial actor in the implementation of EM, but state officials, the acting treasurer, and possibly any special interest groups with close ties to any of these people could be involved, or even could be leading the process to get a city under EM.

REVIEWING THE CAUSES OF EMERGENCY TAKEOVER

Given what we know about EM law and the decision-making processes associated with its implementation, we first consider what should be the *only cause* of EM deployment: the objective fiscal need for it. The purpose of EM as written into law is to "safeguard and assure the financial accountability of local units of government and school districts" (PA 436,1st para.). The most recent EM law (PA 436) asserts that the governor's decision to implement EM is uncontestable in Michigan courts, unless the decision is "[a]rbitrary, capricious, or clearly an abuse or unwarranted exercise of discretion" (PA 436,3b). Given the legal framework of both the Michigan Constitution and the U.S. Constitution, the deployment of EM measures based on the racial characteristics of local communities would amount to just such an abuse of discretion. The legal and sociopolitical legitimacy of EM measures rests on their colorblind application as per the Michigan Constitution Article 26.

Due in part to the increasingly complex and arcane nature of city budgets, the Michigan Department of Treasury contracted the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research at Michigan State University to develop a standardized fiscal assessment metric. The resulting instrument, the Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS), accurately identified fiscally distressed cities while simultaneously increasing the transparency of the EM process (Kloha, Weissert,

& Kleine 2005). Until 2010, FIS scores for all Michigan cities were published on the Treasury website, ostensibly providing evidence of the objective, colorblind nature of the EM system.[9] After all, none of the indicators built into the score included a reference to race. Following this colorblind indicator, if African Americans happen to be disproportionately impacted by the EM system, it is only due to the fact that they are disproportionately concentrated in large, fiscally distressed cities.

In order to test causal claims, we must not only identify what should be the cause of EM, but rule out confounding factors. One such confounder could be that conservative Republican politicians representing lower-density parts of the state shaped the EM system to emphasize the perceived need for emergency measures in urban centers while deemphasizing their perceived need in suburban, exurban, and rural areas. Put another way: that Black people are less likely to vote Republican. This type of partisan politics explains other policies with racially disparate outcomes, as in the area of criminal justice and incarceration (Yates and Fording 2005); however, the case of Michigan does not appear to follow this logic. As noted, both Democratic and Republican governors utilized the EM system throughout its history. The first cases came under James Blanchard, a Democrat elected between 1983 and 1991; several more occurred during Republican John Engler's term from 1991 to 2003, and a majority of cases subsequently occurred during the Democrat Jennifer Granholm (2003-2011) and Republican Rick Snyder's (2011-2019) terms in office.[10] The governor largely controls the EM system, but given the regular rotation of political parties in power in Michigan, there is no compelling reason to emphasize partisanship in our causal explanations of racial disparities in the deployment of emergency measures. For instance, the EM system is deeply unpopular with the urban base of the Democratic Party, yet this does not appear to have been an important consideration for Democrat Jennifer Granholm when she placed the Detroit Public Schools (majority Black) and the city of Benton Harbor (majority Black) under EM control.

An alternative explanation is that the voters of Michigan caused governors to implement race-biased EM through public opinion. The voters might want to systematically punish large, majority-Black cities that are seen as profligate, undisciplined, and corrupt; something akin to race bias in White policy attitudes (Gilens 1996). In this view, austerity-minded state legislatures who support the state takeover of fiscally distressed cities are merely reflecting the will of the people. Recent history suggests that the majority of Michigan residents do not share this vision. In fact, after seeing the destructive results of EM measures, the Michigan voters overturned PA 4 in 2012 via voter referendum.[11] The results were clear: 2.37 million Michigan citizens (53%) voted to repeal the law, while 2.13 million (47%) voted to keep it; only eight of the state's 83 counties voted to retain PA 4 on the whole (Kirkpatrick 2015a).

In contrast to the democratically expressed will of the public, Michigan's governor and legislature were vocal advocates of the EM law. They were so enthusiastic in fact that within 37 days of its public repeal, the law had been rewritten, this time in a manner designed to better withstand electoral and legal challenges. Then only 13 days later a new and improved EM bill was signed into law (PA 436), along with a sibling bill (PA 284) further restricting the public's ability to revise and reform the EM system.[12] Therefore, we see no direct evidence for the proposition that the electorate has a causal role in determining the inequitable distribution of EM outcomes; if anything, state actors took measures against public will, which was in the majority opposed to the law. This logic is codified in the eventual cessation of EM usage after Michigan residents died or became fatally ill in the Flint Water Crisis as a direct fault of poor EM decisions resulting in intense social movements and a National State of Emergency. It is safe to say that public opinion became overwhelmingly against EM and eventually won out.

Ultimately, as the PA 4 repeal episode demonstrates, the governor plays a pivotal role in maintaining and orchestrating the

state's EM system. Emergency managers put in place under PA 4 were removed following its repeal and then immediately reinstated by the governor under the auspices of a previous EM law (PA 72) from 1990.[13] The governor and his office were able to keep the basic structure and outcomes of the law in place, despite the fact that it was democratically overturned. Moreover, the governor's role as key arbiter of emergency intervention was protected and enhanced in the newly reestablished EM system.

TESTING THE CAUSES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN MICHIGAN

We are certain that at some level, actual fiscal emergencies and the seriousness of these emergencies is what causes EM application. However, based on the preceding discussion we have strong theoretical reasons to draw two further speculative arguments. One is that race prejudice was a factor in the application of EM, and the other is that income bias (the status, class, or tax base) was a factor in the application of EM. Moreover, that these latter two factors might themselves contribute to fiscal emergencies and therefore be indirect causes of EM. This is captured in our conceptual model in Figure 1.

In Figure 1, *Emergency Management* is the primary outcome variable. As observed, the governor alone has the final say in EM



Figure 1. Conceptual Model to Test the Role of Race in Emergency Management.

implementation. Therefore, we assume this outcome variable represents the existence of EM and the persons involved' decisions to institute EM (in particular the governor); these are coterminous measures as an observed variable. Fiscal Distress should be the only cause of EM. Therefore, path **A** should be the entire story behind EM application. However, given that fiscal distress is difficult to measure we expect there to be some degree of measurement error represented by e1, in what should otherwise be a one-to-one causal relationship. This represents the gap between a statistical models' accuracy in predicting *Emergency Management* using the intervening role of *Fiscal Distress*. We know theoretically that e1 should not be correlated with *Black Population* because the measure contains no race-based indicators, or cannot be somehow biased by something that causes the urban distribution of race. Path **B** is, therefore, purely a theoretically expected statistical association. It in no way suggests that Black populations are themselves the cause of urban fiscal problems; this is likely a result of the racial history of the United States, not to mention that race itself is no essential, genetic feature of persons, rather a socially constructed phenomenon[14]. Luckily, even if this were not true, having it in the model we control for the association regardless of causes.

We assume all of the things that might have led to *Fiscal Distress* also caused a racial geographic population distribution and therefore can be left out of the model because they will be subsumed in effect **B**. This decision helps us to avoid a problem of confounding because it means *Fiscal Distress* plays the role of measuring all these historical factors at once without a need for further elaboration (see also Frey 1979, 1980). In order to conclude that the governors of Michigan and the actors involved engaged in a colorblind application of EM law there should be no direct effect of *Black Population* on *Emergency Management*, in other words path **C** must equal zero, or not be significantly different from zero, after accounting for paths **B** and **A** and within a reasonable range of measurement error allowed in e1 and e2.

A final consideration of our theoretical model in Figure 1 is the economic resources of individuals in a given city. Cities with higher income households have a larger tax base to alleviate fiscal distress, and local voters may have greater political capital, thus acting as a political defense against the likelihood of state takeover. We know that Black people have lower household incomes than White people on average (Maroto 2016); therefore, the known pattern of EM being concentrated in cities with large Black populations might be explained by path **D**. Thus, controlling for causal path **D** in the model is essential because the racial and socioeconomic composition of units carry many common causes, as race and class are intricately linked in the lives of individuals (Collins 2007). It is entirely possible that there is a direct effect of *Household Income* on *Emergency Management* (not shown in Figure 1), and we would not be surprised if communities with higher-income households enjoyed a higher likelihood of political autonomy, though that is not the purpose of our analysis. The test for an effect of race—that is, whether path **C** is or is not equal to zero—is unaffected by inclusion or exclusion of a *Household Income* direct effect, so long as an effect of *Household Income* is in the model on a causal pathway to the outcome (Elwert 2013).[15]

UNOBSERVED CONFOUNDING?

Our model qualifies as causal if there is no legitimate unobserved confounder of the effect of race; no confounding unobserved causes of EM. Above, we argued that partisan politics, and popular opinion and voting, are not confounders here. Are there other things that could be such confounders? In other words, are there unobserved variables that might lead **C** in Figure 1 to be non-zero, but when included would return **C** to zero? For one, EM application should only be fiscal, so this potentially unobserved variable must be fiscal in nature. If something non-fiscal causes EM application, and this something correlates with race, then it stands to reason that the something is itself race-biased and explains the race-biased nature of EM application. Therefore, by adding

it to the model we would be introducing a second measure of race bias in addition to measuring race itself, and potentially suppressing the effect we aim to observe. This is what makes tests of race as a causal variable in social phenomena so difficult, because race is deeply embedded in legal, social, cultural, political, and normative institutions (Charles and Guryan 2011; VanderWeele and Robinson 2014). We are unaware of something that causes fiscal distress that does not cause the distribution of race in cities but correlates highly with it. Take housing prices or education as examples. Race bias certainly led to the unequal distribution of housing prices and education levels between those racialized as Black and White. Therefore, adding either of these variables to the model would be to introduce confounding. The real problem is that we are unable to observe racism itself; we can only proxy it through observation of race, thus any other variables caused by racism also measure racism and should not be included.

The concentration of African Americans in certain neighborhoods in Northern U.S. cities is a result of migration from the terrorization of Black communities under the Southern States' Race Codes and "separate but equal," and a result of racist reception in the northern part of the U.S. Again, both of these historical factors are driven by race bias, and if we introduce any variables that measure them, such as housing segregation or reasons for family resettlement, we would suppress our attempts to observe race bias. Naturally, as social scientists we consider the possibility of biologically determined traits of individuals as variables. Here again we encounter a similar problem. Studies in social genomics make it crystal clear that race is not genetic or biologically determined, it is a socially constructed set of institutions and mores that developed in response to genes (Chou 2017). Therefore, a genetic marker would also potentially "explain away" an effect of race (for a poignant and highly scientific position on this see Munater, Nieto, and O'Campo 1996). These arguments are the basis for recent work in Critical Race Theory (CRT), which make clear that race is socially constructed and not an essential bio-

logical/genetic feature of individuals (see discussion in Williams 2021). We are already somewhat violating this criterion by including income in the model. However, we do this intentionally given that scholars perpetually debate race and class as important and sometimes competing sociological frames of analysis. Income might potentially adjudicate between them, even though a CRT or intersectionality approach would reject this (Collins 2007). Although we may not personally believe it true, it is theoretically possible that EM is more likely to be applied to poorer neighborhoods *regardless of race* after adjusting for fiscal distress and we want to try and account for this, or at least rule it out.

DATA AND METHODS

Unit of Analysis

Our unit of analysis is any politically incorporated area in Michigan subject to EM law, including cities, townships, villages, and school districts. Following the U.S. Census, Michigan defines these units as sub-county divisions (level 060 in Census coding).[16] Despite varying degrees of legal entitlement to local home rule in the Michigan Constitution, all units are equal in the eyes of the EM laws, and thus similarly vulnerable to emergency takeover. We restrict our focus to units with over 1,500 residents, predominantly townships and cities. Smaller sized units are often villages or rural townships and no unit under this size has ever been subject to EM. As these small units are predominantly White in their populations, this only increases the conservativeness of our test, because standard errors go down when increasing the sample size without adding any new outcomes.

Dependent Variable

We take institution of an emergency manager or a consent agreement as instances of emergency political intervention into local governmental affairs: that is, occurrence of the governor's decision to implement Emergency Management. Thus, the format is a binary variable where the value "1" indicates presence of emer-

gency management. We lag our independent variables one year behind to account for fiscal review and political decision-making following a chronological causal ordering. In total there are 46 cases of EM in 12 units observed between 2007–2013, out of a total 995 units and 6,935 unit-years, after removing missing, non-interpolable data (<1%). No new instances of emergency management have taken place since the 2014 Flint Water Crisis.

Independent Variables

Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS) data provides a scale measure of *Fiscal Distress* for each unit. The Michigan Department of Treasury (MDT) originally tracked 30 conditions (per PA 72, 1990), but the accounting was so detailed that consistent monitoring was overly cumbersome. Experts subsequently revised the scoring system, simplifying and standardizing the fiscal review process. These researchers came up with ten key indicators of fiscal stress that could be combined into a single score (Kloha, Weissert, & Kleine 2005). In 2006, the MDT formalized these criteria as the "objective, measurable, and straightforward" basis of fiscal review and potential emergency management (MDT 2007).17 Thus we use FIS scores from 2006–2012, based on their availability.

In order to investigate the role of race vis-à-vis emergency intervention, we compile Census data for 2000 and 2010 covering percentage of the population that is Black and White in local units (*Black Population* and *White Population*). We interpolate the years in between the decennial census using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) for Michigan's largest municipalities, and linear predictions across the decennial Census for the smaller units (American Community Survey 2011). We use Census data to measure the median *Household Income* of each unit, again using ACS data and linear interpolation to connect the years between 2006-2012, and we take the natural log of income to allow income to have the largest impact at the lower end of the distribution providing more variance to predict EM.18 This allows for further tests of an independent effect of race, as opposed to socioeconomic status or class. Race and income vari-

ables are extremely stable across 5-to-10-year periods, suggesting that our interpolations are accurate.

Method

We use structural equation modeling to test our theoretical path model from Figure 1 against our observed data. We estimate regression coefficients representing the theoretically causal effects running from *Black Population* in a given unit to the likelihood of *Emergency Management*. This causal process should run entirely through *Fiscal Distress*. Again, we are testing whether path **D** from Figure 1 is or is not entirely explained by paths **C** and **A**. This is a method of path decomposition and estimating total, direct, and indirect effects (Bollen 1987; Wright 1934). We estimate the likelihood of EM using a logistic estimation technique because EM is either 1 or 0, but nothing in between. To account for the rarity of EM occurring in only 0.07% of all units, we face a problem of biased estimation due to the many 0's in the dependent variable and the estimation of thresholds along the logit-link (Muthén 1984). The choice of estimator might play a significant role in the model; however, the jury is out on the best estimation option. Therefore, we take the normally least biased option of maximum likelihood (ML) as our starting point. As a robustness check we incorporate robust weighted least squares (WLSM/-V) and Bayesian uninformative prior estimators leading to similar findings.[19]

In order to estimate the model we use *Mplus 7* statistical software after working up the data in *Stata*.[20] The models are straightforward path models with total, direct, and indirect effects as shown in Figure 1, with one exception. The logit-link defies the standard procedure for path decomposition. Thus we use a method incorporating odds ratios (i.e., probability differences) following VanderWeele and Vansteelandt (2010), and Muthén and Asparouhov (2015); this is the default for this type of model in *Mplus*.

We observe 995 units in Michigan using 7 years of data. This means that the observations are hierarchical with unit-years nested in units. In many cases such a structure calls for a multi-

level or longitudinal modeling strategy. Considering that each year is a new opportunity for the governor and the governor's appointed officers in the Treasury and on the Loan Board to instill, remove or continue EM, our cases are in fact independent with regard to the dependent variable—that is, with regard to a governor's yearly, or even more frequently occurring, will. When the FIS score reaches a lower level, the EM should be removed, as the cause of having one has also been removed. Moreover, FIS varies substantially across years, with an intra-class correlation coefficient of 0.573, suggesting that 57.3% of FIS variation occurs between units and 42.7 across years within units. This again points to the independence of fiscal years within units because there is meaningful variation within units that could prompt a governor's decision to instill or remove EM at any time, if conditions warrant (i.e., conditional on the fiscal distress).

A longitudinal model, such as a fixed-effects model, assumes there is path dependency, that a unit will be more likely to get EM as it moves further away from the mean of EM within that unit over time. Modeling in this way would violate the causal process written into the laws, which call for EM when the unit is in fiscal emergency, and not otherwise. It is purely an ongoing fiscal calculation: Can the unit meet its fiscal operating expenses or not? Will the unit face penalties in the next fiscal year that could damage its residents or credit rating? Moreover, the ICC demonstrates that 99.5% of the variation for *Black Population* and 98.9% for *Household Income* occurs between units. Therefore, race and class cannot possibly predict within-unit EM, rendering a longitudinal model useless for our test.

RESULTS

Table 1 in the Appendix provides the descriptive statistics for all variables. Note that we mean-centered all independent variables in order to make the baseline odds (threshold) directly interpretable as the likelihood of EM in an "average" city. Table 2 and Table 3 in the Appendix provide coefficients, p-statistics, odds-ra-

tios, and model fit statistics for the structural equation models. Figure 2 provides the structural estimates from Table 2.



[a] Equal fit test favors Model 2, and exact fit test suggest that Model 2 fits the data well, see Tables 2 and 3.

Figure 2. Structural Equation Estimates in Causal Path Models of Emergency Management in Michigan, 2007-2013.

In both models in Figure 2, e^b are odds-ratios, β are standardized coefficients, η is the latent mean of fiscal distress after centering, τ are thresholds representing the value of the underlying latent variable that distinguishes predictions of $0 < \tau < 1$, and θ are residual variances for the latent variables.[21] In both models, all e^b and β attached to solid black arrows are significant at $p<.001$.

Figure 2, Model 1 demonstrates that a one percentage-point increase in Black population increases the odds of fiscal distress by 5%, and this is a moderate to large-sized effect with an yx-standardized coefficient of 0.36. All effects placed along arrows in Figure 2 may be interpreted in a similar manner. Again, this *Black Population* effect is not interpreted as a direct causal effect of "Blackness" on fiscal distress. We could also say that an increase in fiscal distress by 1 point, increases the likelihood of 1% more of the population being Black in a given city. The point is that they share common historical causes and this is controlled

for by allowing an effect of *Black Population* on *Fiscal Distress* in the model. This modeled covariance of race and fiscal distress and the controlling of household income allow Model 2 to test whether implementation—presumably undertaken in a complex policy-making arena—is race-biased. In other words, that something about race was a causal factor in this bias, because something race-related above and beyond the racial demography of municipalities and their level of fiscal distress played a critical role in this implementation.

The results of Model 2 may be summarized in two parts. The first is that there is a significant effect of percent Black population on the fiscal distress of a political unit and it is noteworthy with a standardized effect of 0.25. The second is that Model 2 fits the data much better than Model 1, and that Model 2 is indistinguishable from the saturated model in its goodness of fit, suggesting that Model 2 is a good-fitting model (i.e., Occam's parsimony logic). Model 1 meanwhile is unrealistic because the causal arrow associated with race is necessary in Model 2 to make it a plausible theoretical approximation of reality given these data. We present these fit tests in Table 2. We also run models with alternative estimators to account for the skewed distribution and arrive at the same results: see Appendix Table 3. Finally, we test a model with a direct effect of household income on EM and the effect is not significantly different from zero, while all other effects remain roughly similar and all significant at $p<.001$; again, the fact that income and Black population covary in Model 2 is sufficient for our test.

Table 2 also gives direct and indirect effects for *Black Population*. Model 2 suggests that *65% of the total effect of Black population is direct*. That means that only 35% of the association between race and emergency management is accounted for by the actual fiscal distress of cities, and the remainder represents the race-biased application of EM law. This comes with a confidence interval. If we allow the direct effect to be 2 standard deviations lower than its estimate, 42% of the *Black Population* effect would remain

direct, and this is already a highly improbable estimate of the "true" effect given these data. Moreover, the coefficient for the direct effect of percentage of Black population on EM has a standard error of 0.007, suggesting that it would take a difference of 7.5 standard errors before the estimate of the statistical effect crosses zero. We would call this impossible given this as an accurate model and given these data (i.e., $p<.001$ for the indirect and direct effects of race).

We conclude that there is a direct effect of race on emergency management—that is, that African Americans have been subjected to differential treatment because of the social construct of race—and this effect accounts for half or more of the total effect of race. The remainder of the total race effect is explained by the historical concentration of Blacks in fiscally distressed urban centers: that is, the indirect, purely statistically discriminatory, effect of race. The results of Model 2 in Table 2 may be put into perspective as predicted changes in odds, in terms of logistic regression results. The likelihood of emergency management is 50% greater where there is a 10 percentage-point larger Black population in a given city. We run the analyses with White population in place of Black population as a robustness check, and to follow the logic that race bias is the simultaneous effect of prejudice against Black in favor of White; as the identity and construct of race depends on both of these social constructed categories. The results for White population mirror the models in Figure 2 and Appendix Tables 2 through 4. The likelihood of emergency management is 57% lower for every 10 percentage-point larger White population, according to Table 4.

CONCLUSION

Using a fiscal theory of the application of emergency management by higher-level government units and a structural equation modeling of race, fiscal distress, and emergency management, we find that race had a direct effect on the likelihood of the state imposing emergency management on Michigan municipalities.[22]

As the effect exists after accounting for actual fiscal need and the median income of the municipality, we conclude that, on average, the targeted implementation of local emergency measures between 2007 and 2013 were discriminatory in nature. It would not be linguistically false to label them "racist" but this may detract from our scientific goals, because of the connotation of this word. We opt for labeling them as racially biased instead.[23] Roughly speaking, about half of the statistical disproportionality in emergency management practices are a byproduct of the historical factors that put urban Blacks in a position to be *differentially impacted* by EM measures (the indirect effect of race indicated in our results), while the other half is a result of the *differential treatment* of Blacks by Michigan's current EM system (the direct effect of race found in our tests). Our research suggests that this direct effect reveals a contemporary form of institutional discrimination—carried out with active political and legal-juridical support—not merely a residual effect of historical oppression.

Our evidence points at a total causal effect of race. This means that we cannot specify the exact mechanisms of race bias. We do not know which particular decisions by which particular persons or procedural factors would allow a biased application of emergency management practices in Michigan. It is "total" because it includes all of these micro-processes that could only further be understood through qualitative investigation or the possibility to be a "fly on the wall" (or inside persons minds) when these various political decisions were made. We can only say that in total, all of these micro-process causes add up to what we observe. Readers are often uncomfortable with causal language, and we are careful not to overstate causality here. We had a causal theory whereby race should not play a role following the laws of Michigan and the explicit purpose of emergency management. We set up a model to test this counterfactually by examining if municipalities in Michigan with similar fiscal problems are not significantly more likely to be placed under emergency management as a function of the percentage of the population that self-report as

Black/African-American. Our test was negative with respect to the causal theory—we conclude that there is race bias.

For strict followers of causal inference, we should use the word "causal" only if our model is the correct specification of EM being caused by the need for EM. If that is true, then the question becomes one of unobserved confounding: *what correlates with fiscal distress and the racial composition of cities that might explain EM application instead?* The distribution of race and the social construction of race are historical and intersectional processes that react to phenotypic markers and can place people who have no African ethnic lineage or even dark skin in a position to be oppressed with race bias, as in, racialized as "Black" (Brodkin 1998). To try and explain away the effect of race by introducing other covariates indicative of race bias would be to hide or confound race bias itself rather than to produce a more accurate data-generating model. We are aware of nothing that correlates with race that meets this exogeneity criteria, but we humbly admit that further research and theoretical reasoning should further scrutinize our conclusions (in the direction of Morning 2014).

Without digressing into a debate about the denotation of the word "causal" and even regardless of the exact causal process, the non-colorblind application of the laws technically constitutes: "Arbitrary, capricious, or clearly…unwarranted exercise of discretion" on the part of the State of Michigan (PA 436). Thus far, however, no one has challenged EM directly on these grounds. Our findings provide the first statistical evidence that the targeted implementation of emergency measures represents differential treatment of communities based on racial makeup. We can take the analogy of discrimination in hiring practices. If candidates are equally qualified for the job, a boss who systematically (read "statistically significantly") takes the White candidate over the Black candidate would be exercising discrimination, regardless of the internal psychological mechanisms of the boss leading to the discriminatory decisions (i.e., whether deliberate or undeliberate). Race bias is causing something about the decision pro-

cess to lead to a particular outcome beyond random chance, and that makes race part of the causal process. In our case, we do not know if persons in the government are or intended to be racist, but because equally fiscally distressed cities are more likely to get EM, this constitutes more than statistical discrimination.

To further this research agenda, we offer two speculations as to why EM might be applied differentially based on race. First, there is a certain political expediency to the practice of targeting poor, majority Black cities for state takeover. Urban Black communities are a structurally weakened political constituency; Black people vote less on average than White people in Michigan (and elsewhere) for reasons both chronic (high levels of unemployment, low levels of education, and so on) and acute (disenfranchisement through incarceration, voter suppression, etc.) and are less likely to have successful candidates even when they do (Zoltan 2009). Whiter communities have more political networking resources at their disposal. Thus, they make difficult targets that can mobilize in response, while poor, majority Black cities can be disenfranchised without the same level of political fallout (Flavin and Hartney 2017).

Our second consideration is *money*. The targeted suspension of local democracy gives rise to urban value extraction. Emergency managers sell off assets and pay off obligations at their sole discretion: this is unimaginable under normal democratic conditions (Agamben 2005; Kirkpatrick 2015b; Peck 2014; Wong 1988). To begin with, extending credit and lending to at-risk cities is big business, and the profits to be made by investors are substantial. Detroit is a good example of this trend. Similar to the woes faced by many individuals as a result of predatory lending in the lead-up to the financial crisis, Detroit (and other cities) borrowed money in highly complicated, speculative, and risky ways. These risks would eventually lead, in the wake of the crisis, to massive payoffs for the city's lenders. The loans designed to pay pensions and other budget shortfalls ended up costing the city and many of its residents dearly (Peck and Whiteside 2016; Kirkpatrick 2016).

For instance, penalties and interest rate hikes imposed after the city failed to perfectly meet all of the conditions of their bail-out loans, combined with changes in the derivatives market, cost Detroit $474 million in fees (paid to big banks and Wall Street firms) on top of their traditional bond debt (Preston and Christoff 2013). In Detroit, Wall Street debts were paid in part to protect the city's credit rating, but at the cost of human welfare, lives, and local democracy.

There are no checks and balances in PA 436, (or previous iterations of the law). This allows emergency managers to amass enormous power over the affairs of cities. Emergency managers in Michigan—serving at the pleasure of the governor—use this power to prioritize municipal obligations to big banks and Wall Street firms over the needs of local residents. Emergency managers are structurally compelled to ensure that cities retain access to capital markets in order to pay for the things they need, which entails settling the city's financial debts by contracting public pensions, shedding municipal employees, decommissioning infrastructure networks, radically reducing the provision of social services, and generally shrinking the form and functions of municipal government.

In their attempts to placate the city's largest creditors, local officials turn to the large-scale sell-off of highly valued public assets. This not only allows the city to pay off investor-based obligations, it also creates new investor opportunities in the form of inexpensive acquisition of public lands, buildings, infrastructures, and services, which are sold or leased, in part or in full, at the discretion of the emergency manager. Detroit is not anomalous in this regard. Opportunities for large-scale urban value extraction still tend to be concentrated in large urban centers, *even in the case of poor, majority Black cities*. The once dominant industrial centers of the east and Midwest contain densely clustered public assets, valuable infrastructural assemblages, and numerous other opportunities for fiscal and financial dispossession. Benton Harbor had a beautiful lakefront golf course, Harbor Shores, which investors

sought for over a decade until an emergency manager finally provided the missing authoritarian power to sell it to them.

At this point, claims concerning why African Americans receive differential treatment at the hands of Michigan's EM system—such as political expediency and urban value extraction—are speculative and exploratory. Scholars might ask, "what is qualitatively special about these 12 cities that led to various, repeated emergency interventions at different points in time?" But this is to cheat the question. To explain away these results through qualitative case descriptions would be to undermine the purpose of quantitative counterfactual analysis, and potentially to undermine the meaning of race, which correlates with many other things and exists independent of time and space in United States' institutions and organizations. We believe that our claims are defensible as causal and that the burden of disproving this should fall on future research.

Our findings also carry major implications for understanding emergency management practices in other states. Michigan is generally representative of the same processes that took place across the Rust Belt. It is not presumptuous to believe that race probably played some role across these cities. Furthermore, given the persistence of race bias in legal, cultural, and economic structures across the United States, we might expect that the Southern and Western states could also see racial deployment of emergency management. Again, a fiscal emergency provides the opportunity structure to enact laws with less resistance. In states with emergency management laws on the books, no further policymaking is necessary. The governor or a governing committee simply needs to decide that emergency intervention is necessary, and to assign any emergency manager they choose.

The most powerful potential impact of our finding should be that this evidence is brought to bear on legal proceedings. However, what is clear in the case of the United States is that the legal system is not independent of politics. Therefore, when the findings that EM was race biased in Michigan were overturned

in a higher court in 2016, we assume that political interests were at play. If a higher-level court were to conclude race bias in just one case, like Michigan, it would set off a wave of litigation of emergency management across potentially all twenty states where it has been practiced at the municipal level and all twenty-nine where it has been practiced for school districts. Therefore, those currently or formerly in power in those states have acute political and economic interest in assuring that any legal findings on race bias are overturned.

ENDNOTES

1 We use the label "Black" to imply persons who are racialized as Black, rather than as a reference to any essentialist features of such persons.

2 In 2013. Authors' own calculations from census and emergency management data. See Figure 3 in the Appendix for a plot of all of Michigan's locally governed units and instances of emergency management by percent Black and level of fiscal distress (a score that we explain in our methods). This Figure demonstrates the great variance in race and fiscal distress that makes Michigan a strong case study.

3 Since the 1980s twenty states enacted and used laws explicitly allowing the state to engage in varying degrees of oversight and takeover of municipalities and other sub-units (Urahn et al. 2016): Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas.

4 Accessible via Oosting, Jonathan, "Appeals court upholds Mich. emergency manager law," The Detroit News, 9/12/2016, http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/09/12/appeals-court-upholds-michigan-emergency-manager-law/90279788/ . A note to readers: In case URL links are broken in the future, copies of all articles in the footnotes are available here: https://github.com/nbreznau/michigan_em/tree/main/data/Internet%20Sources.

5 Any state house or senate representative can call for review; ending a fiscal year in deficit or failing to meet other budgetary and accounting criteria is also grounds, as is any known violation of state law.

6 "How a Financial Emergency Works," Michigan Department of Treasury, accessed 12/10/2016 and saved as a pdf. (https://github.com/nbreznau/michigan_em/blob/main/data/Internet%20Sources/TREASURY%20-%20How%20a%20Financial%20Emergency%20Works.pdf). Original URL link is dead.

7 After 2011, the review team consists of local representatives, state officials, and private firms. The review has four possible outcomes: (1) no/mild financial stress, no action needed; (2) severe stress, a consent agreement is adopted; (3) severe stress, no consent agreement is adopted; and (4) financial emergency, no plan for recovery. If the review finds either of the latter two outcomes (3 or 4), the state will impose an emergency manager, but of course the state intervenes in outcome (2) because they make the consent agreement binding.

8 See for example legal briefing and legal discussions from lawyers Mika Meyers https://www.mikameyers.com/news/article/expansion-of-state-emergency-loan-powers 01/07/2013 and Alec Gibbs http://markmaynard.com/2014/07/everything-you-ever-wanted-to-know-about-the-emergency-manager-takeover-of-michigan-and-how-we-allowed-it-to-happen/ 07/29/2014.

9 After 2010 the scores were removed for reasons still unknown.

10 Snyder was a bit more aggressive, deploying more EM than any previous governor. He signed into law PA 4—making EM easier and making emergency managers far more powerful, and he reinstated a new version of PA 4 immediately after voters overturned it, but testing this Snyder-bias is beyond the scope of this paper.

11 See Jonathan Oosting, "Michigan Emergency Manager Law: What's next after Public Act 4 repeal?" MLive.com 11/11/2012 http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/11/michigan_emergency_manager_law.html.

12 In Michigan, neither voter initiative nor citizen referendum processes can challenge legislation passed with annual "built in" appropriations. Chris Savage, "A comprehensive look at Michigan's new(est) Emergency Manager Law, Now with STABILITY and CHOICE." Electablog. 02/21/2013 http://www.eclectablog.com/2013/02/a-comprehensive-look-at-michigans-newest-emergency-manager-law-now-with-stability-choice.html.

13 "Emergency Financial Manager/Emergency Manager Appointment History" http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/EM-EFM_Appointment_History_2-12-16_514604_7.pdf *Michigan Department of Treasury 02/12/2016*. In case URL link is broken in the future, a copy is available here: https://github.com/nbreznau/michigan_em/tree/main/data/Internet%20Sources.

14 Although hotly debated in some circles, we simply rely on the evidence that genetic variability is much greater within those racialized as Black and those racialized as White than between the two groups. In other words, a randomly drawn Black person is more likely to be more dissimilar genetically than another randomly drawn racialized Black person, than to a racialized as White person – and similar results exist for other racial/ethnic groups (Chou 2017).

15 The size of the effect could be biased by collinearity nonetheless, so we include a model with the direct effect of Household Income as a sensitiv-

ity check.

16 Cities are independent of townships and annex areas within township lines, whereas villages exist within or across townships and school districts exist as semi-autonomous within cities/townships. Many townships incorporate further by becoming chartered, granting them authorities of home rule similar to that of cities.

17 The ten indicators utilized by the MDT are: population growth; decrease in taxable value; general fund (GF) expenditures; GF expenses divided by taxable value; GF operating deficit; GF operating deficit (previous year); GF operating deficit from 2 years prior; size of GF balance as a percentage of revenues; GF deficits in current or previous year; and general long-term debt as a percentage of taxable value. The FIS data were originally available on the MDT website but are no longer there. However, Munetrix LLC, a Michigan-based public benchmarking agency, compiles the data (which we purchased in 2013.)

18 Sensitivity test of Household Income in dollars leads to the same results and is a worse explanatory variable of both Fiscal Distress and Emergency Management.

19 Bengt Muthén comment 10/04/2016 http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/23/12169.html?1475616788, see also Kline (2011:179–81), Muthén (2010), and Lei (2007).

20 Code and replication materials available at https://github.com/nbreznau/michigan_em.

21 Error variance of the underlying continuous latent variable plus that of the logistic distribution; technically the arrow effect of e2 is the logistic distribution variance 3.29 but this is included in the error variance calculation (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975).

22 We refer to the causal effect as "race" in general instead of "Black" in particular, because the Black population variable nearly perfectly measures White population from 2007-2013 (the correlation is -0.905).

23 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "racist" includes: "Showing or feeling discrimination or prejudice against people of other races" https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/racist

REFERENCES

Agamben, Giorgio. 2005. *State of Exception*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Birkland, Thomas A. 1998. "Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting." *Journal of Public Policy* 18(1): 53–74.

Bollen, Kenneth A. 1987. "Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects in Structural Equation Models." *Sociological Methodology* 17: 37–69.

Brodkin, Karen. 1998. *How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Charles, Kerwin Kofi, and Jonathan Guryan. 2011. "Studying Discrimination: Fundamental Challenges and Recent Progress." *Annual Review of Economics* 3(1): 479–511.

Chou, Vivian. 2017. "How Science and Genetics Are Reshaping the Race Debate of the 21st Century." *Science in the News (SITN). Harvard University*. https://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/science-genetics-reshaping-race-debate-21st-century/.

Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 2010. "Financial Emergencies in Local Governments." White Paper, Report 362. https://crcmich.org/financial-emergencies-in-michigan-local-governments-2/.

Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 2011. "The Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act: Public Act 4 of 2011." White Paper, Report 368. https://www.crcmich.org/PUBLICAT/2010s/2011/rpt368.html.

Collins, Patricia Hill. 2007. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. Second Ed. New York and London: Routledge.

Elwert, Felix. 2013. "Graphical Causal Models." Pp. 245–72 in *Handbook of Causal Analysis for Social Research*, edited by S. L. Morgan. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Science & Business Media.

Fasenfest, David and Theodore Pride. 2016. "Emergency Management in Michigan: Race, Class and the Limits of Liberal Democracy." *Critical Sociology* 42(3): 331–34.

Flavin, Patrick, and Michael T. Hartney. 2017. "Racial Inequality in Democratic Accountability: Evidence from Retrospective Voting in Local Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3): 684–97.

Frey, William H. 1979. "Central City White Flight: Racial and Nonracial Causes." *American Sociological Review* 44(5): 425–48.

Frey, William H. 1980. "Black In-Migration, White Flight, and the Changing Economic Base of the Central City." *American Journal of Sociology* 85(5): 1396–1417.

Gilens, Martin. 1996. "'Race Coding' and White Opposition to Welfare." *American Political Science Review* 90(3): 593–604.

Hajnal, Zoltan L. 2009. "Who Loses in American Democracy? A Count of Votes Demonstrates the Limited Representation of African Americans." *American Political Science Review* 103(1): 37–57.

HJC, House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff. 2012. *Democracy for Sale: Subverting Voting Rights, Collective Bargaining and Accountability under Michigan's Emergency Manager Law*. Washington, D.C. (cited in Kirkpatrick 2015[a]).

Hill, Richard Child. 1974. "Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis." *American Political Science Review* 68(4): 1557–68.

Kirkpatrick, L.Owen. 2015[a]. "Ritual and Redistribution in De-Democratized Detroit." Pp. 123–43 in *Reinventing Detroit*, edited by M. P. Smith and L. O. Kirkpatrick. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Kirkpatrick, L. Owen. 2015b. "Urban Triage, City Systems, and the Remnants of Community: Some 'Sticky' Complications in the Greening of Detroit." *Journal of Urban History* 41(2): 261–78.

Kirkpatrick, L. Owen. 2016. "The New Urban Fiscal Crisis: Finance, Democracy, and Municipal Debt." *Politics & Society*, 44(1): 45–80.

Kline, Rex B. 2011. *Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling*. Third ed. New York: Guilford Press.

Kloha, Philip, Carol S. Weissert, and Robert Kleine. 2005. "Developing and Testing a Composite Model to Predict Local Fiscal Distress." *Public Administration Review* 65(3): 313–23.

Lee, Shawna J. et al. 2016. "Racial Inequality and the Implementation of Emergency Management Laws in Economically Distressed Urban Areas." *Children and Youth Services Review* 70: 1–7.

Lei, Pui-Wa. 2007. "Evaluating Estimation Methods for Ordinal Data in Structural Equation Modeling." *Quality and Quantity* 43(3): 495–507.

Mahler, Jonathan. 2011. "Benton Harbor: An Addendum by Chris Savage." *The 6th Floor—New York Times Blog*. https://6thfloor.blogs.nytimes.com/

Maroto, Michelle. 2016. "Growing Further Apart: Racial and Ethnic Inequality in Household Wealth Across the Distribution." *Sociological Science* 3: 801–824.

Massey, D. S. and N. A. Denton. 1988. "Suburbanization and Segregation in United States Metropolitan Areas." *American Journal of Sociology* 94(3): 592–626.

McKelvey, Richard D. and William Zavoina. 1975. "A Statistical Model for the Analysis of Ordinal Level Dependent Variables." *The Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 4(1): 103–20.

Michigan Department of Treasury (MDT). 2007. "Fiscal Indicator Scoring." MDT Publication Number 223016_7. Available from the historical archive of the MDT website. https://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Fiscal_Indicator_Scoring_223016_7.pdf.

Morning, Ann. 2014. "Does Genomics Challenge the Social Construction of Race?" *Sociological Theory* 32(3): 189–207.

Munater, Carles, F. Javier Nieto and Patricia O'Campo. 1996. "The Bell Curve: On Race, Social Class, and Epidemiologic Research." *American Journal of Epidemiology* 144(6): 531–536.

Muthén, Bengt. 1984. "A General Structural Equation Model with Dichotomous, Ordered Categorical, and Continuous Latent Variable Indicators." *Psychometrika* 49(1): 115–32.

Muthén, Bengt. 2010. "Bayesian Analysis in Mplus: A Brief Introduction." Working Paper. StatModel, Version 3. https://www.statmodel.com/download/IntroBayesVersion%203.pdf

Muthén, Bengt and Tihomir Asparouhov. 2015. "Causal Effects in Mediation Modeling: An Introduction with Applications to Latent Variables." *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 22(1): 12–23.

Nickels, Ashley E., Shilpa Viswanath, and Hannah Lebovits. 2021. "When States Intervene—or Don't : Local Fiscal Distress, Municipal Takeovers, and the Complexities of Local Control." Pp. 131–48 in *Cooperation and Conflict between State and Local Government*, edited by R. L. Hanson and E. S. Zeemering. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Oluwole, Joseph O., and Preston C. Green III. 2009. "State Takeover of School Districts: Race and the Equal Protection Clause Program on Law and State Government Fellowship Symposium: Education Reform and State Government: The Role of Tests, Expectations, Funding, and Failure." *Indiana Law Review* 42(2): 343–410.

Pager, Devah and Hana Shepherd. 2008. "The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 181–209.

Parcel, T. L. 1979. "Race, Regional Labor Markets and Earnings." *American Sociological Review* 44(26756): 262–69.

Peck, Jamie. 2014. "Pushing Austerity: State Failure, Municipal Bankruptcy and the Crises of Fiscal Federalism in the USA." *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society* 7(1): 17–44.

Peck, Jamie, and Heather Whiteside. 2016. "Financializing Detroit." *Economic Geography* 92(3): 235–268.

Preston, Darrell and Chris Christoff. 2013. "Only Wall Street Wins in Detroit Crisis, Reaping $474 Million Fee." *Bloomberg News*. March 13. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-14/only-wall-street-wins-in-detroit-crisis-reaping-474-million-fee.

Sands, David, "Detroit NAACP Lawsuit Filing Says Michigan Emergency Manager Law Threatens Voting Rights." *Huffington Post*, 5/14/2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/13/detroit-naacp-lawsuit-emergency-manager_n_3266358.html

Sloan, Lee. 1969. "'Good Government' and the Politics of Race." *Social Problems* 17(2): 161–75.

Sugrue, Thomas J. 2014. *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Urahn, Susan K. et al. 2016. "The State Role in Local Government Financial Distress." July (Second Version, 2016 update). *The Pew Charitable Trusts*. https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/04/pew_state_role_in_local_government_financial_distress.pdf

Vanderweele, Tyler J. and Stijn Vansteelandt. 2010. "Odds Ratios for Mediation Analysis for a Dichotomous Outcome." *American Journal of Epidemiology* 172(12): 1339–48.

Wilde-Anderson, Michelle. 2016. "Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State Takeovers of Local Governments." *Fordham Urban Law Journal* 39(3): 577–623.

Williams, Deadric T. 2021. "Living and Loving in a Racialized Society: Family Status, Cumulative Risk, and Relationship Quality among Black, Hispanic, and White Mothers." *Issues in Race and Society* (Spring): 151–82.

Wright, Sewall. 1934. "The Method of Path Coefficients." *The Annals of Mathematical Statistics* 5(3): 161–215.

Wong, Kenneth K. 1988. "Economic Constraint and Political Choice in Urban Policymaking." *American Journal of Political Science* 32(1): 1–18.

Yates, Jeff and Richard Fording. 2005. "Politics and State Punitiveness in Black and White." *Journal of Politics* 67(4): 1099–1121.

APPENDIX

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables.

variable	type	coding	mean	sd	min	max
Emergency Management	dependent variable	Receivership or consent agreement, municipality and/or school district = 1[a]	0.01	0.08	0	1
Fiscal Distress	intervening variable	"Fiscal Indicator Score"	1.42	1.33	0	9
Black Population	test variable	percentage	3.61	9.89	0	100
Household Income	potential confounder	natural log of median in k$	3.89	0.29	2.85	5.04
White Population	alternative test variable	percentage	91.78	11.37	0	100

Note: 6,935 observations from 985 units

[a]Allen Park, Benton Harbor, Detroit, Ecorse, Flint, Hamtramck, Highland Park, Inkster, Muskegon Heights, Pontiac, River Rouge and Three Oaks were under emergency management for some or all years during the period 2007-2013.

Table 2. Structural Parameters and Fit Statistics for Path Models of Emergency Management (EM) in Michigan.

	M1		M2	
	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on
Coefficients / Metric results				
Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS)	1.081*	- -	0.595*	- -
% Black Population	- -	0.049*	0.053*	0.049*
Median Household Income logged	- -	-0.618*	- -	-0.618*
Threshold (Y$1)	7.031	- -	6.870	- -
Intercept	- -	0.000	- -	0.000
Odds-ratios / Exponentiated results				
Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS)	2.948	- -	1.813	- -
% Black Population	- -	1.050	1.054	1.050
Median Household Income logged	- -	0.539	- -	0.539
Standardized results				
Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS)	0.622*	- -	0.374*	
% Black Population	- -	0.362*	0.245*	0.362*
Median Household Income logged	- -	-0.133*		-0.133*
Direct effects for % Black Population[a]				
Total	0.053*		0.082*	
Direct	- -		0.053*	
Indirect	0.053*		0.029*	
% Direct	none		65%	
Model fit[a]				
X^2 - value	90.643		5.274	
X^2 - df	2		1	
X^2 - p-statistic	0.000		0.022	
CFI	0.972		0.999	
RMSEA	0.080		0.025	
RMSEA <= .05	0.000		0.969	
Difference test M2 v. M1 p-value	0.000			

Note: *p<.001 and N=6,938 unit-years (e.g., cities, townships, school districts). Emergency Management includes periods of probation and overt political dispossession. All independent variables are mean-centered; mean(s.d.) are (FIS = 1.412(1.334), Black = 3.605(9.892), Med.H.Inc = 3.885(0.287)). Maximum likelihood estimation; see Online Appendix Table 3 (https://sites.google.com/site/nbreznau/home) for alternative estimators as the dependent variable is rare (0.07% of cases) and results may be biased by the number of zeros in the data.

[a]For effects calculations see VanderWeele and Vansteelandt (2010), and Muthén and Asparouhov (2015). Fit statistics taken from WLS estimation, as ML does not allow chi-square for a categorical DV.

Table 3. Sensitivity Logistic: Regression Models of Emergency Management (EM) with Different Estimators.

Estimator	ROBUST WLS (M)[b]				ROBUST WLS (MV)[b]				BAYESIAN[c]			
	M1		M2		M1		M2		M1		M2	
	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on
Coefficients/Metric Results												
Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS)	0.277*	—	0.214*	—	0.277*	—	0.214*	—	0.475*	—	0.264*	—
% Black Population	—	0.049*	0.022*	0.049*	—	0.049*	0.022*	0.049*	—	0.049*	0.027*	0.049*
Med. Household Income log	—	-0.623*	—	-0.622*	—	-0.623*	—	-0.622*	—	-0.619*	—	-0.619
Threshold (Y$1)	3.160	—	3.160	—	3.160	—	3.160	—	3.301	—	3.311	—
Intercept	—	0.000	—	0.000	—	0.000	—	0.000	—	0.000	—	0.000
Odds-ratios/Exponentiated Results												
Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS)	1.319	—	1.239	—	1.319	—	1.239	—	1.608	—	1.302	—
% Black Population	—	1.050	1.022	1.050	—	1.050	1.022	1.050	—	1.050	1.027	1.050
Med. Household Income log	—	0.536	—	0.537	—	0.536	—	0.537	—	0.538	—	0.538
Standardized Results												
Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS)	0.365*	—	0.271*		0.365*	—	0.271*		0.535*	—	0.313*	—
% Black Population	—	0.365*	0.207*	0.362*	—	0.365*	0.207*	0.362*	—	0.362*	0.234*	0.362*
Med. Household Income log	—	-0.134*		-0.134*	—	-0.134*		-0.134*	—	-0.133*	—	-0.134*

Table 3, continued.

Estimator	ROBUST WLS (M)[b]				ROBUST WLS (MV)[b]				BAYESIAN[c]			
	M1		M2		M1		M2		M1		M2	
	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on
Direct Effects for % Black Population[a]												
Total	0.014*		0.033*		0.014*		0.033*		0.023*		0.040*	
Direct	—		0.022*		—		0.022*		—		0.013*	
Indirect	0.014*		0.010*		0.014*		0.010*		0.023*		0.027*	
% Direct	none		67%		none		67%		none		33%	
Model Fit[a]												
X^2-value	32.453		5.273		27.146		5.237					
X^2-df	2		1		2		1					
X^2-p-statistic	0.000		0.022		0.000		0.022					
CFI	0.986		0.998		0.987		0.998					
RMSEA	0.047		0.025		0.043		0.025					
RMSEA <= .05	0.610		0.969		0.779		0.969					
Diff test M2 v. M1 p-value	n/a				0.000							
Posterior predictive p-value[b]									0.039		0.502	

Note: *p<.001 and N=6,938 unit-years (e.g., cities, townships, school districts). Emergency Management includes periods of probation and overt political disposession. All independent variables mean-centered.

[a]For effects calculations see VanderWeele and Vansteelandt (2010), and Muthén and Asparouhov (2015). Robust mean (M), and robust mean and variance estimations (MV). For model fit, see http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/23/76.html?1227544991, chi-square value and df cannot be relied upon here, only the p-value. This is calculated in a different way using WLS-based estimators.

[b]Bayesian estimator with 12,400 iterations and thinning = /20 to achieve a stable scaling correction factor of approximately 1 and an autocorrelation below 0.1 (Muthén and Asparouhov 2012; Muthén 2010). Also, eyeing the posterior distributions reveals that they are normal helping to explain why all three estimators used converge on nearly identical results. A p-value of 0.50 suggests that the structurally generated data are as likely to occur as the observed data indicating the best model fit (Zyphur and Oswald 2015).

Table 4. Sensitivity Analyses with Percent White as Test Variable.

	M1		M2	
	EM on	FIS on	EM on	FIS on
Coefficients / Metric results				
Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS)	1.081*	- -	0.534*	- -
% White Population	- -	-0.039*	-0.059*	-0.039*
Median Household Income logged	- -	-0.636*	- -	-0.636*
Threshold (Y$1)	7.031	- -	7.009	- -
Intercept	- -	0.000	- -	0.000
Odds-ratios / Exponentiated results				
Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS)	2.948	- -	1.706	- -
% White Population	- -	0.962	0.943	0.962
Median Household Income logged	- -	0.529	- -	0.529
Standardized results				
Fiscal Indicator Score (FIS)	0.622*	- -	0.332*	
% White Population	- -	-0.334*	-0.312*	-0.334*
Median Household Income logged	- -	-0.137*		-0.137*
Direct effects for % White Population[a]				
Total	-0.042*		-0.080*	
Direct	- -		-0.059*	
Indirect	-0.042*		-0.021*	
% Direct	none		74%	
Model fit[a]				
X^2 - value	25.071		2.299	
X^2 - df	2		1	
X^2 - p-statistic	0.000		0.130	
CFI	0.985		0.999	
RMSEA	0.041		0.014	
RMSEA <= .05	0.835		0.996	
Difference test M2 v. M1 p-value	0.000			

Note: *p<.001 and N=6,938 unit-years (e.g., cities, townships, school districts). Emergency Management includes periods of probation and overt political disposession. All independent variables are mean-centered; mean(s.d.) are (FIS = 1.412(1.334), White = 91.786(11.364), Med.H.Inc = 3.885(0.287)). Maximum likelihood estimation.

[a]For effects calculations see VanderWeele and Vansteelandt (2010), and Muthén and Asparouhov (2015). Fit statistics taken from WLS estimation, as ML does not allow chi-square for a categorical DV.



Note: Jitter applied for ease of viewing. See methods section for measurement detail.

Figure 3. Emergency Management of Michigan's Locally Governing Units by Percent Black and Fiscal Distress.

Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the Brenen International Graduate School of Social Sciences for early-stage financial support of this reserch.

Nate Breznau, SOCIUM Research Center on Inequality and Social Policy, University of Brenen
L. Owen Kirkpatrick, Dedman College, Southern Methodist University

All the Single Ladies: Analysis of the Self-Rated Health of SWANS (Unmarried and Childfree Women)

Cassandra Carter

ABSTRACT

Rising rates of singlehood and childfreeness are emergent trends in the United States. Historically, shifts in family composition have always been important, but the increasing number of unmarried and childfree adults is just beginning to gain acknowledgment. Using the Social Determinants of Health and the Sojourner Syndrome Model as a framework, race and family type are used to investigate the emotional well-being of Black and White unmarried, childfree women, termed herein as SWANS (Single Women Alone with No Stabilizers [Husbands or Children]). The frequencies of self-rated health outcomes are analyzed to determine the association between family type, emotional health, and race. Using secondary data from the National Health Interview Series (2015–2018), binary logistic regression (N=3552) results indicate that the main independent variables of race and family type interact to differentiate emotional health outcomes. These findings persist despite adjusting for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that are known to influence emotional health, such as age, income, education, and insurance coverage status. This study found that Black SWANS have poorer emotional health than White SWANS. Notably, Black SWANS experience the lowest rates of emotional health. These findings persist despite adjusting for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that are known to influence health. The analysis further underscores the importance of focusing on intraracial variations in marriage and health, and supports feminist arguments regarding the methodological and conceptual challenges to studying women who exist on the margins of society and Black women in general. Taken together, the results move toward examining health and family policies to identify areas for potential policy change.

INTRODUCTION

The prevailing health patterns among Black women living in the U.S. are striking. Research demonstrates that health disparities and the widening health gap between Black and White women continue to grow (Braithwaite, Taylor, & Treadwell 2009; Centers for Disease Control 2004). Unmarried, childfree women between the ages of 18 and 46 remain an unexplored group to analyze for health disparities. This group will be referred to as SWANS (Single Women Alone with No Stabilizers [Husbands or Children]). In recent years, the trend has been for women to remain unmarried for longer periods of time than in previous years (or permanently) (Waite & Gallagher 2001). Unmarried childfree women challenge assumptions about womanhood and femininity (Marsh et al. 2007; Nitsche & Brueckner 2009; Rowland 2007). This research will explore the health status of unmarried, childfree women to understand the interactions of race, marital status, and parenthood on self-rated health.

Research on changing family types suggests many tangible health benefits of marriage (e.g., happiness, better health, economic rewards) (Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2022; Waite 1995; Waite & Gallagher 2001). These studies have investigated the variability in measurable health outcomes to show a direct positive relationship between marriage and health (Waite 1995). Meanwhile, family sociologists consistently demonstrate that the probability of marriage varies by race. This pattern suggests that the benefits of marriage also may vary by race. When childfreeness and single status are considered, how is health influenced for Black and White women; do these groups experience the same or different health patterns? These remain unanswered questions among health and family scholars.

The relationship between race and family type is important; however, another important relationship is that between race and health, especially because Black women's health lags behind that of White women on average (Braithwaite, Taylor, & Treadwell 2009, 51). Over time, the health outcomes among Black women

have worsened, even after controlling for socioeconomic and other background factors (Braithwaite, Taylor, & Treadwell 2009; Read & Gorman 2006). A disproportionate number of Black women have lower income and education levels compared with White women, a pattern which presents overall barriers to good health (Braithwaite, Taylor, & Treadwell 2009; Williams & Collins 1995). Factors such as cultural environments, psychological influences, and sociological influences are used to explain major racial health disparities (Braithwaite, Taylor, & Treadwell 2009; Redding et al. 2000; Williams 1999; Williams & Collins 2001). Although these social health behavior models do explain health variation, the specific contributions of never-married and childfree status have not been fully explored in this context. Health status remains complex; as such, the exploration of health differentials demands a focus on multiple selected variables.

As modern society is undergoing rapid social change, the impact on certain individuals' health is unknown. Foregoing marriage among women is a new family trend. The unknown social consequences are important for social scientists seeking to make meaning of that change. SWANS, a byproduct of social change, are constructed as a niche social group.

NEVER-MARRIED CHILDFREE WOMEN: UNDERSTANDING HEALTH

Previous work on the health of never-married individuals has drawn varied conclusions. Never-married individuals have not been consistently held to have either good or poor health patterns overall. For example, Jessie Bernard (1975) asserts that marriage is good for men and bad for women, while Waite and Gallaher (2001) build a strong case for the institution of marriage. However, the health and well-being outcomes of this group might have significant social implications. Analyzing how unmarried, childfree Black and White women compare to each other and to their married counterparts on health outcomes, whether parents or childfree, can suggest specific areas of strength and weakness

in health, family, and societal inequalities. Analyzing various race-gender-marital status interactions will also illuminate how Black and White women may experience an important aspect of life—the inequality of their health. Low marriage rates and low probability of marriage suggest the significance of analyzing nonparental singlehood, especially among Black women (Marsh et al. 2007).

Much like the exclusion of women and particularly Black women, never-married singles have been neglected in research. Historically, in U.S. society, singlehood was considered to be temporary or problematic behavior, because fewer support systems, guidelines, or standards existed for negotiating an unmarried lifestyle (Staples 1981). However, modern impacts of remaining single and childfree for prolonged periods of time have not been as central to health research (Lundquist et al. 2009). In fact, "never-married" is often perceived as a transient marital status, occupied by a large number of individuals moving in and out of the status; therefore, the health consequences of singlehood are difficult to study (DePaulo 2006; Staples 1981; Spreitzer & Riley 1974). As the numbers of both never-married and childfree women increase (Taylor 2010), these findings have implications for many areas of research such as health, race, and family. The mainstream media is occupied with Black women's failure to marry, as evidenced by an overabundance of news articles, stories, and blogs (see Table 1). The topics, although all slightly different, focus on the results of prolonged childfreeness and frame unmarried status among Black and White women as problematic.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for SWANS (N=3552).

Variable Name	Black SWANS (n=5,306)	White SWANS (n=19,073)	P-Value	Relative Difference (B-W)
Self-Rated Health				
Excellent	29.98	40.51	P<.0001*	-10.53
Very Good	33.66	35.18		-1.52
Good	25.61	18.72		6.89
Fair	8.65	4.45		4.20
Poor	2.09	1.14		0.95

Table 1, continued. Descriptive statistics for SWANS (N=3552).

Variable Name	Black SWANS (n=5,306)	White SWANS (n=19,073)	P-Value	Relative Difference (B-W)
Independent Variable				
Age Groups				
18-23	38.22	46.76	P<.001**	-8.54
24-29	24.43	26.01		-1.58
30-35	15.25	13.31		1.94
36-46	22.11	13.92		8.19
Education				
Less than high school	13.48	8.76	P<.001**	4.72
High school	24.59	19.29		5.30
Some college	38.03	39.83		-1.80
Bachelor's degree	17.15	23.64		-6.49
Advanced degree	6.75	8.49		-1.74
Poverty Status				
At or above poverty threshold	77.91	84.15	P<.001**	-6.24
Below	22.09	15.85		6.24
Income				0.00
Less than $15K	57.11	54.71		2.40
$15,000-$24,999	13.78	14.88		-1.10
$25,000-$49,999	20.04	19.24		0.80
Over $50,000	9.07	11.58		-2.51
Home Ownership				
Rent	67.02	50.64	P<.001**	16.38
Own	32.9	45.97		-13.07
Insurance Coverage				
Yes	72.81	78.3		-5.49
No	27.19	21.69		5.50
Region				
North	17.11	19	P<.001**	-1.89
Midwest	17.53	25.33		-7.80
South	55.52	32.34		23.18
West	9.84	23.33		-13.49

* p <0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; **** p<0.00

GROUP INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION: MEET THE SWANS

Race and gender capture a number of interactions that have created a unique and understudied experience among never-married, childfree women. The SWANS are groups of White and Black women who do not have children or a marital partner. Husbands and/or children are viewed as grounding agents in larger society and true markers of adulthood, or as "stabilizing" forces. Similar groups of unmarried Black women have been referred to as the Love Jones Cohort (referring to the 1997 film *Love Jones*) (Marsh et al. 2007) and SaLAs (Single and Living Alone) (Marsh et al. 2007). The Love Jones Cohort is comprised of SaLAs and have been defined and operationalized as Black women between the ages of 25 and 44, living alone, childfree, single, holding high-wage occupations, who have advanced degrees, maintain above-average household incomes, and own their own homes (Marsh et al. 2007, 3).

The term SWANS was first coined by sociology professor Christine Whelan (2006) and was used as an acronym to stand for Strong Women Achievers and No Spouse, from which the expression SWANS in this study was derived. When author Whelan (2006) uses the term SWANS, she refers to a group of women who are unmarried. Of SWANS, she finds that being a high achiever decreases women's chances for marriage (for both racial groups). Whelan's work does not provide an in-depth racial analysis of SWANS; the conceptual framework, when applied to race, is limited. Whelan noted the complexity involved with the racial burden among female high achievers.

BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Pew Center reported one in five (20%) White women ages 40–44 as being childfree in 2008, with 17% of Black women in the same age group childfree that year (Taylor 2010). Rates of childfreeness increased more for non-Whites than Whites between 1994 and 2008. During those same years, the childfree rates for Black

and Hispanic women grew by more than 30%, while rates for White women increased only 11% (Tables 2, 3). The trend among Black women to remain unmarried and childfree has mirrored the overall U.S. decline in marriage and fertility rates (Dickson, Lynda, & Marsh 2008; Lundquist et al. 2009). Little information exists that can be utilized to understand the well-being or social experiences of this group—thus making the goals of this study twofold. While SWANS are a specific population, Marsh and colleagues (2007) suggest that Black unmarried, childfree women are part of the newly emerging Black middle class and are an important demographic group worthy to be studied. Thus, this group's particular experience and demographic profile will contribute to understandings and conceptualizations of singlehood.

Table 2. Contingency table: racial distribution of health factors by family type SWANS only (N=3552).

	Self-Rated Health				
	Fair/Poor		Excellent/Very/ Good		Total
Race Category					
Black	8.18	105	91.82	696	758
White	3.8	62	96.2	2659	2764
					3355
Chi-Square	25.27***				
**P<(0.1)					

MARITAL STATUS AND HEALTH: HAPPY TOGETHER

Although "never married" is the marital status of interest in this study, current understandings about the unmarried are typically viewed from the vantage point of married individuals. Sociologist Peter Stein (1981) studied singles and created a general schema of how individuals arrive at singlehood (see Figure 1). Family scholars continue to focus on married individuals as the group of primary interest. Research demonstrates that married individuals are the healthiest of all marital statuses (CDC 2022;

Table 3. Log-linear model coefficients (odds ratios) SWANS on physical health.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Race[a]				
Black	2.42****	2.21****	1.66****	1.68****
Age[2]		1	1.00**	1.00***
Education[b]				
High school			0.73	0.75
Some college			0.52*	0.52*
Bachelor's degree			0.33*	0.34**
Advanced degree			0.29**	0.30**
Income[c]				
$15,000-$24,999			0.52**	0.52**
$25,000-$44,999			0.44***	0.44***
$45,000+			0.31****	0.30****
Insurance Coverage				
Uninsured			0.58**	1.78**
Region[d]				
South				0.93
Year[e]				
2011				1.17
2012				0.8
2013				0.65
Intercept	-3.24	-4.09	-7.17	-7.13

[a] Reference category is White SWANS; [b] Reference category is Less Than High School; [c] Reference category is Less Than 15K; [d] Reference category is Insured; e Reference category is Year 2010.

* p <0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; **** p<0.00

Stutzer &Frey 2006; Waite & Gallagher 1995). Marriage enhances health by providing additional resources, sexual regulation, and self-esteem building (Stutzer & Frey 2006; Waite & Gallagher 1995). Social researchers interested in studying singlehood only have studies on marriage such as the one cited above to rely on, which are not designed very carefully to consider singlehood as a social category. *The Case for Marriage* (Waite & Gallagher 2001) concluded that married people are emotionally, psychologically, and physically healthier than their divorced, bereaved, or single

	Voluntary	Involuntary
Stable	• Open to lifelong single-hood but not looking for marriage	• Actively seeking mates • Not interested at time of study but now looking
Not Stable	• Choose to be single • Opposed to marriage • Cannot get married for any reason • Member of reigious order	• Never-married and for-merly married • Likely to remarry

Figure 1. Typology of Unmarried Individuals Based on Peter Stein's 1987 Singlehood Typology

counterparts. While the book received some serious critique from the research community (DePaulo 2006; Penman 2005), it is one of the most widely cited works regarding marriage and health. In 2007, the Center for Disease Control's National Center for Health Statistics confirmed this conclusion by demonstrating that married individuals were less likely to be limited in daily activities, to smoke, to drink heavily, or to be physically inactive (CDC 2022).

ANALYTICAL APPROACH

The central question that this study aims to address is: Are there racial differences in the health statuses of SWANS? This research utilizes data from the Integrated Health Interview Series (IHIS). The sample number (34,241) at the individual level includes pooled data from 2010 to 2013 in order to increase the number of health events that may occur among a younger aged cohort. Individuals to be included in the sample for this analysis are selected by two main criteria: 1) race—only individuals that identify as Black or White are included in the sample, and 2) sex—only individuals who identify as female are included. The sample derived from the IHIS covers health data from the years 2010–2013. This study utilizes binomial logistic regression to study the impact that the interaction of race, gender, and marital status has on the outcome variable, health.

Health as a variable and concept is complicated, as it is difficult to ascertain all components of health. As a result, several variables exist that are used to create and predict the dependent variable *self-rated health*. This variable is widely used because of its validity and reliability for measurement of individual health status (Idler & Benyamini 1997; Mossey & Shapiro 1982). Many research studies have linked self-rated health to accurate prediction of mortality and morbidity, which demonstrates the overall reliability of the measurement. Self-rated assessments of health status ask respondents to "rate their overall health" within the ordinal frame of "excellent," "good," "fair," "poor," or some other similar Likert Scale variant (Idler & Benyamini 1997). Self-rated health is used to determine the likelihood that an individual reports being in excellent/good health. The variable labeled SELF-HEALTH is dichotomized and recoded to reflect whether a person reports 1=fair/poor health or 0=excellent, very good, or good health.

Race, marital, and family type are the main independent variables. Variables that are a measure of one's social class are the important variables to consider. For this analysis, family size, family type and marital status will be combined to create the main analytical group, SWANS. Social class parameters, namely, education, income, age, year, and region, are included as control variables. AGE is a continuous variable that measures the individuals' age in years. The data contains information for those women aged 18 to 44 in each model. AGE and AGE-squared will be presented. INCOME is divided into four categories ranging from less than $15,000.00 to greater than $47,000.00 per year. EDUCATION is divided into five categories: no high school degree, high school degree, some college, college degree and those with an advanced degree. Five dummy variables are created (less than high school education, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and advanced degree) to investigate the educational impact on health outcomes (Nitsche & Brueckner 2009).

REGION is coded as a series of dummy variables (SOUTH, NON-SOUTH), with SOUTH as the reference category. Due

to the concentration of Black females in the southern states, the high rates of religiosity, and the "culture of marriage" pervasive in the south, I expect to find the effect of race and marital status on health to vary across regions, such that individuals residing in southern states will have higher rates of marriage than those who reside in the northeast, west, and midwest.

INSURANCE, or medical coverage, is included as an independent variable and is measured as insured or uninsured. The goal of this study is to interpret the health consequences of race and family type, focusing on childfree singlehood. Descriptive statistics of the specified variables are presented, paying special attention to the percentage distribution of family type and each individual variable (for conceptual framework see Figure 3 below). To build a more accurate analysis of child-free unmarried adults, the descriptive tables show the sample distribution including age, race, and education of unmarried childfree women. Bivariate analysis between the dependent variable(s) and each of the explanatory variables is presented. Chi-square tests are used to detect if family types differ significantly on various health outcomes. Using the Chi-square results, the association and strength of association, between the independent and dependent variables can be determined.

DISCUSSION

The social demographic characteristics of SWANS are of interest, especially when compared to married parents, the prototype of American families. As shown in Table 1, most SWANS possess a bachelor's degree or advanced degree (36.17% and 32.33% respectively), with fewer SWANS achieving only lower levels of education, such as a high school diploma or less than high school. This positive education association is one that we will revisit. More than a third of SWANS, 37.34%, reside in the south, compared to the majority, who are located across the remaining 3 U.S. regions (62.66%). SWANS are relatively younger than married women in the sample, with the average age of SWANS being 29.21 years, compared to the average age of married parents (36.24 years)

and married childfree couples (34.35 years). The majority of married childfree women earn over $45,000 compared to SWANS or married parents, and SWANS are slightly less likely than married parents to earn $45,000 or more per year. Single parents, as expected, are most likely to earn the lowest income, less than $15,000 per year (41.62%). SWANS, however, are more likely to earn below $15,000.00 than married parents and married childfree women (33.48%, compared to 26.52% and 18.09%, respectively). Table 1 presents the educational levels of family types and reveals education patterns of SWANS relative to married women. SWANS report lower levels of attainment of bachelor's degrees and advanced degrees than married parents (36.17% compared to 41.03%).

Overall Findings

Because SWANS, unmarried and childfree women, are an understudied population, it is difficult to completely discern or predict their health patterns relative to White women. The descriptive analysis provides some support for the overall notion that unmarried, childfree women may, in some cases, demonstrate better overall well-being in comparison to the married, if not better. The sociodemographic indicators of income and education present an interesting picture of the economic realities of being unmarried. A third of all SWANS (33%) report belonging to the lowest income category (earning less than $18,000), while a little over half of SWANS report yearly earnings of $25,000.00 to $45,000.00. Considering the youthfulness of the sample, as well as the educational status (see below), SWANS are making great financial gains. Educationally, SWANS are making a great deal of social advancements and are attaining advanced and bachelor's degrees on par with married households. The huge difference in obesity status among both Black and White SWANS could suggest a possible health benefit for Black SWANS; White SWANS are nearly twice as likely to report obesity compared to Black SWANS. This issue of body size, race, weight, and marriage should be further explored.

While the results from the descriptive display of health-related variables revealed racial differences in health and other social and demographic categories, some racial similarity exists among the relationships among race, family type, and health.

For the first set of tables that test the SWAN relationship, all models report the odds ratios or race alone as the first independent variable; Model 2 introduces the other main independent variables in a stepwise regression procedure; Model 3 shows the effect of the main independent variable of race, plus the control variables added to family type. The results of the regression models and associated equations simultaneously support race as a major social determinant of health.

The odds of reporting fair/poor health for Black SWANS are about 2.42 times greater than those for White SWANS. The result is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, thus we reject the null hypothesis; the hypothesis that Black SWANS will report fairer/poorer health than White SWANS is supported. For Model 2, the question arises what happens to the model when we add a very important demographic variable, age, which has a tremendous impact on health conditions. When holding age and age-squared at a fixed value, the odds of reporting poor health are still greater (2.21) for Black SWANS, and the result is statistically significant. With Model 3, when we add SES indicators such as education, income, and insurance coverage, the impact of race on reporting poor health decreases, but still the odds of reporting poor health for Black SWANS are 1.66 times greater than those for White SWANS despite holding the impact of age and SES factors at a fixed value. Although it is not statistically significant, the odds of reporting poor health are the greatest for the high school graduates among other educational categories; as the educational level goes up, the odds of reporting poor health significantly decrease.

Similarly, the odds of reporting poor health decrease as income levels increase. Those who earn more than $45,000 are more likely to report good health. For the uninsured, the odds of reporting poor health versus reporting good health increase

by a factor of 0.58 compared to the insured. With Model 4, when we add the effects of region and time, the odds of reporting poor health for Black SWANS slightly increases compared to those for White SWANS. There is not a very noticeable change in the effect of income and education; however, the odds of reporting poor health for the uninsured significantly increase from 0.58 to 1.78. After controlling for various SES variables, race remained a consistent and significant predictor of health, with Black SWANS being more likely to report negative health conditions than White SWANS.

CONCLUSION

The Sojourner Syndrome Model directly addresses the paradoxical situation of Black SWANS. Because of the many social identities of Black women, a focus on health should be addressed by considering various distributions of resources, privilege, and power so that a comprehensive picture of health emerges (Andersen & Collins 2006; Hurtado & Stewart 1997; Mullings 2005; Weber & Fore 2007). The family ranking systems for White women show more of a reward for marriage and motherhood than for Black women. Due to the multiplicative oppression of race, class, gender, and now family type, there is not an equal system of rewards for Black women. This systemic differentiation has revealed race as a master status that overrides any advantages that marriage has for health. In American society, Whiteness is considered the status quo, and there are discriminate advantages of marriage and parenthood. These benefits are contrasted to the disadvantageous situation of Blacks, who collectively display poorer health outcomes than White women.

According to the Sojourner Syndrome Model, oppressive life circumstances among Black women cause their health decline (Kelly 2014; Lekan 2009; Mullings 2005). The use of an intersectional framework is needed to interpret the key findings. Race alone or parental status alone are too restrictive in what they reveal about the Black unmarried-childfree experience. When

additional contextual factors such as race, parental status, and marital status are incorporated in the concept of family experiences, a more comprehensive understanding of health is possible. Recent studies on Black women's health propose that racism, structural discrimination, and social inequality are all associated with physiological changes, and are also somewhat responsible for their adverse health conditions (Williams et al. 1997). Despite major progress in the overall health of all Americans, African Americans experience a complex and diverse range of health problems at a much greater rate compared to Whites. For both racial groups, findings here are consistent with the Social Determinants of Health Model and demonstrate the severity in racial health gaps. Blacks are more likely than Whites to live in poverty, to be uninsured, and to be out of work resulting from disabling health conditions (Braithwaite, Taylor, & Treadwell 2009; Williams et al. 1997). African American women ages 45 to 54 have three times the rate of diabetes, increased levels of breast cancer mortality, and have a 60% greater likelihood of death than White women in the same age group (Holden et al. 2012; Taylor & Holder 2001). HIV/AIDS, cancer, diabetes, and hypertension are just a few of illnesses that plague Black women at a higher rate.

Family scholars now recognize marriage as no longer compulsory, a necessity, or having the same utility as the past. Family scholar Susan Brown, co-director of the National Center for Family and Marriage Research (NCFMR) at Bowling Green State University, comments on the change in marriage: "It is just one of array of options. Increasingly, many couples choose to cohabit, and still others prefer to remain single" (Bowling Green State University 2013). Decreasing marriage rates are not limited to Black communities but are found in society overall, which is explored in detail by family scholars such as McAdoo (2007) and Cherlin (2005). Andrew Cherlin's social-scientific projections in 1993 regarding how increasing educational rates among women would impact marriage rates have come to pass. In fact, well over 20 years later, Cherlin does his best to explain why his predictions

came to pass. In *The Marriage-Go-round*, Cherlin (2010) illuminates the precarious state of the nuclear family as a "war" of cultural ideas. While personal choice and individualism are part of the American ethos, many institutions continue to cater to married individuals in ways that are ultimately beneficial to their health, yet little consideration for unmarried women exists.

Future research should expand the discussion of SWANS' experiences or stimulate a conversation concerning marriage and nonmarriage, always calling into question the role of institutions in creating these divides. Future research should also analyze the SWANS experience among multiple racial groups. Many cultural, social, and religious customs reject the idea of singlehood. Alternative questions of health outcomes and the cultural impact of singlehood can be compared across various racial, social, and religious groups.

REFRENCES

Andersen, Margaret L., and Patricia Hill Collins. 2006. *Race, Class, and Gender: An Anthology*. 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.

Bernard, Jessie. 1975. *Women, Wives, Mothers: Values and Options*. Chicago: Aldine.

Bowling Green State University. 2013. "Marriage Rate Lowest in a Century." July. https://www.bgsu.edu/news/2013/07/marriage-rate-lowest-in-a-century.html.

Braithwaite, Ronald L., Sandra E. Taylor, and Henrie M. Treadwell, eds. 2009. *Health Issues in the Black Community*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 2022. "FASTSTATS - Marriage and Divorce." March 25. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/marriage-divorce.htm.

Cherlin, Andrew J. 2005. "American marriage in the early twenty-first century." *The Future of Children* 15: 33–55.

Cherlin, Andrew J. *The Marriage-Go-Round: The State of Marriage and the Family in America Today*. New York: Vintage, 2010.

DePaulo, Bella. 2006. *Singled Out: How Singles Are Stereotyped, Stigmatized, and Ignored, and Still Live Happily Ever After*. London: Macmillan.

Dickson, Lynda, and Kris Marsh. 2008. "The Love Jones Cohort: A New Face of the Black Middle Class?" *Black Women, Gender & Families* 2(1): 84–105.

Idler, Ellen L., and Yael Benyamini. 1997. "Self-rated Health and Mortality: A Review of Twenty-Seven Community Studies." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*. 21–37.

Holden, Kisha B., Stephanie P. Hall, Maryam Robinson, Sharra Triplett, Dolapo Babalola, Valens Plummer, Henrie Treadwell, and L. DiAnne Bradford. 2012. "Psychosocial and sociocultural correlates of depressive symptoms among diverse African American women." *Journal of the National Medical Association* 104(11–12): 493–504.

Hurtado, Aida, and Abigail J. Stewart. 1997. "Through the Looking Glass: Implications of Studying Whiteness for Feminist Methods." *Off White: Readings on Race, Power, and Society*: 297–311.

Kelly, Ursula A. 2014. "Military Sexual Trauma and Nursing Practice in the Veterans Administration." In *Philosophies and Practices of Emancipatory Nursing*, pp. 285–297. Oxford: Routledge.

Lekan, Deborah. 2009. "Sojourner Syndrome and Health Disparities in African American Women." *Advances in Nursing Science* 32(4): 307–321.

Lundquist, Jennifer Hickes, Michelle J. Budig, and Anna Curtis. 2009. "Race and Childlessness in America, 1988–2002." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 71(3): 741–755.

Marsh, Kris, William A. Darity Jr, Philip N. Cohen, Lynne M. Casper, and Danielle Salters. 2007. "The Emerging Black Middle Class: Single and Living Alone." *Social Forces* 86(2): 735–762.

McAdoo, Harriette Pipes, ed. 2007. Black Families. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Mossey, Jana M., and Evelyn Shapiro. 1982. "Self-Rated Health: A Predictor of Mortality among the Elderly." *American Journal of Public Health* 72(8): 800–808.

Mullings, Leith. 2005. "Resistance and Resilience: The Sojourner Syndrome and the social context of reproduction in Central Harlem." *Transforming Anthropology* 13(2): 79.

Nitsche, Natalie, and Hannah Brueckner. 2009. "Opting Out of the Family? Social change in racial inequality in family formation patterns and marriage outcomes among highly educated women." *American Sociological Association*. (August 2009). Retrieved from http://www.yale.edu/ciqle/Nitsche_brueckner_Executive%20summary.pdf

Penman, Robyn. 2005. "Current Approaches to Marriage and Relationship Research in the United States and Australia." *Family Matters* 70: 26–35.

Read, Jen'nan Ghazal, and Bridget K. Gorman. 2006. "Gender inequalities in US adult health: The interplay of race and ethnicity." *Social Science & Medicine* 62, 5: 1045–1065.

Redding, Colleen A., Joseph S. Rossi, Susan R. Rossi, Wayne F. Velicer, and James O. Prochaska. 2000. "Health Behavior Models." In *International Electronic Journal of Health Education*.

Rowland, Donald T. 2007. "Historical trends in childlessness." *Journal of Family Issues* 28(10): 1311–1337.

Spreitzer, Elmer, and Lawrence E. Riley. 1974. "Factors associated with singlehood." *Journal of Marriage and the Family*. 533–542.

Staples, Robert. 1981. *The World of Black Singles*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Stein, Peter J., ed. 1981. *Single Life: Unmarried adults in social context*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Stutzer, Alois, and Bruno S. Frey. 2006. "Does Marriage Make People Happy, or Do Happy People Get Married?" *The Journal of Socio-Economics* 35(2): 326–347.

Taylor, Paul, ed. 2010. "The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families." *Pew Research Center*.

Taylor, Sandra E., and Kisha Braithwaite Holden.2001. "The Health Status of Black Women." *Health Issues in the Black Community*: 44–61.

Waite, Linda J. 1995. "Does Marriage Matter?" *Demography* 32,(4): 483–507.

Waite, Linda J., and Maggie Gallagher. 2001. *The Case for Marriage: Why Married People Are Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially*. New York: Crown Publishing Group.

Weber, Lynn, and M. Elizabeth Fore. 2007. "Race, Ethnicity, and Health: An intersectional approach." In *Handbooks of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations*, pp. 191–218. Boston, MA: Springer.

Whelan, Christine B. 2006. *Why Smart Men Marry Smart Women*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Williams, David R., and Chiquita Collins. 1995. "US Socioeconomic and Racial Differences in Health: Patterns and Explanations." *Annual Review of Sociology: 349–386.*

Williams, David R., Yan Yu, James S. Jackson, and Norman B. Anderson. 1997. "Racial Differences in Physical and Mental Health: Socio-economic Status, Stress and Discrimination." *Journal of Health Psychology* 2(3): 335–351.

Williams, David R. 1999. "Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health: The Added Effects of Racism and Discrimination." *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 896(1): 173–188.

Williams, David R., and Chiquita Collins. 2001. "Racial Residential Segregation: A Fundamental Cause of Racial Disparities in Health." *Public Health Reports* 116(5): 404–416.

Cassandra Carter, Booz Allen Hamilton

Learning to Breathe Again: Navigating Academic "Weather," Grief, Microaggressions, and Misogynoir as a Black Woman on the Tenure Track

Letisha Engracia Cardoso Brown

ABSTRACT

This article uses Black feminist and critical race theories to foreground an autoethnographic account of grief, microaggressions, and misogynoir faced by a Black woman on the tenure track. This autoethnographic project seeks to highlight how the positionality of Black women faculty must be contextualized by larger social forces such as a global pandemic, misogynoir, and the prevalence of microaggressions in the face of personal experiences of grief. Research on Black women's experiences in higher education is gaining more attention; work that focuses specifically on issues of grief remains limited, however. The goal of this article is to emphasize the ways in which the personal is political for Black women on the tenure track by providing an in-depth look at one Black woman's personal trajectory.

Keywords: Academia, autoethnography, Black feminism, Black girl magic, grief

INTRODUCTION

> I wasn't there when my sister died.
>
> —Christina Sharpe, 2016

On January 12, 2018, five days after my thirty-first birthday, I was confronted by the loss of my thirteen-year-old cousin, who was like another younger sister, to suicide. Like Sharpe, I was not there when she died. I was in Texas working to finish my

dissertation while applying for academic jobs, dealing with the built-in stress of the graduate school process, and hoping that my eight-year journey from my BA to my PhD was worth the struggle and sacrifice. My graduate school experience was impacted by tremendous grief due to the death of close loved ones from start to finish, as well as the general anxieties that come from being a young Black woman in a predominantly White-serving institution (PWI), and the first in my family to pursue a PhD. Nevertheless, in the face of misogynoir, microaggressions, and grief, I persisted. In the end, I wound up accepting a postdoctoral teaching fellowship offer at a land-grant, research-intensive university in southwest Virginia that would begin a month after my dissertation defense. My memories about my interview process, however, are shrouded in the fog of the grief I was experiencing due to the loss of my sister-cousin only months before I received my interview invitation and flew out.

The postdoctoral teaching fellowship that I accepted was intended to bring in a diverse group of recent PhD graduates to this PWI and provide us the opportunity to teach for two years with a possibility of being moved to the tenure track in our postdoctoral department homes. Four positions were created the year I accepted my postdoc; the four, across the college of liberal arts and human sciences, became a cohort of sorts. Ten months into my postdoc in the department of sociology I was granted the opportunity to be moved to the tenure track and I accepted, the only one in my cohort of four to get this offer after only one postdoc year.

My academic transitions have been marked by grief at every step of the way. Loss upon loss due to the passing of those I loved seemed to be part and parcel of my journey, then COVID-19 hit, and all that I was negotiating became further complicated. Being a Black woman on the tenure track at a Research-1 institution is a privilege, as there are so few of us within these spaces, making our absence hypervisible while simultaneously rendering us invisible in several ways (Patton and Catching 2009). Black women faculty on college campuses and universities across the country, in PWIs

and in historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs), to an extent, occupy a space of second-class citizenship, due largely to the patriarchal nature of academic environments (Esnard and Cobb-Roberts, 2018).

Colleges and universities across the country are continuously boasting their commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion, though with limited definitions of each; these efforts tend to have the impact of oppressing those they are intended to serve (Ahmed 2012; Baldwin, Brown, & Brantuo 2023; Baldwin 2021). As noted by Ahmed (2012), colleges and universities are more concerned with issues of perception and generating the "right image" when it comes to efforts to diversifying college campuses in terms of race. Therefore, diversity "become[s] about *changing perceptions of whiteness rather than changing the whiteness of organizations*" (81). This manifests via initiatives and efforts around diversity, inclusion, and equity concerned with generating statistics of increased enrollments of racially marginalized students and faculty, as well as recruitment and retention data that meet a quota (Baldwin et al. 2023). The embedded racism and sexism that exists within academic spaces places Black women faculty in often precarious positions (Baldwin et al. 2023) making our experiences on the tenure track difficult, to say the least.

In this article I grapple with my lived experiences of grief as a Black woman on the tenure track as tied to microaggressions, misogynoir, and the COVID-19 global pandemic to highlight the struggles that Black women writ large must contend with. Grief is a term that many associate with experiences of trauma and loss, usually due to the death of someone close (Wade 2021). According to Merriam-Webster grief is a "deep and poignant distress caused by or as if by bereavement," and in this article I do focus on my experiences of grief as those tied to the death of loved ones as well as acquittances. I also focus on the specific experiences of anti-Black sexism, or *misogynoir*, to which Black women are subject (Bailey 2021), and racial microaggressions as the subtle (seemingly innocuous) verbal, nonverbal, or visual insults experienced by Black faculty and other faculty of color,

often committed unconsciously and unintentionally (Andrews 2015; Solórzano, Ceja, and Yosso 2000). Anti-Blackness is foundational to the structure of the United States and her social institutions, including higher education (Sexton 2010; Bonner et al. 2015). Anti-Black racism and anti-Blackness are not only contextualized by "White-on-Black" racial oppression; they also include the relationship that exist between non-Black non-White folx and Black people in the U.S.

Black women's experiences in higher education are constricted by the imperialist, White-supremacist, sexist, heterosexist, capitalist, patriarchal system that makes up the foundation of our nation (hooks 1984). However, even as we struggle within the *ivory tower* due to our subordinated social location at the intersections of race, gender, class, and often sexuality as well, we find ways to survive and even thrive. This reality is what Cashawn Thompson meant when she popularized the notion of Black girls being magical. Thompson reflected that Black girls, and by extension Black women, are *magic* insofar as "our accomplishments might seem to come out of thin air, because a lot of times, the only people supporting us are other Black women" (Thomas 2015 n. p.). Thus, while this autoethnographic project is primarily concerned with grief, and the racialized and gendered systems of oppression that are existent within the academy, it is also a reflection of Black girl magic in progress.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

My academic training began in earnest once I joined the Africana Studies department as an undergraduate student at the University of Northern Colorado, following two years of academic and personal struggle at the University of Pittsburgh. My successful transition to the PhD program in sociology at the University of Texas at Austin, months after finishing my bachelor's degree, placed me in a program that helped to further my knowledge and understanding of critical theories and forms of analysis. To situate my personal narrative within a larger context of

the struggles faced by Black women in the academy, particularly those of us who pursue a career on the tenure track, I draw on Black feminist and critical race theory to analyze my lived experiences. Black feminism and critical race theory as critical social theories provide necessary tools that seek the liberation of individuals from systemic forms of oppression (marbley et al. 2015). Critical race theory incorporates "transdisciplinary methodologies drawing upon theory, experiential knowledge and critical consciousness to illuminate and combat … institutional racism" (marbley et al. 2015, 56) and is being used more and more within work that critically examines the structures of the academy. Critical race theory has been used to highlight the continued prevalence of institutional racism within higher education, as well as bringing attention to the power differentials within the academy that marginalize people of color, women, and specifically Black women. Born out of radical theorist traditions, critical race theory learned from Black feminism the importance of examining marginalization not as single issues of race, gender, or class, but rather as cumulative forces.

Black feminist theory highlights the ways in which Black women faculty like me live within a double oppression of race and gender (Harris 2007) that often marks us as "outsiders-within" PWI higher educational spaces (Collins 2000). My lived experiences of racial microaggressions are tied to the gendered stereotypes attached to Black womanhood, including that of "the angry Black woman," and modern "Jezebel" (Collins 2000). As a Black woman faculty member whose work centers issues of race/racism as well as gender and sexuality within sports, higher education, and Black girlhoods, I have often felt others' doubt of my ability and position as an "expert" (Andrews 2015). "Real scholars" remain those who are perceived as White and male, adopting an "oppressive epistemological approach to research, teaching, and service" (Andrews 2015, 80): everything that I am not. Black feminist thought accounts for these experiences, allowing me to reflect on my life as a means of highlighting my right to produce

knowledge as a Black woman (Collins 2000). Black feminism and critical race theory provide frameworks through which I can explore my lived realities as part of a larger social context. So, while my autoethnographic project is a personal one, it too is political in its relationship to the broader social world.

LITERATURE: NAVIGATING ACADEMIC "WEATHER"

> Many African-American faculty members see themselves caught in a never-ending cycle of having to prove their competence as intellectuals. The literature on experience of minority professors shows that many believe that they must work twice as hard as other faculty to get half.
>
> —Fred A. Bonner II, 2004

Black faculty are underrepresented on college campuses across the country, making up 6.4% of assistant professors, 5.4% of associate professors, and 3.4% of full professors, despite being 13% of the U.S. population (United States Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics 2010). While university and college campuses continue to champion notions of diversity, equity, and inclusion with respect to the hiring and retention of faculty of color in general, and Black faculty in particular, the increase in Black faculty has stagnated (Overstreet 2019). The academy remains a space that caters to the norms of Whiteness, such that university structures, policies, and procedures have not yet acclimated to an environment that supports a more heterogenous population (Overstreet, 2019). Among Black women who do gain entry to the professorate, we tend to experience environments that are hostile or "chilly" (Giles 2015) toward us, wherein we are subject to pay disparities and face barriers around tenure and promotion, ultimately contributing to high rates of attrition (Overstreet 2019).

More and more scholarship on the experiences of women of color and Black women within the professorate is bringing atten-

tion to these barriers (Harris, 2007; Overstreet 2019). There is still so much left to explore, however. Existing research speaks of *gendered racial battle fatigue* experienced by Black women faculty on the tenure track that result from our experiences of institutional and systemic (macro) and individual and classroom (micro) forms of aggression meant to put us "in our place," reminding us that we are not "real scholars" (Andrews 2015). The daily impact of these forms of raced-gendered oppression come at an emotional, physical, and psychological cost (Andrews 2015). This raced-gendered oppression that is a manifestation of deep-seated anti-Blackness manifests as "misogynoir" (Bailey 2021), making our time in the academy draining. Raced and gendered microaggressions have been broken down into micro- assaults, insults, and invalidations. *Micro-assaults* refer to the explicit racial verbal or nonverbal or environmental attacks; *micro-insults* occur when a verbal comment or action is rude, insensitive, or demeaning to one's racial heritage; while *micro-invalidations* are the acts that occur to degrade or exclude the perceptions, thoughts, and experiences of people of color (Moore 2015; Sue et al. 2007). Ultimately, all three work together for the purpose of attacking folks of color (Moore 2015).

In addition to the burden of these assaults, grief too can arise to make for a more difficult tenure-track experience. Research on the impact of grief because of bereavement remains limited, but the experience of grief due to the death of loved ones is a known facet of racial inequality (Umberson 2017; Umberson 2018). Black people in America encounter the death of a loved one at higher rates than our White peers, as we are three times more likely to experience the death of one or more family members by age 30, and 90% more likely to live through more loss due to the death of loved ones by age 60 (Umberson 2017). Familial loss undermines individual health and overall well-being via a complex interplay of social, psychological, and biological mechanisms (Umberson 2018). Specifically, the death of a loved one often contributes to psychological distress and anxiety which can negatively impact one's health and contribute to the creation of strain in remaining

social relationships (Umberson 2018). Social relationships remain a form of social capital and directly impact health and overall well-being (Umberson 2018), making research on grief from loss a necessary avenue of further study.

While a lack of close social relationship can take its toll on the emotional, physical, and psychological well-being of Black women in the academy, we cultivated ways of navigating this space through the creation of counter-spaces such as "sister-circles" (Barnette et al. 2011). Sister-circles offer support networks for Black women faculty built upon existing friendships, fictive kinship, and a sense of comradery that stems from being in close connection to other Black women navigating similar experiences (Barnett et al. 2011). The cultivation of sister-circles and other spaces that counter that dominant structures of racism and sexism within the academy, of Black women and other people of color, opportunities to find emotional and mental rest—a chance to breathe again. Without the kinship I discovered in sister-circles as a Black woman faculty member at a PWI, navigating grief within the context of the global COVID-19 pandemic along with experiences of microaggressions would not have been unbearable. What follows is a descriptive account of my autoethnographic approach to the examination of my personal navigation of microaggression, misogynoir, and grief within the academy as a tenure-track Black woman faculty member during a global pandemic.

PLACING MYSELF AT THE CENTER: AUTOETHNOGRAPHY AS METHOD

Autoethnography foregrounds the personal experiences of the research to provide a deeper understanding and critical analysis of social contexts and constructs (Buggs 2017). Autoethnography makes possible the deconstruction of barriers that exist between researcher and subject, making it an ideal method for those who have lived through marginalization to be able to give voice to our stories (Buggs 2017). My approach to autoethnography as method

is tied to previous research done via scholarly personal narratives that allow for the articulation of my dual experiences of my personal and professional (academic) selves (Bonner et al. 2015). To do so, I attend to matters of positionality as both my worldview and the positions I adopt about research on the academy within its social and political context. My worldview is shaped by my beliefs about the nature of the social world as well as what we can know about it, and the ways that we interact with and relate to our environments. My positionality is shaped by my lived experiences as a Black woman from a precarious class background on the tenure track, and as the first to pursue a PhD in my immediate family. My positionality at the intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality, and (dis)ability all shape how I have approached this project and others I have conducted in the past. Autoethnography as method, grounded in Black feminist and critical race theories, allows for a reflexive and critical reading of my experiences on the tenure track that extol the reality of the personal as political. Thus, this autoethnographic project aims to build upon previous research conducted by Black women faculty navigating the tenure track (Andrews 2015; Overstreet 2019).

I place myself at the center of study, via Black feminist reflexive praxis, to offer a critical examination of journal entries, emails and other conversational exchanges with colleagues, friends, and acquittances, as well as comments made on my university's system of course evaluations—student's perceptions of teaching (SPOT) surveys. I have kept a journal since about the age of twelve, and in the past four years since my sister-cousin's suicide in January 2018, I have collected five journals, including free-form examples as well as more structured journals such as the Michelle Obama "Becoming Journal" that contain daily prompts. Using this material as data, I offer a personal account of my experiences with grief, microaggressions, and misogynoir as I have moved along the tenure track.

NAVIGATING THE TENURE TRACK: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

In this section I focus on the themes of grief, microaggressions and misogynoir, and the global pandemic COVID-19 as aspects of my tenure-track journey. Being a Black woman at a PWI on the tenure track has been challenging to say the least. Revisiting old wounds, my reading and reflecting on my data has revived feelings of distress and anxiety in the face of multiple traumas; this process has also provided me a sense of catharsis, however. It is my hope that through my personal account other Black women on the tenure track will find affirmation of their lived experiences also.

Moving through the Fog: On Grief

My experiences of grief have been cyclical. My earliest memories of the death of a loved one come from witnessing my maternal grandfather's slow decline following a stroke when I was twelve years old. His death happened first slowly, then all at once, and left an imprint of death on memory. Death has been a visceral part of my life since that moment. The epigraph at the beginning of this article, "I wasn't there when my sister died," is a reality that has haunted me since my sister-cousin committed suicide in January 2018, just shy of what would have been her fourteenth birthday on February 13 of that year. I wasn't there. I was in the last few months of my doctoral journey in Texas, she was in North Carolina living under the weight of anxiety and depression that I was unaware of at the time; I have been navigating both conditions since my adolescence as well. The weight of her suicide was and remains heavy. My memory constantly returns to the drive from the Waffle House to the funeral home parking lot, where I promptly expelled my breakfast less than five hundred feet from where my sister-cousin's body lay in a casket. I still can no longer eat at the Waffle House.

Two months later in March 2018, I found myself in front of a room of students and faculty giving a teaching demo as part of

the application process for what would become my postdoctoral teaching fellowship position. I was in a haze of grief, a fog, my body operating on autopilot. Nevertheless, the interview process went well enough to land me the postdoc with a teaching load of two courses per semester, and a salary of $45,000 (before taxes), the most money that I had made in my life up until that point. Even with the salary, benefits, and security of a position, after defending my dissertation, grief remained my constant companion, lingering just below the surface. Ten months into my postdoc, an opportunity came for me to become part of the department of sociology as a tenure-track assistant professor. I accepted immediately. At paternal aunts passed in her sleep unexpectedly, cracking open my already fragile heart once again. Grief upon grief.

Then, in 2020, while navigating the COVID-19 global pandemic along with the rest of the world, still reeling from the sudden losses of my sister-cousin and aunt, more death and more grief followed. On September 13, 2020, I learned of the sudden death of a high school friend from a Facebook group page. She had died suddenly in a car crash, and memories of our friendship and my time in Pullman, Washington came flooding back. Though we had lost touch after high school, she and I had been close. The suddenness of her death hit me like a ton of bricks, reminding me of the fragility of life. One moment we are in and of the world, living, breathing, and dreaming of our futures; then in an instant we become memories (if we are lucky enough to be remembered). My grief continued and was compounded by recurring experiences of death and loss. Only a month after the death of my high school friend, another good friend from undergrad had his world rocked when his infant son—a twin—died suddenly in his sleep in October 2020. My journal entries from that time are sporadic, disjointed ramblings that highlight the extent of my grief and feelings of anxiety and depression. I ached for my friend, for his wife, for the twin girl and older sister that remained. The funeral for my friend's son was my first via Zoom. It would not, however, be my last.

Given the restrictions on travel due to the global pandemic, funerals and other occasions become virtual experiences for many of us, a new way of navigating a shared grieving experience. For me, the Zoom experience of funerals felt somewhat hollow, reminding me of my distance physically and emotionally from those who were grieving as I was grieving, unable to reach out to them for physical comfort. This lack of contact became heightened for me on December 8, 2020, when I found that my paternal grandfather had died in his sleep. At 84 years old, and with health concerns, his passing was something that had lingered in the back of my mind. The moment of his passing, however, still hit me as suddenly as the other losses I had experienced. My heart was ripped wide open. I was unable to attend his funeral in person in Colorado due to the pandemic and my status as COVID-positive, so Zoom was how I watched his memorial. Watching via Zoom, with an unsteady connection, and technical difficulties on my end and in the church where his funeral was held, created a new form of grief that I had yet to experience. Virtual grieving is complex; it left me feeling disconnected and out of breath. In the years to come, research on grief and mourning should take into consideration how the global pandemic shifted the ways in which we have been able to grieve and mourn.

You Don't Look Like a Professor: Microaggressions and Misogynoir.

Microaggressions are the everyday encounters of belittlement experienced by racially marginalized groups (Sue et al. 2007) including Black women faculty. While these encounters are often subtle, including disparaging looks and comments that on the surface appear innocuous, they accumulate over time and can contribute to feelings of social isolation and an overall lack of support (Clark et al. 2012). For Black women, microaggressions must be contextualized by the raced, gendered, and classed tropes associated with Black womanhood. Patricia Hill Collins termed stereotypes such as the modern Jezebel and angry Black woman

"controlling images," highlighting the power of representational politics in shaping the lived experiences of Black women (Crenshaw 1991). Microaggressions experienced due to controlling images are reflective of what Moya Bailey (2021) calls "misogynoir," or the specific form of anti-Black sexism experienced by Black women. My experiences of microaggressions occurred in various ways. I have encountered subtle (and not so subtle) remarks about my hair, my intellectual ability, and ultimately my right to occupy the space of "expert" and "scholar."

The singular phrase that has continuously followed me as I navigate the tenure track is one that I'm sure has been shared by other Black women faculty: "You don't look like a professor." Even with the changing race and gender dynamics of colleagues and universities through programs aimed at increasing faculty of color, the image of "the professor" remains one that is White and male. Even a quick Google search of "What does a professor look like?" pulls up images of White men in jackets with elbow patches. For Black women in the academy, the refrain "you don't look like a professor" drips with the venom of misogynoir, as it seeks to undermine our credentials and right to occupy space within the professorate. I have experienced first-hand through face-to-face encounters as well as anonymous comments made on my SPOT surveys this form of misogynoir. Students' perceptions of teaching have consistently been shown to benefit faculty who are perceived as normative to the structure of the academy: cis White men fare better than Black women, women, and other faculty of color (Bawso, Codos, and Martin 2013).

In addition to comments about my physical appearance as existing outside of the normative idea of what a professor looks like, my experiences of microaggressions include the failure of people to acknowledge my credentials and expertise. Conversations on social media platforms such as Twitter bring up the ways in which Black women faculty are not acknowledged as holding the status of "doctor" even when we hold doctorates. Students and others call Black women faculty by first name rather than "Dr." in

email correspondence and in face-to-face interactions. The failure to acknowledge Black women as "Dr." highlights the raced, gendered, and classed perceptions that individuals hold about what a "real scholar" looks like (Andrews 2015). My own experiences of being called by my first name or by Mrs./Ms. in email correspondence as well as face-to-face, rather than by my earned title, has been a continuous micro-assault, a constant reminder that I am an "outsider-within" the White space of the academy (Collins 2000).

Troubled Waters: Navigating the Academy in the Wake of COIVD-19.

January 2020 marked the beginning of my second semester on the tenure track. That semester also marked the beginning of the COVID-19 global pandemic. My university, like others across the country, extended breaks (spring break in our case) for courses to be transitioned from in-person to virtual, to try and combat the virus. Still relatively new to solo teaching in my tenure-track journey, the adjustment was a rocky one. We were launched into troubled waters. As a Black woman in the academy, my status as "other" places me in a constant struggle to prove my competence at every turn (Basow et al. 2013). In-class interactions often resulted in students' surprised faces when I introduced myself as "Dr. Brown," with someone always skeptical whether I had finished my doctorate or whether I was a graduate student instructor. The question was asked more than once. My Blackness, my "young face," and my womanhood challenged many students' dominant ideas of what a "real professor" looked like.

Though the mainstream rhetoric has sought to position the global pandemic as a great equalizer, it in fact has highlighted the preexisting inequalities felt by those of us outside of the dominant culture. Academic and lay studies confirmed that women, as well as minoritized racial and ethnic communities were among those to be hardest hit by the pandemic, many of us occupying the status of "essential workers," and thereby functioning on the front.

While my position as an assistant professor at a major university insulated me from some of the more devastating effects of the

pandemic—such as layoffs, loss of wages, loss of insurance, and other consequences—it could not insulate me from everything. As a Black woman, I experienced first-hand how COVID ravaged the Black community. I was personally exposed to COVID-19 and battled the effects for months. All the while, the world around me was in turmoil. The U.S. was witnessing more racial inequality in the form of state-sanctioned police violence in the wake of multiple deaths of unarmed Black victims, each of which took their toll on my psyche. I struggled to navigate feelings of stress, grief, sickness, and exposure to microaggressions all the while having to maintain a consistent level of productivity with respect to research, teaching, and service. The struggle was real.

On March 13, 2020, the prompt in my "Becoming Journal" read "how do you connect with your community," giving me the space to reflect on my experiences up to that point. I wrote,

> I feel so connected to my department community. We have a regular spot where we have meetings, and the serving staff knows my regular order and everything. However, now we're in the midst of a crisis, COVID-19. I'm supposed to teach online moving forward. I'm not going to have face-to-face interactions. I am better face-to-face [when teaching]…I would ask my colleague, X, but we are no longer on the best of terms…I will do my best to keep my student's community intact. I know that my race and ethnicity class has pre-arranged PowerPoints and quizzes which is helpful, but I'm less confident when it comes to my social inequality course.

With the sudden shift to online teaching and learning mid-semester, even with the extra week tacked on at the end of spring break to prepare, I felt inadequate. I'm sure this feeling was experienced by others. Nevertheless, to my surprise, my SPOT scores from that semester were not nearly as horrible as I had anticipated. I received a 5.23/6 for my race and ethnicity course and a 4.96/6 for social inequality, compared to the department average

score of 5.24 and the college average score of 5.38, with respect to my "overall teaching effectiveness." While course evaluations remain skewed measures for Black women faculty, they are what we have as reference to our performance and aptitude.

Teaching during that first semester of the pandemic was difficult. Not only that, the necessity of maintaining a rigorous research and service agenda added to my experiences of anxiety and depression. My mental health was in shambles. Nevertheless, another journal entry from my "Becoming Journal," dated March 25, 2020, prompted me to list five small victories that I had accomplished. Those victories included 1) I had finished a draft of a paper on Black men, faith, food, and health from my dissertation data that I intended to submit to a special call for papers in *The Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 2) a co-authored book chapter with a graduate student was accepted for inclusion in an edited volume, 3) I participated in a study to support a graduate student's research, 4) I attended a university virtual happy hour event in my role as Secretary of our university's Black Faculty and Staff Caucus, and 5) I had a virtual therapy session. That my "victories" were so heavily tied to collegiate productivity does not escape me. However, my heart is gladdened by the knowledge that I leaned into self-care in the form of therapy and virtual social events during such a difficult time.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Navigating the tenure track as a Black woman is no easy feat. We are faced with structural as well as interpersonal barriers related to our lived experiences at the intersections of race, class, and gender. My autoethnography has attempted to highlight various barriers and struggles to bring attention to some lived experiences of Black women faculty. This project has covered only four years of grief; that my cousin's son was murdered in October 2021, at eighteen, will have a lasting impact on my life for years to come. Grief is a part of my life, as much and often more than anything else. Yet the grief isn't the only thing that holds me. The magic that

exists within the shared spaces of my sister-circles, for instance, gives me moments of respite—opportunities, to breathe again.

REFERENCES

Ahmed, S. 2012. *On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional Life*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Bailey, M. 2021. M*isogynoir Transformed: Black Women's Digital Resistance*. New York: NYU Press.

Baldwin, A. N. 2021. *A Decolonial Black Feminist Theory of Reading and Shade: Feeling the University*. New York: Routledge.

Baldwin, A. N., Brown, L. E. C., and Brantuo, N. 2023. "Full Participation by Another Name is This Bridge Called My Back." In *Black Feminist Decoloniality Theorizing Toward Futurity*. (Eds. Andrea N. Baldwin and Nana Brantuo). Blacksburg: Virginia Tech Publishing.

Barnett, A. M., Stadulis, R., Payne, M. R., Mitchelle, M., Williams, L. Williams-Costa, C. 2011. "In the company of my sisters: Sister circles as an anxiety intervention for professional African American women." *Journal of Affective Disorders* 129(1–3): 213–218.

Basow, S. A., Codos, S. & Martin, J. L. 2013. "The effects of professor's race and gender on student evaluations and performance." *College Student Journal* 47(2): 352–363.

Bonner, Fred A. II. 2004. "Black professors: On the track but out of the loop." *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. (June 11). https://www.chronicle.com/article/black-professors-on-the-track-but-out-of-the-loop/?cid=gen_sign_in

Buggs, S. G. 2017. "'Your momma is day-glow White': Questioning the politics of racial identity, loyalty, and obligation." *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 24(4): 379–397.

Clark, C. R., Mercer, S. H., Zeigler-Hill, V., & Dufrene, B. A. 2012. "Barriers to the success of ethnic minority students in school psychology graduate programs." *School Psychology Review* 41(2): 176–192.

Collins, P. H. C. 2000. *Black Feminist Though:t Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. New York: Routledge.

Crenshaw, K. 1991. "Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence against women of color." *Stanford Law Review* 43(6): 1241–1299.

Ellis, C., Adams, T., & Bochner, A. 2011. "Autoethnography: An overview." *Historical Social Research* 36(4): 273–290.

Esnard, T. & Cobb-Roberts, D. 2018. *Black Women, Academe, and the Tenure Process in the United States and Caribbean*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Giles, M. 2015. "Acclimating to the Institutional Climate: There's a 'chill' in the air." In *Black Faculty in the Academy: Narratives for Negotiating Identity and Achieving a Successful Career* (Eds. Fred A Bonner II, Aretha faye marbley, Frank Tuitt, Petra A. Robinson, Rosa M. Banda, and Robin L. Hughes). New York: Routledge.

Harris, T. M. 2007. Black Feminist Thought and Cultural Contracts: Understanding the Intersection and Negotiation of Racial, Gendered, and Professional Identities in the Academy. *New Directions for Teaching and Learning* 110: 55–64.

hooks, bell. 1984. *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*. New York: South End Press.

Rucks-Ahidana, Z. 2021. "The Systemic Scarcity of Tenured Black Women." *Inside Higher Education*. https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2021/07/16/black-women-face-manyobstacles-their-efforts-win-tenure-opinion?s=03

marbley, a. f., Rouson, L., Li, J., Huang, S. H., and Taylor, C. M. 2015. "Black Faculty Negotiating the Microaggressions in Scholarship." In *Black Faculty in the Academy: Narratives for Negotiating Identity and Achieving a Successful Career* (Eds. Fred A. Bonner II, Aretha faye marbley, Frank Tuitt, Petra A. Robinson, Rosa M. Banda, and Robin L. Hughes). New York: Routledge.

Moore, A. W. 2015. "The Life of a Black Male Scholar: Contesting Racial Microaggressions in Academe." In *Black Faculty in the Academy: Narratives for Negotiating Identity and Achieving a Successful Career* (Eds. Fred A Bonner II, Aretha faye marbley, Frank Tuitt, Petra A. Robinson, Rosa M. Banda, and Robin L. Hughes). New York: Routledge.

Overstreet, M. 2019. "My First Year in Academia, or the Mythical Black Woman Superhero Takes on the Ivory Tower." *Journal of Women and Gender in Higher Education* 12(1): 18–34.

Patton, L. D. & Catching, C. 2009. " 'Teaching while Black': Narratives of African American student affairs faculty." *International Journey of Qualitative Studies in Education* 22(6): 713–728.

Rucks-Ahidiana, Z. 2021. "The Systemic Scarcity of Tenured Black Women." *Inside Higher Education*. https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2021/07/16/black-women-face-many-obstacles-their-efforts-win-tenure-opinion?s=03

Sharpe, C. 2016. *In the Wake: On Blackness and Being*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Sue, D. W., Capodilupo, C. M., Torino, G. C., Bucceri, J. M., Holder, A., Nadal, K. L., & Esquilin, M. 2007. "Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for clinical practice." *American Psychologist* 62(4): 271–286. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.62.4.271

Thomas, D. 2015. "Why everyone's saying, 'Black girls are magic'." *Los Angeles Times*. https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-everyones-saying-black-girls-are-magic-20150909-htmlstory.html

Umberson, D. 2017. "How Losing Family Members Earlier than Expected Adds to Racial Disadvantage for U.S. Blacks." *PRC Research Brief* (2)1. https://doi.org/10.15781/T2N29PC1R

Umberson, D. 2018. "Black Death Matters: A conceptual framework for understanding racial disparities in relationship loss health." *PRC Research Brief* (3)1. DOI: 10.15781/T2K06XH6D

Letisha Engracia Cardoso Brown, University of Cincinnati

Race and Ethnicity across Borders: An Ethnographic Study of Haitian Women in Diaspora

Nikita Carney

ABSTRACT

Using a transnational approach grounded in ethnographic research with Haitian women, this paper augments existing U.S.-based literature on race and gender to examine the construction of race and ethnicity as transnational processes rooted in local historical contexts. Focusing on the workplace as a crucial site where race is reproduced, this article draws from the experiences of Haitian women in Boston, Montreal, and Paris regarding race and ethnicity to shed light on the ways in which race is constructed transnationally while remaining locally grounded. Haitian women experience race in each context, but the ways in which race manifests in Boston differs from the ways in which race manifests in Montreal or Paris, due to the specifics of each locale's historical relationship to race, labor, and migration.

INTRODUCTION

Categories of race and ethnicity exist globally and immigrants are perhaps especially well-positioned to reveal the complexities of race and ethnicity across place. The purpose of this article is twofold: 1) to uncover the ways in which race is created and recreated in three geographic contexts, particularly concentrating on the role of paid labor and the workplace; and 2) to make the argument that U.S.-based race theory can be augmented to study race transnationally. Drawing from ethnographic research with Haitian women in Boston, Montreal, and Paris, I employ a transnational approach to uncover the historical contexts that shape

understandings of race and ethnicity as modalities in which social membership and cultural citizenship are experienced, and to illuminate the ways in which national ideologies, combined with relationships to the paid work force, function as powerful influences in the daily lives of Haitian women. I investigate shifts in racial and ethnic identity for Haitian women as they participate in multiple national contexts.

This article takes paid labor as its site of inquiry, examining the ways in which race, class, and labor intersect in the lives of Haitian transmigrants and influence constructions of racial and ethnic identity for migrants and the greater community. Looking specifically at paid labor ties experiences of race and ethnicity to larger structures of the global political economy. Neoliberalism, like race and ethnicity, transcends national borders, but unfolds in particular ways in particular places as it is shaped by the local historical context. Simultaneously, this multi-sited study illuminates ways in which the relationships between and among sites shape expressions of race and ethnicity for Haitian women.

I examine existing literature on women of color and work, especially the scholarship of Rose Brewer, and establish to what extent that research illuminates this transnational population. I also highlight what knowledge about Haitian women in diaspora might add to Brewer's theories of race, gender, and employment. Haitian women's diverse experiences highlight ways in which categories of race and ethnicity are established and maintained through daily interactions in the workplace. These categories of race and ethnicity situate Haitian women within the context of the nation of arrival,[1] indicating varying levels of belonging within the nation in relation to people of other racial and ethnic groups. While focused on expanding Brewer's theory of race, gender, and labor to illustrate how Brewer's scholarship can apply transnationally, this article also adds to existing literature on Black identity formation pertaining to West Indian youth in the United States (Butterfield 2004; Richards 2014) and Algerian women in France (Killian & Johnson 2006) by adding the voices

and experiences of first-generation Haitian women as they navigate migration, work, and race in diaspora.

EXPANDING THE LITERATURE

I met Naomi[2] at an event hosted by Maison d'Haïti, the major Haitian cultural center in Montreal. She spoke on a panel featuring scholars and activists involved in the Haitian community. I introduced myself after the panel and we stayed in contact during my time in Montreal and beyond. She is in her mid-thirties with very light skin and curly hair. She is extremely well-connected in the community and always involved with activism alongside her graduate studies. On a cold night in January of 2017, Naomi and I met up for an interview over hot chocolate in a café in Montreal. In addition to the formal interview, we talked for hours about our lives and our research. That evening Naomi told me:

> It's hard because I don't really identify with U.S. Black feminist [theory], though I have a lot of respect for it and understand the context in which it arose.
>
> —Naomi, a biracial, Haitian-born graduate student in Canada

This quote led me to ask the question of what is missing for Naomi when she looks at U.S. Black feminist theory. I posit that what is missing for her is an acknowledgment of how U.S.-based theories fit within a transnational racial framework. Her comment emphasizes how race and ethnicity cannot be fully understood without historical and cultural context. I attempt to address her concerns by deploying transnational analyses of race and ethnicity that can allow for deeper understanding of these contexts. Much of the rich literature on race and ethnicity in U.S. sociology has focused specifically on race within the context of the United States. To explore race transnationally, scholars must be careful not to apply uncritically U.S.-based theories and concepts to other contexts, and to remain mindful of the contexts within which theories are developed. For the purposes

of this article I refer to Vertovec's most basic definition of transnationalism as "multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states" (Vertovec 1999). In addition to the wealth of scholarship produced on race and ethnicity in the U.S. context, we can also draw from the work of postcolonial scholars such as Frantz Fanon (2008), Paul Gilroy (1993), Stuart Hall (1996), Jacqui Alexander (2005), and others. Though the work of postcolonial scholars such as these provides one piece of the puzzle for analyzing race transnationally, the focus of this article is the ways in which U.S.-based scholarship on race can be used with care to study race transnationally. Through transnational analyses of the ways in which race and ethnicity are constructed we can build upon existing theories, testing, challenging, and developing ever more nuanced understandings of race and ethnicity. I contend that aspects of U.S. black feminist theory can do important work in describing and analyzing how the work site becomes a place of racial formation.

Feminist theories of race and paid labor provide a basis for understanding the intersecting power relations at play for Haitian women within the global political economy. Following the work of Marxist feminist scholars, I argue that paid labor is inseparable from issues of gender, culture, and the global political economy (Brewer 1999; Ong 2010). Early Marxist feminists argued that women's oppression is rooted in their relationship to the means of production vis-à-vis men (Benston 1989). Some have suggested that women's employment outside the home is empowering, and leads to greater gender equality in the household. This argument largely evolved from studies of white, middle-class, heterosexual women in the United States as they have struggled to gain gender equality within the workforce.

For Haitian women, the things that they share with middle-class white women in the U.S. because of gender are inflected differently because of race, citizenship status, and language, as well as gender (Charusheela 2003; Kim 2013). S. Charusheela argues that paid work historically has had very different mean-

ings for descendants of slaves and immigrants who are brought to metropoles to perform cheap labor. Charusheela goes so far as to assert, "The actual experience of work, far from being liberation from the bonds of home, was and is often demeaning, undignified, and oppressive" (2003, p. 298). In addition to the challenges of reframing normative gender relations within the household, women of color have experienced work outside of the household as degrading but necessary for survival. On top of the challenges of paid work, rather than freeing women of color from the bonds of the household, work outside the home involves a double day for many women, as they must perform work outside the home while also taking care of their families.

U.S.-based theories of race and ethnicity can be used to inform transnational analyses, but only if thoughtfully applied with attention to how the local context shaped the development of the theories. This article draws from the seminal works of renowned U.S. feminist scholars Rose Brewer (1999) and Evelyn Nakano Glenn (2011) to examine how the lived experiences of Haitian women in diaspora might enable us to extend and augment current scholarship about how labor affects the lives of women of color in intersecting and historically constituted ways. The racial and gendered division of labor is rooted in social, and arguably cultural, systems of meaning.

Looking particularly at the U.S. context, Brewer identifies the ways in which the position of Black women within the U.S. labor system reflects the historical and systematic oppression of Black women. Glenn, also focusing on the U.S., examines the intersection of race and labor in three local sites, creating a comparative historical analysis of race and gender, labor, and citizenship during the era of U.S. Reconstruction. While these two authors specifically write about the United States, I argue that their theories of race, gender, and labor as rooted in a cultural system of meaning and material relations can elucidate the racialized processes of citizenship-making in other nations as well, especially in this age of transnational neoliberalism. Simultane-

ously, the experiences of Haitian women in diaspora in this study can draw attention to how we need to adapt these theories when examining these processes outside of the United States.

At the core of Brewer's analysis is the notion that women of color occupy a position within the paid work force that is determined by race, gender, and class. Black women in the United States are often relegated to poorly paid, gender-segregated jobs, such as domestic labor and clerical work, and face disproportionate rates of unemployment while engaging in unpaid and devalued social reproductive labor (Brewer, 1999; Marable, 2015). Black women's placement within labor hierarchies in the United States remains intertwined with global neoliberal projects that systematically track women and minorities into insecure forms of employment, consisting of positions that fluctuate based on the ebb and flow of capitalist market demands (Brewer 1999; Kim 2013).

By adapting Brewer's analysis of Black women's relationships to paid labor in the United States to look at experiences of Haitian women in Boston, Montreal, and Paris, I argue that the historical relationship of each nation to colonialism, racism, gender oppression, and xenophobia influences the ways that Haitian women become situated within the workforce. Similarly, I assert that Glenn's historically situated analysis of race, gender, labor, and citizenship can inform a transnational analysis of the ways that Haitian women's labor connects them to forms of both membership and exclusion in various nations.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

To contextualize my ethnographic data on Haitian women, race, and labor, I now provide a brief history of Haitian migration, and an overview of each of the three field sites. August 14, 1791, marked the beginning of the Haitian Revolution, a slave revolt that defeated Napoleon's army and led to Haitian Independence in January of 1804 (Dayan 1995). Haiti became the first independent Black republic in the world. Following the revolution, Haiti

fought a battle of international diplomacy for over half a century to gain recognition as an independent nation-state while the international community, notably the United States, France, and the Vatican, refused to come to terms with the implications of an independent Black nation (Trouillot 1995). France demanded that Haiti pay reparations to compensate for the economic loss of the colony. Haiti endured serious political instability, including a military occupation by the United States beginning in 1915 that lasted for 19 years. The occupation officially ended in 1934, but the United States continued to play a large role in Haiti both politically and financially (Levin 1995).

A few decades after the end of U.S. occupation marked the start of the brutally repressive Duvalier dictatorship, which lasted almost thirty years, from 1957 to 1986 (James 2010). Foreign governments continued to play a large role in Haitian politics following the Duvalier regime by supporting political candidates who aligned with foreign interests and by orchestrating the coup d'état that overthrew President Aristide in 1991. Most recently, prominent interventions in Haiti have taken the form of foreign aid with restrictive conditions and the proliferation of activity by nongovernmental organizations, which some scholars argue has become a form of neocolonialism (Schuller 2008).

The first major flow of Haitian emigration occurred during the Duvalier regime (Basch, Schiller, & Blanc 2005). Under the dictatorship, many intellectuals and members of the political opposition fled to the United States, Canada, and France, among other nations, since these governments historically played a large role in Haitian politics (Basch, Schiller, & Blanc 2005; Delachet-Guillon 1996). Canada never occupied Haiti in an official sense, but Canadian banks opened in Haiti during the Duvalier dictatorship in order to advance Canadian business interests in the nation, despite that fact that investing in the Duvalier dictatorship supported the oppressive regime and continued to fuel the out-migration of Haitians, many of whom landed in Montreal (Bernardin 1974).

The first wave of immigrants consisted almost exclusively of middle- and upper-class Haitians, many of whom faced poverty and discrimination because of migrating. To make a living, Haitian immigrants had to enter the workforce in subordinate roles, many taking jobs in service industries, especially in health care as physicians' aides and hospital workers (Basch Glick Schiller, & Szanton Blanc 2005).

This study focuses on three metropolitan areas, one in each country, in which many Haitians have made their homes and developed thriving diasporic communities: Boston, Montreal, and Paris.

Boston, Massachusetts, USA

Beginning with the first wave of Haitian migrants in the late 1950s, the number of people of Haitian ancestry in the United States continues to grow steadily, with an estimated 290,000 people in 1990, 548,000 in 2000, and 830,000 in 2009 (Buchanan 2010). Haitians in the first wave of migration to Boston in the 1960s and 1970s found themselves in the midst of violent race riots over the desegregation of schools. Caught in the middle of longstanding racial tensions between white and African American residents of the city, they shared the brunt of the anger that many white residents directed at all Black people. As in other U.S. destinations for Haitian migrants, Boston's long history of racial tensions has seriously influenced the inclusion and exclusion of Haitians from dominant U.S. society. Massachusetts is home to the third-largest Haitian community in the United States, following Florida and New York. The Haitian community in Massachusetts has played an important role in the cultural and economic life of the state over the past 50 years. As of 2004, there were an estimated 60,630 Haitians in Massachusetts, mostly concentrated around Boston and its outlying suburbs (Jackson 2011). In Boston, 20% of Haitians work in health care support occupations, including as registered nurses and in administrative support positions (Menino 2009).

Montreal, Quebec, Canada

The first major wave of Haitian migrants to Quebec occurred during the period known in Quebec as *la revolution tranquille*—the quiet revolution, which allowed for the migration of primarily upper-class, French-speaking Haitians to take professional jobs in the province during the 1960s (Mills 2013; Pegram 2005). By 1974, Haitian migrants made up the largest number of migrants coming to Quebec, accounting for 14.5% of total incoming migrants (Jadotte 1977). When increasing numbers of lower-class Haitians began to migrate to Quebec in subsequent years, the provincial and national governments shifted to an immigration policy that prioritized labor-ability over race and ethnicity. In the case of Haitians in Quebec, the first wave of migrants was temporarily accepted into the nation because of their professional and French-language skills. Quebec only began recruiting Haitians after first attempting to recruit French-speaking Europeans. This history reveals the interconnectedness of race, labor, and class in who was included in the nation. Today, Haitians are one of the largest non-European ethnic groups in Canada. As of 2001, 82,000 Haitians lived in Canada, 90% of whom lived in Quebec (Statistics Canada 2007).

Paris, Île-de-France, France

France's national policy on race is legally mandated colorblindness. Collecting data on race through any national census is forbidden. This supposed colorblindness, however, does not translate into an absence of racial tensions, nor does it alter assumptions about which people properly represent the French nation. French law makes it difficult to know exactly how large the Haitian community is in France, but estimates coalesce around anywhere between 30,000 to 60,000, primarily concentrated in the Paris region (Delachet-Guillon,1996; Fleurimond 2003).[1] France is considerably farther from Haiti than the Caribbean and North American destinations that attract Haitian migrants, but Haiti's history as a former colony of France gives that nation a certain

familiarity and appeal to Haitians who have the means to travel there. Over past decades the Haitian community in France has shifted between moments of great political mobilization and a virtual absence of visible Haitian cultural and political organization.

METHODS

This project consists of ethnographic research with Haitian women in Boston, Montreal, and Paris from 2011 through 2017. In total, I actively engaged in fieldwork for approximately 6 months in Boston, 6 months in Montreal, and 3 months in Paris. My fieldwork included 39 in-depth, semi-structured interviews ranging from one to four hours in length. I identified the interviewees through snowball sampling, with the assistance of key informants in each site. Each interviewee, except one, was born in Haiti.[3] Most emigrated in young adulthood, though some in the Boston sample migrated in adolescence and two in the Montreal sample migrated as children, though they still had strong memories of their early lives in Haiti. The vast majority of interviewees lived in Port-au-Prince prior to emigrating and were of the middle and upper classes in Haiti.

As a Haitian American woman who grew up in Boston, I began this project by reaching out to my family's social networks in the city and asked for referrals to other Haitian women who might be willing to take part in my research. In Montreal, I began with no formal ties to the Haitian community, but quickly found key informants through Haitian folkloric dance classes that I attended. My two key informants in Montreal introduced me to many more Haitian women in the community, easing my access to this group. In Paris, I made contacts at a conference on the Haitian diaspora, one of whom became a key informant for my research. In each location, my status as a second-generation Haitian woman whose family was of the middle class eased my entry into the communities for my research. Most of the interviews in each location took place in the interviewee's home, though a handful took place in cafes and several took place within the

women's workplaces. In addition to the formal interviews, I had hundreds of conversations with members of the Haitian communities where I conducted my research, resulting in over 600 pages of detailed fieldnotes.

Basing my analysis on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Lofland et al. 2007), I coded the fieldnotes and transcribed interviews using Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software. I began with open coding, and then refined my initial codes to capture themes of race, gender, discrimination, culture, and labor. Through this process I came to build a framework for understanding how the Haitian women in this study experience race and ethnicity in different geographic locations, each with their unique historical contexts.

BLACKNESS, HAITIANNESS, RACE, AND ETHNICITY

First Wave of Migration

The ways in which race is socially constructed as a category in Haiti differ from the social construction of race in the United States, Canada, and France (Basch, Glick Schiller, & Szanton Blanc 2005; Waters 1999). In Haiti, race and class function as interconnected categories, with lighter-skinned Haitians tending to occupy positions of power and membership in the higher socioeconomic classes. Perhaps as a result of the strong correlation between race and class in Haiti, race serves as a much more fluid category in Haiti than in the United States. For instance, a person's race in Haiti may change based on his or her social and economic situation, rather than being fixed based on one's skin color. When moving to the United States, Haitians face much less flexible racial categories that impact their interpersonal relations (Waters 1999, p. 31).

In Montreal, the first wave of Haitian migrants encountered issues of social integration. The government opened its borders to Haitian migrants of a certain class because Quebec needed skilled laborers to replenish the workforce due in large part to Quebec's low birthrate. Around the same time many Haitian

intellectuals were seeking asylum from the Duvalier dictatorship. According to a first-hand account by one of the early Haitian migrants, this government-level desire to welcome laborers preceded wide acceptance of the idea of socially integrating foreigners at the level of the general population.

Quebec, a francophone nation within a larger Anglophone nation, has fought to maintain French Canadian ethnic and cultural identity, leaving many unsettled by the sudden influx of foreigners, even those who speak French. This feeling of viewing immigrants as forever foreign permeates a statement by Guerda, a retired nurse in her late 60s. She is also a feminist activist and works for the public radio corporation. She is small in stature, and has short grey hair and medium brown skin. She told me about her entry into Quebec's workforce during an interview in the living room of her home, a bright and sunny space, on a cold winter morning in 2016.

> I remember when I was studying to become a nurse, an instructor told me that I was a representative of my country. And I thought, "A representative of my country? What does that mean? I can't represent my country. I am from Haiti, but I'm not here to represent my country. No one gave me an ambassador's mandate. Would you evaluate me for who I am inside this course?"[4]
>
> —Guerda (Montreal)

The wariness about foreigners in Montreal largely was expressed through anxieties about maintaining French Canadian ethnic identity and a persistent assumption that Quebec's history is that of white French Canadians, despite the fact that today 1 in 5 people in Montreal are foreign born. In 2017, the city of Montreal marked its 375th anniversary with a video that included only white French Canadians, providing a clear example of the enduring image of Quebec's people despite the great diversity in Montreal today. The video sparked outrage from minorities in the city and was quickly taken down and replaced by media that more

accurately depicted the city's diversity. Each Haitian woman I interviewed that week expressed their dismay over the racism of excluding all but French Quebecers in Montreal's history.

Many immigrants know of racial tensions in the United States before migrating and are prepared to encounter a certain amount of structural racism, but sometimes they feel unprepared to face the interpersonal racism that they experience. While Haitians immigrating to the United States may not feel antagonism towards white Americans, since they did not historically experience slavery in the United States, white Americans often see Haitians as African American, and therefore may subject Haitians to the same racist treatment doled out to African Americans. This was particularly true for the early wave of immigrants, in the 1960s and 1970s, many of whom had light skin and enjoyed a privileged status in Haiti prior to migrating (Pierre-Louis 2013). The experience of racism may have been particularly shocking for the first major wave of Haitian immigrants in the 1960s since they arrived in the United States in the midst of racial tensions surrounding the civil rights movement. In Boston, many first-wave migrants found themselves in the middle of race riots over busing to desegregate schools (Formisano 2004; Lupo 1988). Contrary to descriptions of social unease experienced by Haitians in Montreal because of their status as foreigners, early Haitian migrants to Boston describe scenes of blatant racial hostility and violence directed at them because of their perceived similarities to African Americans. They found themselves caught between white (many Irish and Italian) and African American Bostonians. Josephine, a middle-aged woman in Boston, reflected on the racial and ethnic tensions in the city when she arrived:

> There were certain areas in Boston you couldn't venture into because it could really cost—you could end up being very hurt. So it was hard. I mean, I remember it being very scary, more scary than anything else. Because I lived in fear all the time, not knowing, not understanding …

> My sister probably had it a little easier than I did, but I went to [public high school]. At the time, it was being desegregated, and it was during busing. We were bused to school, with police escort. We had riots every other day. You're in class one minute, next thing you know riot, boom, you're home. So you were not getting a proper education …
>
> But you get thrust into Boston in the middle of desegregation and it's racist and it's cold. The black kids don't like you. The white kids don't like you. The Haitian kids who are somewhat hip don't want to associate with you because you've just come.
>
> —Josephine (Boston)

Haitian immigrants have at times aligned themselves with African Americans (Marcelin 2005; Waters 1999) and at other times defined themselves as distinctly separate from African Americans (Marcelin 2005; Basch Glick Schiller, & Szanton Blanc 2005; Waters 1999).

In both the Boston and Montreal contexts, the first wave of Haitian migrants in the 1960s and 1970s entered into contested and emergent racial hierarchies. The nuances of those hierarchies and the ways in which racial and ethnic identity are inflected varies depending on the historical context of each site. These examples illustrate how racial tensions affected early Haitian migrants in work, in school, and in the streets. The following section focuses on the nexus of race, ethnicity, and work to highlight the ways in which the workplace served as a stage upon which anxieties over race and ethnicity played out for Haitian workers and their colleagues.

Race, Ethnicity, and Work

Perceptions that Haitians are hard workers and good employees, both from within immigrant communities and from dominant Western society, has led employers in North America and France to seek out Haitian women, often as domestic workers (Delachet-Guillon 1996; Waters 1999). Many Haitian immigrants,

particularly in the United States, are aware of this stereotype and choose to consciously embrace it, expressing great pride in the highly touted West Indian work ethic. This stereotype at times offers a strategically beneficial trope for Haitians to employ, allowing them entry into the paid workforce; however, the image of Haitians as efficient and productive employees continues to situate Haitian migrants as subservient to white Westerners and makes them targets for labor exploitation because of the assumption they will not or cannot complain.

The benevolent racism of categorizing Haitians as "good workers" conceals the historical and contemporary destabilization of the Haitian economy and exploitation of Haitian labor that has led so many Haitians to seek work abroad. Western nations have played a crucial role, though to varying degrees, in destabilizing Haiti economically, creating the conditions that require Haitians to seek employment through foreign companies or abroad. Dubbing Haitians as "good workers" sets them in conflict with other marginalized groups in search of work within gendered and racialized labor hierarchies, and creates the image of Haitians as good lower-level employees who can follow orders, rather than as workers who occupy leadership roles.

In Boston's paid labor hierarchy, early Haitian migrants were clearly differentiated from African Americans. Almost every Haitian woman with whom I spoke in Boston referenced the fact that employers believe Haitians to be good workers, often citing this stereotype with pride. Flore, an elegant Haitian woman in her 80s who migrated to Boston during the 1950s, speaks to this perception. She migrated with her husband as one of the first Haitian families in Boston. She reflected on the influx of Haitians during the first major wave of migration in the 1960s. During an interview in her home in a well-to-do suburb of Boston, with her daughter and grandchildren gathered in the next room, Flore told me:

> Because Haitian people, there is something good in Haitians. When they come here, they work. They see

> Haitian people will have two, three jobs. When they go to do a job, they work.
>
> Every Haitian who goes to the hospital, they like them because they're very hard workers. I don't know if you've heard that talk. But they are hard workers. They did like Haitians. Matter of fact, if you say you're black, they say, "You're not black, you're Haitian." But I don't know, you're not black, you're Haitian. That's the way they used to put Haitian people. "You are not black."
>
> That's the truth. And all of these people nearly come and they find jobs right away. There a lot of them in hospital now. Because they are good workers, are real, real good workers. So that's again—See, some people, they have two, three jobs. They go to this hospital, they go and they go and do this. They're very good workers.
>
> —Flore (Boston)

Differentiating Haitians from African Americans in this way sheds light on the racial tensions between white and black Americans at this time. White employers in certain circumstances privileged Haitian workers over African Americans, using the trope of Haitians as hard-working as a way to situate Haitians above African Americans in the labor hierarchy. By privileging Haitians above African Americans, white employers fostered divisiveness along ethnic lines rather than a Black solidarity between African Americans and immigrants that could have had more power to challenge conditions in the workplace.

In stark contrast, Haitians I have spoken to in Montreal were surprised to hear of the prevalence of the "good worker" stereotype in Boston. Many in Montreal cite having been able to find fulfilling work, despite the challenges of being Black immigrant women. Without the challenge of situating themselves in relation to the largely invisible native Black Quebecers, Haitians in Montreal cited their status as foreigners as more of a roadblock than

the fact that they are Black. In Montreal racism and xenophobia are inextricably linked, as someone who is Black is automatically assumed to be non-native.

For Haitians in Montreal, the race issues are more subtle than in the United States, often involving othering comments about hair or asking Haitian women to perform their Haitianness in some way in an overzealous, and sometimes offensive, display of multicultural appreciation. For instance, several Haitians in Montreal stated that coworkers would make offhanded comments about their food in a sometimes complimentary, but always othering manner.

Guerda reflects on her entry into Quebec's workforce as a Black woman in the 1970s:

> I moved [to Quebec] in the 1970s and it was very difficult for Black women, very difficult. We were expected to stay in our low-level jobs and not advance. There was this condescendence. I remember when I arrived at the hospital for my job and they all knew that I was the new hire, but no one would even look at me. I was the only Black person there. So I loudly said, "My name is Guerda. I am a part of your team now." A few years later, when they had come to trust me, they told me that they were not very happy that I had started working with them because they were not used to working with Black people.[5]
>
> —Guerda (Montreal)

Guerda forcefully inserted herself into her new work team, boldly introducing herself and stating her position as if daring her new coworkers to challenge her right to be there.

Farah, a Haitian woman who moved to Montreal in 2005, reported that she sees subtle racism in her workplace today. Farah is a tall, dark-skinned woman with shoulder-length straightened hair. She wears glasses and has a slight gap between her front teeth. She works part-time as an event coordinator for a company in Montreal, and part-time as a self-employed fitness coach.

During an interview in a small, unfinished room at the center where she works as a fitness coach, Farah said:

> Racism is] subtle here. It's very subtle. Sometimes if you don't have two situations you won't feel it. They hide it very well, but it's mostly in the job I have right now, because in the job I have I'm a receptionist/ event coordinator. And then sometimes for example if I am at the reception desk some people might come and they don't say "hi." But I will notice that sometimes when I have a lot of work I have a temp come to work as a second receptionist for 4 hours. Often she's blonde, someone white. If for example I am behind her, the same person who never says hello to me will greet her with, "Hi, how are you?" But with me they never say "Hello." So it's like that, really subtle.
>
> But you really have … I'm not looking for racism, but there is a difference in comportment when there's someone who's like them, who's not me. For example, the Black employees in the office, and we don't have many, but there are 2 Black people out of 80 employees. There are differences. The white people, when they are together they are friends with each other, they walk together, they are always together, but the Black people have to walk alone and don't really have friends here.
>
> Here it's very subtle. If you don't find yourself in certain situations you would say, "Oh, it's a welcoming country, they love Black people, they love immigrants!" You know, if I'm in the States I know they don't like Black people so I will be careful, you know? But here, you tend not to be careful but they are after you. They are really racist here but they hide it really well so you cannot say they are racist.[6]
>
> —Farah (Montreal)

Paris did not receive the same influx of Haitian migrants as did Montreal and Boston during the first wave of Haitian emi-

gration under the Duvalier dictatorship; however, a small number of Haitians have lived, worked, and studied in France since the colonial days when Saint Domingue was a French colony. In France, lack of a large, visible presence allows Haitians smoother integration than migrants from Africa and the Middle East. Similar to the ways in which Haitians situated themselves in relation to Black Americans in Boston, Haitians in Paris are situated in relation to Muslim, North African immigrants. Though different than race in the United States and in Montreal, North African immigrants and their children experience discrimination in France on the basis of skin color and religion (Beaman 2017).

While the Haitian Revolution dealt a huge blow to France as an imperial power, the Algerian Revolution is a more recent military defeat that weighs heavily on French consciousness, particularly as large numbers of North Africans have migrated to France in recent decades. Many perceive the influx of North African migrants as a threat to the French nation, as it represents a reversal of the imperial flow of the French population as they colonized North Africa. Though Haitians and North Africans are both Black and therefore visually marked as not fully French, Haitians are considered closer to the ideal of "Frenchness" by way of their dress and affiliation with Christianity. Afro-Caribbeans were positioned against Africans, in that Afro-Caribbeans were considered closer to white (Bazenguissa-Ganga 2012). In comparison to North Africans, Haitians are therefore considered more easily assimilated into the French nation. In the current moment, racism largely takes the shape of Islamophobia in France (Scott, 2007), temporarily rendering Christian Haitians as part of the dominant French cultural identity that stands against immigrant and native-born French Muslims.

An example of this is the way that Mirlande, one of my research participants in Paris in the summer of 2017, spoke about Muslims from North Africa. Mirlande is a middle-aged woman with light brown skin. Each time I saw her she dressed very modestly, in a matronly manner that makes her appear older than she is. Her hair is always pulled back into a tight bun at the nape of

her neck, and she likes to wear colorful 1980s-style headbands. Mirlande first moved from Haiti to New York, and then from New York to Paris, where she lived, worked, and raised a family.

On several occasions Mirlande made comments that signaled her dislike of North African Muslims. One day we were leaving an event hosted by the Haitian Catholic Association in Paris. We left the church's reception area where the event was held and were walking side-by-side to the metro. It was a Sunday afternoon and there were hardly any other people on the sidewalk. Mirlande was telling me about how she brings books for the Haitian priest to read, and how she had just left a copy of *The Alchemist* with him. Suddenly, Mirlande stopped her exuberant storytelling and fell silent. She then whispered under her breath with a hint of disdain, "I bet you don't see THAT in the United States." I saw a Black man walking towards us wearing traditional North African garb, a long tunic and a cap on his head. Pretending not to understand, I asked her to clarify. As we approached the man on the otherwise vacant, stone-paved sidewalk, Mirlande silently but emphatically gestured toward the man with her head and eyes.

On another occasion, Mirlande and I left a Haitian cultural event in another part of town in search of something to eat. It was after 3 pm and she complained that she had not eaten lunch because she had expected there to be food at the event. We asked for directions to the nearest restaurant and set off in the sweltering heat. We soon found a little pedestrian street scattered with small restaurants. The first place we came across advertised that they served halal food. Mirlande quickly dismissed it as an option. Despite the fact that she was feeling faint with hunger, she told me that she would never trust those people's food.

Not all Haitian women in Paris expressed anti-Muslim sentiments like this, but Mirlande's case provides an extreme example of the ways in which Haitians are situated as separate from the Muslim, North African population of the city. By way of religious affiliation and dress, Haitians find themselves more easily a part of the French population. In some cases that separation may

be unintentional, though in Mirlande's case she very clearly and repeatedly differentiated herself from the North African other. While differentiating herself from French Muslims, Mirlande still finds herself towards the bottom of the paid labor hierarchy, performing the gendered labor of caring for small children, just like several other Haitian women I interviewed in Paris.

A handful of women across the sites worked for the United Nations (UN) or other large international organizations, both while in Haiti and while living abroad. Their language skills, often speaking French, Kreyol, Spanish, and sometimes English, put them at an advantage in international agencies. The Haitian women who worked for the UN spoke of a rigid hierarchy within the organization, however, where Haitian women were often hired as local staff and white Americans and Europeans were frequently hired as international staff. Though language skills and cultural familiarity gained Haitian women entry into these large and powerful organizations, their positions within those organizations were frequently constrained by internal power dynamics that maintain hierarchies based on country of origin, and therefore race. These organizations are unique in that they foster an international consciousness in the workplace, cultivating a desire to travel and take part in multiple national contexts, rather than remaining rooted firmly in a single country.

Tamara is a tall middle-aged woman with very light skin dusted with freckles. When I interviewed her, she wore a long grey dress that clung to her curves, and her short, straight, black hair was messily styled atop her head. Tamara participated in multiple national contexts from the time she lived in Haiti and worked first for the United Nations and then for the American Embassy. She came from a well-connected family in Haiti and she knew the head of recruitment for the United Nations. After working for the UN, Tamara transitioned to a job with the American Embassy in Port-au-Prince.

Tamara enjoyed working for the American embassy. She said, "Oh, it's great. Americans are good with Haitians, they

treat us well."[7] She worked as an administrator and reported that the American consuls greatly appreciated her. Though Tamara had an enjoyable experience working for the American Embassy, her work still situated her within racialized global power dynamics. The presence of the American embassy speaks to the long relationship between the United States and Haiti, particularly during the U.S. occupation from 1915 to 1934, U.S. meddling in Haitian elections, and contemporary U.S. involvement in the form of coercive foreign aid.

Tamara needed to leave the American embassy for personal reasons and decided to move to Paris. Since she had previously worked for the UN in Haiti it was relatively easy for her to transition into working for it once she moved to France. While working for UNESCO, an agency of the UN, in France, Tamara did a lot of work with African countries, especially Tanzania. After working for UNESCO, she went on UN Peacekeeping operations in Africa.

The United Nations was founded in the United States and largely maintains Western ideals across the globe. As a Black woman and a native of Haiti, Tamara was tracked into a particular career path within the United Nations that rendered her subordinate to her white American and European counterparts while in Haiti. She was able to negotiate her positioning within the UN from being local staff in Haiti to working as a Paris-based employee. As part of the UNESCO and the UN Peacekeeping operations, Tamara was situated in a position of power over the Africans with whom she interacted.

DISCUSSION

Race and ethnicity exist across national borders, but the local context always inflects the ways in which these categories manifest and shape people's daily lives. Brewer's work lends itself to adaptation outside of the U.S. context precisely because she constructs her theoretical contribution in relation to the specifics of the historical relationship between Black women and labor in the

United States. Her theory is grounded in a particular history but has generalizability beyond that specific contact. It enables scholars to apply that attention to specificity to other contexts, and in the process extend and augment her theory of race, gender, and labor.

Similarly, we must understand the experiences of Haitian women with regards to race and ethnicity in each of these locales as shaped by the historical contexts of each setting. In Boston, early immigrants found themselves in the midst of a struggle over desegregation, part of a long history of the afterlife of slavery and forced segregation in the United States. That racial history shaped the experiences of Haitian migrants as they worked to find their place within a raced social, political, and economic hierarchy. Haitians in Montreal around this same time faced a strikingly different landscape. Racism certainly existed in the Montreal context as well, but it was shaped by the history of Quebec's ethnic identity and anxieties over protecting and maintaining a uniquely Quebecois ethnic identity. Compared to Boston, the racism faced by Haitians in Quebec was much more subtle, though still pervasive. Quebec did not carry a history of hundreds of years of slavery and segregation, which means that racism developed quite differently in Quebec than in the United States.

Lastly, France's long imperial history has shaped the nation's deeply entrenched racist ideologies. As an imperial metropole, Paris has long attracted migrants from previous colonies. Haiti's fight for independence fades into more distant history when compared to the more recent fight for Algerian independence. Since Haitians migrated to France in much smaller numbers, they were able to integrate with more ease in some ways than if Haitians had a larger presence on the national stage. Contemporary French citizens generally view North African immigrants as unable to assimilate and a threat to the nation. Meanwhile, Haitians in Paris are dispersed enough that they do not garner much national attention as a group.

Experiences of middle- and upper-class Haitian migrants shed light on the shifting meanings associated with racial and ethnic identity and the ways in which those meanings influence daily life. In Montreal during the Quiet Revolution, Haitian migrants met a type of racist resistance that was deeply grounded in xenophobic fears of outsiders diluting the prized French-Canadian ethnic identity. This xenophobia no doubt carried with it racist undertones, given that the ocular component of race allows one to differentiate between racial "insiders" and "outsiders." Quebec provides an example of a dominant native ethnic group (French Canadian) attempting to protect itself from outside threats. As seen in the examples above, Haitian women came face to face with French Canadian racism when attempting to integrate in the workplace. In the quote from Guerda, we see that her French-Canadian colleagues refused to greet her because they were uncomfortable and unhappy having to work with a Black woman. Guerda challenged their quiet racism by boldly introducing herself to the silent room and making a show of acting overly polite and cordial in the face of their silent treatment. Through her continued work alongside these colleagues, she eventually became integrated to the point where they felt comfortable verbalizing their earlier misgivings.

In contrast to the general social unease reported by early migrants in Montreal, early Haitian migrants in Boston were met with overt racial slurs and threats to personal safety. This intense reaction stems from the particulars of the relationship between the United States, slavery, and the long and drawn-out process of desegregation. Haitians in Boston met racism from white Bostonians not for being "outsiders," but for being "Black." Simultaneously, at times African Americans dissociated from Haitian migrants, perhaps in part because of the ways in which Haitian labor became more highly valued than African American labor. This labor hierarchy reinforced ethnic divisions between Haitians and African Americans, but did not necessarily shield Haitians from the brunt of the racism directed towards Blacks, regardless of their ethnicity.

Unlike in Montreal, many of the whites in Boston during the first wave of Haitian migration were descendants of immigrants from Ireland and Italy themselves. Irish and Italian immigrants in the United States were at times racialized as less than fully white and struggled to negotiate their place in the racially and ethnically stratified paid labor market (Handlin 1991; O'Connor 1995; Stack 1979). Attempting to maintain their ethnic identities from outsiders, white ethnic groups in Boston were largely outsiders themselves, struggling to make a place for themselves in the existing racial hierarchies in the United States.

In France, a purportedly universalist nation in which the state actively aims to erase racial difference, racism nonetheless persists but takes on different forms due to the taboo associated with the term race. For this reason, racism in France often manifests in coded language about religion or culture. As the vast majority of Haitians are Christian, this religious alignment eases Haitian integration into French society in a way that Muslim immigrants from North Africa do not experience. As they were placed in relation with African Americans in Boston during the 1960s and 1970s, Haitians in Paris are situated above North African immigrants in France's social and economic hierarchies. Though secular in name, France's national work holidays reflect the Christian calendar, allowing Haitian migrants to integrate into the workplace more easily than immigrants of other faiths.

In addition to the experiences of Haitian women in these three nation-states, Haitians also participate in paid labor within international organizations such as the United Nations. While the UN does not represent any single nation, it broadly represents the interests of the West. The UN is a transnational organization with a disproportionately Western agenda. Within the UN, the organization creates structures and hierarchies that continue to privilege employees from North American and Western European nations and track employees from Haiti into subordinate administrative roles. In this way, global racial and ethnic hierarchies are reinforced through employment within the UN;

however, at moments Haitian women are able to negotiate their positioning within the UN. In one example, a Haitian woman moved to Montreal before working for the UN in a supervisory capacity over staff in Barbados. In another example, Tamara moved to Paris and then traveled to work in Africa as a representative of France.

CONCLUSION

This transnational examination of work, race, and ethnicity illustrates the ways in which race and ethnicity are constructed and contested across different spaces. Racism exists in each of these locations in some form, but the way that it manifests is strictly related to the specific history of each locale. We can talk about concepts of race and ethnicity transnationally, but only while remaining grounded in the specificities of individual locations. Scholarship on race that has been developed based solely on the U.S. context, such as the work of Rose Brewer, can help to reveal processes of race and ethnicity in other places. However, we must be cautious and deliberate when applying U.S.-based race theories to other contexts; blindly applying U.S. theories of race to the rest of the world is an act of scholarly imperialism and misses the nuances of space, place, and history.

The experiences of these Haitian women demonstrate that racism manifests differently across locations, and that the particular expression of racism is dependent on each location's historical context. Race is a concept that transcends national boundaries, but it is complex and constantly shifting in its manifestations. The way we see race in daily workplace interactions for Haitians in Boston differs from the way that race and racism play out in Montreal or Paris. Manifestations of racial difference also shift across time, though the historical context informs contemporary expressions of race and racism. For instance, Haitian migrants during the 1960s and 1970s faced different social and political climates than those who emigrated in more recent years; that said, the history of race riots in Boston during the 1970s and the push for multicultural inclusion inform the city's current racial climate.

This article examined the ways in which positioning within the paid labor system, in both national and international contexts, shapes the manifestations of race and ethnicity for Haitian women in diaspora. The above examples include instances where Haitian women in Boston, Montreal, Paris, and the UN experienced and took part in shaping racial formations inside and outside of the workplace. Both the movement of Haitian women transnationally and the presence of international organizations draw attention to the ways in which race and ethnicity exist not only within discrete locales but between and among locales. Using the method of multi-sited ethnography, the experiences of Haitian women in this article highlight the interconnectedness of place and nations when examined through the lens of race and paid labor. The interconnectedness of race and ethnicity across sites is precisely what enables us to adapt the work of U.S. feminist scholars on race and labor to help explain the relationship between race and paid labor transnationally as well.

ENDNOTES

1 Though not explicitly the focus of this article, the experiences of Haitian women in diaspora shape their identities with regards to Haiti as well as to the United States, Canada, and France.

2 All names are pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of research participants.

3 The one who was not born in Haiti was born to Haitian parents in Miami and immediately returned to Haiti for her early childhood.

4 Translated from French by the author.

5 Translated from French by the author.

6 Translated from French by the author.

7 Translated from French by the author.

REFERENCES

Alexander, M. J. 2005. *Pedagogies of Crossing: Meditations on Feminism, Sexual Politics, Memory, and the Sacred*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Basch, L., Schiller, N. G., & Blanc, C. S. 2005. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-states*. Oxford: Routledge.

Bazenguissa-Ganga, R. 2012. "Paint It 'Black': How Africans and Afro-Caribbeans Became 'Black'in France." In *Black France/France Noire* (pp. 145–172). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Beaman, J. 2017. *Citizen Outsider: Children of North African Immigrants in France*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Benston, M. 1989. "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation." *Monthly Review* 41(7): 31–44.

Bernardin, Renaud. 1974. "Le Canada, le Québec et Haiti." *Le Devoir*. Nov. 7.

Brewer, R. M. 1999. "Theorizing Race, Class and Gender: The New Scholarship of Black Feminist Intellectuals and Black Women's Labor." *Race, Gender & Class* 6(2): 29–47.

Buchanan, Angela B., Albert, Nora G., & Beaulieu, Daniel. 2010. *The Population with Haitian Ancestry in the United States: 2009*. U.S. Census Bureau.

Butterfield, S.-A. P. 2004. "Challenging American Conceptions of Race and Ethnicity: Second generation West Indian immigrants." *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*.

Charusheela, S. 2003. Empowering Work? Bargaining Models Reconsidered. In D. K. Barker & E. Kuiper (Eds.), *Toward a Feminist Philosophy of Economics* (pp. 287–300). London, New York: Routledge.

Dayan, J. 1995. *Haiti, History, and Gods*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Delachet-Guillon, C. 1996. *La communauté haïtienne en Ile-de-France*. Paris: Editions L'Harmattan.

Fanon, F. 1952. *Black Skin, White Masks*. New York: Grove Press.

Fleurimond, W. 2003. *La communauté haïtienne de France: Dix ans d'histoire, 1991-2001*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Formisano, R. P. 2004. *Boston against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Gilroy, P. 1993. *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. Chicago: Aldine.

Glenn, E. N. (2011). *Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion, Subordination, and Resistance*. Vol. 76. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=62249374&site=ehost-live

Hall, S. 1996. "Race, Articulation, and Societies Structured in Dominance." In *Black British Cultural Studies: A Reader* (p. 16). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Handlin, O. (1991). *Boston's Immigrants, 1790-1880: A Study in Acculturation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Jackson, Regine O., ed. 2011. *Geographies of the Haitian Diaspora*. New York: Routledge.

Jadotte, Herard. 1977. "Haitian Immigration to Quebec." *Journal of Black Studies* 7(4): 485–500.

James, E. C. (2010). *Democratic Insecurities: Violence, Trauma, and Intervention in Haiti*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Killian, C., & Johnson, C. 2006. " 'I'm Not an Immigrant!': Resistance, Redefinition, and the Role of Resources in Identity Work." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 69(1): 60–80.

Kim, M. 2013. "Race and Ethnicity in the Workplace." In D. M. Figart & T. L. Warnecke (Eds.), *Handbook of Research on Gender and Economic Life* (pp. 218–235).

Levin, A. 1995. Civil Society and Democratization in Haiti. *Emory International Law Review* 9(389).

Lofland, J. 2006. *Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis* (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Lupo, A. 1988. *Liberty's Chosen Home: The Politics of Violence in Boston*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Marable, M. 2015. *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in Race, Political Economy, and Society*. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.

Marcelin, L. H. 2005. "Identity, Power, and Socioracial Hierarchies among Haitian Immigrants in Florida." In A. Dzidzienyo & S. Oboler (Eds.), *Neither Enemies nor Friends: Latinos, Blacks, Afro- Latinos* (1st ed., p. 323). Retrieved from Table of contents http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/hol052/2004052797.html

Menino, Thomas, M. 2009. *Imagine All the People: Haitian Immigrants in Boston*. Boston: City of Boston.

Mills, Sean. 2013. "Quebec, Haiti, and the Deportation Crisis of 1974." T*he Canadian Historical Review* 94(3): 405–435.

O'Connor, T. H. 1995. *The Boston Irish: A Political History*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.

Ong, A. 2010. *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia*. New York: SUNY Press.

Pegram, Scooter. 2005. "Being Ourselves: Immigrant Culture and Self-Identification among Young Haitians in Montréal." *Ethnic Studies Review* 28: 1–20.

Pierre-Louis, F. 2013. "Haitian Immigrants and the Greater Caribbean Community of New York City: Challenges and Opportunities." *Memorias. Revista Digital de Historia y Arqueología Desde El Caribe* 10(21): 22–40.

Richards, B. N. 2014. "Ethnic identity on display: West Indian youth and the creation of ethnic boundaries in high school." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(6): 978–997.

Schuller, Mark. 2008. "Participation, More Than Add Women and Stir? A Comparative Case Analysis in Post-Coup Haiti." *Caribbean Review of Gender Studies* 2.

Scott, J. W. 2009. T*he Politics of the Veil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Stack, J. F., Jr. 1979. *International Conflict in an American City: Boston's Irish, Italians, and Jews, 1935-1944*. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press.

Statistics Canada. 2007. *The Haitian Community in Canada*. Retrieved from http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-621-x/89-621-x2007011-eng.htm

Trouillot, M.-R. 1995. *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Vertovec, S. 1999. "Conceiving and researching transnationalism." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2): 447–462.

Waters, M. C. 1999. *Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities*. New York; Cambridge, MA: Russell Sage Foundation; Harvard University Press.

Nikita Carney, Bentley University

Wealth Matters: Home Ownership, Housing Values, and the Model Minority Myth of Black Meccas in The New South

Maretta McDonald and Lori Latrice Martin

ABSTRACT

Black Meccas symbolize the structural—albeit residentially segregated—incorporation of a population subset identifying as both Black and middle-class, measured largely using income, and ignoring indicators of wealth. Given the tenuous nature of Black middle-class status and the challenges associated with measuring social class, we challenge conventional metrics categorizing Black Meccas, which often ignore asset ownership, values specific to housing, and Black population heterogeneity, including ethnic diversity. We examine racial and ethnic disparities in housing values across Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the New South in an effort to reevaluate definitions of Black Meccas. Using an underutilized perspective, the politics of respectability, and census-based data and regression modeling, we address a gap in the literature on race, place, and class by examining variations in the types and levels of assets owned and the appearance and/or disappearance of Black Meccas in the United States from the 1990s to 2016. We found that in Black Meccas of the New South wealth disparities, as reflected in the values of Black homes in comparison to their White counterparts, still exist.

Keywords: Black Meccas, racial inequality, respectability, Black middle class, wealth inequality

American mythology includes the perception of racial progress as linear and always moving towards greater equality between the dominant racial group in America—White people—and racial and ethnic minorities in America—especially Black people. One of the greatest signifiers of this American myth is the concept

of Black Meccas. Black Meccas, including Harlem in its heyday, and post-1970, Atlanta, Georgia, are allegedly places where Black people can thrive in ways unimaginable in other parts of the country and at other points in America's history (Allen 2017).

The term Black Mecca is derived from a historical place. Mecca, which is located in present-day Saudi Arabia. Mecca is a holy city because it is the birthplace of the founder of one of the world's most popular religions. The term Mecca also has a broader meaning. The term is often used to refer colloquially to any place viewed as the center for a group, activity, or interest. However, there is something very unholy about places where Black people remain segregated residentially and in schools, where child poverty remains high, racial wealth inequality persists, and the practice of leadership by people who identify their race as Black seldom reflects the interest of the majority of Black residents. Focusing on selected social and demographic variables alone limits our understanding of Black Meccas, and about the existence of a New South. Focusing on indicators of Black middle-class status, while ignoring ethnic (large subpopulations of foreign-born Black people recently from Africa and the Caribbean) and class differences within the Black population masked the ongoing suffering of many within the Black population (Bennett and Lutz 1999; Green and Shelton 2017; Logan 2007; Martin 2013; Waters 1990, 1994, 1999). Black Meccas when understood more broadly are more illusion than reality. The challenge lies in the standard operationalization of Black Meccas, the overwhelming focus on descriptive versus predictive analyses, and the reliance on data-driven versus theory-driven scholarly inquiries. Black Meccas can best be—and should be—understood beyond mere measures of selected sociodemographic variables, but more importantly through three important frameworks: politics of respectability, the myth of meritocracy, and the model minority myth.

THE MEANING OF MECCAS

The term Black Mecca has been used since the early part of the twentieth century to describe the cultural, intellectual, political, and social awakening occurring in Harlem in the 1920s. The "father of Black Harlem," Phillip A. Payton, a founder of the Afro-American Realty Company, recruited Black tenants to live in units left unsold by White developers after the Lenox Avenue IRT subway line was completed (Martin 2013). Harlem not only became home to many Black people for the first time, but it also became home to social protests. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Urban League, and Marcus Garvey's movement all had a strong presence in Harlem (Jackson 2018). Harlem was "designed to help birth the New Negro. Harlem was an idea as much as it was a real place: it was a sanctuary, a race capital, a hope-disturbing lighthouse" (Sandhu 2011:2).

Many in the popular press appear to like the use of the term Black Mecca to describe cities like Atlanta, Georgia, although the metrics used for defining Black Meccas vary. Atlanta is considered the Black capital of America because of the number of Black businesses, historically Black colleges and universities, and relatively large Black population and Black electorate (Dameron and Murphy 1997; Harris and Tassie 2012; Hobson 2017; Mulholland 2017; Phillips 2003). Phyl Garland is credited with popularizing the idea that Atlanta was indeed the Black Mecca in an article published in Ebony magazine (Michney 2017).

Scholars such as Bullard (1989) are not wholly convinced that Black Meccas exist, or that Black people have benefited from the economic progress in the South, which caused many scholars to declare the emergence of a New South. Bullard (1989) edited a volume where he and other scholars questioned the existence of Black Meccas and also called into question the existence of a New South, given the enduring racial disparities between Black people and White people on a host of sociological outcomes. Bullard (1989) examined the six largest statistical areas in the South, beginning with a discussion about Black migration patterns, fol-

lowed by key periods where Black populations thrived economically and/or politically, and conclude with each area's decline. The cities included Houston, Texas; New Orleans, Louisiana; Atlanta, Georgia; Memphis, Tennessee; Birmingham, Alabama; and Tampa, Florida. Bullard (1989) made the general argument that the South has not allowed Black people in the region full economic access. He asserts also that the South has not allowed Black people in the region full political participation (1989).

Delores Aldridge (1989) wrote an essay in the edited volume titled In Search of the New South. In it, Aldridge (1989) said that the New South—and by extension the existence of Black Meccas—was an illusion. Although Aldridge conceded that the South became "a favored destination for new industry and in-migrants from other regions of the country" during the 1970s through the mid-1980s, she also observed that White racism and institutionalized discrimination maintained two societies—one Black, one White. Moreover, Aldridge (1989:ix) said, "residuals of southern apartheid are with us in the New South as demonstrated in the present-day inequities in education, employment, income, housing, and residential amenities, the judicial system, and a host of other areas."

Houston, Texas, established in 1836, is one example of a city in the New South plagued by a host of sociodemographic challenges. Bullard (1989:16) wrote that Houston had a relatively small slave population with many Black people working as domestic servants and that Black migration to Houston increased after Juneteenth as demand for labor grew in Houston. Houston's Fourth Ward, also known as "Freedmen's Town" was the center of Black life in the city in the 1920s. Over 90 percent of Black-owned businesses in Houston were located in Freedmen's Town, where most Black people lived until the Great Depression (Bullard 1989). Despite Houston's rich history, by the 1980s, Black residents were residentially segregated from their White neighbors. Black households were 3 times more likely to live in poverty than White households. The unemployment rate for Black people

was double the unemployment rate for White people—this just a decade after having the reputation "as the largest most affluent Black community in the South" (Bullard 1989:44).

Wright (1989) examined New Orleans, which was established in the early eighteenth century and which was home to Black people very early on. In 1726, there were 300 slaves in New Orleans compared to 1,000 slaves in 1732. In the early 1800s, there were over 1,000 free people of color living in New Orleans. By 1810, the city of New Orleans was predominately Black, with over 5,700 free people of color, 8,000 White people, and nearly 11,000 Black people (Wright 1989). Unlike some other cities in the New South, New Orleans has always had a very visible and very large underclass (Wright 1989).

Bullard and Thomas (1989) discuss the historical emergence of Atlanta. Atlanta, so named because of its location as the terminal point of the railroads on the Atlantic coast, became a financial capital in the South in the very early twentieth century (Bullard and Thomas 1989). Atlanta was selected in 1914 as one of 12 Federal Bank cities. The city soon made investments in office buildings, while other cities across the nation were investing in factories. Designed in a perfect circle, Atlanta stayed roughly the same size over time with no significant annexation well into the second half of the twentieth century. This lack of annexation led to uneven development, resulting in a mostly Black central city core (Bullard and Thomas 1989). Atlanta gained the titles of the "Jewel of the South," "City of the 21st Century," a "Regional City" (Bullard and Thomas 1989:83).

After all, Atlanta was home to the landmark Black-owned Citizen's Trust Bank, which was founded in 1921. Atlanta was also the site of Sweet Auburn Avenue, the center of Black business in the city; and the city was long regarded as a sort of "Black talent academy" (Bullard and Thomas 1989:92). Civil rights giant Andrew Young was elected to the U.S. Congress in the early 1970s and a year later, Atlanta had its first Black mayor, both important symbols of a New South. Bullard and Thomas (1992), however, cautioned against equating political gains with economic gains.

Memphis, a city also in the New South, did not enjoy the economic progress that so many reflected upon since the 1970s. Memphis, much like the other five largest metropolitan areas in the South covered in Bullard's (1989) edited volume, has a very long history of Black residents. The first group of Black people arrived in Memphis in 1795 (Vaughn 1989). The large production of cotton led to the large population growth of the Black population. Memphis was home to two slave markets, yet Memphis was also one of the first cities in the south to emancipate slaves (Vaughn, 1989). However, during the height of economic development in the South, Memphis became known as the "dark spot in the Sunbelt" (Vaughn 1989:119). Unlike Atlanta and Washington, D.C., Memphis was unable to elect a Black mayor despite the existence of a large Black voter population (Vaughn 1989).

Birmingham, Alabama, is also located in the New South (Portfield 1989). "The Magic City," founded in 1871, earned the title because of its industrial wealth (Portfield 1989:121). "Birmingham was recognized as the industrial capital of the New South" (Portfield 1989:123). After slavery ended, many Black people migrated to Birmingham to work in the coal and iron industries. Black people worked in racially segregated occupations. Black women worked overwhelmingly as domestic servants and many Black men worked as yardmen and chauffeurs (Portfield 1989).

While Birmingham was praised for its place in the industrial industry, the city was also mocked because of relatively high crime rates that fed the city's and the state's appetite for the practice of convict leasing (Portfield 1989). "Black people were pawns of the fee system and convict leasing. They were economically as well as politically impotent" (Portfield 1989:124). Most Black residents in Birmingham were (and remain) economically insecure and the city was (and remains) racially polarized (Portfield 1989). In fact, Portfield (1989:124) described Black people living in the city as living "in economic bondage."

Tampa, Florida, is another city situated in the New South. Caitlin (1989) observed that many Black people moved to Tampa after the Civil War. The state and the city had a reputation for

strong resistance against racial inequality. The economic base for Tampa was built upon the rail lines, cigar industry, and the city's use as a port. While 800 Black people called Tampa home in 1865, the numbers grew to over 1,600 in 1890. By 1900, over 4,000 Black people lived in Tampa. "The Scrub" was the original Black community in Tampa. It was the center of Black life until urban renewal destroyed the community in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Despite the fact that Tampa had a history of strong Black unions, including the International Longshoremen's Union Local 1402, the city was largely left out of the boom that led many to declare the arrival of a New South. Caitlin (1989) said Tampa was actually worse off than other cities in the south. Tampa did however, become home to many Afro-Cubans and other Black migrants by the 1980s. Housing was less expensive, less segregated, but also less safe in some areas. By and large, Black people in Tampa were marginalized in the political process and a "loss of community identity, caused mainly by the closing of traditionally Black elementary, and high schools, a phenomenon not experienced elsewhere" (Caitlin 1989:160).

In short, Bullard (1989:161) concluded that during the mid-1970s the South was viewed as the "land of opportunity for Black people." The area "attracted both the skilled and the unskilled, educated and uneducated, as well as low-income and middle-income Black people who sought to make their fortune" in a city in the South (Bullard 1989:161). The South became a leader in non-agricultural jobs. Nearly 200,000 of the Black people who moved to the South in the 1970s left between 1975 and 1980, and nearly 90,000 Black people left between 1980 and 1985. Yet, Black people remained a numerical majority in places like Birmingham, Atlanta, and New Orleans (Bullard 1989).

THE MYTH OF MECCAS

Despite claims of the dawning of a new day—an emergence of a New South—and the existence of one or more Black Meccas, persistent and chronic unemployment plagued most Black workers.

While homeownership is often used as an indicator of Black Meccas, Black middle-class status, and overall economic well-being, Bullard (1989) pointed out that "Black homes often have more deficiencies than their White counterparts" (Bullard 1989:165). Black homeowners rarely have access to the housing markets to which White homeowners have access, thus Black suburbanization in the New South represented "spillover from Black neighborhoods or an extension of the segregated housing pattern typical of the central city" (Bullard 1989:165). For far too many Black people, the New South was not noticeably different than the Old South. Bullard (1989:173) predicted this would be the case "until Black people…share more fully in the resources of the South."

More recently a body of literature has appeared also calling into question the existence of Black Meccas in America. Dixon (2004) focused on how "Maynard's millionaires" did well during his tenure in office as the mayor of Atlanta, but the economic benefits did not trickle down to poor and working-class Black people in the city. Dixon (2004:4) wrote that poor and working-class Black people were never intended to be part of the Black Mecca: "The Black Mecca hype was the product of this relentless business-class self-promotion." Dixon (2004:8) called for an end to any more discussions about "Black Meccas," declaring, "The time for pilgrimage is over. The next Black Meccas must be built in the many cities where we already stand, and for the people who already live there."

Wahl and Gunkel (2007) indirectly call into question whether Black Meccas exist, by challenging the almost exclusive focus on metropolitan statistical areas as the preferred unit of analysis in measuring racial progress. Black people in the South flocked not only to large cities since 1970, but also to micropolitan areas—places with populations between 10,000 and 50,000. Selma, Alabama; Tuskegee, Alabama; and Meridian, Mississippi are among the 560 micropolitan areas to experience increases in their Black populations over the past few decades.

Wahl and Gunkel (2007) measured Black-White residential segregation in their analysis, a measurement that is not historically used to identify Black Meccas. The authors found persistent

racial residential segregation between Black people and White people in their sample of 130 micropolitan areas using data from the 1990 and 2000 census, but the extent to which Black people lived apart from White people was more moderate in micropolitan areas than in metropolitan areas. The findings have methodological and theoretical implications. Racial residential segregation should be part of any discussion about Black Meccas and a New South, as the measurement points to the spatial, economic, and social incorporation of historically disadvantaged groups in America, particularly in the case of Black people.

By 2010, some places in the New South that saw Black population increases experienced Black population losses, as exemplified in metropolitan Atlanta. More and more Black people were leaving the city for Atlanta's suburbs. The exodus of nearly 30,000 residents from the central city outward occurred at the same time Atlanta was governed by a Black mayor and a predominately Black city council (Bullard, 2011). Bullard (2011) identified a number of factors contributing to the out-migration. The factors included the destruction of almost all of the city's public housing, ongoing class conflict within the Black population, and mismanagement of Empowerment Zone funds intended to foster economic development across the city with dollars from the federal government. Bullard (2011) also blamed under-resourced schools, predatory lending practices, and an increase in food deserts.

Some have chosen to ignore the challenges facing cities in the New South, including those designated as Black Meccas. Kotkin (2015) wrote about the best places for Black people to live and despite persistent racial differences on unemployment and income, the author chose to celebrate the fact that 13 of the top 15 areas were in the South. A few years later, Kotkin (2018) wrote with the same celebratory tone hailing Atlanta and Washington, D.C. as two of the best places for Black people based upon how Black people in these cities rank on homeownership rates, median income, and rates of self-employment relative to Black people in other cities, not with respect to how they rank

with similar White people. The articles also ignored within-group differences. Black ethnic groups, such as recent immigrants from certain countries in Africa, tend to have higher levels of education than both native-born Black and White people, which may account for some of the observed differences (Martin 2013). In short, the Black population is not monolithic but Korkin's (2015; 2018) metrics treat the Black population as such.

THE POLITICS OF RESPECTABILITY AND THE MAKING OF MYTHS

Most discussion about the experiences of Black people in the New South, and the debates about the reality or mythology surrounding Black Meccas, focus on comparing Black people in various towns and cities on indicators such as home ownership, business ownership, income, and changes in population. Few of the discussions surrounding these debates provide framework for understanding what Black Meccas and a New South really represent in the broader context of race relations in America. We contend Black Meccas and the New South can best be understood through three important frameworks: politics of respectability, the myth of meritocracy, and the model minority myth.

Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham wrote about the politics of respectability in her book, Righteous Discontent (1993). She described how the Black Baptist women's movement, from the 1880s through the early part of the twentieth century, worked to combat stereotypes about Black women. The Black Baptist women's movement not only focused on the Bible, the bath, and the broom, but it also focused on combating social justice issues (Higginbotham 1993). The Black women in the movement, who were undoubtedly inspired by the policy of submission and accommodation of Booker T. Washington and led by such notable Black women as Nannie Boroughs, believed that monitoring their attitudes and behaviors, as well as those of Black women from lower social class positions, would lead to greater acceptance and greater respectability from members of the dominant group (Higginbotham 1993). While the ideas of the women associated with this movement were in

many ways quite radical, they also helped to reinforce many of the stereotypes associated with Black people, and Black women in particular (Higginbotham 1993). Although Higginbotham (1993) considered the politics of respectability as a bridge discourse that could unite Black women from various social classes and even unite Black women with White women and Black men, the politics of respectability did expose long-held class differences within the Black population and an affinity for adhering to a set of White middle-class standards that in many regards did not even exist.

Unfortunately, the politics of respectability is not used to understand why racial and ethnic disparities persist despite changes in individual attitudes and behavior, while structural barriers persist. The idea that hard work will be rewarded is a widely held American myth and Black Meccas serve as signifiers of the myth. Black people living in so-called Black Meccas are portrayed as model minorities, the existence of which is a myth that does more harm than good by masking the ongoing misery and suffering of large segments of the Black population. Additionally, the politics of respectability is often misunderstood and misrepresented as respectability politics, or the idea that Black people must win the respect of the dominant racial group in order to enjoy full citizenship and the American Dream.

We are unaware of any studies directly linking Black Meccas to the politics of respectability, the myth of meritocracy, and the model minority myth. We view Black Meccas as the spatial sites of Black people who are said to adhere to at least part of the politics of respectability—the part that focuses on modifications in behaviors and attitudes. Conventional wisdom says Black people in so-called Black Meccas "have made it." They are hailed as model minorities and other Black people—should they wish to succeed—need only follow their lead. Black people, particularly those with membership in the fragile Black middle-class, are upheld as proof that America is indeed a meritocracy and that anyone can succeed if they only put forth their best efforts. The continued suffering of lower-class Black people and the ongoing

experiences with racial discrimination from private and institutional practices for the Black middle-class are minimized, marginalized, or rendered invisible. While Harlem as a Black Mecca was so hailed because of its emphasis on the latter part of the politics of respectability—the focus on social justice issues—and as a site of protest, in the post-Civil Rights era, Black Meccas in more recent times are places where residents are simply "too busy to hate." Residents don't riot or rally. Black people in modern day Black Meccas are rightly focused on owning homes, owning businesses, and furthering their education, and do not concern themselves with enduring racial disparities. The time has long passed for new ways of thinking about and new ways to measure wellbeing as it relates to Black people in America.

DATA AND METHODS

Data

Reconsidering how Black Meccas are defined and measured is important. We examine variations in housing values—one of the greatest contributors to racial and ethnic disparity in America—over time and within the Black population. The data for this analysis was procured from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Service (IPUMS) for 1990-2016 (Ruggles et al. 2017). More specifically, we analyzed data for the years 1990, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2016 for the metropolitan areas defined in much of the literature as southern Black Meccas: Atlanta, Georgia; Birmingham, Alabama; Houston, Texas; New Orleans, Louisiana; Memphis, Tennessee; and Tampa, Florida. For the years 1990 and 2000, the data were drawn from the five-percent census samples; data for 2005, 2010, and 2016 were drawn from the American Community Survey (ACS) for the corresponding year. In addition to data from the decennial years of 1990, 2000, and 2010, 2005 data is added to reflect the housing values before the official start of the Great Recession of December 2007 (Jacobsen and Mather 2011). The 2016 data were used because it should reflect post-Great Recession economic recovery.

The unit of analysis is the household. Characteristics for the head of household are used as a proxy for household composition. Households are included in the sample if the head of household is the owner-occupant of the residence. There are 418,657 households across the five cross sections that fit this criterion. In the regression analysis, eight households were not included due to listwise deletion, producing samples of 115,159 households for 1990, 168,454 for 2000, 44,241 for 2005, 44,885 for 2010, and 45,910 for 2016. Household weights are used in this analysis. Although the proportion of Blacks in these cities are higher than their representation in the overall U.S. population (U.S. Census 2018), the weights were used to reflect the sampling frame. Models were estimated without use of the weighting; the resulting coefficients, standard errors, and significance values were very similar to those derived from the use of the weighted data.

Measures

Economic well-being. In this analysis, housing values measure relative economic wellbeing because disparities in value directly translate to disparities in wealth accumulation (Archer, Gatzlaff and Ling 1996; Denton 2001; Lipsitz 1995). Housing values are the reported value of owner-occupied housing units measured in contemporary U.S. dollars.

Race. The focal relationship of interest is comparison of relative economic well-being across race in Black Meccas of the New South. Race is measured using the reported race of the household head, with three categories of White, Black, and other race (White is the omitted category). Households containing mixed race couples were not differentiated (Fu 2008). Constructed as a dichotomous variable, Black ethnicity is used as measure of Black heterogeneity as foreign –born Black ethnic groups are viewed as culturally different from American born Blacks (Martin 2013).

Social class and respectability. The level of educational attainment has two functions in this analysis. First, it is used to measure middle-class. Class status may be measured in a number of other ways including by income and occupational prestige. However,

some scholars assert that educational attainment is the best measure of middle-class (Bowser 2007; Higginbotham 2009). Additionally, attaining a college degree is also a symbol of hard work within the myth of meritocracy framework, as education is seen as an equalizer across race (Coleman 1961; Jencks 1972). Heads of household with at least a bachelor's degree is the measure of middle-class and meritorious (hardworking) in a dichotomous variable.

Marital status is also used to measure respectability. Although, cohabitation and single female-headed households have lost some of its stigma, they violate these norms of respectability (Cherlin 2004). Marriage is also a symbol of the high moral status of a household.

Interactions. In order to fully test for the politics of respectability within Black Meccas, we construct interaction terms to examine the moderating effect that race plays in economic well-being in the New South. We disaggregate educational attainment by race (Black*education; other race *education) as well as marital status (Black*married; other race*married) to estimate the effects of behavior and attitude modification (politics of respectability and model minority/meritocracy myths) on housing values as an indicator of relative economic well-being.

Controls. Our control variables are age and gender. Age is a continuous variable measure by year. Regarding gender, the data used in this analysis from IPUMS constructed gender as dichotomous male/female variable. Even though gender does not necessarily correspond with biological sex, this analysis is limited to these categories that appear in the data (Female =1).

We also control for variation in housing costs based in place by adding controls for MSAs into the models to account for clustering of the data. Full multilevel models using different statistical techniques (HLM) are not appropriate here because the number of groups at that level is small (n=6). A summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis are provided in Tables 1a and 1b.

ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

Based on the literature of the myth of meritocracy, the politics of respectability, and the model minority myth the following hypotheses were developed:

> Hypothesis 1: Black households in southern Black Meccas have lower housing values than their White counterparts.
>
> Hypothesis 2: Black ethnicity matters in understanding variations in housing values for Black people in so-called Black Meccas.

First, we estimated the models using multivariate ordinary least squared regression (OLS) to test the hypotheses. Based on the research question and the level of measurement of the dependent variable (housing values), OLS is the appropriate quantitative methodological approach. We conduct a cross-sectional analysis for each year (1990, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2016) to examine the trends over time. Three models per year are estimated. The first model for each cross-section approximates the baseline and no explanatory variables are added. Theoretical predictors and controls are added to the second model for each year, examining the effects of marital status and socioeconomic class on housing values while controlling for gender, age, and place. Lastly, model 3 includes the interaction terms. We then illustrate and discuss the racial inequality in housing values across cross-sectional samples using visualizations of the Black-to-White housing value gap in each Black Mecca.

RESULTS

OLS Regression Results

In Model 1, for each time period in the southern Black Mecca MSAs, displayed in Table 2, being a Black household predicts lower average housing values. The disparities between Black peo-

Table 1a. Means (Standard Deviation) for Variables Across Race in Black Meccas of the New South, 1990-2016

	1990		2000	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Household-level demographic characteristics				
	Whites			
Head has a bachelor's degree or better (1 = yes)	0.300	0.46	0.326	0.47
Head's marital status (1 = married)	0.697	0.46	0.663	0.47
Female head (1 = yes)	0.254	0.44	0.277	0.45
Age of head	51.938	16.34	52.339	16.00
Housing value (U.S. dollars)	93165.09	71560.38	139853.20	127418.60
Proportion of sample	0.828	95353.00	0.780	131333.00
	Blacks			
Head has a bachelor's degree or better (1 = yes)	0.167	0.37	0.211	0.41
Head's marital status (1 = married)	0.536	0.50	0.488	0.50
Black ethnicity (1=yes)	0.026	0.16	0.064	0.24
Female head (1 = yes)	0.406	0.49	0.456	0.50
Age of head	51.427	15.56	50.491	15.16
Housing value (U.S. dollars)	55792.91	36525.87	88515.20	74129.11
Proportion of sample	0.138	15867.00	0.161	27172.00
	Other Race			
Head has a bachelor's degree or better (1 = yes)	0.252	0.43	0.274	0.45
Head's marital status (1 = married)	0.805	0.40	0.748	0.43
Female head (1 = yes)	0.175	0.38	0.224	0.42
Age of head	43.992	12.36	44.719	12.80
Housing value (U.S. dollars)	68087.34	58888.94	110111.00	107370.40
Proportion of sample	0.034	3941.00	0.059	9955.00

2005		2010		2016	
Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
0.381	0.49	0.400	0.49	0.431	0.50
0.652	0.48	0.638	0.48	0.634	0.48
0.391	0.49	0.407	0.49	0.463	0.50
53.421	15.55	55.145	15.59	57.286	15.60
211079.00	171126.50	220257.30	238435.70	267928.70	322692.80
0.778	34431.00	0.759	34080.00	0.762	34983.00
0.288	0.45	0.308	0.46	0.348	0.48
0.472	0.50	0.464	0.50	0.448	0.50
0.091	0.29	0.097	0.30	0.107	0.31
0.547	0.50	0.572	0.49	0.598	0.49
51.692	14.76	53.221	14.60	57.670	14.25
137856.30	105297.10	144802.40	143058.70	160029.70	177013.90
0.150	6658.00	0.168	7556.00	0.160	7339.00
0.359	0.48	0.422	0.49	0.485	0.50
0.723	0.45	0.729	0.44	0.729	0.44
0.358	0.48	0.363	0.48	0.391	0.49
46.194	13.25	47.559	12.96	50.645	14.05
170497.30	135678.80	196819.90	188221.60	262507.00	292142.40
0.071	3152.00	0.072	3249.00	0.078	3588.00

Table 1b. Descriptive Statistics for Households in Black Meccas of the New South by Race, 1990-2016 (continued)

	1990		2000		2005		2010		2016	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Sample Level Characteristics										
Head has bachelor's degree or better (1 = yes)	0.280	0.45	0.304	0.46	0.366	0.48	0.386	0.49	0.422	0.49
Head's marital status (1 = married)	0.679	0.47	0.640	0.48	0.630	0.48	0.615	0.49	0.611	0.49
Female head (1 = yes)	0.273	0.45	0.302	0.46	0.412	0.49	0.432	0.50	0.479	0.50
Age of head	51.596	16.18	51.591	15.80	52.646	15.39	54.272	15.38	56.828	15.38
Housing value (U.S. dollars)	87157.71	68705.18	129815.00	120836.50	197168.10	162791.00	205858.60	223528.60	250256.60	304259.70
Numbers of household-year	115161		168460		44241		44885		45910	

Source: U.S. Census 1990-2016 Note: Household weights are applied. Sample size is before listwise deletion.

ple and White people continue to grow across years as reflected by the coefficients for Black. For example, the 1990 average housing value of Black households was approximately $36,816 less than average White housing values. However, in each subsequent year in the analysis, the average Black housing value are estimated to be continue to be worth less, and increasingly so. In 2016, Black housing values are predicted at roughly $92,000 less, on average, than White homes in Black Meccas of the New South. Conversely, the gap between the average housing values between White and the other race group increased from 1990 to 2000 to 2005, decreased in 2010, and became no longer significant in 2016. Based on Model 1, we have baseline evidence to support Hypothesis 1 at each time point.

Model 2 estimates housing values after including household characteristics as predictors and controls for variation between Black Meccas. These cross-sectional models also provide strong evidence to support Hypothesis 1. Even after controlling for education, marital status, sex, age, and MSA mean housing value variation, the relationship between race and housing values is still negative and statistically significant across time periods. The models estimate that the mean housing values for Black households, holding all other variable constant, are roughly $29,000 less than the White comparison group in 1990, $41,000 less in 2000, $50,000 less in 2005, $55,000 less in 2010, and at $73,000 in 2016.

We also notice that adding these measures increases the adjusted R2 for each model, showing that this model explains more of the variation in mean housing values than Model 1 (1990: $\Delta R2 = .185$; 2000: $\Delta R2 = .185$; 2005: $\Delta R2 = .17$; 2010: $\Delta R2 = .092$; 2016: $\Delta R2 = .093$). Additionally, the difference between the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistics of Model 1 and 2 for each time period provides very strong support that the Model 2 for each time period fits the data better than Model 1 (Williams 2017). Of course, both educational attainment and marital status have positive statistically significant relationships with housing values in Black Meccas across time periods in Model 2, also dis-

played in Table 2. However, we show in Model 3 that the returns for these household characteristics are not the same across race.

Turning our attention to the cross-sectional estimates of Model 3, displayed in Table 2a, we continue to find strong evidence to support Hypothesis 1. The mean housing values for Black households continue to be worth less than comparable White households after controlling for all other variables including the interactions between race and social class, as well as race and marital status. Clearly, the interaction terms reflect the difference in slope between middle-class Black households and White middle-class households as reflected in the most recent data displayed in Figure 1 and in its corresponding coefficient (2016: b(Black*education) = -$109,365 p<0.001).

The same negative and statistically significant relationship is reflected in the relationship between housing values and the interaction of race and marital status across time periods in southern Black Meccas. There is variation between the slopes of marital status between Black and White households as reflected in the coefficients for the interaction terms. For example, in the most recent data, the benefit of marriage on housing values is roughly $33,000 less than for White households (b = -32867.62 p < 0.001).

For the sake of comparison, we estimate the following housing values based on the 2016 regression equation.

$$\hat{Y}_{\text{Housing Value}} = \$120968.17 - \$16{,}891.25_{\text{Black HH}} + \$9{,}980.90_{\text{Other Race HH}} + \$16{,}9436.56_{\text{CollegeDeg}} + \$79{,}325.17_{\text{Married}} - \$3{,}135.99_{\text{Female}} + \$570.67_{\text{Age}} - \$109{,}364.92_{\text{Black*CollegeDeg}} - \$14{,}440.08_{\text{OtherRace*CollegeDeg}} - \$32{,}867.62_{\text{Black*Married}} - \$35{,}802.21_{\text{OtherRace*Married}} - \$49{,}458.84_{\text{Birmingham}} - 6{,}548.41_{\text{Houston}} - \$53{,}230.55_{\text{Memphis}} - \$1{,}668.41_{\text{New Orleans}} - \$22{,}491.28_{\text{Tampa}}$$

A hypothetical White 40-year-old married man with at least a bachelor's degree as the head of household, holding all MSA level predictors at 0 (locating the household in Atlanta) is predicted to have a housing value of approximately $393,000 on average. In comparison, a household with the same characteristics described

Table 2. Cross-sectional OLS Regression of Housing Values in Black Meccas of the New South, 1990–2016

	1990	2000	2005	2010	2016
Model 1: Baseline					
Household characteristics					
Race (White)					
Black	-36816.26[c] (396.80)	-51403.60[c] (600.41)	-68098.73[c] (1958.86)	-72130.28[c] (2205.47)	-91774.90[c] (2850.81)
Other race	-24179.11[c] (997.69)	-31029.48[c] (1170.85)	-38434.41[c] (3090.34)	-25619.90[c] (3589.37)	-3907.44 (5848.92)
Constant	92388.20[c] (249.39)	141821.11[c] (366.77)	206579.97[c] (1071.92)	217333.55[c] (1440.54)	258861.50[c] (1840.54)
Adjusted R^2	0.039	0.027	0.028	0.017	0.015
BIC	2886170.56	4414316.03	1184029.65	1229524.60	1281807.81
Model 2: Including education, marital status, age of head household and controlling for MSAs					
Household characteristics					
Race (White)					
Black	-28976.02[c] (389.86)	-41339.26[c] (586.33)	-49377.86[c] (1841.59)	-54898.27[c] (2207.96)	-73180.98[c] (2791.57)
Other race	-18465.08[c] (891.07)	-22744.38[c] (1105.80)	-27273.17[c] (2837.14)	-23669.52[c] (3422.59)	-21007.50[c] (5811.37)
College degree	51360.79[c] (523.26)	81367.73[c] (715.08)	104927.74[c] (1901.08)	114942.63[c] (2543.51)	149548.54[c] (3208.53)
Married	21921.40[c] (521.89)	31136.54[c] (684.33)	47866.82[c] (1730.00)	52321.79[c] (2350.29)	70804.67[c] (2855.28)
Female head	126.35 (553.74)	-4491.78[c] (710.82)	-7376.42[c] (1766.39)	-7435.44[b] (2328.43)	-4849.17 (2977.98)
Age	118.58[c] (11.53)	204.83[c] (16.59)	204.08[c] (49.48)	488.06[c] (62.08)	585.35[c] (85.42)

Table 2. Cross-sectional OLS Regression of Housing Values in Black Meccas for New South, 1990-2016 (continued)

	1990	2000	2005	2010	2016
Level 2 variation					
Southern Black Meccas (MSAs) (Atlanta)					
Birmingham	-31052.47[c] (797.74)	-38301.19[c] (1184.63)	-65614.67[c] (3531.46)	-28223.72[c] (4082.18)	-49393.15[c] (4586.35)
Houston	-31940.98[c] (591.70)	-49775.13[c] (805.65)	-73890.91[c] (2180.50)	-40303.78[c] (2779.19)	-7360.90 (3868.45)
Memphis	-20689.06[c] (813.55)	-34191.15[c] (1067.96)	-61751.54[c] (2789.56)	-39531.24[c] (3795.37)	-51493.74[c] (4823.66)
New Orleans	-19511.43[c] (758.78)	-33048.28[c] (1042.23)	-48163.41[c] (2959.71)	-11532.46[c] (3467.76)	-173.90 (4790.32)
Tampa	-29719.10[c] (603.14)	-53238.11[c] (834.10)	-21544.16[c] (2574.19)	-27537.54[c] (3771.09)	-24086.97[c] (428.91)
Constant	77852.38[c] (859.13)	117732.95[c] (1175.38)	167252.37[c] (3415.76)	139488.32[c] (4521.13)	135081.34[c] (6310.49)
Adjusted R^2	0.224	0.189	0.198	0.109	0.108
BIC	2861613.13	4383696.03	1175595.72	1225195.07	1277335.18
Model 3: Including interactions					
Household characteristics					
Race (White)					
Black	-19040.86[c] (547.44)	-23307.47[c] (810.48)	-22104.54[c] (2578.73)	-24213.87[c] (3185.20)	-16891.25[c] (3670.21)
Other race	-12900.31[c] (1555.92)	-10096.01[c] (1889.20)	-5380.14 (4771.58)	-7724.73 (6134.12)	9980.90 (11114.39)
Black ethnicity	8528.70[c] (2288.79)	8976.25[c] (1719.26)	16189.46[a] (6686.63)	-3090.86 (4422.58)	20559.26[b] (7541.44)
College degree	54015.20[c] (581.09)	88128.47[c] (827.03)	114899.40[c] (2242.22)	128450.93[c] (3164.55)	169436.56[c] (3906.72)
Married	23630.00[c] (573.79)	34226.97[c] (785.32)	53581.80[c] (2005.79)	55407.64[c] (2917.11)	79325.17[c] (3337.04)
Female	321.54 (552.63)	-4046.47[c] (708.70)	-6537.46[c] (1759.58)	-6152.43[b] (2320.65)	-3135.99 (2969.01)
Age	115.00[c] (11.51)	205.67[c] (16.57)	208.43[c] (49.41)	478.86[c] (62.15)	570.67[c] (84.61)

Table 2. Cross-sectional OLS Regression of Housing Values in Black Meccas for New South, 1990-2016 (continued)

	1990	2000	2005	2010	2016
Interactions					
Black* college degree	-26510.71[c] (1170.98)	-48709.09[c] (1500.80)	-58520.92[c] (4304.57)	-75607.83[c] (4853.44)	-109364.92[c] (6136.12)
Other race* college degree	1298.04 (2684.41)	-6983.88* (2991.90)	-14712.41[a] (6794.73)	-10686.05 (7467.37)	-14440.08 (12118.37)
Black* married	-9244.48[c] (706.78)	-12957.16[c] (1086.04)	-22136.73[c] (3495.94)	-12163.59[b] (4299.63)	-32867.62[c] (5338.14)
Other race* married	-7433.01[c] (1826.13)	-14116.53[c] (2209.05)	-24314.82[c] (6080.24)	-16963.69[a] (7150.12)	-35802.21[a] (14549.71)
Level 2 Variation					
Southern Black Meccas (MSAs) (Atlanta)					
Birmingham	-31275.41[c] (794.47)	-38797.12[c] (1180.40)	-66339.38[c] (3540.85)	-29319.72[c] (4079.70)	-49458.84[c] (4606.60)
Houston	-32029.19[c] (590.66)	-50042.88[c] (803.13)	-73705.53[c] (2169.32)	-40654.37[c] (2769.57)	-6548.41 (3859.11)
Memphis	-21128.77[c] (812.08)	-35326.32[c] (1065.92)	-63213.22[c] (2769.19)	-42257.16[c] (3826.41)	-53230.55[c] (4786.40)
New Orleans	-19496.15[c] (754.56)	-33601.95[c] (1037.74)	-48166.21[c] (2945.23)	-13324.43[c] (3473.43)	-1668.41 (4754.32)
Tampa	-29438.53[c] (602.50)	-52904.25[c] (832.99)	-20551.31[c] (2558.40)	-27330.97[c] (3765.07)	-22491.28[c] (4257.14)
Constant	75983.67[c] (874.12)	113371.28[c] (1209.85)	159173.72[c] (3455.40)	132658.54[c] (4694.92)	120968.17[c] (6438.65)
Adjusted R^2	0.228	0.194	0.203	0.113	0.114
BIC	2861145.17	4382797.82	1175369.81	1225039.08	1277080.88
Observations	115159	168454	44241	44885	45910

Note. Standard errors in parentheses. AIC = Akaike information criterion of goodness of fit. Reference category for dummy variables in parentheses. Household weights are applied.

[a] $p < 0.05$, [b] $p < 0.01$, [c] $p < 0.001$

above, except changing the race of the household to Black is estimated to have a mean housing value of about $233,000. This is a difference of about 68 percent.

Model 3 also tested Hypothesis 2 by adding Black ethnicity as a predictor. Also shown in Table 2, we find that the relationship between households of Black ethnic groups in Black Meccas and housing values are positive and statistically significant in each cross-section except in 2010, when there was no significant or substantive difference between this group and non-Black ethnic groups. In 1990 and 2000, the difference was not substantive, though statistically significant. However, in 2005 and 2016, the housing values of Black ethnic households are estimated to be worth substantially more than non-Black ethnic house-



Figure 1. Effect of Education on Housing Values in Black Meccas by Race, 2016.

holds on average, holding all other predictors in the model constant. In 2005, the estimated housing value for Black ethnic households in Black Meccas are about $16,000 ($p < 0.001$) more on average. Similarly, in

2016, the average housing value for Black ethnic households is estimated to have an average housing value that is worth roughly $21,000 more than similarly situated households of non-Black ethnic heritage. Thus, in four out of five time periods, Model 3 provides strong evidence to support hypothesis 2.

Lastly, as reflected in the BIC statistics across time periods, we have very strong support that Model 3 fits our data better than Model 2. However, the difference in the adjusted R2 for each cross-section shows that the full model explained less than 1 percent more of the variation in mean housing values in southern Black Meccas (1990: $\Delta R^2 = .004$; 2000: $\Delta R^2 = .005$; 2005: $\Delta R^2 = .005$; 2010: $\Delta R^2 = .004$; 2016: $\Delta R^2 = .006$).

Ratios of Black-to-White Housing Values

Figures 2-7 reflect the median housing values in 1990, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2016 for Black and White married middle-class households for each of the six Black Meccas of the New South based on the regression models. Figure 2 represents the predicted median housing values for Atlanta, Georgia for each time period. In this graph, we notice that the gap between the Black and White married middle-class estimated housing values is wider in 2010 than it was in 2005 and the gap increases again in 2016. The Black-to-White median housing value ratio in 2005 was the smallest, with Black married middle-class housing value worth 0.68 of the value of their White counterparts. However, in 2016, the racial gap in Atlanta is wider, with the median value of Black married middle-class housing values worth 0.60 of White home values ($200,000 to $330,000 respectively).

The estimates of the predicted median housing values in Birmingham, Alabama, for married middle-class couples are shown in Figure 3. After a cursory glance comparing the six figures, we notice that the largest housing value gap across these Black Meccas exists in Birmingham. We can see that the Black-to-White housing value ratio does not change substantially, even though the 2016 ratio of 0.566 represents the predicted racial gap across

time points and MSAs. This finding undermines the belief that the Black middle class is approaching equality with their White counterparts in these places.

In Figure 4, we see a substantial decrease in the Black-to-White housing value ratio in Houston, Texas from 2000 to 2005 (0.69 to 0.87). The predicted median housing value for White married middle-class households in 2005 is estimated at $187,000, while similarly situated Black households' predicted median housing value is $162,500—a difference of about $24,000. However, like in Atlanta and Birmingham, the racial gap in predicted median housing values for married middle-class households increases in 2016; the Black-to-White ratio increased to 0.67. This means that, for every dollar of White married middle-class median housing value, the Black housing value is 67 cents.

Memphis, Tennessee's Black-to-White housing value ratios show a unique trend among the southern Black Meccas analyzed here, as depicted in Figure 5. The ratios start to move toward parity, decreasing from 0.64 in 1990 to 0.69 in 2000. However, the difference in the estimated Black and White housing values took a noteworthy negative turn in 2005. The ratio between Black and White home values became 0.61, meaning that the predicted median married middle-class housing value for a Black household is worth 61 cents compared to a comparable White household's housing value dollar.

The New Orleans, Louisiana, graph reflects the opposite pattern from that of Memphis (Figure 6). The predicted median housing value for married middle-class households racial gap began with a difference of $35,000 in 1990. Though substantial, this Black to White housing value ratio is the second smallest of all the Black Meccas in this analysis for 1990 at 0.69. However, in 2000, there was a large increase in the racial gap of housing values, with the Black married middle-class home worth 59 cents to the housing value dollar of their White counterparts. The impact of Hurricane Katrina and subsequent gentrification (Johnson 2015; Parekh 2015; Perine, Swarner and Pinkney 2017) is reflected in the trend from 2005 (before the catastrophe) to 2016.



Figure 2. Black to White Married Middle Class Median Housing Value Ratio and Median Housing Values by Race in Atlanta, Georgia MSA, 1990-2016.



Figure 3. Black to White Married Middle Class Median Housing Value Ratio and Median Housing Values by Race in Birmingham, Alabama MSA, 1990-2016.



Figure 4. Black to White Married Middle Class Median Housing Value Ratio and Median Housing Values by Race in Houston, Texas MSA, 1990 - 2016



Figure 5. Black to White Married Middle Class Median Housing Value Ratio and Median Housing Values by Race in Memphis, Tennessee MSA, 1990 - 2016



Figure 6. Black to White Married Middle Class Median Housing Value Ratio and Median Housing Values by Race in New Orleans, Louisiana MSA, 1990-2016.



Figure 7. Black to White Married Middle Class Median Housing Value Ratio and Median Housing Values by Race in Tampa, Florida MSA, 1990-2016.

Though total equity has not been achieved and a housing value gap still exists, the estimated housing values for Black and White married middle-class predicted households are the most similar in Tampa, Florida. In fact, in 2010, the Black married middle-class household predicted median housing value was worth roughly 91 cents for every housing value dollar of similarly situated White households. At each cross section, the Black-to-White median housing value ratio after 1990 does not descend below 0.81. Of all the cities in this analysis, Tampa's housing values are closest to being representative of Black Meccas of the New South's promise of relative economic well-being. However, this smallest ratio of 2010 still equates to an estimated $20,000 material difference in potential asset accumulation, which we argue is substantial. In light of these material differences between Black and White homeowners and the impact this inequality has on asset accumulation, it is important to investigate the relationship between race and housing values in Black Meccas of the New South as indicators of relative economic well-being more closely using more advanced statistical analyses.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The goal of this study was to examine the relationship between race, place, and class through the lens of the politics of respectability and the myths of meritocracy and model minorities. We examined the effect of race in economic well-being by examining housing values. We expected that there would be variation in housing values across race that could not be explained by factors that are promoted as a direct path from poverty to affluence, like getting a college education and building a nuclear family through marriage. We find that race continues to be a differentiating factor in the values of homes, regardless of Blacks as a group adhering to the attitudes and behaviors of the politics of respectability (marriage) and the myths of meritocracy and the model minority (educational attainment). We also find that Black people within southern Black Meccas do not form a homogeneous group and

there is variation in the economic outcomes of the overall Black population based in Black ethnicities.

The study findings also reflect the material impact that differences in housing values have on Black households. As conversations about baby bonds and reparations are discussed as policies to lessen the economic divide between Black and White groups in the future, understanding how wealth inequality presents itself in the present is also important. Similarly situated Black families do not benefit from home ownership in the same way that White families. If this aspect of wealth inequality is not addressed, the wealth divide will continue even if money is pumped into the Black community. The ratios of housing values by race painted a clear picture of the trends that are likely to remain until policymakers address the housing industry.

The image of America as the land of opportunity where anyone can succeed based upon his or her willingness to work hard is more like a mirage than a reality, or even a dream that one might aspire to, especially if you are a person of color. The experiences of Black people in America provide some of the most historical and enduring evidence of the myth of the American dream, the myth of meritocracy, and the model minority myth. No matter how hard Black people have tried to modify their behavior or to proclaim a moral authority upon which to engage in unconventional forms of political activities (e.g., boycotts, other forms of protests), Black people continue to lag behind White people on a host of social and demographic variables, particularly when assets such as housing values are considered. Black people are a diverse group; therefore, it is not surprising that Black ethnicity matters or that there is variation within the Black population on housing values. If the Black middle class continues to lag behind comparable Whites, one can only imagine what the situation is like for Black people with relatively lower levels of socioeconomic status and lower (or no) levels of asset ownership within and across Black ethnic groups. Our research findings support the aforementioned conclusions and further point to the need for revisiting how scholars think about Black Meccas.

Black Meccas, as they have been defined and understood in the literature to date, do not adequately reflect the demographic profiles, or the experiences, of the diversity that is the Black population. Black Meccas serve to perpetuate the myth that there is a segment of the Black population that has "made it." Black Meccas also imply that residential segregation is, at least in part, the result of class differences and/or personal preferences, when residential segregation is best understood as the legacy of discriminatory public policies and individual practices that have relegated Black people, as a whole, to certain geographical areas, sometimes concentrating people with relatively low income levels, as in the case of distressed communities, and sometimes concentrating people with relatively moderate income levels in so-called Black Meccas. In reality, when one considers a host of factors, especially housing values, Blacks in the middle class, including those living in so-called Black Meccas, are not any closer to reaching parity with White people in contemporary times than they were decades ago.

Abandoning or reimagining Black Meccas has theoretical, methodological, and public policy implications. The politics of respectability, which focuses on changes at the individual level and dismantling structural issues, is a powerful but underutilized framework for understanding persistent racial inequality. Additionally, scholars should consider broader measures of determining the overall economic well-being of Black people that go beyond measures of income to also include indicators of wealth and other quality of life factors. Scholars should also look at differences within the Black population, including Black ethnicity. Moreover, public policies must focus not merely on addressing changes on the individual level (e.g., increasing educational levels, income levels, and occupational prestige), but more importantly on addressing structural issues (e.g., residential segregation, predatory lending, tax policies that benefit affluent homeowners, etc.). The idea that there are places in the United States where Black people find a sanctuary from the systemic racism that produces geographical spaces is simply not true, and the concept of Black Meccas and related literature perpetuates that myth.

REFERENCES

Aldridge, Delores. 1989. "Foreword." Pp. ix-x in *In search of the New South*, edited by R. Bullard. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Allen, Renique. 2017. "Racism Is Everywhere, so Why Not Move South?" *The New York Times,* July 8. Retrieved January 16, 2018 (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/opinion/sunday/racism-is-everywhere-so-why-not-move-south.html).

Amato, Paul R. 2010. "Research on Divorce: Continuing Trends and New Developments." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 72(3):650-66.

Archer, Walter R., Gatzlaff, Dean H., Ling, David C. 1996. "Measuring the Importance of Location in House Price Appreciation." *Journal of Urban Economics* 40(3):334-53.

Bowser, Benjamin P. 2007. *The Black Middle Class: Social Mobility—and Vulnerability*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Bullard, Robert D., ed. 1989. *In Search of the New South: The Black Urban Experience in the 1970s and 1980s*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Bullard, Robert D. 1989. "Introduction: Lure of the New South." Pp. 1-15 in *In Search of the New South,* edited by R. Bullard. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.

Bullard, Robert D. 1989. "Black People in Heavenly Houston." Pp. 16-44 in *In Search of the New South,* edited by R. Bullard. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Bullard, Robert D. and E. Kiki Thomas. 1989. "Atlanta: Mecca of the Southeast." Pp. 75-97 in *In Search of the New South,* edited by R. Bullard. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Bullard, Robert D. 1989. "Conclusion: Problems and Prospects." Pp 161-163 in *In Search of the New South,* edited by R. Bullard. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Bullard, Robert D. 2011. "Twenty-point Plan to Depopulate Black Atlanta." *Race, Poverty, and the Environment* 18(2):20.

Catlin, Robert. A. 1989. "Black People in Tampa." Pp. 142-160 in *In Search of the New South,* edited by R. Bullard. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Cherlin, Andrew J. 2004. "The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 66(4):848-61.

Coleman, James S. 1961. *The Adolescent Society: The Social Life of the Teenager and Its Impact on Education*. New York: Free Press.

Dameron, Rebecca J., Murphy, Arthur D. 1997. "An International City Too Busy to Hate? Social and Cultural Change in Atlanta: 1970-1995." *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 26(1):43-69.

Denton, Nancy A. 2001. "Housing as a Means of Asset Accumulation: A Good Strategy for the Poor?" Pp. 232–266 in *Assets for the Poor: The Benefits of Spreading Asset Ownership,* edited by T. M. Shapiro and E. N. Wolff. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Dixon, Bruce. 2005. Black Mecca: The Death of an Illusion. *The Black Commentator,* October 13. Retrieved January 16, 2018 (https://www.Blackagendareport.com/content/Black-mecca-death-illusion).

Dodoo, F. Nii-Amoo. 1997. "Assimilation Differences among Africans in America." *Social Forces* (2): 527. doi: 10.2307/2580723.

Fu, Xuanning. 2008. "Interracial Marriage and Family Socio-economic Well-being: Equal Status Exchange or Caste Status Exchange?" *The Social Science Journal* 45(1): 132–55. doi: (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2007.12.008).

Geist, Claudia. 2017. "Marriage Formation in Context: Four Decades in Comparative Perspective." *Social Sciences* 6(1):9.

Green, Anthony D., and Shelton, Jason E. 2017. "No Fault of Their Own? Beliefs about the Causes of Racial Inequality among American Blacks and West Indian and African Immigrants." *Issues in Race and Society* 5:123–146.

Harris, Cherise A. Tassie, Keisha Edwards. 2011. "The Cinematic Incarnation of Frazier's Black Bourgeoisie: Tyler Perry's Black Middle-class." *Journal of African American Studies* 16(2):321-344.

Higginbotham, Evelyn Brooks. 1993. *Righteous Discontent*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Higginbotham, Evelyn Brooks. 2009. "Entering a Profession: Race, Gender, and Class in the Lives of Black Women Attorneys." Pp. 22-49 in *Emerging Intersections: Race, Class, and Gender in Theory, Policy, and Practice* edited by B. T. Dill and R. E. Zambrana. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

"History of Harlem." *Harlem Heritage Tours*. Retrieved January 16, 2018 (http://www.harlemheritage.com/).

Hobson, Maurice J. 2017. "Ali and Atlanta: A Love Story in the Key of the Black New South." *Phylon*. 54(1):79–96.

Hobson, Maurice J. 2017. "Can Atlanta's New Mayor Revive America's 'Black Mecca'?" *The Conversation,* December 7. Retrieved January 16, 2018 (https://theconversation.com/can-atlantas-new-mayor-revive-americas-Black-mecca-86902).

Hohle, Randolph. 2009. "The Rise of the New South Govermentality: Competing Southern Revitalization Projects and Police Responses to the Black Civil Rights Movement 1961-1965." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 22 (4):497-527.

Jackson, Caroline. 2018. "Harlem Renaissance: Pivotal period in the development of Afro American culture." *20th Century African American Culture*. 1978, Volume 2. Yale-New Haven Teachers Institute. Retrieved January 16, 2018 (http://teachersinstitute.yale.edu/curriculum/units/1978/2/78.02.03.x.html).

Jacobsen, Linda A., Mather, Mark. 2011. "A Post-Recession Update on US Social and Economic Trends." *Population Bulletin Update* 12(6).

Jaret, Charles. 1987. "Black Migration and Socioeconomic Inequality in Atlanta and the Urban South." *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 14(½): 62-105.

Jencks, Christopher. 1972. *Inequality: A reassessment of the effect of family and schooling in America*. New York: Basic Books.

Johnson, Cedric. 2015. "Gentrifying New Orleans: Thoughts on Race and the Movement of Capital." *Souls* 17(3-4):175-200. doi:10.1080/10999949.2015.1125219.

Kotkin, Joel. 2018. "The Cities where African Americans are Doing the Best Economically." *Forbes,* January 15. Retrieved January 16, 2018 (https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2018/01/15/the-cities-where-african-americans-are-doing-the-best-economically-2018/#1b7120d41ªbe).

Logan, John R. 2007. "Who Are the Other African Americans? Contemporary African and Caribbean Immigrants in the United States." Pp. 49–68 in *The Other African Americans: Contemporary African and Caribbean Immigrants in the United States,* edited by Y. Shaw-Taylor and S.A. Tuch. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, and Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Martin, Lori L. (2013). *Black Asset Poverty and the Enduring Racial Divide*. Latham, MD: First Forum Press.

Michney, Todd M. 2017. "Revisiting Atlanta's 45-year Reputation as the "Black Mecca." *Georgia Tech Center for Innovation*, February 17. Retrieved January 16 (https://gtcui.wordpress.com/2017/02/17/revisiting-atlantas-45-year-reputation-as-the-Black-mecca/).

Mulholland, Quinn. 2017. "An Identity Crisis in America's Black Mecca." *Harvard Political Review,* December 5. Retrieved January 16 (http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/an-identity-crisis-in-americas-Black-mecca/).

Oppenheimer, Valerie K. 1997. "Women's Employment and the Gain to Marriage: The Specialization and Trading Model." *Annual Review of Sociology* 23(1): 431-53.

Parekh, Trushna. 2015. "They Want to Live in the Tremé, But They Want It for Their Ways of Living: Gentrification and Neighborhood Practice in Tremé, New Orleans." *Urban Geography* 36(2): 201–20. doi: 10.108%2723638.2014.961359.

Perine, Kelsey, Swarner, Payson, Pinkney, Donovan. 2017. "Hurricane Katrina and the Effects of Gentrification on African American Communities." Available at SSRN:https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3070766.

Phillips, Mona Taylor. 2003. "Contesting the Costs of Belonging: A Global Black Feminisms Seminar at Spelman College, Atlanta, Georgia." *Agenda* 17:58, 59–64. DOI: 10.1080/10130950.2003.9674494

Porterfield, Ernest. (1989). "Birmingham: A Magic City." Pp. 121–141 in *In Search of the New South,* edited by R. Bullard. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Ruggles, Steven, Genadek, Katie, Goeken, Ronald, Grover, Josiah, Sobek, Matthew. 2017. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 7.0. [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

Sandhu, Sukhdev. 2011. "Harlem is Nowhere: A Journey to the Mecca of Black America by Sharifa Rhodes-Pitts-review." *The Guardian,* August 11. Retrieved January 16 (https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/aug/12/harlem-nowhere-journey-Black-review).

Seltzer, Judith A., Bachrach, Christine A., Bianchi, Suzanne M, Bledsoe, Caroline H., Casper, Lynne M , Chase-Lansdale, P. Lindsay, DiPrete, Thomas A., Hotz, V. Joseph, Morgan, S. Phillip, Sanders, Seth G., Thomas, Duncan. 2005. "Explaining Family Change and Variation: Challenges for Family Demographers." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 67(4): 908–25.

Vaughn, Sandra. 1989. "Memphis: Heart of the Mid-South." Pp. 98–120 in *In Search of the New South,* edited by Robert Bullard. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Wahl, Ana-Maria Gonzalez, Gunkel, Steven E. 2007. "From Old South to New South? Black-White Residential Segregation in Micropolitan Areas." *Sociological Spectrum* 27: 507–535.

Waters, Mary C. 1990. *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Waters, Mary C. 1994. "Ethnic and Racial Identities of 2nd-Generation Black Immigrants in New York City." *International Migration Review* 28(4): 795–820.

Waters, Mary C. 1999. *Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Williams, Robert. 2017. Scalar Measures of Fit: Pseudo R2 and Information Measures (AIC and BIC). Retrieved March 30, 2018. https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats3/L05.pdf.

Wright, Beverly Hendrix. 1989. "New Orleans: A City that Care Forgot." Pp. 1–15 in *In Search of the New South* edited by R. Bullard. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Maretta McDonald, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Lori Latrice Martin, Louisiana State University

Hidden Figures: Systemic Racism and the Possible Effects of Sampling Bias in Large-Scale Education Data Sets

ElizabethAnn S. Kelly

ABSTRACT

Significant influence over national educational systems and educational policies is exerted by large-scale international studies of education such as the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and the Programme for International Student Achievement (PISA). The impact of these influences on educational systems and student achievement is evidenced by the changes in patterns of cross-national and cross-cultural disparities in educational achievement over iterations of the test. This paper examines the import of national educational policymaker actions and potential sample bias of these tests through the lens of racism and educational inequities. Despite a data gap, national policy makers implement changes in educational policies and practices based on results from these large-scale studies and so fail to take into account the differing contexts students, especially minority cohorts, experience within education settings. Additionally, some specific examples of practices to exclude specific student cohorts from test participation are presented.

Keywords: Systemic racism, PISA, TIMSS, sampling bias, large-scale dataset

The Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and the Programme for International Student Achievement (PISA) are large-scale international studies of education which for decades have exerted significant influence over national education systems and domestic educational policies around the world, creating

changes in educational policy and practice (Baird et al. 2016; Feniger 2020; Takayama 2008). The impact of these influences on educational systems and student achievement is evidenced by changes in patterns of cross-national and cross-cultural disparities found in large-scale studies of educational achievement (Halpern et al. 2007; Hedges & Nowell 1995; Hyde, Fennema, & Lamon 1990; Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, & Williams 2008; Lindberg, Hyde, Petersen, & Linn 2010). However, while these studies and others like them have helped researchers better understand the contexts in which students are both successful and unsuccessful, there are still stories being left untold, and figures being hidden by intranational systemic racism and sampling bias.[1] Both TIMSS and PISA publish extensively on their sampling methods and possible biases. However, how many policy makers read this literature? In 2014, an international group of scholars and educators published an open letter to the director of the PISA assessment outlining issues related to national governments making education policy decisions based on PISA assessment results and an interest in climbing through the PISA rankings (https://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/may/06/oecd-pisa-tests-damaging-education-academics). This paper identifies why exclusion of minorities from the optimal benefits of education exacerbates the effects of racism in society and specific instances in PISA and TIMSS administration which reflect the institutional exclusion of specific minority cohorts which increase systemic inequity in educational assessment and the concomitant reforms emanating from national results.

THE VALUE OF EDUCATION

Learning is valued cross-culturally by policy makers, and education is considered a basic human right by the United Nations: equal access to education is the fourth goal in the United Nations' plan for a sustainable future (United Nations 2019). Despite this, and much intervention on the ground, rates of attendance and graduation from secondary education have not risen in a num-

ber of low- and middle-income countries contained in UNESCO data, as well as in African focused cross-national datasets (UNESCO 2017; Results report 2019, Global Partnership for Education results report). An important critique of current policy initiatives in education is the tendency to view education as a "cure-all" for inequities, without first addressing the inequities inherent in the educational system (Datzberger 2018). We cannot approach education as isolated from the political, social, and economic context in which it occurs, a context that embodies systemic racism emanating from power dynamics as well as institutional "efficiencies."

To better understand the structural changes required, it is necessary to conduct research investigating the contexts in which students are being educated. The seeds of the disparity in educational achievement may be found in Michel Foucault's exhaustive writings on the concept of power, where he posited that power comes from knowledge, uses knowledge, and then power reproduces itself through the creation of further knowledge. Power and knowledge cannot exist in isolation, but only in mutuality. To that end, he coined the neologism "power-knowledge" (pouvoir-savoir) (Foucault 1976).

In more recent research, this idea of power-knowledge within individuals is conceptualized as human capital, which is defined as the total knowledge, skills, and experience that a person possesses (Aslam 2014). Higher human capital is associated with a sense of empowerment, of which there are several kinds, including economic, social, psychological, and political. In many cases, equality largely means reducing the constraints on the lives of minority individuals, while simultaneously increasing the number and types of opportunity offered to them, resulting in economic and political empowerment, the mechanism through which education influences outcomes. Therefore, in order to affect real change in society through education, and reduce inequities, it is necessary to start formulating education policy from a transformative rather than an assimilative perspective (Datzberger 2018). Most current educational policy is written from an assimilative

perspective: policy makers believe that by giving children equal opportunities for education, they will then have equal opportunity in life (Sachs 2015). However, this is an overly simplistic view of educational reform. Instead, a transformative approach to education is needed, one that provides equity, not merely equality, in opportunities for education (Young 2001).

POWER THROUGH EDUCATION

An education is required to achieve economic empowerment in most segments of the globe, as that education provides the entry into higher paying careers (Aslam 2014). As level of education increases, a person's income also often increases. This association is stronger for women than men who are afforded the same educational advantage. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, this increase is double for women what it is for men (Aslam 2014).

Political empowerment is the extent to which a person can effect real change in their society and government. There is a long-standing power imbalance between the educated and the uneducated in politics; it is even codified in the 12th Amendment of the United States Constitution, which describes the way in which the President and Vice-president are elected via the Electoral College in lieu of a plebiscite. Hamilton's commentary on the role of the Electoral College in the Presidential election makes clear that the express purpose is to ensure the disenfranchisement of the uneducated poor (Hamilton 1788). Interestingly, while this discrepancy in political power between the educated and the uneducated persists, it is lessening due to the rise of social media and the Internet. Through the use of online platforms, people with less education are more likely to perceive an increase in political empowerment (Sasaki 2017).

EDUCATION AS A TOOL

The political power imbalance between the educated and the uneducated is one of the underpinnings of educational psychology as a field (Dewey 2008). Accepting Foucault's (1976) concept of power-knowledge impels the conclusion that education (in

that transfer of knowledge is the mechanism by which education achieves its goals) is an analog of the transfer of power in our society; thus it is fraught in its potential to consolidate or shift control away for those currently exercising control over society. While a tool of empowerment, educational access and content historically has been manipulated in more malignant ways, too (Blackburn 1987; Ingram 2013; Lewis 2017; Rostam-kolayi 2014; Watts 2013).

Education as Oppression

Cross-nationally, education at times has been used as a tool of oppression, in limiting the free development of students to become their full and best selves, in targeting their behavior and restricting their actions, as well as in constraining their spheres of interest and studies (Blackburn 1987; Ingram 2013; Lewis 2017; Rostam-kolayi 2014; Watts 2013). The education of girls and minorities often has been conceived to restrict them, rather than to create active participants in the world (Blackburn 1987; Connell Szasz 1980; Maina 2006; Watts 2013). While character development and the engendering of virtue in students has been a historical goal of mass education globally (Benavot & Resnik 2006), there has been specific, and limiting, emphasis on what was acceptable for specific groups. Parity in enrollment rates is not sufficient to achieve equity for less powerful cohorts; studies show that even when enrolled in school girls, rural students, and those from racial and social minorities do not receive the same level of learning as majority boys (Hickey & Hossain 2019; World Bank 2017). For example, a randomized controlled trial of teacher bias in mathematics found that while teachers do not differ when correcting work, when evaluating student mathematics ability they assess students with stereotypically female and nonwhite names as having lower abilities than stereotypically white and male names, even when the actual achievement scores were the same (Copur-Gencturk et al. 2020). Additionally, while membership in a minority racial or ethnic cohort does not necessarily correlate with lower socioeconomic status (SES) across

all global populations, when those students do fall into a lower SES category, they along with the rest of the cohort are likely to be treated differently: a study in Australia found that lower-SES schools were not only less likely to offer high-level mathematics subjects, when they were offered students were far less likely to choose those courses than their peers living in higher-SES neighborhoods (Murphy 2019). Those who are Black and female, at least in the United States, may undergo an even more disadvantaged educational environment.

Black Girls in the United States

Being black and female creates a lived experience that differs from peers in the United States. In schools with a majority of minority students, Black girls who perform well academically are often criticized for their behavior (Morris 2007). Teachers target Black girls, focusing on improving their etiquette and encouraging them to ascribe to ideals of white femininity, showing the impact of the intersection of race, class, and gender on girls in school (Morris 2007). These experiences in the classroom shape how girls perceive themselves and their capabilities; even the most academically gifted girls feel inferior to boys in mathematics and science when teachers focus on behavior and signal more appreciation of boys' effort (Spearman & Watt 2013). These perceptions of inferiority can be found in girls as young as six. In first grade girls often begin avoiding educational activities that are described as "for smart kids"; this behavior is not found in boys (Bian et al. 2017).

Education as Colonization

While it cannot be denied that religious institutions' interest in the morality of girls helped to formalize and expand girls' education in Europe and the Great Britain, there is a darker side to religious institutional involvement, as religious-based educational systems also were used as a tool of colonialization outside of Europe (Churchill 2004; Mohanty et al. 1991; Mujuni 2015; Turyasiimwa 2020), with specific and separate effects on female students.

Uganda. Prior to British colonialization in 1877, what is now the country of Uganda had no formal education system; educational standards and expectations were set locally within each formal or informal governmental unit (smaller kingdoms and tribal lands) (Mujuni 2015). One of the leaders of the region, concerned with the threat of colonialization, invited missionaries to implement formal education in 1875 as means to resist potential invasion (Mujuni 2015).

Due in large part to the inroads made by the missionaries, Uganda became a colony of the British Empire in 1894, less than 20 years later (Turyasiimwa 2020). Colonization of Uganda resulted in a formal state educational system for boys, but no provision was made under British rule for the education of girls, due to the local culture's views on the superiority of men and the influences of the missionaries, which continued through the 1960s (Sekamwa 2000; Turyasiimwa 2020).

Residential Schools. While formal education created a pathway for colonization in Uganda, it was explicitly used as a tool of colonization and genocide in Canada and the United States, or in the words of the creator of the residential school system in the United States it was "education for extinction." The stated goal was to eradicate all vestiges of indigenous cultures in North America (Churchill 2004). To that end children were forcibly removed from their parents and placed in residential schools where they would be educated to be "white" and punished for practices that were deemed "heathen."

Much of the focus of research in this area, like much history of formal education as a whole, has focused on boys; however, one of the more concentrated initiatives undertaken by the American Bureau of Indian Affairs was the removal of girls from their homes to "re-educate" them into "ideal women" (Trennert 1982). By focusing on cutting off girls from their cultures these men were effectively interfering with the generational transmission of cultural practices and knowledge from mother to child, which is particularly insidious when considered in the context of the

matriarchal structure of many North American Indigenous cultures (Churchill 2004). This also meets the United Nations definition of genocide by both removing children from one group to another, and by inflicting "conditions of life" meant to destroy an existing culture (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948). In addition to the genocidal intent of the men responsible, increased military regimentation, and lack of recognition of the reservation environment to which the children would return, contributed to the failure of the schools to meet the educational needs of Native American students (Trennert 1982).

To further their "education" many girls at residential schools were placed in the "outing" system established to introduce Native American young women to the running of a home, with all its attendant chores; this devolved into servitude in white homes with the proceeds used to support the costs of running of the residential school and providing no real benefit to the girls, forcing them into slave labor (Paxton 2006). Additionally, the girls labored to maintain the domestic environment at the schools themselves, to further reduce costs (Trennert 1982).

While the conditions within the United States Residential School System were truly deplorable, they pale in comparison to the conditions found in Canada. In concert with various Christian institutions,[2] the Canadian government oversaw the forcible removal and education of over 150,000 indigenous children from 1920 until the last residential school closed in 1996 (MacDonald 2015). Similar to the American system, however, no balance existed between manual labor to keep the schools running and the ostensible education for which the schools were established. Rather than providing an education to benefit their charges, let alone meet equivalency with their white counterparts, estimates indicate in the early decades of operation less than 50 percent of the boys and girls even survived, often due to diseases such as tuberculosis, or persistent malnutrition and its attendant health impacts (Milloy & McCallum 2017). The Canadian government

not only engaged in the cultural aspects of genocide, but in failing to protect the health of the children they kidnapped from their families, the government is responsible for the systematic extermination of indigenous children. Similar seeds of institutional racism have grown runners which run through today's educational systems.

RACISM IN EDUCATION TODAY

Historically, education has been wielded by the powerful to achieve their goals, to the benefit of some and detriment of others. Access to education has a potentially transformative effect for minority cohorts, allowing increases in social and economic empowerment. Race and minority ethnic status could be an important predictor in educational achievement in international testing, however this data is not gathered by PISA or TIMSS administrators for most participant nations.[3] Sociologists and other researchers have documented policies, processes, cultures, attitudes, and events that have led across the globe to racist outcomes, including exploitation, violence, discrimination, and intolerance. The complexity of race and racism, as well as its subtleties, have been investigated and interpreted across cultures (Andrews et al. 2014), from attitudes towards blood, skin color, and sport in the United Kingdom (Yuval-davis et al. 2009) or immigrant youth and sexuality in Sweden (Bredström 2003) or nation-building in both post-colonial Southeast Asia and east Asia (Ang 2022). Racism goes beyond color, especially the overly simplistic bifurcation of white people or people of color, as white-on-white racism has been documented repeatedly (an example of this would be the institutionalized racism Romani and Irish Travelers face in the UK and Ireland). Researchers found an increasing impact of racism in middle tier countries (those not falling within the bounds of traditional Western countries, or the poorer, Western-colonized countries) which exploit poorer countries or their own ethnic minorities (Dunaway 2016). Despite this extensive scholarship, neither TIMSS or PISA collects data on

race. The inclusion of race in the data collected could provide the ability for more nuanced explorations of the dataset and the basis for more equitable educational policy changes. Related to race, while Primary Language Spoken at Home is collected for TIMSS, no data is collected on if students are first- or second-generation immigrants, which has been shown to be predictive of achievement in individual countries.

LARGE-SCALE EDUCATION DATASETS

In an effort to understand the "whats and hows" of education around the world, large-scale studies such as TIMSS and PISA have been developed and have become a central part of the study of comparative education. In addition to providing snapshots of the practices and contexts of education, these studies can create impetus for change at the national level when policymakers examine national results, especially in relationship to results of other countries.

TIMSS

TIMSS data are gathered under the auspices of International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) which designed and conducted education-related large-scale comparative studies over the past six decades. Intended to assess changes in student performance related to science and mathematics, TIMSS has measured student achievement and collected comprehensive contextual information from teachers, students, and principals at four-year intervals over the past twenty-five years, being first administered in 1995 (Mullis et al. 1997); it was administered most recently in 2019 (Mullis & Martin 2017). The purpose of the TIMSS is twofold: first, it aims to assess global trends in STEM instruction; and second, it informs educational policy at both the national and international level (Mullis et al. 2016).

TIMSS's student performance data can be disaggregated in myriad ways; because it is accompanied by significant student, class, and institution background information, specific conditions affecting student achievement can be determined (Broer et

al. 2019). A two-stage random sample design is utilized for participation in a TIMSS cycle, employing representative and well-documented probability samples (LaRoche et al. 2016b).

Like other large-scale assessments, TIMSS has evolved over its existence. The instrument was developed based on methods initially used by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)s, and focuses on curriculum-based achievement rather than knowledge-based achievement. In part because TIMSS is international, cultural and educational system differences required adaptations to the design, analysis, and subsequent reporting of findings from the assessment (Martin & Mullis 2019). Much has remained the same through subsequent TIMSS cycles, but the survey has evolved as variations in sample design, survey administration, and national participation have occurred. For example, in early surveys multiple adjacent grades were assessed in order to target a specific age (13), but in subsequent surveys only eighth graders were included (Broer et al. 2019). Recent editions included parental questionnaires for fourth graders (Broer et al. 2019). The instrument also has changed regarding inclusion of specific questions when their validity has been found suspect (e.g., elimination of parental occupation and income) based upon issues found in other IEA studies (Buchmann 2002). The questions now also recognize the impact of developments in technology, such as increased internet accessibility or computers in the home (Broer et al. 2019). Finally, different national educational systems elect to take part in each cycle of TIMSS. Research shows that participation in various IEA large-scale assessments is related to previous participation in similar assessments and overall wealth of the country (OECD, 2015).

PISA

Similar to the IEA, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) designed the PISA as a large-scale, cross-national survey, but instead focuses on measuring student knowledge rather than grade level curriculum. The goal of PISA is to assist governments in evaluating students' ability to apply

acquired knowledge based on literacy testing for reading, mathematics, and science, as well as problem-solving skills, independent of the national educational system curricula. Beginning in 2000, PISA has operated triennially, with each of the three subjects being tested each cycle and one being of particular focus in a given year (reading in 2000 and 2009, mathematics in 2003 and 2012, and science in 2006 and 2015.) The 2018 iteration added a new dimension to assess digital literacy, including distinguishing between fact and opinion (Schleicher 2019). PISA's two-stage sampling process first identifies a diverse cohort of schools estimated to be representative based on location and demographic factors (e.g., rural or urban) then randomly selects 40+ students to sit for the exam. A range of four to eight thousand students are surveyed for each country, and each student is assigned a sampling weight to reflect the nation's PISA-eligible class (Schleicher 2019).

When the PISA instrument is compared to TIMSS, the students are on average older (15-year-olds vs. eighth graders), and expected skills are tested instead of assessing achievement based on grade level curricula. Additionally, the tests use dissimilar scaling techniques based on different models of item response theory, as well as differing in test length and focus of student questionnaires (He et al. 2018). There are some significant overlaps in the measured constructs of TIMSS and PISA, however. For example, in both the 2015 PISA and TIMSS surveys, items on the background questionnaires provided to principals, teachers, and students contained substantially similar wording related to the same theoretical concepts (e.g., to assess the context of the learning environment, both instruments used Likert scale items on motivation, subject matter enjoyment, and engagement with the school community) (He 2018; OECD 2015; Mullis 2013).

The use of PISA data to assess achievement at the national level and create educational policy changes and curriculum development has been well documented (Breakspear 2012; Meyer, Heinz-Dieter, & Benavot 2014; Sellar 2014), even generating the term "PISA shock" when countries find the ranking of

their students' performance lower than expected (Elliott 2019). A number of issues arise from generalizing the success of specific educational practices from one nation or region to another, including some specific to PISA (Auld & Morris 2016; Hopfenbeck et al. 2018). External systems and practices may influence student achievements that are not captured in PISA datasets and that confound cross-national achievement comparisons (Feniger and Lefstein 2014; Alexander 2010). For example, the PISA background questionnaire does not ask students about outside tutoring, which is prevalent in Asian nations with a strong emphasis on national examination preparation and where a culture of extra tutoring outside of the classroom has evolved (Gillis 2016). This unobservable data could significantly raise performance on PISA, which tests for knowledge the student is expected to have, rather than assessing knowledge specifically tied to grade level curriculum, like TIMSS. Additionally, with PISA's sampling technique (selecting a small cohort of students from each school), and not tying teacher questionnaires to the specific learning environment for the tested student, the actual classroom inputs and teacher traits cannot be assessed, making it problematic to serve as a contextual predictor of achievement and the basis for implementing educational practices. Despite this, OECD makes teacher level recommendations based on PISA data (OECD 2010). Carnoy documents an issue regarding judging the effectiveness of educational practices by using TIMSS and PISA assessments for the same students one year apart, finding the predictive benefits of teacher and classroom characteristics (e.g., teacher quality and opportunity to learn) related to achievement to be overstated, at least at the country level (Carnoy 2016).

SAMPLING TECHNIQUES IN TIMSS AND PISA

Both TIMSS and PISA use a two-stage sampling strategy. First a random list of eligible schools is drawn up for each country, then for TIMSS random selection of one or more classes of the appropriate academic level are selected from each school. Sampling is

done by class rather than by student to allow for instructional environments to be used as variables (LaRoche et al. 2016). PISA samples students, not classes, therefore the second stage of PISA's sampling is selecting a cohort of students from the target population within the selected school. These students may or may not share classes or grade levels (OECD 2019).

For each cycle of TIMSS two datasets are collected, for fourth grade and eighth grade (or the country-appropriate equivalents); these represent the midpoint of primary education and the end point of primary education. In 2015, educational systems could choose to participate in either the fourth-grade assessment, the eighth-grade assessment, or both (LaRoche et al. 2016). Each participating national education system undertakes the test administration and collection of data, governed by documentation and training from the international project teams. In order to prevent bias in responses which could affect national outcomes, the IEA applies participation or response rate standards to participating education systems' data. Issues with response rates at the school, classroom, and student levels may lead to the exclusion of that system's data in the TIMSS and TIMSS Advanced international database and resulting reports (LaRoche et al. 2016). However, it is likely that some countries also use the TIMSS and PISA sample exclusion criteria to artificially inflate their TIMSS scores.

Both TIMSS and PISA designers have established benchmarks and methodology to ensure sample validity ensuring statistically defensible results. However, in addition to ignoring the illustrative and potentially transformative data on race, countries systematically exclude specific cohorts, ostensibly for efficiency or other administrative purposes. Such exclusions suggest the potential for sample bias, and additional harm when national policies might be promulgated subsequently which affect the excluded group. An in-depth analysis of each country's sampling for TIMSS and PISA is beyond the scope of this article; however, some examples are illustrative of the issues.

While research indicates student achievement on international assessments can be related to characteristics of students or

their classroom environments (Kelly 2022; Meinck 2017; Grace & Thompson 2003; Mullis 2012b), certain types of students are consistently excluded from participation in TIMSS and PISA testing. When IEA-established participation standards are contravened, this results in annotation or segregation of TIMSS reported data in order to highlight the potential validity issues (Mullis 2012a, Meinck 2017) and the OECD survey design includes similar sample validity standards and practices. Clearly, impossibility of test administration in specific circumstances meets a reasonability standard, however, national practices related to these excluded cohorts may exceed that standard.

Special Educational Needs

Both TIMSS and PISA allow for exclusion of schools dedicated to educating those with disabilities or specific students with disabilities. However, by allowing exclusion of students receiving their education in specialized environments or having a learning disability, even if the individual student is performing at "grade level," TIMSS and PISA are reinforcing the idea that special education is "less than" standard education classrooms. This emphasizes a culture of exclusion applying to special needs children, indicating that they are not participants in the cohort of achievement (Schuelka 2012). While this does not fall within the bounds of systemic racism, except to the extent race influences students' characterization as special needs, it does speak to systemic inequity. Symbolic annihilation applies to the erasure of segments of the population in popular media (Gerbner 1972), and, in a sense, students participating in special education programs or possessing a physical or educational disability similarly can be siloed and excluded from these international assessments, without any documentation that the particular disability would prevent valid participation. In essence, they become invisible.

Eliminating specific cohorts from TIMSS and PISA testing presents potential bias considerations and implications for international educational policy (Schuelka 2012, McGrew et al. 1992). Countries' use of discretion related to special needs stu-

dent participation results in a lack of transparency and therefore accountability (Gamazo et al., 2019) and countries' focus on high achievement for their students could exacerbate the inclusion of potentially low-performing students in special education settings which do not participate in the assessments. In the U.S., students with certain background characteristics have been funneled into special education programs, without regard to actual disability, in order to raise test scores (Reschly 1993; Vanchu-Orosco 2012). The potential is there for countries to behave similarly in order to influence scores on TIMSS, PISA, and their own national assessment surveys.

In the administration of PISA assessments, OECD allows for the participation of students whose disabilities are not severe enough to support exclusion; this can be accomplished through use of the standard test instrument or a revised one designed for those with learning differences. However, in 2015 only 11 countries employed that option (Gamazo et al., 2019). Additionally, analysis of PISA data finds a lower participation of special education students than occurs in the population, and, for some countries, increased individual student exclusion rates. Canada, in particular, while having a low school exclusion rate (for schools established specifically to meet the needs of students with disabilities), in 2015 excluded 7.1% of individual students in participating schools. Luxembourg and Norway follow a similar pattern of rising percentages of student exclusion (Brzyska 2018). TIMSS 2019 data reporting did not segregate excluded students with disabilities from those students speaking an alternative language; however, 17 participating countries had student exclusion rates at either the fourth grade or eighth grade level that exceeded the 5% benchmark, with some exceeding 10% (LaRoche et al. 2019). Despite exclusion from test participation, students with disabilities may be subject to national policies promulgated based on results from TIMSS and PISA assessment, which may not be optimal for their achievement. It should be argued, therefore that it would be more beneficial to include these students and allow researchers to examine their results in order to inform better policy initiatives.

Georgia

In addition to excluding students with special educational needs, countries have the discretion to only offer testing to students educated in a specific language, even when significant numbers of students are educated in another language. While not anti-BIPOC racism, language limitations in test administration may represent a facet of educational discrimination against ethnic minorities. In the case of Georgia, only including native (and thus ethnic) Georgian speakers in the target populations in both the 2015 and 2019 iterations of TIMSS, as well as the 2018 PISA assessment, results in a sample that is only representative of 90% of the target population (Mullis et al. 2017, UNICEF 2019). Ethnic tensions in Georgia have been documented extensively in the South Caucasus region and extend back decades; some analysts indicate they began in the 1990s, others say as far back as the 1920s or even earlier (Tabatadze 2016; Nichol 2009). While there is debate over Russia's actions in the past decades and the effects on intrastate conflicts, fundamentally there are ethnic factions of the Georgian state living in disharmony: independence-desiring Georgians and those in regions which identify or claim kinship with the Russian Federation, such as Abkhazia or South Ossetia (which are currently Russian-occupied) or are part of minority communities (Isakhanyanm 2012, Nichol 2009). Ethnic minorities constitute 16% of the Georgian population, with Azeris representing 6.3% and Armenians 4.5% (Georgian Census 2014). A rise of nationalism in the last part of the twentieth century exacerbated ill-treatment of minority populations, with ethnic Georgians maintaining rights and privileges that were not enjoyed by other residents (Wheatley 2006).

After becoming an independent nation, and after its subsequent admission in April 1999 to the Council of Europe, Georgia committed to ratification of both the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) and the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. After long delays, the Georgian Parliament finally approved the FCNM and it became operable in April 2006. Despite adopting these

principles, initially the prevailing attitude by the majority government upon achieving its independence from Russia was that minority populations should react with gratitude in being allow to stay (Wheatley 2006).

The Georgian government has acknowledged its difficulties in achieving full integration of its diverse ethnic populations (UN Document CERD/C/GEO/4-5 2011), including in the area of education. The educational barriers are primarily inherent and systemic, relating to factors not in students' control (Kitiashvili 2016.) In 2017, in response to the United Nations report of its deficiencies in addressing the needs of minority populations, Georgian representatives noted they had implemented ethnic minority access to education at all levels in the students' native language; as of 2017, there were 220 non-Georgian language schools (Georgia, Addendum 2017). Providing native language education offers both benefits and negative outcomes for Georgian students. Research has found that while there is improvement in access to higher education for members of ethnic minority cohorts, limitations continue to restrict participation of these students. Additionally, by not including non-ethnic Georgians in the TIMSS or PISA samples, it is largely impossible to assess if these students are receiving a fair and equal education, as the Georgian government is claiming to provide.

Canada

A possibly more subtle introduction of sample bias occurs in Canada. According to the TIMSS International Results in Mathematics for both the 2015 and 2019 iterations, the Canadian sample is only indicative of 67% and 79% of the targeted population respectively. In Canada only two provinces participated in the 2015 eighth grade TIMSS samples, Ontario and Quebec; in 2019 students from the provinces of Alberta, Manitoba, Newfoundland, Ontario, and Quebec participated in the fourth grade assessment. While they are the most populous provinces, they are also the most affluent and whitest.

The 2018 PISA assessment specifically excludes Indigenous students living on reservations in Canada. Canada currently has over six hundred recognized First Nations governments and indigenous people make up the majority of the population in Nunavut and parts of the Northwest Territories. However, the tested provinces only have 2% to 3% indigenous populations. As an indigenous population, the First Peoples of Canada have and continue to experience exploitive and inequitable treatment and outcomes, in comparison to those of white ancestry across multiple spheres including education, environmental justice, food security, criminal justice, and heath care (Brzozowski et al. 2006; Deaton et al. 2020; Frost 2019; Hammond et al. 2017; M. Hu et al. 2019; Smylie et al. 2010). Given the Canadian government's history in the "education" of indigenous children, including the forcible removal of children to residential schools into the 1990s, this lack of inclusion of indigenous majority areas of Canada is deeply concerning, as well as likely masking the actual variability in achievement within the Canadian sample.

China

Similar to Canada, in China only certain provinces participate in PISA assessments; in 2018 these provinces were Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang (OECD 2019), which are four of the six wealthiest provinces (IMF 2022). China uses a hukou system, which defines if a person is from an urban or rural area based on their parentage. While it is now possible for rural hukou holders to work in cities, people must access certain government services through their hukou. As a result, rural hukou holders cannot access those services while working or living in cities (Brugiavini et al. 2018). This system has created significant differences between rural and urban individuals in terms of access to healthcare, education, and pensions or other benefits (Hung 2022). Research has shown that local residents are primed from childhood to be less trusting of non-local residents, especially in urban areas, resulting in a barrier for social integration for rural hukou

holders in cities (Luo & Wang 2020). These barriers increase for migrant ethnic minority individuals (Tan et al. 2022).

There are two issues related to the hukou system in the PISA sample; the first is the urban-rural divide for individuals who remain in their localities. By sampling only highly urban and wealthy areas, children from poorer rural areas are excluded from the PISA assessment. From 2010 to 2012, 100% of urban children completed primary and secondary education, while only 88% and 70% of rural children completed primary and secondary education, respectively. For that same time period, only 2% of rural individuals accessed any tertiary education, while 54% of urban individuals were able to receive tertiary education (Zhang et al. 2015). Such large gaps in educational attainment suggest that there are similarly large gaps in educational achievement between rural and urban children.

The second issue is that children with rural hukous who are living in cities cannot access secondary education without returning to their assigned localities. Subsequent to significant reforms to the hukou system regarding education, children belonging to migrant families may attend primary school where their parents are living and working, which has increased access to primary education for rural hukou children, but in order to access secondary education these children must return to the area from which their parents come (Zhou & Cheung 2017). Officially, these rural children still have access to the same secondary and tertiary educational opportunities as their urban peers, they must simply access those opportunities in another area (Hu & West 2014). This means for the purposes of PISA these rural children are not members of the target population, as they are excluded from the educational systems in the provinces being sampled, even if they are living the area.

CONCLUSION

It is widely accepted that access to education is key to individual empowerment, and most advocates also recognize that sys-

temic inequities in educational systems prevent minority cohorts from obtaining optimal benefits from these institutions. Recent backlash against critical race theory and inclusive educational practices in certain developed countries suggests that while this disadvantage is recognized, it is seen as a benefit by some. To change the status quo and create a more equitable global community, better data that is not "colorblind" is optimal to inform policymakers' decision-making processes, and also remove plausible deniability.

Both the TIMSS and PISA have significant influence, and they are rightly the benchmark for high-quality data collection at such a large scale. However, there has been significant overreach by policymakers in interpreting the actual implications of testing results regarding successful contexts for student achievement. While these assessments do provide valuable insights into global educational practices, allowing participating countries such broad oversight in sampling procedures has led some in practice to cherry-pick student populations in order to artificially enhance national educational profiles. Even in countries where explicit cherry-picking is not occurring, there has been very little done to address potential issues regarding systemic racism in educational systems and its influence on sampling procedures.

A tool in addressing systemic racism and other institutional inequities would be elimination of practices excluding minority cohorts from testing participation. Such changes would have to include sampling in rural areas that are more logistically complex to access, such as described in Canada and China. Additionally, test process modifications would require sampling students in special education environments, as students of color are disproportionately assigned to those classrooms. Progress also would necessitate that, in addition to these sources of systemic racism in education being recognized, they be addressed; that educational systems be continually studied to identify potential sources of systemic disadvantage so that they may be addressed both within research, and in the real world.

In reviewing the impact of these large-scale international achievement tests, other modifications of testing procedures are indicated to provide additional datapoints to understand the impact of racism in education. The introduction of collecting of racial demographic information could be a valuable way for PISA and TIMSS to inform public policy, and lead to increased transparency and accountability for educators and institutions. In contrast with other nations, the United States PISA sampling does gather data on race and ethnicity, which is a key tool in assessing racial achievement gaps within and between state education systems before students reach the age to take SATs. Collecting this information on a global scale would add an important missing context to the datasets as a whole. It is common for more homogenous countries to believe that racism is not an issue in their society. However, as discussed above, research indicates this is not accurate. By gathering racial and ethnicity characteristics, the information necessary to analyze operational aspects and outcomes by researchers could better inform public policy in education and help to hold institutions responsible for systemic inequities to ameliorate those conditions.

The current sampling systems employed by PISA and TIMSS allow countries to hide the statistical realities in some areas and so, too, the child figures behind them. As educators and researchers, we have a duty of care to address these sources of systemic inequities in our societies.

ENDNOTES

1 The intent is not to imply statistical invalidity of these tests, but that the methodology which permissibly does not include certain segments of the populations may result in sample bias which then presents issues when educational policy makers interpret results and generate implications beyond the data's actual explication.

2 In July 2022, Pope Francis visited Canada with the purpose of apologizing for the Roman Catholic Church's role in the genocide of First Nations Peoples within Canada. The visit had mixed reactions, with many members of First Nations stating the Pope did not go far enough

by not recognizing the Church's culpability as an institution, instead focusing on the actions of "individual 'Christians'"(Paradis 2022). Additional criticism was drawn by the Pope's refusal to rescind the Church's Doctrine of Discovery (Palmater 2022), which states Christians have the right and obligation to claim any and all lands not already inhabited by Christians (Romanus Pontifex 1455).

3 The United States PISA sample does include data on the race of participants, however this is not standard across national samples.

REFERENCES

Andrews, K., Bassel, L., & Winter, A. 2014. The British Sociological Association Race and Ethnicity Study Group Conference "Mapping the Field: Contemporary Theories of Race, Racism and Ethnicity." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(10): 1862–1868. https://doi.org/10.108%1419870.2014.931994

Ang, I. 2022. "On the Perils of Racialized Chineseness: Race, Nation and Entangled Racisms in China and Southeast Asia." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 45(4): 757–777. https://doi.org/10.108%1419870.2021.1990979

Aslam, M. 2014. *Empowering Women: Education and the Pathways of Change; Background paper prepared for the Education for all global monitoring report 2013/4, Teaching and learning: achieving quality for all; 2013*. http://www.worldbank.org/mdgs/gender.html

Benavot, A., & Resnik, J. 2006. "Lessons from the Past: A Comparative Socio-Historical Analysis of Primary and Secondary Education." *Global Educational Expansion Historical Legacies and Political Obstacles*, eds. Aaron Benavot, Julia Resnik, Javier Corrales (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences), 1–90.

Bian, L., Leslie, S. J., & Cimpian, A. 2017. "Gender Stereotypes about Intellectual Ability Emerge Early and Influence Children's Interests." *Science* 355(6323): 389–391. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aah6524

Blackburn, J. 1987. "Schooling Women." *Australian Feminist Studies* 2(4): 213–219. https://doi.org/10.108%8164649.1987.9961554

Bredström, A. 2003. "Gendered Racism and the Production of Cultural Difference: Media representations and identity work among 'immigrant youth' in contemporary Sweden." *NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research* 11(2): 78–88. https://doi.org/10.108%8038740310002932

Brugiavini, A., Cavapozzi, D., & Pan, Y. 2018. "Urban-rural differences in social policies: The case of the hukou system in China." In R. Taylor & J. Jaussaud (Eds.), *China's Global Political Economy: Managerial Perspectives* (pp. 55–66). Oxford: Routledge. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=5mEPEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA55&dq=hukou+system+and+secondary+education&ots=1NE-VCX5ZT&sig=_sZcBXNBXqeVo7Y4pU45d-Qr-NU#v=onepage&q=hukou%20system%20and%20secondary%20education&f=false

Brzozowski, J.-A., Taylor-Butts, A., & Johnson, S. 2006. "Victimization and offending among the Aboriginal population in Canada." *Juristat: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics*, 26(3), 1–30. http://library.mtroyal.ca:2461/collections/Collection-R/Statcan/85-002-XIE/85-002-XIE2006003.pdf

Churchill, W. 2004. "Genocide by Any Other Name: American Indian Residential Schools in Context." *Genocide, War Crimes and the West: History and Complicity*, ed. Adam Jones, (London: Zed Books), 1–15.

Connell Szasz, M. 1980. " 'Poor Richard' Meets the Native American: Schooling for Young Indian Women in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut." In *Historical Review* 49(2).

Deaton, B. J., Scholz, A., & Lipka, B. 2020. "An Empirical Assessment of Food Security on First Nations in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics* 68(1): 5–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/cjag.12208

Dewey, J. 2008. *The Early Works of John Dewey*, Volume 5, 1882 - 1898: Early Essays, 1895-1898, Ed. J. A. Boydston, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.)

Dunaway, W. A. 2016. "Challenging the Global Apartheid Model." *Journal of World Systems Research* 22(1): 16–22. https://doi.org/10.5195/JWSR.1

Foucault, M. 1976. L'Histoire de la Sexualité: la volonté de savoir. (Paris: Editions Gallimard).

Frost, K. (2019). "First Nations Sovereignty, Environmental Justice, and Degrowth in Northwest BC, Canada." *Ecological Economics* 162(April): 133–142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.04.017

Hamilton, A. 1788. No. 68: The Mode of Electing the President. *The Independent Journal*.

Hammond, C., Thomas, R., Gifford, W., Poudrier, J., Hamilton, R., Brooks, C., Morrison, T., Scott, T., & Warner, D. 2017. "Cycles of Silence: First Nations Women Overcoming Social and Historical Barriers in Supportive Cancer Care." *Psycho-Oncology* 26(2): 191–198. https://doi.org/10.1002/pon.4335

Hu, B., & West, A. (2014). "Exam-Oriented Education and Implementation of Education Policy for Migrant Children in Urban China." *Educational Psychology*, 41(3): 249-267. https://doi.org/10.108%3055698.2014.977780

Hu, M., Daley, A., & Warman, C. 2019. "Literacy, Numeracy, Technology Skill, and Labour Market Outcomes among Indigenous Peoples in Canada." *Canadian Public Policy* 45(1): 48–73. https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.2017-068

Hung, J. 2022. "Hukou System Influencing the Structural, Institutional Inequalities in China: The Multifaceted Disadvantages Rural Hukou Holders Face." *Social Sciences* 2022 11(5):194. https://doi.org/10.3390/SOCSCI11050194

Ingram, L.-A. 2013. *Citizen-girls: Girls' perspectives on gender, citizenship and schooling*. University of Toronto.

Lewis, T. L. 2017. Spiritual Mothers Educating Republican Daughters: Elizabeth Bayley Seton, The Sisters of Charity, and St. Joseph's Academy for Girls. Houston State University.

Luo, J., & Wang, X. 2020. "Hukou Identity and Trust: Evidence from a framed field experiment in China." *China Economic Review* 59: 101383. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.CHIECO.2019.101383

MacDonald, D. B. 2015. "Canada's History Wars: Indigenous genocide and public memory in the United States, Australia and Canada." *Journal of Genocide Research* 17(4): 411–431. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2015.1096583

Maina, N. K. 2006. "Interpretation of the Qur'an and its Influence on Girls' Access to Secondary School Education in Kenya." In *Contemporary Developmental Issues in Kenya*, eds. John Shiundu, Paul Achola, Helen Mondoh, Grephas Opata, Billy Ng'ong'ah (Egerton, Kenya: Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa) .

Meyer, Heinz-Dieter, & Benavot 2014. *PISA, Power, and Policy: the Emergence of Global Educational Governance*. (Oxford: Symposium Books).

Milloy, J. S., & McCallum, M. J. 2017. *A National Crime: The Canadian Government and the Residential School System* (Anniversary). University of Manitoba.

Mohanty, C. T., Russo, A., & Torres, L. 1991. *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).

Morris, E. W. 2007. "Ladies" or "Loudies"? *Youth & Society* 38(4): 490–515. https://doi.org/10.1177/0044118X06296778

Mujuni, J. B. 2015. *A Case Study of Cooperative Learning in Bushenyi District in Uganda: Educational leaders' and teachers' perceptions*. (Chicago: Loyola University).

Mullis, I., Martin, M., Foy, P., & Hooper, M. 2017. *TIMSS 2015: International Results in Mathematics*. http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/timss2015/international-results/wp-content/uploads/filebase/full%20pdfs/T15-International-Results-in-Mathematics.pdf

Romanus Pontifex. 1455. https://www.papalencyclicals.net/nichol05/romanus-pontifex.htm?fbclid=IwAR1S2d6t4KTxVtWasYcNAGMMTOPDPcwUazdvG_S9chRIAxEHaDCIkdDtOL4

Palmater, P. 2022. Pope Francis, we don't accept your hollow apology. Here's why | The Star. *Toronto Star*. https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2022/07/26/pope-francis-we-dont-accept-your-hollow-apology-heres-why.html

Paradis, D. 2022. Reaction from survivors mixed as Pope Francis apologizes. *APTN*. https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/reaction-from-survivors-apology-pope-francis-maskwacis-alberta/

Paxton, K. A. 2006. "Learning Gender." In *Boarding School Blues: Revisiting American Indian Educational Experiences*. Lincoln: Bison Books (University of Nebraska Press).

Rostam-kolayi, J. 2008. "Origins of Iran's Moderns Girls' Schools: From Private/National to Public/State" *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 4(3), 58–88.

Sasaki, F. 2017. "Does Internet Use Provide a Deeper Sense of Political Empowerment to the Less Educated?" *Information Communication and Society* 20(10): 1445–1463. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1229005

Sekamwa, J. 2000. *History and Development of Education in Uganda*. (Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers).

Smylie, J., Fell, D., & Ohlsson, A. 2010. "A Review of Aboriginal Infant Mortality Rates in Canada: Striking and Persistent Aboriginal/Non-Aboriginal Inequities." *Canadian Journal of Public Health* 101(2): 143–148.

Spearman, J., & Watt, H. M. G. 2013. "Perception Shapes Experience: The Influence of Actual and Perceived Classroom Environment Dimensions on Girls' Motivations for Science." *Learning Environments Research* 16(2): 217–238. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10984-013-9129-7

Tan, Y., Kwan, M. P., & Chai, Y. 2022. "How Chinese Hukou System Shapes Ethnic Dissimilarity in Daily Activities: A Study of Xining, China." *Cities* 122: 103520. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.CITIES.2021.103520

Trennert, R. A. 1982. "Educating Indian Girls at Nonreservation Boarding Schools, 1878-1920." *Western Historical Quarterly* 13(3): 271–290.

Turyasiimwa, A. 2020. *Analyzing Policy and Practice in the Education of the Girl-Child in Uganda*. PhD diss., California Lutheran College.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Pub. L. No. UNGA Resolution 260 A (III). 1948.

Watts, R. 2013. "Society, Education and the State: Gender perspectives on an old debate." *Paedagogica Historica* 49(1): 17–33. https://doi.org/10.108‰309230.2012.745886

Yuval-davis, N., Lee, L., 2009. "Interview with Professor Nira Yuval-Davis: After Gender and Nation." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 9(1): 128–138. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2009.01034.x

Zhang, D., Li, X., & Xue, J. 2015. "Education Inequality between Rural and Urban Areas of the People's Republic of China, Migrants' Children Education, and Some Implications." *Asian Development Review* 32(1): 196–224. https://doi.org/10.1162/ADEV_A_00042

Zhou, S., & Cheung, M. 2017. "Hukou System Effects on Migrant Children's Education in China: Learning from past disparities." *International Social Work* 60(6): 1327–1342. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020872817725134

ElizabethAnn S. Kelly, University of Albany

Motherhood and Work: Women Combining Work and Childcare as a Patriarchal Response

Nicole Dezrea Jenkins

ABSTRACT

Employers have begun to strategize ways to accommodate families as they navigate work-family balance, and scholars have found that various policies contribute to how employees perceive and manage work-family balance. However, research in this area largely centers on White workspaces and experiences for policy recommendations, leaving out those experiences specific to people of color and their workspaces. The practices and experiences of people of color in managing work-family balance are mostly absent from policy development for the institutions of work. I argue that Black women, who are the largest group of growing entrepreneurs in the US, have valuable experiences that contribute to a better understanding of how families of color navigate and understand their parenting and work responsibilities. In this paper, I describe racialized child-rearing techniques used by Black mothers to maintain work-family balance. Drawing on two years of participant observation, ethnography, and unstructured interviews in a Black, women-owned and operated business, I find that Black women adopt collective racialized conceptualizations of motherhood and responsibilities, that center competing ideological frames of motherhood. Mothers value their Black children's success in education, yet understand institutions of education as hostile sites for their children. Women aspire to work outside of the home to secure self-actualization, yet understand their roles as mothers through a patriarchal lens that places more responsibilities of parenting and childcare on mothers than fathers. This patriarchal

understanding of parenting responsibilities adopted by mothers is used to negotiate their responsibilities between work and family, and it shapes their strategies for managing parenting and work. In practice, women adopt queer parenting strategies to achieve the combination of work and family by relying on communal networks, not including their male partners, for support in child-friendly work spaces. Women develop collective conceptualizations of motherhood and its responsibilities while maintaining facets of self-identity in Black spaces.

Keywords: Parenting, motherhood, work-family balance, child-friendly, patriarchal, queer parenting, other mothering, family networks

WHO IS MISSING FROM WORK-FAMILY BALANCE POLICIES?

In seeking to understand how work-family balance is understood and achieved in the U.S., I center the narratives and experiences of Black women. I ask: How do Black women conceptualize motherhood and responsibilities associated with the identity? How do Black women achieve work-family balance? Research discusses various policies and practices that will benefit families in the workplace, however, few studies center Black families and workspaces to understand how and why particular decisions are made regarding work and family. I use data from two years of ethnographic data collection in a child-friendly work location, owned and operated by Black women. Data from participant observation, ethnography, and unstructured interviews capture women's interactions with children in the workspace and how they enact and perceive motherhood responsibilities. I find that women execute work-family balance through conceptualizations of motherhood that include communal aspects of childcare between women in a child-friendly working environment. Together, women's conceptualization of motherhood and their reliance on patriarchal understandings of parenting responsibilities shape their strategies for managing parenting and work. In contrast, women use queer parenting strategies to achieve the combination of work and family by relying on communal

networks outside of traditional family arrangements for support in child-friendly workspaces.

Black mothers in this study prioritize their children and themselves, while creating working environments that enable women to blend their responsibilities as parents with their aspirations to work outside the home. These strategies can place more pressure on women and mothers to create this blend and less need for fathers to do the same. I provide an empirical example of how Black women navigate work and family by relying on both patriarchal and queer concepts around parenting. This research adds to the body of existing literature on diverse parenting practices.

Sociopolitical contexts have greatly influenced societies' collective understanding of what it means to successfully parent and work. Although the complexities of families are continuing to transform the ways we think about parenting and responsibilities, mothers remain the primary caregivers for young children. Family policies disproportionally affect them despite the steady increase of women in the job market. Women's robust presence in the workforce and continued presence as the primary caregivers in the home make them a unique case for understanding work-family balance. Additionally, Black women's historical presence in the workforce, and their provision of childcare for White children, make them a unique case for understanding the intersectional complexities that exist when we consider identities.

While attitudes support the combination of mothers working and childrearing, there has been a decline in caring for children at work over the three decades from the late fifties to the early nineties, pre-COVID (Rindfuss 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic has greatly disrupted conceptual understandings and decisions to work and parent in combination. As the world opens back up and folks return to their physical workspaces or work from home, the importance of childcare and work-family balance are uniquely resurfacing.

Childcare reform continues to gain national attention. It is essential to analyze the current policies that impact working families as they navigate work-family balance. A mismatch in

work-family policies often leaves parents with unfavorable policies that do not support them as they manage family and work life. For example, policies often fail to consider the significant increase in women in the workforce with small kids and the elderly to care for; as well as an egalitarian setup of families that introduces the need for men to support childcare as well (Waldfogel 2019). Scholars have found that women created and used more flexibility in their work schedules soon after the birth of a child, reducing the need for their male partners to do so (Hynes 2005). The work-family life balance is far more straining on women than men. Therefore, we need equitable options for both men and women to choose work and home opportunities for self-actualization (O'Connor 2005). While more egalitarian households may place constraints on fathers, these households introduce opportunities for women to relieve the restrictions of housework and lack of leisure time, and open opportunities, while introducing complexities in the lives of fathers as equal parents (Steddelman-Steffen & Oehrli 2017). Additionally, predominantly heteronormative family-leave policies omit queer couples from parenting conversations altogether (Cahill & Meyer 2003).

Social class also plays a role in the experiences of mothers navigating work-family balance; working-class and single mothers' experiences remain starkly different from high-earning and partnered mothers. High-paying and executive-level positions offer women more flexibility at work. In Women Who Opt Out, Jones finds that highly educated women with top-earning partners can opt out of the workforce, while in stark contrast, involuntary part-time workers are seeking more hours. They find that inflexible, unpredictable work hours increase the strain between work and family (Jones 2012).

Women in high-paying positions have many advantages compared to those working in low-paying positions. A bank may offers a range of benefits for working mothers that allow them the ability to prioritize both work and family without strain, including flexible and part-time work hours in upper-level positions.

Such companies may offer childcare facilities, assistance funds, time off for adoption plus assistance, lactation rooms, and so on. In contrast, women working as janitorial staff, may not have the same flexibility, even working for a company prides itself on its ability to maintain women. These benefits are usually extended to women in high-paying positions while assisting them with work-family balance through its various policies.

On-site childcare is expensive and often not an option. While reforms and increases in early-intervention childcare programs' budgets have improved, access to childcare remains unattainable for many women of color (WOC) who are both working and often providing childcare. Access to subsidies is often limited as well. Recommendations for capping childcare costs to match a percentage of family income would illuminate the dilemma for women who are choosing between working jobs that only cover the costs of childcare or staying at home.

How are Black mothers negotiating work-family balance? I provide an empirical case of how Black mothers enact work-family balance and conceptualize motherhood and the responsibilities associated with the identity. In this article, I show how Black mothers practice work-family balance through shared responsibilities of motherhood among women, deploying racialized parenting strategies that protect and prepare Black children for racial hostility.

I use data from two years of ethnographic research in a hair-braiding salon to demonstrate a case of Black women working in child-friendly working environments. Black women practice work-family balance through the established community. Women in the salon share responsibilities for childcare. The women understand their parenting role as mothers to be primarily responsible for children's care and development. They define motherhood responsibilities centering on Black children's success in dominant U.S. institutions, such as schools. Mothers emphasize the importance of children's education in the workplace by providing them with academic tasks to pass the time. These find-

ings are significant because they provide an empirical case for how Black women enact work-family balance, define motherhood, and enact their associated responsibilities in a Black-owned and operated space.

Women define motherhood as centering on Black children's success in U.S. institutions by emphasizing their children's educational experiences; they also recognize institutions of education as hostile to children of color (Ray 2022). The mothers seek to protect their children from inevitable circumstances of racism, sexism, nationalism, and other forms of hostility their children will encounter while at school; they seek to prepare their children for these experiences.

They practice work-family balance by communally sharing duties of childcare in the workplace. By blending the workspace with childcare, women can achieve self-actualization and maintain their perceived responsibilities. Together, women's conceptualization of motherhood and their reliance on patriarchial understandings of parenting responsibilities shape their strategies for managing parenting and work. They also use queer parenting strategies: relying on communal networks outside of their partners for support in child-friendly work spaces. Mothers value working outside of the home; much of their childrearing is racialized due to their frequent encounters with institutional racism.

THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS ON MOTHERHOOD AND WORK

The Intersectional Complexities of Parenting Policy at Work

Historically, with much of the caring duties covered by women of color, many White women had the privilege to seek educational and other professional and civic opportunities freely. While White women were achieving self-actualization, Black women's devalued identity as a means of labor was sealed, with minimal regard for their responsibilities as mothers and wives. Addition-

ally, Black women are the fastest-growing of entrepreneurs in the U.S. (American Express 2018, Hamilton 2021). However, White workspaces privilege Whiteness and people of color often perform "racial tasks" to alleviate some of the difficulties associated with being a person of color in a White space; these survival mechanisms sustain racial hierarchies of primarily White organizations (Wingfield & Alston 2014).

Scholars have noted a cultural deficit in work-family research outside of Anglo and European-focused cultures (Shokley et al. 2017). The utilization of family work policies are highly racialized and gendered. There are advantages for fathers who take advantage of family leave, and benefits can extend to the entire household. When fathers in heterosexual relationships experience transitions to parenthood similar to mothers, they come to think about and enact parenting in more similar ways to their partner (Rehel 2014). In her study of 85 semi-structured interviews with fathers and mothers in three cities, Rehel (2014) found that fathers who took paternity leave developed parenting strategies similar to their partners. She finds that the shift from managerial helper to co-parenting creates opportunities for gender-equitable divisions of labor for hetero couples in regard to parenting. Generally, misperceptions of the stigma associated with the utilization of benefits from family policies often leave benefits underused by employees and increase work-family conflict (Mandeville et al. 2016).

While there is extensive research in the areas of work-family balance, satisfaction in family-friendly policies is difficult to attain as researchers have found that even when some families benefit, others reported low satisfaction (Saltzstein et al. 2001). Negative perceptions of work-family balance are linked to long work hours, having to work extra hours, and unpredictable working hours (Baxter & Chester 2011). While scholars have shown that family support policies such as flexible work hours, take-home work, and family leave improve efforts at work-family balance and job satisfaction, these policies are gendered and leave

women disadvantaged (Breaugh & Frye 2008, Frye & Breaugh 2004, Goni-Legas 2016, Manour & Trembley 2016).

Policies are still behind in considering the intersectional complexities of families. Researchers have found that family-friendly policies and practices have a direct correlation to work-family balance in Europe and Hong Kong (Chou & Cheung 2013, Ronda et al. 2016). Additionally, queer families remain vulnerable to exclusion from parenting conversations due to a sociocultural invisibility (Reed 2018). Additionally, without considering the racialized aspects of work-family balance, policies fail to understand Black women's experiences.

Black Mothers' Patriarchal Framing of Queer Parenting Practices

Black women have been socialized to push the limits of capacity to better align with an idea of "strength" that blurs the lines between over-extension and productivity. The Strong Black Women trope or narrative has been explored by scholars extensively, who find that strong Black womanhood is a truthful but harmful narrative (Scott 2017). Black women are socialized to respect and enact the ideologies of strong Black womanhood from an early age (Scott 2017). This socialization begins in the family and is often passed along from other Black women.

As a result of their adoption of the identity and concepts of strong Black womanhood, women are lacking in areas of self-care in the process. Black women take on as much as they can handle, and then more; they feel that they are equipped to do so based on mythologies from slavery that dehumanized Blacks. While Black women are doing it, the myth holds true that they are, in fact, women that are strong, the need for self-care is clear, and Scott suggests a manifesto for Black women's self-care is necessary and calls for self-care as a new mandate for strength.

The pressures of strength for Black women extend to mothers and add adequacy to the equation. In her study examining Black middle-class mothers and their careers, Barnes (2015) found that Black mothers work toward identities of respectability to provide

real perspectives of Black women and Black families contrary to stereotypes, as a way to protect themselves and their families. The pressure of being a perfect mother, wife, and daughter rests heavily on Black women, who are heavily scrutinized if they do not add up. In combination, the pressures of strength and adequacy for Black mothers can be unattainable for women managing careers and the responsibilities of motherhood.

<B>Strong Black Women and Respectability

Black mothers adopt patriarchal systems in negotiating their roles between family and work (Barnes 2015). Mothers from Barnes's study embraced a patriarchal system that did not work in their favor as a way to place value on the survival of the family and their image in the community (Barnes, 2015, 182). Black career women in this study choose to stay at home or modify their careers to ensure the stability of their families and privilege their marriage. Varying characteristics of families can result in either conflict or integration for mothers (Dow 2019). Mothers who work outside the home and are operating in gendered spheres that include the cult of domesticity often fall into conflict. In contrast, mothers who are operating in an egalitarian household and have support from kin or other networks experience integration (Steddelman-Steffen & Oehrli 2017). These mothers' combination of work-family and parenting is developed from cultural expectations, inside and outside of the home, and they are supported by economic, social, and structural circumstances. These framings often rely on a patriarchal system that privileges two-parent households and men's paid labor and careers over women's paid and free labor and careers. This patriarchal framing often leaves Black working mothers to strategize on ways that they can accomplish all things in combination.

Sociologists have broadened the definition of family to encompass families in a variety of forms. It is only right, then, to also queer our definition of parents and parenting. "Family responsibilities, including financial and emotional support, elder and child caretaking, and other household duties are frequently

shared throughout support networks that may involve extended family and friends' participation in a variety of familial roles" (Cahill et al. 2003). Queer families, families of color, and immigrant families have relied on a variety of network supports in parenting and childrearing (Wilhelmus 1998, Mays et al. 1998, Cahill et al. 2003). Queer parenting structures include a spectrum of family formations outside of heteronormative, nuclear family structures that rest on patriarchal understandings. This spectrum of family structures includes caring for children who live in another home, single parenting, adopted parenting, foster parenting, and same-sex parents.

Black women have been queering motherhood in the United States by necessity. While working outside of the home can incite feelings of self-actualization and allow mothers to be creative beyond their parenting responsibilities, they are often left managing the tasks of childcare and work in combination without support. Mothers in heterosexual relationships are devoted to the responsibilities of childcare in ways that do not match their male partners. Single mothers are also managing these responsibilities in full. McClain (2019) offers compelling stories about Black mothers' adversity to demonstrate various ways in which Black motherhood remains a political position in this era. Community is often the response to adversity. "Other mother" is a communal aspect of mothering in which blood mothers receive assistance from the community; this has been central to the institution of Black motherhood (Hill Collins 1987, 2005; Story 2014). African American mothers do not see working as a decreased devotion to their families but instead as an expectation of motherhood (McClain 2019).

Black mothers' experiences are unique also, as they must regularly navigate issues of race and racism for themselves and their children in the institutions they frequent. Black mothers additionally encounter covert racism daily.

ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODOLOGY

I use two years of ethnographic research in a hair-braiding salon located in a Western U.S. city to describe how Black mothers conceptualize their identities as mothers and enact work-family balance in a child-friendly workspace. I observed hundreds of mothers in their workplace and customers as they received their hair styling services. The braiders employed in the salon were primarily from West African countries, while the primary customer base were Black/ African American women. Women shared their values and priorities as mothers and regularly practiced child-rearing within the salon space, where children were often present. In what follows, I use pseudonyms for the research location and all participants discussed.

The salon is one of five operating businesses within a strip mall located in the city. The African-owned and operated business is run by a young Senegalese couple, Mimi and her husband, Ammad. Their employees are purposefully all women from various African countries. Some of the women have recently arrived in the U.S. and are newly employed in the salon, while others have been in the U.S. and worked at the salon for several years. However, ALL braiders are experts in the craft of braiding and learned the craft as children in Africa. The salon serves a primarily Black customer base. Scholars continue to discuss the complexities that exist within the African diaspora and the ways in which their experiences differ across context and within various institutions, especially in the U.S. (Jenkins 2019, Watts-Smith 2014, Waters 1999). For this project, I focus on Black women and distinguish the racial identities of West African immigrants from Black/ African Americans. This is not to disregard the complexities that exist within the African diaspora, but to highlight it as a necessary distinction. West African immigrant women were self-identified while other Black women were categorized as Black or African American when the distinction was unclear or not discussed. This project includes experiences of braiders employed in the salon from varying African countries and the Black American

women they provided services for. Braiders ranged in age from 21 to 55, while clients' ages ranged from 2 years old to those in their later 80s.

When I initiated my research in the salon, I began generally by learning the names of braiders and introducing myself to each one, taking the time to learn the varying personalities and skills each braider brought to the space. I felt that building a rapport was an essential part of my research process and experience. I learned the styling routines for the variety of styles offered in the salon, including which braiders specialized in which styles. As I learned the normal day-to-day operations of the salon, I began helping in any way that I could. I started with sweeping up hair throughout the day, taking out the garbage, greeting customers as they entered the salon, and even making food runs. I quickly graduated from being able to assist customers by answering questions about pricing and styling timeframes to answering phone calls and texts from customers, scheduling, confirming, and canceling appointments. Mimi, the owner of the salon, was so pleased with my reception-like duties that she even placed me in a managerial position on two separate occasions while she visited Africa.

Because of these roles, I had opportunities to engage with braiders and customers regularly. I scheduled and confirmed appointments and was often there to greet customers when they arrived for their appointments. Conversations between customers and braiders were not constant across the duration of the styling process (averaging 5 hours per customer), but often consisted of meaningful dialogue including politics, racism, and, of course, motherhood.

My insider-outsider identity was unique in my research experience. As an Afro Latinx woman I relied on my Blackness as an insider status. I had concerns early on about my Blackness being challenged by other Black women, something that I had experienced from my past. To my pleasant surprise (with the exception of one or two isolated incidents), I was perceived as a Black woman in the salon in the eyes of customers and braiders. Where

I became an outsider was my nationality. While braiders did not emphasize my mixed-race appearance, they did emphasize my American identity. Braiders often referred to me as American, and this took some getting used to. One of the most compelling and advantageous aspects of my identity that led to the most meaningful conversations and insider status within the salon was my being a mother. While I was welcomed early on by the salon owner and received well by the braiders in the salon, once I mentioned that I was a mother, and shared photos of my family, many of the relationships that I had made changed drastically for the better and became increasingly intimate as we shared stories of motherhood.

I spent two years conducting research and analyzing the data. To begin, I visited the salon on weekdays in between my graduate courses on Monday through Thursday and from 9-4 on Fridays. I spent more time in the salon when my class schedule was in recess for breaks between semesters. During spring break, summer, and winter break, I visited the salon Monday-Friday from 9 am to 4 pm. While the salon was a child-friendly space for both customers and braiders employed in the salon, I did not bring my child to the salon and relied on paid childcare while I conducted my research. My son did accompany me on a few shorter and isolated visits to the salon.

I spoke with the women in the salon using unstructured interviews in the form of a relaxed conversation. I did not record our conversations, but I did take notes on my phone and small notepads throughout the day. Each night when I returned home, I transcribed my phone and notepad notes into detailed field notes. My field notes include dialogue from conversations I had with women as well as some conversations they had amon one another. I documented how they came to define and practice motherhood, as well as the consistency of how children were incorporated into the salon space. I use this data to describe how Black women conceptualize Black motherhood and enact work-family balance. I analyzed my data by using grounded theory. I began by taking

my detailed field notes and hand-coding my documents weekly. Then, I used coded field notes to develop reoccurring themes in the data and develop biweekly thematic memos. I used my thematic memos to determine the most salient themes to discuss in this research project.

While I have conducted this research to the best of my abilities, my process is not without flaws, and this project possesses several methodological limitations. These include few one-on-one interviews, as most conversations were between multiple women. Due to the long hours spent in the salon by both customers and braiders, who spent an average of five hours from start to completion on styles, I conducted interviews in the salon as braiders worked and customers received their hairstyles or waited for their turn. Therefore, this resulted in a lack of privacy for most conversations, which could have impacted women's responses. An additional limitation is the limited data on fathers' and mens' conceptualization of their roles in parenting and responsibility (Johnson & Young 2016). "Current literature limits our knowledge of the full range of Black fathering practices and experiences; and second, reclaims and repurposes 'cultural analysis,' not to pathologize 'what's wrong with Black families and fathers,' but to shed much needed light on the ways in which Black fathers themselves process and make meaning of their roles and realities" (Johnson & Young 2016). Because the space was dominated by women, most of my data captures mothers and their experiences and perspectives with parenting, therefore I have little framing around men's contributions and perspectives in this data. Lastly, while the natural flow of the conversations used for this study is an advantage, because I did not use a tape recorder, dialogues are based on my notes and the best recall of conversations, so are approximations rather than exact word-for-word dialogue. I do, however, include reflexive and sensory dialogue within my field notes to assist with recalling the specific details I seek to share.

FINDINGS

> I know that it has not been easy as I have tried to navigate the challenges of juggling my career and motherhood. And I fully admit that I did not always get the balance right. But I hope that you can see that with hard work, determination, and love, it can be done.
>
> —Hon. Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson

In the opening statements at her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, the Honorable Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson addressed the nation by beginning where many women begin, with her family. While she thanked her family for their support in a heartfelt message, she also touched on the difficulties of managing career and parenthood and reminded families across the country of the sacrifice that happens when women juggle their professional careers and identities as mothers. My study provides an empirical case of how Black mothers understand their parenting responsibilities and practice balance between work, family, and self-actualization. I found that mothers understand and enact their responsibilities as mothers in response to systems of oppression. In response to a patriarchal system of oppression that places less value and more strain on mothers, Black mothers prioritized their own self-actualization through decisions to work outside of the home, even when it is challenging. Partnered and unpartnered women's conceptualizations of motherhood were centered on patriarchal foundations that resulted in an imbalance in caregiving responsibilities that left them most responsible for managing childcare. In response to understandings of the role of the mother as primary, these working mothers adopted queer parenting strategies of blending work and mothering. Lastly, mothers recognized education as a hostile institution for children of color (Ray 2022) and while mothers prepared their children academically they also prepared them for encounters with racism.

VALUE IN SELF-ACTUALIZATION: HOW GOOD MOTHERS WORK AND CARE FOR CHILDREN

Women in this study value work as a critical responsibility of motherhood and self-actualization. Mimi, a tall Senegalese woman in her early thirties, and the salon owner, shared her preference for work outside the home rather than staying at home with children. While she recognizes that there are women who have this desire, she knows that work is something in life that fulfills her.

> I…just cannot stay at home all day and care for da children only. No, I cannot do it. I am da type to go to work, because I enjoy to be away from home and to go to work. I need to do dat for me.

While daycare costs made Mimi's decision to work outside of the home a more challenging decision, her decision remained. She explained that even if the cost was just as much as she was earning, she would rather put all of her earnings towards daycare costs than stay home and not work. I informed Mimi that she and I shared this desire to work and less willingness to stay home.

Mimi values working outside of the home as something she needs to be happy. She recognizes that while she is a mother, she has aspirations outside of that part of her identity that are not fulfilled if she does not work. She finds that work is something that she enjoys doing and is a large part of her happiness. Knowing this about herself, she works to combine the two crucial aspects of her life. After five years and building up a relatively large clientele, Mimi transitioned from taking appointments in her home to opening her own salon in Las Vegas. Mimi spends most of her time at the salon, and as a mother, this is hard at times because she has less time with her children. She feels guilty for this but loves what she does. Mimi told me that she spends so much time at work that she feels guilty for the time she misses with her children. She admitted to "spoiling" her daughter when they have alone time, but she doesn't mind because it helps her to feel less guilty.

While mothers value their own self-actualization, they rely on patriarchal understandings of parenting and motherhood, and perceive that most childcare responsibilities are theirs to manage as mothers. In response, mothers negotiate their work and leave bearing in mind their childcare responsibilities.

"GIRL, I TOOK ALL THE LEAVE"

Gina's customer (all names have been changed to pseudonyms) is a new customer and young mother from LA. She told me that she worked at the post office and just recently went back to work now that her daughter was seven months old: "Girl, I took every kind of leave I could, postpartum and everything I could qualify for, it was just too hard to leave her, it's not enough time." Here she was referring to maternity leave. I shared with her that when I had my son, I was active-duty military and was granted six weeks of maternity leave. Returning to work and having to take my six-week-old infant to a daycare was an emotionally straining process for me. Avery, a veteran braider in the salon and mother of two in her fifties chimed in. "It is a mother's responsibility to ensure that her job is a job that allows her to take care of her children, that is part of being a good mother," she said. Other mothers in the salon nodded their heads in agreement. In the moment, I did not feel inadequate as a mother, but wondered if I was perceived to be so because of my inability to care for my child based on my career choice. I couldn't help but think that this is, likely, the tactics of most mothers in determining work. However, should this responsibility rest on mothers or employers, to ensure that all parents can work who have children to care for as well?

Working mothers value their work but believe it is their responsibility to ensure that their work does not interfere with their ability to mother successfully. These examples demonstrate how working mothers prioritize work for self-actualization but prioritize their perceived childcare responsibilities over work. They see it as their responsibility to seek employment that values their motherhood and responsibilities as mothers.

Working in a child-friendly space is one of the critical techniques that these women use to achieve work-family balance. The child-friendly work environment assists braiders and customers alike. Mothers feel comfortable bringing their children to the salon, and caring for them is normalized within the space.

IN RESPONSE TO PATRIARCHAL PARENTING SCHEMAS

Mimi, the salon owner, is a married woman. She and her husband Ahmad have two children and have been discussing having another child. We share family photos, and she begins to untangle some of the challenging things that women think of when they think about having a baby.

While she desires to have another baby, a few concerns emerge, like the pregnancy experience and body image concerns after birth. A prevalent concern and frequent topic of discussion was of course childcare; however, Mimi seemed to have been developing a plan. She shares that she would have to figure out childcare for her baby when she decides to return to the salon, because she cannot rely on her husband to help her manage. She had developed a plan for how she will manage caring for her new baby and working in the salon.

"My husband, he does not do da care for small babies, no mm mm," she shakes her head and waves her finger. "But you know what, it is so easy for me, Nickie, because you see, I can just bring my baby here. I can have him on my back or chest." She pats her chest, indicating where her new baby would rest. You remember when you first came here to my shop? How you saw me with that baby wrapped around me like dis. Mmmhmmm. Just like you saw me the first day you met me. So easy," she said with confidence.

In response to a patriarchal understanding of motherhood roles and responsibilities, mothers strategize by combining work with childcare in unique ways that support their aspirations to work outside of the home and meet their expectations for what it

means to be a good mother. The salon space makes this possible for both braiders and customers alike. A child-friendly workspace creates the opportunity for this blend for the mothers working in the salon.

Child-Friendly Workspaces

It is election day 2018, and it is all that is on my mind. I pull up, and see Mimi pull up at the same time. I wait for her by the door and see that she has five children with her, her two children, and her best friend Joleen's (a nurse) and Adeana's (a veteran braider in the salon) three children. "Today is no school, so I have to babysit," she says jokingly. I greet the children, and at least one of them is happy to see me. It is early in the morning, so I imagine they aren't excited about having to wake up early and come to the salon on a non-school day. The children enter the shop and make themselves comfortable throughout the shop, some in the empty chairs and others in the waiting area. Before sitting, they go around and hug each braider, as their mother asks. Malik is treating it as a chore.

Before the first customer arrives, the children are directed to the break room and hair storage room. This room is a small area near the salon entrance. It has a couch large enough for all the children to sit comfortably, a small television, table, and microwave. The walls are covered with rows of packs of synthetic hair. There are various shades of browns, blondes, reds, and even some brighter colors like pink and blue. The textures and lengths also varied. While most of the hair was long and stretched, textured hair used for braids and twists, some of the packs of hair included shorter, kinkier and curlier textures for crochet styles. Adeana's children are 11 and 7. They will be entering fifth and second grade when summer is over. The children have American accents, but they tell me they would like to learn French because they do not know how to speak French yet, even though their mother does. I noticed that the children understand French because their mother speaks French to them often in the salon, but they respond in English.

The children share with me their new Duolingo app that they are using to learn French. They talk to me about school and friends. For lunch, Mimi brings a pizza into the shop for the children, and they heat it in the microwave and eat it before I leave. The children had snacks, books, and their electronic devices packed in their bookbags to keep them entertained. Spongebob is on the breakroom TV at low volume but is mostly background noise as each child is deeply immersed in the apps on their iPads.

They share their favorites apps with me. Kaleb likes sports while Debra likes cooking games. They both enjoy the geometry app and the language learning app. Being in the salon is no big deal to the children, who are well-behaved and patient, understanding that they will spend the day in the salon. They play quietly in the breakroom and come out to do small tasks to help in the salon. Francis (a thirteen-year-old girl enrolled in a local honors high school) took out the trash, Malik mopped the floor, and Betty retrieved several packs of hair for braiders throughout the day. When it is almost time for the other three children to leave, Mimi calls them over and gives them $5 each for their help in the salon: "Malik, you don't work here, ok, that's just for you, ok," she laughs. "If I pay him, he will think he works here, and he will keep mopping, and I won't be able to get him to stop!" We all laugh. The kids all say goodbye.

Because of the incorporation of children into the space, childrearing is common in the space and mothers have expectations for their children to maintain good behavior. One afternoon, Joleen visited the salon briefly with her children. She had just visited a retail store in the shopping center and wanted to stop by to briefly say hello. She greets Mimi and the other braiders and shows them a new pair of sandals she just purchased. As they work their way towards the door, she turns to her son, a seven-year-old in first grade. "Did you say goodbye?" Joleen says to Malik. He was at the door leaving, but comes back into the shop, strolling and covering his face. "Yeeeesss," he whines "I diiiiiid." He sobs. Joleen gives him a look, and he walks over to Carine.

She is surprised. "Hi, baby," she says. "Byyyyyyeee," he cries, "Awwww," she says as she hugs him and looks at Joleen, confused. Joleen shakes her head telling her not to pity or baby him. "Say goodbye," she says. Malik walks over to all of us and says goodbye. She points at me for the last bye he says while sobbing. I stick out my lip, "Aww it's ok, bye bye Malik," I say. Mimi also shakes her head, like Joleen. As Malik walks towards the salon exit with his mother, Mimi teases him, pointing the blowdryer at him and blowing it in his face, goodbye, baby. She teases. "He was in trouble earlier, and now he is crying because he got in trouble again for not saying bye. He is making a big deal over nothing, he is fine. I do not baby kids, you know, it's not good. I am not soft with my kids. Mmmmm." She shakes her head. " My kids, I say something, and they do it because they are scared. I don't have to speak to them. I look at them, and they know. I still listen to my mom even though I am grown, it's respect, and they have to learn."

A medium-framed dark-skinned woman in her late twenties entered the salon with a stroller and a toddler. She parks the stroller and introduces us to her son Joseph, who sits in the stroller right next to her as Adeana begins her style. He is entertained by toys, snacks, and various toddler Youtube videos playing on her phone. After about 20 minutes, Joseph is quietly scolded by his mother. "Now Joseph, we don't do that and you know better, so now you have to go into time out," she says firmly in a low tone. I did not see the infraction; however, there was no protest from Joseph. I watch Joseph rest his head down onto his folded hands as his mother counts "ten, nine, eight…" when she reaches zero Joseph lifts his head. He continues to play his game, this time leaving out the behavior he "knew better" than to do. The client was an incredibly patient woman and seemed to be a great mother. She spoke to Joseph, asking him questions and including him in conversations that were about him. She told Mimi that he is her third son and that she wants a daughter, so they will try again. "What if you have another boy?" Mimi asks, "you gonna

try again after dat?" The woman put her head down and began to smile, "Yes we will, but just one more time after that." The women in the shop all "ooooh" and "aww" at the woman's decision to try for a girl, bearing five children in the process. Joseph becomes a bit restless at around 1 pm, he has been well-behaved for 3 hours now and quite patient, I think this is incredible for a toddler of 21 months. I give Joseph lollipops with the permission of his mother.... Joseph eats three lollipops by the time I leave at 2 pm. "I'm going to give him a pass today," his mother said each time he reached for another one. Childrearing like this is a normal part of the daily operations of the salon.

Children are incorporated as part of the salon space; this allows braiders to work while still caring for their children. Work-family balance is achieved in this space through the incorporation of the braiders' children into the space. This blend also makes the space welcoming for customers who bring their children into the space. This environment makes the blend of motherhood and work one that makes work-family balance attainable. In response to the patriarchal expectations of women as mothers, women balance their work with childcare by creating child-friendly workspaces that make the blend possible. Braiders and their customers provide communal support in childcare duties in this space using unique strategies for parenting that I describe as "queer parenting strategies."

Queer Parenting Strategies as a Response

Working in a child-friendly space is one of the critical techniques that these women use to achieve work-family balance. The child-friendly work environment assists braiders and customers alike through the adoption of queer prarenting strategies such as other-mothering, a communal aspect of mothering where mothers help one another with childcare while sharing space. Feminist scholars have emphasized the diversity that exists in unique forms of caring for children and mothering for women of color across the globe (Bolich 2017, Chamberlain 2013, Wilhelmus 1998, Cahill et al. 2003, Ehrenreich Hoschild 2003, Schmalzbauer 2004) and

encouraged the broadening of our understandings of how women should mother (Hill-Collins 1990). "Black women's experiences as bloodmothers, othermothers, and community othermothers reveal that the mythical norm of heterosexual married couple, nuclear family with a nonworking spouse and a husband earning a 'family wage' is far from being natural, universal and preferred, but instead is deeply embedded in specific race and class formations" (1990, 222–23). Queer parenting practices provide mothers with a broader definition of motherhood that supports their lived experiences and aspirations beyond parenting. The salon space provided mothers with comfort in bringing their children to the salon.

Mimi arrives at the shop at 11:40. She greets all the customers and braiders and hugs the children in the shop. She checks on all customers, making sure each style is adequate, then she begins a style on the new mother. The woman is browned-skinned and looks to be in her early thirties. She is accompanied by her male partner, teenage daughter, and infant son. While the family works to care for the infant in the salon space, they are also supported by braiders in the salon.

The new mother asks Mimi if there is a microwave in the shop. She would like to heat her baby's bottle. The teenage daughter retrieves the bottle and Mimi heats it up in the microwave, passing it back to her teenage daughter. All of the women in the shop are happy to see the newborn baby. The father retrieves the warmed bottle from the teenage daughter and feeds the newborn baby while the mother gets her hair braided. Once the baby is fed, the teenage daughter then brings the baby closer to his mother while she gets her hair braided. The teenage daughter holds the baby while the women in the salon "ooo" and "ahhhh" at the sight of an infant.

While her family is present and assists her, this new mother can bring her newborn into the salon, and can comfortably tend to her while she is styled. The salon owners support her motherly duties and even assist her by heating the infant's bottle. The

salon is always child-friendly, and this environment is beneficial to both customers and braiders, and the normalizing of parental tasks helps achieve the desired work-family balance.

This example demonstrates how mothers can easily incorporate their children within this space without worry, and with confidence in other women's willingness to help and acceptance of children in the salon. This mother's ability to bring her child to her hair appointment, that will last hours, and remain comfortable speaks volumes about the operations of the salon and the family-friendly environment. This atmosphere is where women can flourish at work and as mothers or both. Braiders often had their children in the salon on days when school was out for a holiday or even longer breaks like winter and summer.

EDUCATION AS A HOSTILE INSTITUTION

Academic Preparedness

Mothers shared their passion for and dedication to their children's education with one another in the salon. While scholars have captured the guilt experienced by parents who must spend time away from their children for work or other tasks (Brooks 2015, Borelli et al. 2016, Aarntzen 2021), another significant theme that emerged in my data was how mothers centered and emphasized the importance of preparing their children for educational experiences. As one of the key pillars of socialization and a prominent institution within U.S. society, education is a regular site of racial hostility for Black and immigrant children (Ray 2022). The strategies used for educational preparation indicate that mothers recognized educational institutions as hostile institutions for their children and worked towards preparing them for what they would inevitably encounter. Mothers prepared their children academically, implementing a host of academic tasks within children's daily activities, and demonstrating a desire to assist their children with succeeding in the institution. In addition to academic preparations, mothers also strategize on ways to prepare themselves and their children for encounters with racism at school.

While child-friendly workspaces allow women to blend their perceived responsibilities of both motherhood and work, mothers do rely on daycare services as well. Kim, a Black woman from South Carolina, added to one of the many discussions we had on childcare costs. She shared that her daughter was extremely advanced by the time she went to kindergarten and she credits her advanced performance to her attendance in preschool. Mimi chimed in that her daughter had a similar experience. "So many people told me that I should be home with my children instead of working when my kids were small but you know what, those same people come to me and say oh my goodness Mimi, your daughter, she is so smart, what did you do to train her like dis? An' you know what I tell dem, daycare!" she nods her head towards Kim. While daycare and preschool can assist with the academic preparedness of children, mothers additionally enhance preparedness by including educational tasks and supports for their children.

In conversations centering on motherhood, this customer demonstrates that her commitment to her child's success and education are positive attributes of being a mother and mark a salient portion of her responsibilities as a mother. Despite stereotypes that surround her based on her age and number of children, she does work to reframe perceptions of her to more accurate depictions of her mothering. Mothers working in the salon also demonstrated the importance of their children's education. It was essential to them that their children are successful in their learning. As they became aware of school subjects that their children may be struggling with, mothers ensured that they received extra practice and assistance outside of school.

Bianca, a customer in the salon who was getting her hair styled in dark-brown Senagelese twists to the middle of her back, discussed her frustration with her child entering kindergarten over-prepared from her working with him. "My son has so many problems in school because he is only five but was so far advanced from the other kindergartners from the very start." She was urged

to advance him to first grade. “I don’t regret having taken time to teach him things early, however, now I am worried that he is being punished for it at school.” This mother’s concern for her son’s academic wellbeing is apparent in her early involvement in his academic success. In her efforts to prepare him for school, she even exceeded the required expectations.

One morning I arrived at the salon to find a normally calm and cheerful Mimi in an unfamiliar mood that indicated something was bothering her. I asked if everything was ok and she explained that her son was struggling in math at school and that she did not have the time to assist him since she worked so often. “You know to do da homework, and if he has trouble in anything else den I want dem to help him to study in dat too, you know what I’m saying?”

Adena, another braider, shares that her daughter goes to Mathleads, an after-school program that helps kids with their math skills and gives them extra assignments to sharpen the skill. “You know what, I like that. This way, they can even get ahead too,” Mimi says.

I offer to look up some tutoring options for Mimi as she braids. I asked what services she wants specifically and her budget for paying a tutor. Mimi wants someone to come to do homework with her son for one hour after school, four days per week. I search the internet and call around for pricing. “[Author’s name], you calling for me?” Mimi asks. “Ya,” I say. “ Aww [Author’s name], thank you,” she says. I call Mathleads, but they will only help with math and no other subjects, so this will not be a good fit for Mimi and her son. I find a tutor, Zena, a university student who tutors in all subjects, ages K-college. I arrange tutoring with Zena for Monday -Thursday from 7-8 for both Mimi’s children. Zena can come to the shop or to Mimi’s house, whatever is convenient. She charges $25 per hour but will adjust the price to $30 per hour and tutor both of her children. I talk to Zena on the phone and tell her she will be receiving a call from the mother to confirm.

By scheduling tutoring for their children, mothers show that they are invested in the academic success of their children. They recognize that there is work to be done outside of school to ensure that children grasp the material in effective ways. Mothers working in the salon demonstrate their commitment to their children's education and success through making arrangements for additional supports for their children in the form of tutoring. They hire experts in the subjects in which their children need extra assistance and schedule times for them to receive tutoring after school. These efforts are an example of how mothers prioritize their children's success.

Black mothers have intersectional concerns with their Black children's education. While they want to ensure success, they must also be mindful of the racism that exists within these institutions that are particularly hostile for youth of color (Ray 2022). Black mothers negotiate ways they can prepare and protect their children from these inevitable circumstances. They must have open communication with their children so that they can become aware of these issues as they arise and tend to them accordingly.

The Talk(s): Understanding Education as a Hostile Institution

"The talk" is a conversation that Black parents have with their children to discuss how to engage when encountered by the police (Anderson et al. 2022). While parents have discussed this phenomenon as a necessary conversation that begins early for most Black families, the conversation is often revisited and updated as children grow and learn to navigate these encounters in more age-appropriate ways. In addition, these conversations extend beyond police encounters. Discussions of race and racism occur more broadly as children encounter these societal ills. The Black mothers in my study felt it was their responsibility to intervene in instances of racism where their child needed protection. Therefore, it was crucial to ensure that students have an open and honest communication with their mothers so that they will be made aware of any instances of racism. Mothers prioritize

protecting their children, as well as engaging in an age-appropriate conversation with their child to explain that what they have experienced is wrong.

Avery is a Senegalese woman in her mid-fifties who has been a braider at Mimi's for about five years now. She has three children who have all left home. Two of her children are professionals, one a computer engineer and the other a mining engineer, her third child is in college in New Mexico and is going to school for mining engineering as well. Avery started having children young, having her first child at 15, and her second at 17. Avery told me that communication is vital in parenting and that it is imperative for children to feel that they can communicate openly. She told me a story about her son. When her son was in middle school, a teacher asked students what they aspired to be when they grew up; when her son responded by saying he wanted to be an engineer, the teacher told him that he would be on the street. Avery went to the school and spoke to the principal and told them that her son was no longer allowed to attend the school until the teacher was removed. They refused, and she moved her son to another school.

This was unfortunately not the family's only encounter with racism at school. Avery told me that when her son played football in high school, he was the only Black player, and experienced frequent harassment. The harassment escalated and another player on his team spat in her son's face and told him to "go back to his country with his people." Because she taught her son not to fight, he handled the situation by leaving the practice field and heading into the locker room. When the student entered, he pulled him aside from the other players and told him that his mother pays for his school just like his father pays for his and if he could not leave him alone he and his people will have to come set him straight. The student received a reality check, and they became close friends for the rest of his time at the school. Avery's point was that there is nothing that her son cannot talk to her about, and she is proud of that. "I tell my children, there is no problem

too big, no problem we cannot solve, tell me, and we will do what we need to do." "There is no bad kid; kids are told they are bad, and then they think, what else can I do to please you when I am bad anyways."

"They Don't Think I Will Come Down There but I Do, and I Ask Questions … I Care"

While academics are an essential component that mothers focus on in their efforts to prepare their children for the institution of education, racism is another apparent reality that requires preparation. Racialized perceptions and perjorative narratives about of children of color and their parents can infiltrate the experiences of children at school.

Avery's client sat quietly for a lot of the beginning of our conversation but began to share her experiences as we reached the topic of education and dealing with schools as a parent. Kim, a slender brown-skinned women with a youthful, Forever 21 style, joined the conversation. She told us all that she started having children very young as well. She had her first child at 15 years old and now, at the age of 23, has five children. Because her son is smaller than other children his age and is so smart, he gets picked on, so she is anxious. "They know I work so they don't think I will come down there when there are problems, but I do, and I ask questions, I care about my kids learning. You see, kids should not stop learning when they leave school. It is up to parents to continue to teach children at home, I mean they can't only learn at school, am I right?" she ask rhetorically as the mothers in the salon nodded their heads, pointed at her in agreement, and spoke various verbal confirmations. "Exactly! Okay? Yaasss!" "Whenever there is an incident at that school involving my child, they are going to see my face, that was one thing they had to learn really quickly. Sometimes they would be surprised to see me. Like wow, you actually came to the school, not call but show up. Now, they already know if they call me, they better be ready to see me. Whatever you thought about me, you better be prepared to rethink it."

Kim is aware of how she is perceived by individuals within her son's school and holds firm to her commitment to his success through her involvement in his education. She is assertive and wants the institution to be aware that she is an involved parent, and that her son's education is a priority to her. As a Black mother, assumptions that she does not hold these values and priorities make this process of convincing necessary.

This excerpt is an example of the various ways in which mothers must show up for their children to ensure success. They are aware that while they are working to assist their children in their education and towards prosperity, their children will encounter many barriers, including racism, for which they must prepare them, and protect them from whenever possible. Black mothers are enacting ideal motherhood through the support of their children. They prioritize their success in school by ensuring that they are safe and supported throughout their education, and when children are not, mothers step in. Black mothers describe how they submerged themselves in their children's education and infiltrated when issues arose, and provided their children with strategies for managing these issues as they arise. Many of them thought this to be a mother's necessary duty. As a Black mother, showing dedication and support to children's education is an essential component to successful motherhood, as described by the women. In addition, mothers emphasize the importance of their own self-actualization.

CONCLUSION

Researchers have discussed the difficulties associated with achieving work-family balance. They have few models that demonstrate how people of color balance work and family in tandem. Although Black women have been in the workforce substantially longer than White women and remain one of the larger groups of earners, their experiences with work-family balance are rarely centered. To include Black mothers' experiences as an essential feature of understanding work-family balance in the U.S., I ask

how Black women conceptualize motherhood and responsibilities associated with the identity and how Black mothers achieve work-family balance.

I find that Black mothers define good motherhood by adopting patriarchal understandings of motherhood. Black women value working outside of the home as a critical feature of their self-actualization but emphasize that a good mother ensures that she has a job that recognizes and prioritizes her responsibilities as a mother. Additionally, they prioritize their children's educational preparedness, including both academic preparations and issues of racism. Lastly, mothers adopt queer parenting strategies to manage the combination of work and mothering; in shared Black space, child-friendly work environments provide support for other women when children are present.

These findings indicate that Black women define motherhood as centering on the success of their children's education as well as their happiness. Women can achieve work-family balance in environments that welcome the blend of childcare and work. Black women must work harder to demonstrate their commitment to their children's success due to perjorative narratives surrounding Black motherhood that counter the presumed assumption. Mothers do this through eager involvement in their children's education and addressing their children's experiences with racism as they occur. Mothers additionally value their work as a critical feature of motherhood, so long as it does not interfere with their ability to successfully mother. While child-friendly work environments are not achievable in all working environments and can present safety concerns, this research serves as a case of how Black women are working towards achieving work-family balance.

By including what Black women value in motherhood, we can model work-family policies in ways that accommodate these values. Additionally, with a successful model of how work-family balance is achievable, we can sample this technique and replicate it in spaces that may be able to achieve the same success.

The collective efforts of Black mothers in child rearing demonstrated in my findings are not surprising as scholars have discussed the joint efforts of Black mothers through the concept of "other mothers," a network of mothers that help one another with child-rearing tasks (Hill Collins 1990, Bock 2017). Additionally, scholars have discussed the complexities associated with Black motherhood (Barnes 2015, Dow 2019). Black mothers' ability to achieve work-family balance should not be surprising, as they have had a much longer experience in the workforce and had to manage the role of motherhood as well.

Additionally, as the family becomes more complex, scholars and policymakers should seek to understand how policies can be beneficial for single-parent households, families with elderly or disabled care responsibilities, international families, and queer families, to better understand their practices towards achieving work-family balance.

Author's Notes: I am most grateful to my research participants, who allowed me access into their everyday lives and spaces, because without them this work would not be possible. I extend my sincerest gratitude to the anonymous reviewers who took the time to review and comment on my work. Their comments provided additional perspectives and resulted in the best possible version of this work. This work was completed during the Howard University Writing and Creative Works Summer Academy. I am grateful to the community of scholars who provided writing resources and acountability. Thank you to Dr. Ranita Ray and Associate Provost Angela Cole-Dixon for your mentorship and support throughout this project. A special thank you to Bunnarith Bao for the insightful discussions that supported my thought and writing process throughout this project.

REFERENCES

Aarntzen, van der Lippe, T., van Steenbergen, E., & Derks, B. 2021. "How Individual Gender Role Beliefs, Organizational Gender norms, and National Gender Norms Predict Parents' Work: Family Guilt in Europe." *Community, Work & Family* 24(2): 120–142. https://doi.org/10.1080/13668803.2020.1816901

American Express. 2018. "2018 State of Women-Owned Businesses Report." https://www.americanexpress.com/content/dam/amex/us/womens-entrepreneurship/State-Of-Women-Owned-Businesses-Report-2018.pdf.

Anderson, O'Brien Caughy, M., & Owen, M. T. 2022. " 'The Talk' and Parenting While Black in America: Centering Race, Resistance, and Refuge." *Journal of Black Psychology* 48(3-4): 475–506. https://doi.org/10.1177/00957984211034294

Barnes, R. J. D. 2015. *Raising the Race: Black Career Women Redefine Marriage, Motherhood, and Community*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Baxter, Janeen, & Chesters, Jenny. 2011. "Perceptions of Work-Family Balance: How Effective Are Family-Friendly Policies?" *Australian Journal of Labour Economics* 14(2): 139–151.

Bloch. 2017. "'Other Mothers,' Migration, and a Transnational Nurturing Nexus." Signs: *Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 43(1): 53–75. https://doi.org/10.1086/692441

Borelli, Nelson, S. K., River, L. M., Birken, S. A., & Moss-Racusin, C. 2016. "Gender Differences in Work-Family Guilt in Parents of Young Children." *Sex Roles* 76(5-6): 356–368. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-016-0579-0

Breaugh, J., & Frye, A. 2008. "Work-Family Conflict: The Importance of Family-Friendly Employment Practices and Family-Supportive Supervisors." *Journal of Business and Psychology* 22(4): 345-353.

Brooks. 2015. "Social and Spatial Disparities in Emotional Responses to Education: Feelings of 'Guilt' among Student-parents." *British Educational Research Journal* 41(3): 505–519. https://doi.org/10.1002/berj.3154

Cahill, Battle, J., & Meyer, D. 2003. "Partnering, Parenting, and Policy: Family Issues Affecting Black Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) People." *Race & Society* 6(2): 85–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.racsoc.2004.11.002

Cao, Roger Mills-Koonce, W., Wood, C., & Fine, M. A. 2016. "Identity Transformation During the Transition to Parenthood Among Same-Sex Couples: An Ecological, Stress-Strategy-Adaptation Perspective." *Journal of Family Theory & Review* 8(1): 30–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/jftr.12124

Chou, K. L., & Cheung, K. C. K. 2013. "Family-friendly Policies in the Workplace and Their Effect on Work-life Conflicts in Hong Kong." *The International Journal of Human Resource Management* 24(20): 3872–3885.

Collins, P. H. 1987. "The Meaning of Motherhood in Black Culture and Black Mother-daughter Relationships." *Sage* 4(2): 3.

Collins, P. H. (2005). "The meaning of Motherhood in Black Culture and Black Mother–daughter Relationships." *Gender through the Prism of Difference*, 285–295.

Cox, A. M. (2015). *Shapeshifters: Black Girls and the Choreography of Citizenship*. *Durham*, NC: Duke University Press.

Dow, D. M. 2019. *Mothering while Black: Boundaries and Burdens of Middle-class Parenthood*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ehrenreich, B., Hochschild, A. R., & Kay, S. (Eds.). 2003. *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy*. New York: Macmillan.

"Executive Women, Flexibility Help Bank One Win Working Mother 'Best Employer' Honors --Again." 2002. PR Newswire, p. 1.

Frye, N., & Breaugh, K. 2004. "Family-Friendly Policies, Supervisor Support, Work-Family Conflict, Family–Work Conflict, and Satisfaction: A Test of a Conceptual Model." *Journal of Business and Psychology* 19(2): 197–220.

Goñi-Legaz, S., & Ollo-López, A. 2016. "The Impact of Family-Friendly Practices on Work-Family Balance in Spain." *Applied Research in Quality of Life* 11(3): 983–1007.

Gatrell, C. (2004). *Hard Labour: The Sociology Of Parenthood: The Sociology of Parenthood, Family Life, and Career*. London: McGraw-Hill Education (UK).

Glenn, E. N. 1990. "Cleaning Up / Kept Down: A Historical Perspective on Racial Inequality in Women's Work." *Stanford Law Review* 43: 1333.

Hamilton, Darrick, E. J. Freeman, and N. Chinchilla. 2021. "The State of Black Entrepreneurship in the United States." Institute for Economic Policy Research and the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at UC Berkeley. https://www.haasinstitute.berkeley.edu/state-of-Black-entrepreneurship.

Jenkins, N. D. 2019. "Contested Identities: African Diaspora and Identity Making in a Hair Braiding Salon." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 48(6): 806–835. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891241619829210

Johnson, M., & Young, A. 2016. "Diversity and Meaning in the Study of Black Fatherhood: Toward a New Paradigm." *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 13(1): 5–23. doi:10.1017/S1742058X16000047

Mansour, S., & Tremblay, D. G. 2016. "Workload, Generic, and Work–family-specific Social Supports and Job Stress." *International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management*.

Mandeville, A., Halbesleben, J., & Whitman, M. (2016). "Misalignment and Misperception in Preferences to Utilize Family- Friendly Benefits: Implications for Benefit Utilization and Work-Family Conflict." *Personnel Psychology* 69(4): 895–929.

McClain, D. 2019. *We Live for the We: The Political Power of Black Motherhood*. London: Hachette UK.

Mclanahan, Sara & Waldfogel, Jane. 2011. Work and Family: Introducing the Issue. *The Future of Children* 21(3-14).

Moller, Stephanie, Joya Misra, & Eiko Strader. 2013. "A Cross-National Look at How the Welfare States Reduce Inequality." *Sociology* Compass 7.2: 135–46. Web.

Ray, Ranita. 2022. "School as a Hostile Institution: How Black and Immigrant Girls of Color Experience the Classroom." *Gender & Society* 36(1): 88–111. https://doi.org/10.1177/08912432211057916

Reed, Elizabeth. 2018. "The Heterogeneity of Family: Responses to Representational Invisibility by LGBTQ Parents." *Journal of Family Issues*, 39(18): 4204–4225. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192513X18810952

Ronda, L., Ollo-López, A., & Goñi-Legaz, S. 2016. "Family-Friendly Practices, High-Performance Work Practices, and Work-Family Balance." *Management Research: The Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management. Review of Work and Family*.

Saltzstein, Alan L., Ting, Yuan, & Saltzstein, Grace Hall. 2001. "Work-Family Balance and Job Satisfaction: The Impact of Family-Friendly Policies on Attitudes of Federal Government Employees." *Public Administration Review* 61(4): 452–467.

Scott, Karla D. 2017. *The Language of Strong Black Womanhood: Myths, Models, Messages, and a New Mandate for Self-care*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Schmalzbauer. 2004. "Searching for Wages and Mothering from Afar: The Case of Honduran Transnational Families." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 66(5): 1317–1331. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-2445.2004.00095.x

Smith. 2014. *Black Mosaic: The Politics of Black Pan-Ethnic Diversity*. New York University Press. https://doi.org/10.18574/9781479811113

Stadelmann-Steffen, I., & Oehrli, D. 2017. "Perceiving Reconciliation: Childcare Policies and Gendered Time Conflicts." *Gender & Society* 31(5): 597-623.

Waters, Mary C. 1999. *Black Identities, West Indian Immigrant Dreams, and American Realities*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Nicole Dezrea Jenkins, PhD, Howard University

Insecure Employment Relations in the Post-Civil Rights Period: The Persistence of Racial and Gender Gaps in Hourly Employment

Caroline Hanely and Enobong Hannah Branch

ABSTRACT

Fundamental changes in the nature of work since the 1970s have made it difficult to assess how the role of race and gender in structuring access to secure employment relations has changed in the post–Civil Rights period. This paper focuses on different forms of workplace exploitation, represented by hourly versus salaried employment, as a key fault-line of intersectional inequality. Hourly employment relations represent a form of exploitation with greater potential for economic insecurity than salaried employment due to lower pay, greater scheduling instability, and greater likelihood of involuntary part-time work. The paper assesses racial and gender differences in rates of hourly employment over time, including among workers who began their working lives in the pre- and post-Civil Rights periods. Using CPS-MORG data from 1979 to 2019, the paper shows that hourly employment is highly stratified by race, as non-Hispanic Black workers hold such positions at much higher rates than non-Hispanic White workers. Gender intersects with race to shape rates of hourly employment over time. White men's odds of hourly employment are increasing over time, signaling rising insecurity, but at a slower rate than among Black men, White women, and Black women. Long-standing patterns of relative labor market disadvantage across racial and gender groups persist despite narrowing group differences in occupational and educational attainment and the decline of pre-Civil Rights Movement workers as a share of the labor market. In a period of deepening class-based inequalities, centering evaluation of racial and gender labor market advantage on different forms of exploitation that operate across industries, occupations, and new forms of work organization provides a more comprehensive picture of the role of race and gender in shaping access to secure employment relations.

KEYWORDS: Race, Gender, Intersectional, Hourly employment, Exploitation

INTRODUCTION

The postindustrial period has been marked by seismic shifts in the nature of work, reshaping what types of labor market opportunities exist, how workers experience their jobs, and patterns of compensation for that labor. Starting in the 1970s and continuing to this day, structural transformations such as the decline of manufacturing and rise of the service sector, de-unionization, globalization, and new workplace technologies have shifted the balance of power between workers and employers. Employers have implemented new, "flexible" forms of work organization that shift the risks associated with market fluctuations to workers (Smith 1997; Peck & Theodore 2002; Hacker 2006). Insecure or precarious employment relations have therefore emerged as a core feature of the American labor market that cuts across industries and occupations, exposing even highly educated workers to economic insecurity (Kalleberg 2011; Branch & Hanley 2017).

The rise and diffusion of insecure employment relations raises important questions about racial and gender inequality. Access to secure employment in the postwar period was explicitly organized around race and gender. Longstanding patterns of occupational segregation and devaluation, undergirded by systemic racism in New Deal employment protections and legally sanctioned discrimination, preserved the economic security of the standard employment relationship for white men while consigning other groups to work that offered little in terms of pay, job security, and opportunities for advancement (Boyle 1998; Glenn 1992; Bonacich 1976). Yet improvements in educational and occupational access in the post–Civil Rights era did not produce comparable gains in economic security for women and racial minorities (Pettit & Ewert 2009; Branch & Hanley 2014). Increasing inequality within occupational and educational groups has made economic insecurity a widespread feature of the American labor market. These changes have been most disruptive of white men's employment experiences, as women and racial minorities were often confined to insecure employment conditions until that

period (Reid & Rubin 2003; Branch 2011; Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey 2012). *Have race and gender become less salient for shaping access to secure employment relations in the postindustrial period, or are race and gender still central to employers' flexible labor strategies*?

This paper advances a historically informed relational perspective on workplace inequality that emphasizes the role of opportunity hoarding and exploitation as key inequality-producing mechanisms (Tomaskovic-Devey & Avent-Holt 2019). We argue that since insecure employment relations are no longer confined to nonstandard employment or other alternative work arrangements, and cross occupational and educational lines, different forms of exploitation represent a key faultline for understanding intersectional inequalities. We therefore evaluate change in the relationship between race, gender, and insecure employment relations by focusing on trends in hourly versus salaried employment. Work that is paid by the hour represents a distinctive form of exploitation with greater potential for economic insecurity than salaried employment due to lower and more variable pay, greater scheduling instability, and greater likelihood of involuntary part-time work. Yet workers who are paid by the hour usually work full-time, are not exclusively low-wage, and are employed across a wide range of occupations and industries. Hourly employment thus represents a key site for evaluating change in the role of race and gender in structuring access to secure employment relations in the post–Civil Rights era. We focus on Black and white men and women because of the historical role of the Black/white racial binary in justifying labor market inequality, and the way it continues to inform racialized and gendered notions of appropriate labor (Branch 2011; Frederickson 2003; Kaufman 2002). Drawing on data from the CPS-MORG from 1979 to 2019 we show that observed rates of hourly employment are highly stratified by race. Multivariate analysis shows that group rates of hourly employment are increasing in ways that are expanding intersectional inequalities, suggesting that while white men are become more economically insecure over time, their labor market advantage

relative to white women, Black men, and Black women is nonetheless increasing. Hourly employment represents a key fault line for the generation of intersectional inequalities in a period of deepening class-based exploitation.

RACE, GENDER, AND INSECURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL AND RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Over the last forty years postindustrial employment restructuring has fundamentally reshaped the American workplace. Throughout the postwar period the American labor market was characterized by high aggregate levels of prosperity and employment stability. Employment was organized around a primary labor market with stable and high-paying jobs, and a secondary labor market that supported it. Standard employment relations—full-time and/or fixed schedule work performed at an employer's place of business and with the expectation of continued employment (Kalleberg et al. 2000)—marked a clear division between secure and insecure jobs that aligned closely with industrial and occupational groups and was organized around a strict racial and gender division of labor (Boyle 1998; Bonacich 1976). Unequal opportunities along racial and gender lines were therefore well summarized by patterns of industrial and occupational segregation (Reid & Rubin 2003).

Racial and gender employment inequality in the postwar period was actively produced to create security for some at the expense of others. The employment protections of the New Deal, which created the standard employment relationship, were explicitly written to differentially affect workers across racial and gender lines. Agricultural and domestic service industries were exempted from legislation to avoid disrupting the racial division of labor in the South (Katznelson 2005; Palmer 1995). Access to skilled manufacturing jobs in the North was often contested by unions whose members sought to maintain advantages along color lines (Quadagno 1994). A central goal of the labor

movement in its effort to institutionalize the standard employment relationship was to secure for its members a living wage, or the amount necessary for a (white) male breadwinner to support a family (Kessler-Harris 1990). White women often held retail, clerical, and temporary agency positions and left the labor force upon marriage (Hatton 2011; Smith & Neuwirth 2008). Black men relied on semi- and unskilled blue-collar work that offered less security than the skilled labor and craft positions overwhelmingly held by white men. Black women were explicitly employed as a reserve labor force that was drawn in and cast out of jobs based on employers' needs (Branch 2007; Glenn 1992; Beale 1970). The standard employment relationship thus has inherent racial and gender dimensions (Vosko 2000; Fuller & Vosko 2008).

A relational perspective on inequality clarifies how the deeply institutionalized association between race, gender, and secure employment in the postwar period matter for understanding intersectional inequalities in the postindustrial period. The distribution of workplace rewards—including access to secure employment relations—is organized around bounded and unequal social categories such as Black/white and male/female. Inequalities can become durable— and outlive the ideologies that legitimated the creation of those inequalities— when social categories salient outside the organization such as gender and race (exterior categories) are mapped onto categories within an organization such as skilled/unskilled, permanent/temporary, or standard/nonstandard (Tilly 1998). Racial and gender expectations thus become embedded in employers' conceptions of a job's ideal worker (Acker 1990, 2006), and race- and sex-typing informs the process of matching workers and jobs, legitimating unequal opportunities and ultimately sustaining inequalities (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993; Kaufman 1986; 2002; Branch 2011). Two key mechanisms distribute workplace rewards across categorical distinctions: opportunity hoarding and exploitation. Opportunity hoarding occurs when opportunities such as access to good jobs are reserved for dominant groups (and is supported by the

active exclusion of others) while exploitation refers to the use of power to transfer income from one group to another (Tomaskovic-Devey & Avent-Holt 2019). The history of reserving standard work for White men while assigning various forms of nonstandard work to women and non-white men can be viewed as a form of opportunity hoarding that fused interior and exterior categories, legitimating an unequal division of labor.

The advent of new competitive pressures in the 1980s presented organizations with problems they could not solve through traditional means of opportunity hoarding for white workers and the hyper-exploitation of Black workers. Organizations responded with a two-pronged strategy that deepened class-based inequalities. First, employers adapted the opportunity hoarding model of the postwar period—preserving employment security for some workers at the expense of others—to the post-Civil Rights period by expanding the use of nonstandard and alternative forms of work organization across occupations and industries. Alternative forms of work organization such as contingent, temporary, and subcontracted labor are designed to enhance employers' flexibility and profit by evading the legal protections of the employment relationship (Smith 1997; Peck & Theodore 2002). Second, employers enacted measures that deepen exploitation within the standard employment relationship including downsizing and offshoring, union busting, and new technologies designed to enhance managerial control of the labor process (Bluestone & Harrison 1982; Vallas 1993; Rosenfeld 2014; Kristal 2013; Hanley 2014). Unlike earlier periods in which the security and stability of white workers during economic downturns could be preserved by job tenure and seniority policies, employment disruption in the postindustrial period was less racially selective and more broadly felt. Employer practices that deepen exploitation and heighten insecurity were not confined to blue-collar work, but instead spread across industries and occupations (Osterman 1999; Branch & Hanley 2017). As a result, employment conditions that used to apply only to the secondary sector and other low-wage jobs are now seen across industries, occupations, and educational levels.

What do these changes mean for contemporary racial and gender inequality? Racial and gender gaps in educational and occupational attainment narrowed just as postindustrial economic restructuring undermined the quality of the professional and skilled manufacturing jobs from which white women, Black men, and Black women had long been denied access (Pettit & Ewert 2009; Branch & Hanley 2014). Workers who entered the labor market in the post-Civil Rights Movement (CRM) period have less occupationally and industrially segregated working lives than pre-CRM cohorts, but there is still a strong racial and gender division of labor (Stainback & Tomaskovic-Devey 2012; Dozier 2010). High levels of inequality within occupations and educational levels means that focusing on those axes of difference does not tell the full story of contemporary racial and gender inequality.

As nonstandard work increased in the 1980s and 1990s, and alternative forms of work organization grew in the 2000s, it was disproportionately performed by racial and ethnic minorities and women (Smith 1997; Bell 1998; Cohany et al. 1998; Presser 2003; Kalleberg et al. 2000; Hipple & Hammond 2016; Katz & Krueger 2020; Abraham & Houseman 2021). Yet focusing on alternative work arrangements as a site for understanding racial and gender inequality in insecure employment has its own drawbacks because workers with alternative work arrangements comprise a relatively small share of the total labor force. While estimates are sensitive to data source and measurement decisions (Abraham & Houseman 2021), one recent study found that alternative work arrangements including independent contractors, on-call workers, and temporary help agency or contract workers rose from about 10% of the employed population in 1995 and 2005 to 15.8% in 2015 (Katz & Krueger 2016). Further, insecure employment relations are not confined to nonstandard or alternative work arrangements, as workers with standard employment relations experience employment insecurity due to the uncertainties of at-will employment and weak enforcement of existing labor and employment rights (Gleeson 2016). Nonstandard and alternative forms of work organization therefore mark an important but ulti-

mately limited site for evaluating racial and gender differences in secure employment that run across industrial, occupational, and educational boundaries.

Persistence in racial and gender inequality in nonstandard work and new forms of work organization suggest that historical associations continue to inform employers' notions of appropriate labor in insecure employment relations. In the next section we argue that the boundary between hourly and salaried employment marks a key site for understanding the interconnections between race, gender, and insecure employment relations in the post-Civil Rights period.

EXPLOITATION AND INSECURITY IN THE HOURLY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

The capitalist employment relationship rests on exploitation, or the use of power to transfer income from one group to another (Tomaskovic-Devey & Avent-Holt 2019). Employers organize the labor process in ways that maximize the potential for exploitation (Braverman 1973), often within the legal boundaries of the employment relationship and sometimes by violating its boundaries (e.g., Bernhardt et al. 2009). Just as alternative forms of work organization represent a strategic evasion of employment protections encoded in employment law (including the formal definition of the employee/employer), wage and hours laws that define exemptions for minimum wage, overtime, union organizing, and other employment rights provide tools for deepening exploitation within the standard employment relationship (Lambert 2008). While many studies have examined insecure and intersectionally unequal employment experiences associated with work that is paid by the hour—such as the part-time and variable work schedules that are normative in the retail sector (e.g., Williams 2006; Carré & Tilly 2017)—such research often does not recognize the commonalities across different types of hourly jobs or emphasize hourly pay as a form of workplace exploitation that crosses occupational, industrial, and educational lines. In this section

we conceptualize hourly employment as a distinctive form of exploitation with greater potential for economic insecurity than salaried employment, and argue that it represents an important site for investigating intersectional inequality in insecure employment relations.

Employers exercise broad control over the labor process, including designing systems of compensation that advance managerial objectives (Burawoy 1979). The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, the legal cornerstone of the employment relationship in the United States, was written to address employer practices in primarily manufacturing settings (Lambert 2008) with minimum wage and overtime exemptions for executive, administrative, and professional (EAP) work. The EAP exemptions—tied to job duties and subject to a minimum salary threshold—were not intended to produce a narrow application of employment rights to blue collar work but, rather, expressed the belief that high wages indicated an absence of exploitation, rendering legislative protection against unpaid long hours unnecessary (Linder 1994:9). Being paid on a salaried (as opposed to an hourly) basis is one legal standard for establishing exempt status under the FLSA (Congressional Research Service 2017). While not all hourly workers are covered by the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime requirements due to select industry exemptions, the vast majority of hourly workers are covered by the statute.

If workers who are paid by the hour are more clearly subject to wage and hours protections than are salaried workers, and employers design compensation systems that advance managerial interests, why might employers choose to pay certain positions on an hourly basis and others on a salaried basis? Haber and Goldfarb (1995) argue that hourly pay reduces absenteeism because hourly employees are not paid for time they do not spend on the job, but the benefits of hourly pay to the employer outweigh its costs only when three criteria apply: the pace of work is not controlled by the employee; employee output can be clearly observed or measured in real time; and the duration of job tasks

is relatively certain and predictable. In short, Haber and Goldfarb (1995) assert that employers use hourly pay to maximize exploitation when the work itself is routinized. An alternative but complementary perspective emphasizes the flexibility that hourly pay allows employers to integrate into the standard employment relationship: variable and last-minute scheduling practices allow employers to adjust labor supply in real time in a fashion that is similar to the way that firms use temporary agency or contract workers (Lambert 2008). In addition to the cyclical use of hourly employment, the hourly compensation approach also comes with lower fixed costs because of the ability to avoid contributions to employee benefits by capping weekly hours below the full-time work threshold (Carré & Tilly 2017).

While employers maximize exploitation in salaried work via the use of normative control to motivate uncompensated overtime (e.g., Kunda 2009), exploitation is advanced in hourly employment relations with tools such as underemployment, scheduling instability, and wage theft (Lambert 2008; Jacobs & Padavic 2014; Carré & Tilly 2017; Bernhardt al. 2009). While not all hourly workers regularly work part-time, most part-time workers would prefer to work more hours (Golden 2016; Bell & Blanchflower 2021). The ease with which work schedules can change from week to week (including below the full-time standard) is central to exploitation in the hourly wage relationship, as hours withholding and scheduling instability can serve as tools for disciplining workers and maintaining managerial control (Carré & Tilly 2017; Jacobs & Padavic 2015). Hourly employment is therefore a tool for maximizing workplace flexibility from the point of view of the employer that is likely to produce economic insecurity from the worker's perspective.

A large sociological literature documents patterns of exploitation and insecurity in low-wage and part-time jobs that are paid by the hour—"bad jobs." Studies of the retail sector, restaurant and food service work, health technicians, and nonprofessional care or office workers all highlight the highly racialized and gen-

dered nature of hourly employment (e.g., Williams 2006; Clawson & Gerstel 2014; Acker 2006). Yet existing research does not often emphasize the centrality of the hourly versus salaried divide in employment relations or conceptualize being paid by the hour as a core feature of flexible or insecure employment relations. Not all hourly jobs are low-wage or part-time, but hourly employment relations are tools for implementing a particular form of exploitation likely to result in economic insecurity. As economic insecurity has grown across occupations, industries, and educational levels, hourly employment represents a key site for investigating change in the role of race and gender in access to secure employment relations.

This paper asks whether the effect of race and gender on the odds of hourly employment has changed from 1979 to 2019, as class-based inequalities in the labor market have deepened, and hourly employment has become more dispersed across occupations and industries. Given the close historical associations between race, gender, and insecure employment relations, and research documenting the importance of racialized and gendered inequality regimes in contemporary workplaces, we expect to find disproportionate rates of hourly work among white women and Black men and women, relative to white men, even holding occupation, industry, education, and other covariates constant. Further, we expect that Black women in particular are doubly disadvantaged by the compounding effects of race and gender, continuing their historical relegation to insecure employment relations. While we do not directly observe organizational processes, our expectations are grounded in a historical and relational perspective that foregrounds the central role of race and gender in the workplace: groups with access to scarce resources mobilize to maintain them, using group boundaries to organize production around social categories of race and gender, and historical associations to justify and legitimize the allocation process (Kaufman 2002; Acker 2006; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993; Tomaskovic-Devey & Avent-Holt 2017).

DATA AND METHODS

To evaluate change in the relationship between race, gender, and hourly employment, we use repeated surveys from the Current Population Survey's Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-MORG) dataset from 1979 to 2019 (extracts prepared by the National Bureau of Economic Research). We include only data from odd survey years in the multivariate analysis because households in the MORG files appear in the sample twice over the course of a 2-year period, raising the potential of artificially inflated standard errors. The sample is limited to employed public and private sector respondents ages 18-64 (excluding military and self-employed) who usually work more than one hour per week and are paid at least $1 per hour. The resulting sample includes about 2.9 million observations (between 103,003 and 163,283 observations in each survey year).

We limit our analysis of racial and gender inequality to non-Hispanic white and Black respondents because we follow an intersectional approach that foregrounds close comparison of outcomes across socially constructed dimensions of difference to draw attention to how historical contexts can maintain systems of oppression (Misra et al. 2020). Including other racial and ethnic groups in the analysis would limit our ability to attend closely to our core interest in the Black-white racial binary, which was instrumental to the institutionalization of employment security for some and insecurity for others in the postwar period (Branch & Hanley 2022).

Studies of labor market inequality often use separate models for men and women with a variable for race or ethnicity, making it difficult to foreground how racial or ethnic employment effects vary by gender. We choose, instead, to combine women and men in one model and use a single categorical variable for racial and gender group (white men, which is the reference group; white women; Black men; and Black women). Use of a single race and gender group variable, rather than an interaction term for race * gender, supports analytical simplicity and clarity in presen-

tation of results, particularly with regard to the interaction terms discussed below.

To estimate change over time in the effects of race and gender group on hourly employment we use a "changing parameter model" (Firebaugh 1997) that pinpoints changing predictor-outcome relationships at the individual level and does not make a wider argument about aggregate social change. We use logistic regression to predict the likelihood of hourly employment as a function of year (measured as a series of dummy variables for survey year; reference is 1979), the interaction of year * racial and gender group, and a series of covariates discussed in more detail below.

$$E(Y) = \alpha + \gamma D_{YR} + X\beta + (XD_{YR})\delta$$

We use Wald tests to evaluate the joint significance of the year*race and gender group interaction, along with two other interaction terms used to assess the robustness of our findings. Interaction terms are multiplicative and not additive in logistic regression, so we calculate the interaction term odds ratios by multiplying the reported coefficients for main effects and interaction terms. For all analyses we use the logistic command in Stata to produce coefficients that are odds ratios, which are interpreted as the change in the odds of the outcome associated with a one-unit change in the predictor variable. An odds ratio of 1 means that there is a 50/50 chance of the occurrence, so the variable is not highly associative; a significant coefficient <1 means the variable makes the outcome less likely, relative to the reference category, while a significant coefficient >1 means the variable makes the outcome more likely, relative to the reference group.

The dependent variable, hourly (versus salaried) employment, is measured in the CPS-MORG with a survey question asking employed respondents whether they are paid by the hour for their jobs (the variable is not available in other data sources often used to analyze workplace inequality in the United States, such as the U.S. Census or the General Social Survey). Our first

model includes only the intersection of year*race and gender group, while model two adds an array of controls for individual and job characteristics. Generational differences in the institutional features of the labor market at the point of labor market entry may shape employment pathways across the life course, and they are particularly important for understanding the distinctive experiences of Black women in the labor market (Petit & Ewert 2009). We therefore include a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent reached working age before or after the implementation of antidiscrimination and equal opportunity policies passed as a result of the Civil Rights Movement (CRM). The *pre-CRM cohort* respondents, who were born before 1947, began their working lives in a context of legally sanctioned employment discrimination and may, therefore, follow hourly employment trajectories that are different from later cohorts. (See Appendix Figure 1 for the share of the sample belonging to the pre-CRM cohort by year.) We control for *age* and *age-squared* in our analyses to account for greater likelihoods of hourly work earlier in one's career which are likely to dissipate over time. Occupations, job groupings based on shared skills and tasks, are important conceptual tools for sociological analysis of employment inequality, despite the growth of within-occupation earnings inequality. One of the challenges of assessing change over time in labor market inequality is that foundational changes in the occupational coding scheme used by the U.S. Census can make it difficult to create comparable occupational groups across time periods. In response to this problem, we use Rosenfeld and Kleykamp's (2012) broad measure of *occupational group* to take differences in the type of jobs held by hourly versus salaried workers into account in our analysis (professional, technical, and managerial, which is the reference group; production, craft, repair, and non-extractive labor not elsewhere classified; service; and farm, forestry, and fisheries). We measure *education* with years of schooling completed: less than high school (less than 12 years education, which is the reference category); high school (12 years); some college

(1-3 years of postsecondary schooling); college (4 years of postsecondary education); and advanced degree (more than 4 years of postsecondary education). Family structure figures heavily into gendered employment experiences, including hours worked (Tilly 1996). We therefore control for *usual hours worked* per week and *marital status* (never married, which is the reference category; married; and divorced/widowed). We measure *industry* with 13 categories: durable manufacturing, which is the reference category; nondurable manufacturing; agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining; construction; transportation, communication, and public utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; business and repair services; personal services; entertainment and recreation services; professional and related services; and public administration. Finally, geography shapes exposure to economic opportunity (Branch & Hanley 2011, 2013, 2014). We therefore include a dummy variable for *rural* versus urban residence and a control variable for *region* with the following categories: New England (Northeast), which is the reference category; Middle Atlantic (Northeast); South Atlantic (South); East South Central (South); West South Central (South); East North Central (Midwest); West North Central (Midwest); Mountain (West); and Pacific (West).

Models 3 and 4 introduce additional interaction terms to test the robustness of our results. Model 3 considers whether the effect of belonging to the pre-CRM cohort on odds of hourly employment varies by race and gender, and to what extent taking that interaction into account affects the primary race and gender * year interaction term of interest. Model 4 includes an interaction term for race and gender * occupational group as a check on the possibility that occupational segregation within our four occupational groups explains the differential trend estimates for odds of hourly employment by race and gender group.

We assess the evidence that hourly employment is a less secure employment relationship than is non-hourly (salaried) employment by describing earnings and working hours trends for each

form of employment. The CPS-MORG reports *weekly earnings* for all hourly and salaried employees. We convert the weekly earnings estimate to 2015 dollars using the Consumer Price Index research series (CPI-U-RS $2015). Outliers (i.e., those earning less than $0.50 or more than $100 per hour in 1989 dollars) were trimmed, following the procedures described in Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz (2009). We estimate *hourly earnings* by dividing the weekly earnings estimate by usual hours worked per week. As non-hourly (salaried) workers often work more than the official definition of full-time work (40 hours per week), we likely underestimate the degree of hourly earnings inequality between hourly and salaried workers. In addition to comparing usual hours per week across hourly and salaried employment, we also compare rates of involuntary part-time work. Voluntariness of part-time is conceptually and operationally difficult to measure. Conceptually, even workers who work part-time because they are busy with care or other family obligations may be constrained in that the choice arises from not having access to affordable childcare options; part-time workers classified as voluntary and involuntary often want to work more hours (Bell & Blanchflower 2021). Operationally, the CPS changed its measurement of reasons for part-time work in 1994 in ways that likely underestimate the degree of involuntary part-time work thereafter (Tilly 1996). With these caveats in mind, our measure of *involuntary part-time work*—survey respondents who are part-time because they could only find part-time work or due to slack work/business conditions—is a conservative estimate not intended to reify the idea of voluntariness among those with other reported reasons for part-time employment.

RESULTS

The analysis starts by outlining key observed trends in economic security by hourly employment, then uses logistic regression analysis to investigate the extent to which the relationship between race, gender, and hourly employment has changed from 1979 to 2019.

Is Hourly Employment More Insecure?

The Current Population Survey began measuring hourly versus salaried employment on its monthly labor force surveys in 1973, and first made hourly pay status available by occupation in 1979 (Haber & Goldfarb 1995). Rates of hourly employment are fairly stable across the 40-year period from 1979 to 2019, rising from about 57% of employed adults (18-64 years old) in 1979 to a high of about 60% in 1995, and dropping back to 57% by 2019 (Figure 1). Limiting analysis to only non-Hispanic Black and white workers yields a slightly sharper drop after 1995, to about 55%. While rates of hourly versus salaried employment have changed little since 1979, the consequences for economic security of being paid on an hourly or salaried basis have grown.



Figure 1. Share of workers paid by the hour, 1979-2019.

While the share of employed workers paid on an hourly basis over the last 40 years has been stable at about 57% of the adult workforce (Table 1), the relative stability of hourly employment—despite vast changes in the composition of work over the 40-year period—obscures a shift in the occupational and industrial composition of hourly work (Haber & Goldfarb 1995). Table 1 shows

that hourly employment is found across occupations and industries, and increasingly dominates certain types of employment. Hourly employment increased slightly among professional, technical, and managerial occupations from 1979 to 2019, from 38.5% to 44.5%, while it declined among production, craft, and other non-extractive blue-collar jobs from 81.5% in 1979 to 78.3% in 2019. Among service occupations, hourly employment increased by almost 10 percentage points to 80.4% in 2019. The biggest occupational change is in farm, forestry, and fisheries occupations; only about 34.4% of whose workers were paid by the hour in 1979 compared with 71.6% in 2019. Rates of hourly employment across industries are highly disparate and variable over time. The industries with little change over time include retail (about 70% hourly across the period), transportation (58%), and personal services (52.4% in 1979 and 53.8% in 2019). Rates of hourly employment increased by about 40% in the finance, insurance, and real estate industry (to 38.3% in 2019) and by about 20% in business and repair services (68% in 2019), entertainment and recreation services (66% in 2019), and professional services (53.5% in 2019). The biggest declines in hourly employment were in durable manufacturing, mining, and construction. This represents a shift in hourly employment away from blue collar occupations and industries toward white collar work.

Table 2 shows that compared with salaried work, hourly employment offers lower levels of economic security in terms of pay and involuntary part-time work, and pay gaps associated with salaried work increased from 1979 to 2019. In 1970 mean weekly earnings among hourly workers was $516.56, compared with $742.34 for salaried workers, despite mean hours worked gap of only about 4 hours per week. On an hourly basis, salaried workers earned about $6 per hour more than hourly workers in 1979, likely due at least in part to their higher levels of educational attainment: 36.2% of salaried workers had at least a college degree in 1979, compared with 7.8% of hourly workers, despite similarity in mean ages of hourly and salaried workers (35 and 38, respectively). A key difference between hourly and salaried work-

Table 1. Share workers paid by the hour, by occupation group and industry.*

	1979	2019	Change 1979-2019	Percent change 1979-2019
Occupation group				
Professional, technical, managerial	38.5%	44.5%	6	15.6%
Production, craft, repair, non-extractive labor	81.5%	78.3%	-3.2	-3.9%
Service	70.8%	80.4%	9.6	13.6%
Farm, forestry, fisheries	34.4%	71.6%	37.2	108.1%
Industry				
Durable manufacturing	71.9%	62.2%	-9.7	-13.5%
Non-durable manufacturing	68.1%	64.6%	-3.5	-5.1%
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	42.6%	64.4%	21.8	51.2%
Mining	63.8%	58.1%	-5.7	-8.9%
Construction	77.1%	67.5%	-9.6	-12.5%
Transportation, communications, public utilities	58.0%	58.2%	0.2	0.3%
Wholesale trade	44.7%	50.5%	5.8	13.0%
Retail trade	70.9%	71.7%	0.8	1.1%
Finance, insurance, real estate	27.1%	38.3%	11.2	41.3%
Business & repair services	56.0%	68.0%	12	21.4%
Personal services	52.4%	53.8%	1.4	2.7%
Entertainment & recreation services	54.9%	66.2%	11.3	20.6%
Professional & related services	44.2%	53.5%	9.3	21.0%
Public administration	42.1%	48.7%	6.6	15.7%
All	57.3%	57.4%	0.1	0.2%

Source: Author analysis of CPS-MORG data
*Analysis limited to ages 18-64; excludes self-employed

ers in 1979 was their rates of part-time work (usually less than 35 hours/week), including involuntary part-time work. About 18.8% of hourly employees usually worked part-time in 1979, compared with 7.4% of salaried employees. One measure of involuntary part-time work is normally working full-time but being temporarily part-time due to slack work or business conditions. According

to this measure, about 7.2% of hourly employees were involuntarily part-time in 1979, compared with 5.2% of salaried workers. Another measure of involuntary part-time work, being part-time because the worker could not find a full-time job, shows a similar gap: 7.8% of hourly and 5.9% of salaried workers were part-time for that reason in 1979. Finally, there is also a marriage gap across hourly and salaried workers: about 64% of hourly workers were married in 1979 compared with 72.8% of salaried workers. Since the financial consequences of part-time work are closely tied to the presence of other earners in the household, the lower marriage rate among hourly workers also speaks to their economic insecurity relative to salaried workers.

Table 2. Economic security and demographic characteristics of hourly and salaried workers, by year..

	1979		2019		Percent change 1979-2019	
	Hourly	Salaried	Hourly	Salaried	Hourly	Salaried
Economic security						
Mean weekly earnings ($2015)	$516.56	$742.34	$710.75	$1298.48	37.6%	74.9%
Mean usual hours worked per week	37.4	41.5	37.2	42.2	-0.4%	1.7%
Mean hourly earnings ($2015)	$16.65	$22.57	$18.66	$30.97	12.0%	37.2%
Share part-time (usually < 35/wk)	18.8	7.4	20.4	5.8	8.2%	-22.2%
Share involuntary part-time						
Usually FT, PT due to slack conditions	7.2	5.2	2.7	2.4	-62.2%	-54.7%
Could only find PT work	7.8	5.9	6.0	1.9	-23.1%	-67.7%
Demographic characteristics						
Share with college or more education	7.8	36.2	21.4	63.0	174.0%	74.0%
Share married	64.0	72.8	47.6	63.5	-25.7%	-12.8%
Mean age	35.0	38.5	39.4	43.1	12.8%	11.9%

Source: Authors' calculation of CPS-MORG data.

By 2019, the weekly earnings gap between hourly and salaried workers had grown to about $500, as hourly workers took home about $710 per week on average compared with $1,298 for salaried workers. The growing gap comes from a rate of hourly pay growth among salaried employees nearly twice that of hourly workers, despite marginal changes in mean hours worked per week and sharp increases in educational attainment among hourly employees. In 2019 21.4% of hourly and 63% of salaried workers had completed at least four years of college, and the average age of hourly and salaried workers was slightly higher than in 1979 (39 and 43, respectively). Hourly workers' hourly earnings only increased by about 12% from 1979 to 2019, to an average of $18.66 in 2019, while salaried workers' hourly earnings increased by about 37%, to an average of about $30/hour in 2019. Rates of part-time work increased among hourly workers and decreased among salaried workers across the period: about 20.4% of hourly and 5.8% of salaried employees usually worked less than 35 hours per week in 2019. While the hourly/gap in involuntary part-time work narrowed by one measure, it increased markedly by another. Around 2% of hourly and salaried workers were usually full-time but reported part-time work due to slack work or business conditions in 2019, but 6% of hourly workers were part-time because they could not find full-time work in 2019, compared with only 1.9% of salaried workers. Finally, marriage rates fell from 1979 to 2019 among both hourly and salaried workers but the rate of change was greater among hourly workers, only 47.6% of whom were married in 2019 compared with 63% of salaried workers.

Overall, the demographic and economic security trends we observe across salaried and hourly employment reflect wider patterns of growing inequality in the U.S. labor market, emphasizing the importance of investigating the hourly/salaried work divide as a site of intersectional inequality that crosses occupational, industrial, and educational lines. Figure 2 shows the share of workers paid by the hour by racial and gender group.

We see relative stability over time in the extent to which hourly employment is stratified by race and gender. Only 50% to



Figure 2. Share of workers paid by the hour, by race and gender group, 1979-2019.

53% of white men hold hourly jobs across the period, marking a slight downward trend, compared with about 57% of white women in 1979 and 55% in 2019 (down from a peak of 62.3% in 1995). Black workers are significantly more reliant on hourly employment than are white workers and are less stratified by gender. About 64% of Black women held hourly positions in 1979, compared with about 70% in 1995 and 66% in 2019. Over 70% of Black men held hourly jobs in 1979, dropping to about 64% by 2019.

In the period under study, 1979 to 2019, the composition of the labor market changed in important ways, due in part to a process of cohort replacement whereby older workers who began their working lives in the postwar, pre-Civil Rights era were gradually replaced by workers who entered the labor market under dramatically different labor market conditions. A key question we ask in this analysis is whether racial differences in hourly employment differ across pre- and post-Civil Rights Movement (CRM) workers, by which we mean workers who began their working lives before or after the implementation of anti-discrimination and equal opportunity measures arising from the Civil Rights



Figure 3. Share of workers paid by the hour, by race and gender group, Pre-Civil Rights Movement cohort only, 1919-2009.

Act. Over 50% of employed adults in 1979 reached working age before the CRM, a figure that drops steadily over time to about 25% in the mid-1990s to only about 1% in 2009 (see Appendix Figure 1). Figure 3 shows rates of hourly employment by racial and gender group for the pre-CRM cohort only. While the relative reliance on hourly employment is the same as that observed for the full sample—Black men and women holding hourly jobs at much higher rates than white women and, especially, white men—there are a few notable differences between Figure 2 and Figure 3. First, rates of hourly employment are lower and their trend flatter among white men for the pre-CRM cohort, only about 45% of whom held hourly jobs across the period. Gender inequality in hourly employment was greater for the pre-CRM cohort, but in racially unequal ways, with gender stratifying employment experiences among white workers to a greater degree than among Black workers. Pre- and post-CRM white women held hourly positions at similar rates, while Black men and women in the pre-CRM cohort held hourly positions at slightly lower rates than in the full sample. Overall, the comparison of pre- and post-CRM

cohorts suggests an increase in hourly employment over time due to cohort replacement that is most significant among white men, who nonetheless appear to maintain a relative advantage compared with other groups.

Race, Gender, and Odds of Hourly Employment

To what extent can racial and gender differences in hourly employment—including the stability in relative advantage observed over time—be explained by compositional differences across groups, including the different labor market experiences of pre– and post–Civil Rights Movement (CRM) cohorts? To answer this question, we employ logistic regression and report odds ratios that summarize the marginal contribution of racial gender group to odds of hourly employment by year (see Appendix Table 2 for full model results). All model figures show only statistically significant odds ratios reflecting the interaction of race and gender group by year, relative to the reference category, which is white men's odds of hourly employment in 1979. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate increased odds and odds ratios less than 1 indicate reduced odds, relative to the reference group.



Figure 4. Contribution of race and gender to odds of hourly employment, by year (Appendix Table 2, Model 2).

Whereas observed rates of hourly employment highlight race as a key axis of difference (Figures 2 and 3), accounting for group differences in occupation, industry, education, and marital status, among other factors, points more clearly to the salience of gender as it intersects with race. Taking a wide range of covariates into account, Figure 4 shows a slight increase in white men's odds of hourly employment over time and significant racial gender gaps that are fairly stable over time (see Appendix Table 2, Model 2). All things equal, white men in 2019 are about 1.7 as likely to hold jobs paid by the hour as they were in 1979. Before 2005 Black men's odds of hourly employment did not significantly differ from white men's odds in 1979. In 2005 Black men are 2.17 times as likely to be paid by the hour as white men in 1979, all things equal, and the gap grew to 2.37 by 2019. Compositional differences explain much, but not all, of the observed gap in hourly employment between white and Black men, but the racial differences among women are less easily explained, and the gap between men and women grows over time. Relative to white men in 1979, white women were 1.3 times more likely to hold hourly



Figure 5. Contribution of race and gender to odds of hourly employment by pre- versus post-CRM cohort (Appendix Table 3, Model 3).



Figure 6. Contribution of race and gender to odds of hourly employment by year (Appendix Table 2, Model 3).

jobs in 1979 and 3 times as likely in 2019. Across the board, Black women are most likely to hold hourly employment, even taking group differences into account. Black women were 1.5 times as likely to hold hourly positions as white men in 1979, and by 2019 they were 3.78 times more likely to be paid by the hour than white men in 1979. These estimates suggest that hourly employment is an important source of intersectional inequality with important consequences for group differences in economic security. The persistence of these group differences in hourly employment is notable in light of the narrowing of occupational and educational differences over the period (see Appendix Table 1).

To what extent are the odds of hourly employment different for workers who entered the labor market before and after the Civil Rights Movement's anti-discrimination and equal opportunity measures were implemented? Figure 5 shows the contribution of race and gender to the odds of hourly employment across pre- and post-CRM cohorts (all interactions are significant, see Appendix Table 2 Model 3). Compared with the reference cate-

gory (post-CRM white men), white men who arrived at working age before the CRM are less likely to hold hourly positions, all things equal (odds ratio 0.89). All other racial-gender and cohort groups are more likely to hold hourly jobs than white men in the post-CRM cohort, but the racial-gender group cohort differences are important. Among both white women and Black men, there is little difference in relative odds of hourly employment across cohorts when we take a range of covariates into account. Pre- and post-CRM white women are about 1.2 times as likely to hold hourly jobs as post-CRM white men, while Black men are about 1.4 times as likely. Among Black women there is an important cohort difference: pre-CRM Black women are 1.3 times as likely as the reference group to hold hourly positions, which is about the same marginal likelihood as pre-CRM white women and a lower marginal likelihood than Black men in either cohort, all things equal. Black women who arrived at working age after the CRM, by contrast, have the highest marginal odds of hourly employment: they are 1.6 times more likely to be paid by the hour than post-CRM white men, all things equal. The annual estimates of

Figure 7. Contribution of race and gender to odds of hourly employment by occupation group (Appendix Table 2, Model 4).



Figure 8. Contribution of race and gender to odds of hourly employment, by year (Appendix Table 2, Model 4)..

each racial and gender group's marginal odds, taking the interaction of race-gender and pre-CRM cohort into account, is shown in Figure 6 (see Appendix Table 2 Model 3). When we take the interaction of race-gender and cohort into account, Black men's marginal odds of hourly employment do not significantly differ from those of white men in 1979. We still see a mild upward trend in white men's odds over time and a growing gender gap that is racially disparate. White and Black women's odds of hourly employment are 1.2 and 1.6 times higher than that of white men in 1979, respectively. By 2019 white women were 2.9 times as likely to be paid by the hour as white men in 1979, and Black women were 3.6 times as likely, all things equal.

Given the relatively coarse measure of occupation group used in this analysis, one important consideration is whether unmeasured group differences in occupational attainment across racial and gender lines accounts for estimated group differences in odds of hourly employment. We examine this possibility by including an interaction term for race-gender group by occupation group. Figure 7 shows how the contribution of race and gen-

der to odds of hourly employment differ by occupation group (see Appendix Table 2 model 4). Compared to the reference group, which is white men in professional, technical, and managerial occupations, each group has higher marginal odds of hourly employment, but the effect of occupation group varies by race and gender. Among production workers, who have the highest marginal odds of hourly employment, all things equal, white men are 5 times as likely as white male professional workers to be paid by the hour, white women are 4.8 times as likely, Black men are 5.9 times as likely, and Black women are 5.6 times as likely. Among service workers, white men are 3.5 times more likely to be paid by the hour than white men professionals, white women are 2.8 times as likely, Black men 4.4 times as likely, and Black women 4.6 times as likely, all things equal. Among professional workers, white women are about 1.4 times more likely to be paid by the hour that white men, while Black men and women are each about twice as likely. Finally, white men, white women, and Black men in farm, forestry, and fishery occupations are about twice as likely as white male professionals to hold hourly positions, while marginal odds differences among Black women are not significantly different from the reference group. It is therefore clear that race and gender produce disparate odds of hourly employment within broad occupational groups, but this analysis cannot distinguish between fine-grained differences in occupational attainment within these occupational groups and the possibility that hourly employment varies by race and gender even among those with the same detailed occupations.

For the purposes of this analysis, the key question is whether taking racial and gender differences in the odds of hourly employment within occupational groups into account changes our estimates of change over time in racial and gender differences in hourly employment. Figure 8 suggests that it does not. We see a, by now, familiar pattern of significant group differences that are growing over time despite narrowing group differences in occupational and educational attainment (see Appendix Table 2

model 4). White men in 2019 were 1.7 times more likely to work in hourly employment than white men in 1979, all things equal. This represents an increase in white men's levels of economic security despite their continued advantage relative to white women and Black men and women. Black men's odds of hourly work were not significantly different from those of white men in 1979 before 2015 (with the exception of 2001), but they were over 2.5 times more likely to be paid by the hour than white men in 1979 from 2005 through 2015 and 2.9 times as likely in 2019. White women were only 1.3 times as likely to hold hourly employment as white men in 1979, but their relative odds increased to 3.26 by 2019. Throughout the period Black women had the highest likelihood of hourly employment: they were twice as likely to be paid by the hour compared with white men in 1979 and 4.3 times as likely in 2019. These marginal odds estimates take an array of covariates into account, so they cannot be explained by group differences in occupation, industry, or education, age/cohort, marital status, usual hours of work, region of the country, or rural residence.

In sum, this analysis points toward not just the preservation of racial and gender differences in economic security during the post-Civil Rights Movement period, but a deepening of racial and gender inequalities in hourly employment that suggests this represents an important axis of intersectional inequality. In the discussion and conclusion, we discuss the wider implications of the analysis for understanding intersectional inequalities in a time of growing class-based inequality.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper examines change in the relationship between race, gender, and access to secure employment relations by advancing a historically informed relational perspective on workplace inequality. Race and gender are not just categories of unequal social outcomes deriving from race- and gender-neutral processes, but essential elements of capitalist production that are embedded in the workplace processes of opportunity hoarding and exploita-

tion. Access to secure employment in the pre-Civil Rights period was explicitly organized around race and gender, but fundamental changes in the nature of work have made it difficult to assess change in the centrality of race and gender in access to secure employment relations in the post-Civil Rights period. How do we assess patterns of relative advantage when insecure employment relations are less confined to particular types of work and when traditional axes of employment advantage—occupational and educational attainment, access to standard employment—are therefore less reliable indicators of economic security? We argue that different forms of exploitation, in the form of hourly versus salaried employment, represent a key faultline for understanding intersectional inequalities. Work that is paid by the hour represents a distinctive form of exploitation with greater potential for economic insecurity than salaried employment due to lower and more variable pay, greater scheduling instability, and greater likelihood of involuntary part-time work.

Using labor force data from the CPS-MORG, we show that racial and gender inequalities in observed rates of hourly employment are highly stable from 1979 to 2019, despite the deep social, labor market, and regulatory changes that unfolded over this period, including the replacement of older cohorts, who began their working lives before the anti-discrimination and equal opportunity measures of the Civil Rights Act, with newer cohorts. Such durable inequalities are consistent with the historical relational perspective we have adopted (Tomaskovic-Devey & Avent-Holt 2017; Tilly 1998). Inequalities become durable when social categories such as race and gender become fused with particular roles within work organizations. Groups with access to scarce resources mobilize to maintain them, using boundaries to organize production around social categories of race and gender, and mobilizing historical associations of appropriate labor to justify and legitimize that allocation process. Inequalities become entrenched as work norms and routines are established around those unequal social categories and persist even as explicit racial

and gender ideologies legitimizing the unequal division of labor subside. The historical association of secure employment relations with white men continues to shape workplace opportunity.

While the share of all jobs in the United States paid on an hourly basis is highly stable over time, at about 57%, hourly employment has become more common in professional and white-collar occupations. Yet multivariate analysis shows that neither convergence in educational attainment across racial and gender lines, nor the diffusion of hourly work across occupations and industries, has significantly weakened longstanding patterns of unequal access to secure employment relations. Logistic regression analysis of the odds of hourly employment from 1979 to 2019 shows that white women, Black men, and Black women are much more likely to work in hourly jobs than are white men. All things equal, intersectional inequalities in hourly employment have actually increased since 1979. While white men's odds of hourly employment are increasing over time, the relative odds associated with white women, Black men, and Black women are growing at a sharper rate, with Black women bearing the double disadvantage of race and gender that makes them most likely to hold hourly positions.

While some observers have questioned whether the rise and diffusion of employment insecurity marks the decline of racial and gender advantage—and, in particular, declining advantage among white men, since their employment experiences have been most disrupted by economic restructuring—we emphasize the distinction between relative and absolute advantage. White men are becoming less distinctively insulated from labor market insecurity, marking an absolute decline in their labor market positions over time. Yet they remain advantaged relative to white women, Black women, and Black men, even when educational attainment, family structure, occupation, and industry are taken into account. Recognizing the distinction between absolute decline in labor market position and relative advantage, compared with other social groups, may help observers better understand the

competing narratives of economic insecurity and racial-gender advantage/disadvantage that continue to be debated among academics and in public discourse.

Overall, we have argued that it is necessary to conceive of employment relations and social relations as mutually constituting. In the context of the rise and diffusion of insecure work, this means being attentive to how race and gender are woven into the fabric of employment relations to ask how historical race-gender relations are reconfigured or reinforced by new employment arrangements, and interpreting results through the lens of racial and gender processes. Just as the distinction between the primary and secondary labor markets was a key division that organized racial and gender inequality in the postwar period, we find that the distinction between hourly and salaried employment is organized around racial and gender lines in the postindustrial period. The large, significant inequalities historically associated with Black and white men and women have been reformulated but not erased. We hope that future studies of employment insecurity will consider the use of a historical relational perspective that puts intersections among race, gender, and class at the center of the analysis. Inattention to the historically specific context in which new forms of employment inequality are produced limits our understanding of contemporary racial and gender inequalities, as well as the processes by which insecure work has become a normative experience in American society.

REFERENCES

Abraham, Katherine G. and Susan N. Houseman. 2021. "What Do We Know about Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States? A Synthesis of Research Evidence from Household Surveys, Employer Surveys, and Administrative Data." Report prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor, Chief Evaluation Office, by the W.E. Upjohn Institute. September 5, 2021, accessed July 19, 2022 https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OASP/evaluation/pdf/Alternative_Work_Arrangements_Abraham_Houseman_Oct_2021_508c.pdf.

Acker, Joan. 1990. "Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations." *Gender & Society* 4(2): 139–158.

Acker, Joan. 2006. "Inequality Regimes: Gender, Class, and Race in Organizations." *Gender & Society* 20(4): 441–464.

Bell, David N. and David G. Blanchflower. 2021. "Underemployment in the United States and Europe." I*ndustrial & Labor Relations Review* 74(1): 56–94.

Bell, Linda A. 1998. "Differences in Work Hours and Hours Preferences by Race in the U.S." *Review of Social Economy* 61(4): 481–500.

Bernhardt, Annette, Ruth Milkman, Nik Theodore, Douglas Heckathorn, Mirabai Auer, James DeFilippis, Ana Luz Gonzalez, Victor Narrow, Jason Perelshteyn, Diana Polson, and Michael Spiller. 2009. *Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers*. National Employment Law Project.

Bielby, William T. and James N. Baron. 1986. "Men and Women at Work: Sex Segregation and Statistical Discrimination." *American Journal of Sociology* 91(4): 759–799

Biggart, Nicole Woolsey. 1989. *Charismatic Capitalism: Direct Selling Organizations in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Blau, Francine, Peter Brummund and Albert Liu. 2013. "Trends in Occupational Segregation by Gender 1970-2009: Adjusting for the Impact of Changes in the Occupational Coding System." *Demography* 50(2): 471–492.

Bluestone, Barry and Bennett Harrison. 1982. *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry*. New York: Basic Books.

Bonacich, Edna. 1976. "Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Relations in the United States: A Split Labor Market Interpretation." *American Sociological Review* 41(1): 34–51.

Branch, Enobong Hannah. 2011. *Opportunity Denied: Limiting Black Women to Devalued Work*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Branch, Enobong Hannah and Caroline Hanley. 2011. "Regional Convergence in Low-Wage Work and Earnings, 1970-2000." *Sociological Perspectives* 54(4): 569–592.

Branch, Enobong Hannah and Caroline Hanley. 2013. "Interrogating Claims of Progress for Black Women since 1970." *Journal of Black Studies* 44(2): 203–226.

Branch, Enobong Hannah and Caroline Hanley. 2014. "Upgraded to Bad Jobs: Low-wage Black Women's Relative Status Since 1970." *The Sociological Quarterly* 55(2): 366–395.

Branch, Enobong Hannah and Caroline Hanley. 2017. "A Racial-Gender Lens on Precarious Nonstandard Employment." *Research in the Sociology of Work* (special issue "Precarious Work: Causes, Characteristics and Consequences" edited by Arne L. Kalleberg and Steven Vallas) v. 31: 183–213.

Branch, Enobong Hannah and Caroline Hanley. 2022. *Work in Black and White: Striving for the American Dream*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Boyle, Kevin. (1998. *The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Browne, Irene and Joya Misra. 2003. "The Intersection of Gender and Race in the Labor Market." *Annual Review of Sociology* 29: 487–513.

Burawoy, Michael. 1979. *Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carré, Françoise and Chris Tilly. 2017. *Where Bad Jobs are Better: Retail Jobs across Countries and Companies*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Carr, Deborah. 2001. "Two Paths to Self-Employment? Women's and Men's Self-Employment in the United States, 1980." Pp. 127–149 in Daniel B. Cornfield, Karen E. Campbell and Holly J. McCammon, Eds. *Working in Restructured Workplaces: Challenges and New Directions for the Sociology of Work*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Christensen, Kathleen. 1987. "Women and Contingent Work." *Social Policy* 18:15–196.

Christensen, Kathleen. 1988. *Women and Home-based Work: The Unspoken Contract*. New York: Henry Holt.

Clawson, Dan and Naomi Gerstel. 2014. *Unequal Time: Gender, Class, and Family in Employment Schedules*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Cohany, Sharon R., Steven F. Hipple, Thomas J. Nardone, Anne E. Polivka, and Jay C. Stweart. 1998. "Counting the Workers: Results of a First Survey." Pp. 41-68 in Kathleen Barker and Kathleen Christensen, eds. *Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Congressional Research Service. 2017. "Overtime Exemptions in the Fair Labor Standards Act for Executive, Administrative, and Professional Employees." *CRS Reports*. October 31, 2017. Accessed June 15, 2022 https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45007/4

Dozier, Raine. 2010. "Accumulating Disadvantage: The Growth of the Black-White Wage Gap Among Women." *Journal of African American Studies* 14: 279–301.

Firebaugh, Glenn. 1997. *Analyzing Repeated Surveys*. Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 7–115. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Freeman, Richard B. (ed.). 1994. *Working Under Different Rules: A National Bureau of Economic Research Project Report*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Fuller, Sylvia and Leah Vosko. 2008. "Temporary Employment and Social Inequality in Canada: Exploring Intersections of Gender, Race and Immigration Status." *Social Indicators Research* 88(1): 31–50.

Gleeson, Shannon. 2016. *Precarious Claims: The Promise and Failure of Workplace Protections in the United States*. Oakland: University of California Press.

Glenn, Evelyn Nakano. 2002. *Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender shaped American Citizenship and Labor*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Golden, Lonnie. 2016. "Still Falling Short on Hours and Pay: Part-time Work becoming New Normal." Economic Policy Institute report, December 5, 2016 https://files.epi.org/pdf/114028.pdf.

Haber, Sheldon E. and Robert S. Goldfarb. 1995. "Does salaried status affect human capital accumulation?" *Industrial & Labor Relations Review* 48(2): 322–337.

Hacker, Jacob. 2006. *The Great Risk Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the Decline of the American Dream*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hanley, Caroline. 2014. "Putting the Bias in Skill-Biased Technological Change? Postwar White Collar Automation Technologies at General Electric." *American Behavioral Scientist* 58(3): 400–415.

Harvey, Adia M. 2005. "Becoming Entrepreneurs: Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender at the Beauty Salon." *Gender & Society* 19(6): 789–808.

Hatton, Erin. 2011. *The Temp Economy: From Kelly Girls to Permatemps in Postwar America*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Hollister, Matissa. 2011. "Employment Stability in the U.S. Labor Market: Rhetoric versus Reality." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37: 305–324.

Jacobs, Anna W. and Irene Padavic. 2015. "Hours, Scheduling and Flexibility for Women in the U.S. Labour Force." *Gender, Work and Organization* 22(1): 67–86.

Jacobs, Jerry A. and Kathleen Gerson. 2005. *The Time Divide: Work, Family, and Gender Inequality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kalleberg, Arne L. 2009. "Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in Transition." *American Sociological Review* 74 (February): 1–22.

Kalleberg, Arne L. 2011. *Good Jobs, Bad Jobs: The Rise of Polarized and Precarious Employment Systems in the United States, 1970s to 2000s*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Kalleberg, Arne L., Barbara F. Reskin and Ken Hudson. 2000. "Bad Jobs in America: Employment Relations and Job Quality in the United States." *American Sociological Review* 65 (April): 256–278.

Katznelson, Ira. 2005. *When Affirmative Action was White: The Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Katz, Lawrence F. and Alan B. Krueger. 2016. "The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015." NBER Working Paper No. 22667 (September 2016). Accessed July 19, 2022. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22667/w22667.pdf.

Kaufman, Robert L. 2002. "Assessing Alternative Perspectives on Race and Sex Employment Segregation." *American Sociological Review* 67(4): 547–572.

Kessler-Harris, Alice. 1990. A *Woman's Wage: Historical Meanings & Social Consequences*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.

Kristal, Tali, 2013. "The Capitalist Machine: Computerization, Workers' Power, and the Decline in Labor's Share within U.S. Industries." *American Sociological Review* 78: 361–389.

Kunda, Gideon 2009. *Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Lambert, Susan J., Julia R. Henly, Michael Schoeny, and Meghan Jarpe. 2019. "Increasing Schedule Predictability in Hourly Jobs: Results from a Randomized Experiment in a U.S. Retail Firm." *Work and Occupations* 46(2): 176–226.

Lambert, Susan J. 2008. "Passing the buck: Labor flexibility practices that transfer risk onto hourly workers." *Human Relations* 61(9): 1203–1227.

Linder, Marc. 1994. "Closing the Gap between Rich and Poor: Which Side Is the Department of Labor On?" *New York University Review of Law and Social Change* 21: 1–31.

Maldonado, Marta Maria. 2006. "Racial Triangulation of Latino/a Workers by Agricultural Employers." *Human Organization* 65(4): 353–361.

McCall, L. 2001. "Sources of Racial Wage Inequality in Metropolitan Labor Markets: Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differences." *American Sociological Review* 66: 520–541.

Mettler, Suzanne. 1998. *Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Morris, Martina and Bruce Western. 1999. "Inequality in Earnings at the Close of the Twentieth Century." *Annual Review of Sociology* 25: 623–657.

Osnowitz, Debra. 2010. *Freelancing Expertise: Contract Professionals in the New Economy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Osterman, Paul. 1999. *Securing Prosperity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press and the Century Foundation.

Palmer, Phyllis. 1995. "Outside of the Law: Agricultural and Domestic Workers Under the Fair Labor Standards Act." *Journal of Policy History* 7(4): 416–440.

Peck, Jamie A. and Nikolas Theodore. 2002. "Temped Out? Industry Rhetoric, Labor Regulation and Economic Restructuring in the Temporary Staffing Business." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 23(2): 143–175.

Pettit, Becky and Stephanie Ewert. 2009. "Employment Gains and Wage Declines: The Erosion of Black Women's Relative Wages since 1980." *Demography* 46: 469–492.

Polivka, Anne E. and Thomas Nardone. 1989. "On the Definition of Contingent Work." *Monthly Labor Review* 112: 9–16.

Presser, Harriet. 2003. "Race-ethnic and Gender Differences in Nonstandard Work Shifts." *Work and Occupations* 30(4): 412–439.

Purser, Gretchen. 2012. "The Labour of Liminality." *Labour, Capital & Society* 45(1): 10–35.

Quadagno, Jill. 1994. *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Reid, Lesley Williams and Beth A. Rubin. 2003. "Integrating Economic Dualism and Labor Market Segmentation: The Effects of Race, Gender, and Structural Location on Earnings, 1974–2000." *The Sociological Quarterly* 44 (3): 405–432.

Reid, Lori L. 2002. "Occupational Segregation, Human Capital, and Motherhood: Black Women's Higher Exit Rates from Full-Time Employment." *Gender and Society* 16(5): 728–747.

Rosenfeld, Jake and Meredith Kleykamp. 2012. "Organized Labor and Racial Wage Inequality in the United States." *American Journal of Sociology* 117(5): 1460–1502.

Rosenfeld, Jake. 2014. *What Unions No Longer Do*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Segal, Lewis M. 1996. "Flexible employment: Composition and trends." *Journal of Labor Research* 17(4): 525–542.

Smith, Vicki. 1997. "New Forms of Work Organization." *Annual Review of Sociology* 23: 315-339.

Smith, Vicki and Esther B. Neuwirth. 2008. *The Good Temp*. London and Ithaca: ILR Press/Cornell University Press.

Stainback, Kevin and Donald Tomaskobiv-Devey. 2012. *Documenting Desegregation: Racial and Gender Segregation in Private-Sector Employment Since the Civil Rights Act*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Thomas, Deborah A. 2008. "Wal-Mart, 'Katrina', and other Ideological Tricks: Jamaican Hotel Workers in Michigan." *Feminist Review* 90: 68–86.

Tilly, Charles. 1998. *Durable Inequality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tilly, Chris. 1996. *Half a Job: Bad and Good Part-Time Jobs in a Changing Labor Market*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald. 1993. *Gender and Racial Inequality at Work: The Sources and Consequences of Job Segregation*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Western, Bruce and Jake Rosenfeld. 2011. "Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality." *American Sociological Review* 76(4): 513-537.

Williams, Christine L. 2006. *Inside Toyland: Working, Shopping, and Social Inequality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wilson, George, Vincent J. Roscigno and Matt Huffman. 2013. "Public Sector Transformation, Racial Inequality and Downward Occupational Mobility." *Social Forces* 91(3): 975–1006.

Winant, Howard. 1994. *Racial Conditions: Politics, Theory, Comparisons*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Vallas, Steven. 1993. *Power in the Workplace: The Politics of Production at AT&T*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Vosko, Leah F. 2000. *Temporary Work: The Gendered Rise of a Precarious Employment Relationship*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

APPENDIX

Appendix Table 1. Occupational, industrial, and educational attainment by racial and gender group, 1979 & 2019.

	White men		White women		Black men		Black women	
	1979	2019	1979	2019	1979	2019	1979	2019
Occupation								
Professional, technical, managerial	42.8%	56.0%	68.9%	79.4%	23.0%	43.4%	48.7%	64.7%
Production, craft, repair, non-extractive labor	48.5%	31.9%	13.8%	4.9%	58.7%	38.3%	18.6%	8.9%
Service	7.2%	11.3%	16.3%	15.5%	15.6%	18.1%	32.1%	26.2%
Farm, forestry, fisheries	1.5%	0.8%	1.0%	0.2%	2.8%	0.3%	0.7%	0.2%
Industry								
Durable manufacturing	20.1%	10.5%	8.5%	3.1%	20.1%	7.6%	8.4%	3.3%
Non-durable manufacturing	10.3%	5.2%	8.4%	2.7%	11.4%	6.1%	9.5%	2.5%
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	2.1%	1.3%	1.6%	0.4%	3.2%	0.3%	0.8%	0.1%
Mining	2.1%	1.5%	0.3%	0.3%	0.6%	0.5%	0.2%	0.1%
Construction	9.8%	10.2%	1.3%	1.6%	8.3%	6.2%	0.4%	0.5%
Transportation, communications, public utilities	10.0%	9.6%	4.2%	4.1%	11.5%	15.1%	4.7%	6.4%
Wholesale trade	5.1%	3.6%	2.5%	1.4%	3.7%	2.6%	1.1%	0.8%
Retail trade	12.0%	10.6%	19.0%	10.1%	9.6%	10.9%	10.0%	9.5%
Finance, insurance, real estate	4.2%	5.7%	8.8%	8.2%	3.2%	4.4%	6.5%	6.4%
Business & repair services	3.4%	5.4%	2.6%	2.9%	4.1%	6.5%	2.4%	4.3%
Personal services	1.2%	13.7%	4.3%	14.6%	2.2%	12.1%	11.9%	11.6%
Entertainment & recreation services	0.8%	1.9%	1.0%	1.8%	0.8%	1.9%	0.6%	1.3%
Professional & related services	11.7%	14.3%	32.7%	43.5%	12.5%	18.2%	36.2%	44.6%
Public administration	7.2%	6.6%	4.7%	5.3%	8.6%	7.6%	7.2%	8.6%
Education								
Less than high school	16.6%	3.1%	12.9%	2.0%	33.5%	4.2%	25.2%	3.5%
High school	38.1%	28.5%	46.2%	21.2%	38.5%	36.0%	40.7%	28.9%
Some college	21.7%	27.6%	22.7%	29.3%	17.2%	31.7%	20.7%	33.9%
College (4-yr)	13.0%	27.0%	10.8%	29.9%	6.3%	19.7%	8.3%	20.9%
More than college	10.6%	13.8%	7.4%	11.2%	4.6%	8.4%	5.1%	12.8%

Source: Author analysis of CPS-MORG data.

* Analysis limited to non-Hispanic Black and White workers ages 18-64 and excludes self-employed; occupation/industry/education figures sum to 100% of each racial gender group by year



Appendix Figure 1. Pre-Civil Rights Movement cohort share of employed ages 18-64, by race gender group, 1979-2009.

Appendix Table 2. Logistic regression of hourly (versus salaried) employment (odds ratio).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Year (ref = 1979)				
1981	0.96***	0.97*	0.97*	0.97*
1983	0.96***	1.02	1.01	1.01
1985	0.98	1.10***	1.09***	1.09***
1987	0.99	1.19***	1.17***	1.17***
1989	1.01	1.24***	1.22***	1.22***
1991	1.00	1.28***	1.25***	1.26***
1993	1.03**	1.33***	1.30***	1.31***
1995	1.07***	1.50***	1.47***	1.49***
1997	1.05***	1.54***	1.50***	1.52***
1999	1.01	1.52***	1.47***	1.49***
2001	0.99	1.54***	1.49***	1.51***
2003	0.97**	1.49***	1.44***	1.45***

2005	1.00	1.58***	1.52***	1.54***
2007	0.96***	1.54***	1.49***	1.50***
2009	0.94***	1.52***	1.47***	1.48***
2011	0.98*	1.63***	1.57***	1.59***
2013	0.95***	1.62***	1.56***	1.57***
2015	0.94***	1.66***	1.60***	1.61***
2017	0.92***	1.69***	1.62***	1.64***
2019	0.93***	1.73***	1.67***	1.68***
racial gender group (ref = White men)				
White women (WW)	1.19***	1.31***	1.19***	1.37***
Black men (BM)	2.13***	1.55***	1.46***	2.00***
Black women (BW)	1.54***	1.51***	1.63***	1.98***
Year x racial gender group (ref = White men 1979)				
1981 x WW	1.08***	1.10***	1.11***	1.10***
1981 x BM	0.98	1.00	1.00	0.99
1981 x BW	1.03	1.10*	1.09*	1.09*
1983 x WW	1.12***	1.17***	1.19***	1.18***
1983 x BM	0.92*	0.96	0.97	0.95
1983 x BW	1.11**	1.21***	1.20***	1.18***
1985 x WW	1.10***	1.16***	1.19***	1.17***
1985 x BM	0.91**	0.94	0.96	0.94
1985 x BW	1.14***	1.26***	1.24***	1.21***
1987 x WW	1.12***	1.20***	1.24***	1.22***
1987 x BM	1.00	1.05	1.08	1.04
1987 x BW	1.22***	1.35***	1.31***	1.27***
1989 x WW	1.12***	1.24***	1.29***	1.27***
1989 x BM	1.04	1.09	1.12*	1.09
1989 x BW	1.24***	1.39***	1.34***	1.30***
1991 x WW	1.14***	1.27***	1.33***	1.31***
1991 x BM	0.96	1.00	1.04	0.99
1991 x BW	1.25***	1.37***	1.32***	1.28***
1993 x WW	1.12***	1.26***	1.33***	1.30***
1993 x BM	0.88***	0.91*	0.94	0.90*
1993 x BW	1.21***	1.34***	1.29***	1.25***
1995 x WW	1.14***	1.23***	1.30***	1.26***
1995 x BM	0.89**	0.95	0.99	0.92
1995 x BW	1.17***	1.27***	1.21***	1.16***

1997 x WW	1.13***	1.25***	1.33***	1.29***
1997 x BM	0.93	0.99	1.04	0.97
1997 x BW	1.22***	1.30***	1.23***	1.18***
1999 x WW	1.12***	1.22***	1.30***	1.27***
1999 x BM	0.91*	0.98	1.03	0.96
1999 x BW	1.29***	1.43***	1.35***	1.29***
2001 x WW	1.12***	1.26***	1.35***	1.31***
2001 x BM	0.87***	0.96	1.01	0.94
2001 x BW	1.19***	1.33***	1.25***	1.20***
2003 x WW	1.18***	1.36***	1.47***	1.44***
2003 x BM	0.84***	0.93	0.98	0.92
2003 x BW	1.17***	1.37***	1.29***	1.25***
2005 x WW	1.11***	1.31***	1.42***	1.38***
2005 x BM	0.79***	0.89**	0.94	0.87**
2005 x BW	1.15***	1.35***	1.26***	1.22***
2007 x WW	1.11***	1.32***	1.44***	1.40***
2007 x BM	0.75***	0.84***	0.89**	0.83***
2007 x BW	1.12***	1.33***	1.24***	1.21***
2009 x WW	1.14***	1.37***	1.49***	1.46***
2009 x BM	0.77***	0.88**	0.93	0.86**
2009 x BW	1.11**	1.28***	1.19***	1.17***
2011 x WW	1.11***	1.34***	1.47***	1.43***
2011 x BM	0.78***	0.86***	0.91	0.84***
2011 x BW	1.16***	1.36***	1.27***	1.23***
2013 x WW	1.09***	1.36***	1.49***	1.45***
2013 x BM	0.77***	0.88**	0.93	0.86***
2013 x BW	1.17***	1.40***	1.30***	1.26***
2015 x WW	1.06***	1.33***	1.46***	1.42***
2015 x BM	0.81***	0.86***	0.91	0.85***
2015 x BW	1.27***	1.50***	1.40***	1.36***
2017 x WW	1.05**	1.38***	1.50***	1.46***
2017 x BM	0.92*	1.05	1.11*	1.02
2017 x BW	1.26***	1.53***	1.42***	1.38***
2019 x WW	1.01	1.33***	1.45***	1.41***
2019 x BM	0.79***	0.88**	0.94	0.86**
2019 x BW	1.16***	1.44***	1.34***	1.30***

Occupation group (ref = Professional, technical, managerial)			
Production, craft, repair, non-extractive labor	4.38***	4.38***	4.99***
Service	1.77***	2.53***	3.54***
Farm, forestry, fisheries	1.77***	1.76***	2.08***
Occupation group x racial gender group (ref = Professional WM)			
Production x WW			0.70***
Production x BM			0.59***
Production x BW			0.57***
Service x WW			0.58***
Service x BM			0.62***
Service x BW			0.65***
Farm x WW			0.73***
Farm x BM			0.49***
Farm x BW			0.84
Pre- Civil Rights Movement (CRM) cohort	0.95***	0.89***	0.88***
Pre-CRM cohort x racial gender group (ref = Post-CRM WM)			
Pre-CRM x WW		1.17***	1.19***
Pre-CRM x BM		1.11***	1.15***
Pre-CRM x BW		0.88***	0.94***
Age	0.91***	0.91***	0.91***
Age-squared	1.00***	1.00***	1.00***
Education (ref = Less than h.s.)			
High school	0.81***	0.80***	0.79***
Some college	0.64***	0.64***	0.63***
College (4-yr)	0.24***	0.24***	0.23***
More than college	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***
Marital status (ref = single never married)			
Married	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***
Divorced or widowed	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***
Usual hours of work per week	0.94***	0.94***	0.94***
Industry group (ref = Durable manufacturing)			
Non-durable manufacturing	0.85***	0.85***	0.85***
Agriculture, forestry, fishing	0.58***	0.57***	0.56***
Mining	1.02	1.01	0.98
Construction	0.92***	0.92***	0.89***

Transportation, communications, public utilities		0.77***	0.77***	0.76***
Wholesale trade		0.58***	0.58***	0.58***
Retail trade		1.24***	1.23***	1.22***
Finance, insurance, real estate		0.44***	0.44***	0.42***
Business & repair services		0.71***	0.71***	0.69***
Personal services		0.50***	0.50***	0.50***
Entertainment & recreation services		0.72***	0.72***	0.70***
Professional & related services		0.83***	0.83***	0.81***
Public administration		0.72***	0.72***	0.67***
Region (ref = New England, Northeast)				
Middle Atlantic, Northeast		0.71***	0.71***	0.71***
South Atlantic, South		0.73***	0.73***	0.74***
East South Central, South		0.82***	0.82***	0.82***
West South Central, South		0.71***	0.71***	0.72***
East North Central, Midwest		1.06***	1.06***	1.06***
West North Central, Midwest		1.08***	1.08***	1.08***
Mountain, West		0.97***	0.97***	0.98***
Pacific, West		0.96***	0.96***	0.96***
Rural		1.18***	1.18***	1.19***
Constant	1.16	150.67	157.96	147.91
Pseudo r-sq	0.007	0.251	0.251	0.253

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Caroline Hanely, William & Mary
Enobong Hannah Branch, University of Massachusetts Amherst

Religion and Reconciliation: Religious Racial Reconciliation After Events of Black/White Tension

Ewart Forde, Lori Latrice Martin, and Stephen C. Finley

ABSTRACT

Race and religion have been significant determinants of the life options for Black and white people in America for hundreds of years, yet claims of a post-racial society may not be readily justified. For example, high-profile police-involved shootings of Black men, such as in the case of Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge in the summer of 2016, George Floyd in 2020, and other racially generated events, may serve to resurrect the seemingly lingering prominence of this matter. Racial reconciliation is defined as the creation of the beloved community to which Dr. King and others referred, which embraces and values racial differences that seem to divide humanity by engaging in robust interracial togetherness toward the realization of a racially transformed church and community. While there is a great deal of literature about racial reconciliation, many writings are limited conceptually and empirically. To that end, we collected data from individuals involved in religious racial reconciliation efforts in 2020 to address the following research questions: To what extent do religious racial reconciliation efforts increase in the wake of high-profile racialized events? What are the experiences like for African American Christians who take part in religious racial reconciliation? What factors create opportunities for success? Are there barriers that may never be overcome?

KEYWORDS: Religious reconciliation, Racial reconciliation

Race and religion have been significant determinants of the life options and possibilities for Black and white people in America for hundreds of years, yet claims of a post-racial society may not be readily justified. For example, high-profile police-involved shootings of Black men, such as in the case of Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge in the summer of 2016, George Floyd in 2020, and other racially generated events, may serve to resurrect the seemingly lingering prominence of this matter. The several recent high-profile police-involved shootings of Black men have propelled Americans to look not only to the government for solutions but also to the faith-based community.

Religious racial reconciliation is defined as the creation of the beloved community to which Dr. King and others referred, which embraces and values racial differences that seem to divide humanity by engaging in robust interracial togetherness towards the realization of a racially transformed church and community. While there is a great deal of literature about racial reconciliation, such writings can be limited. To that end, we examine the following research questions using data collected between 2016 and 2020: To what extent do religious racial reconciliation efforts increase in the wake of high-profile racialized events? What are the experiences that African American Christians who take part in religious racial reconciliation report? What factors create opportunities for success? Are there barriers that may never be overcome?

RACE AND RELIGION

The criminal justice system is not the only area of American society where there is evidence that Black people are unjustly treated (Alexander, 2010). It extends to other areas, including disaster management, as was evidenced during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and more recently the great flood of Baton Rouge (Buras, 2015). These periods demonstrated discriminating resource allocation for housing, education, infrastructure, and business (Kutner, 2007). This was, again, demonstrated by the

recent splitting of Baton Rouge to create the City of St. George. For many years Baton Rouge was led by white politicians who facilitated the control of resources to different areas. The changing population demographic of recent years allowed the Black population to be able to elect leaders from their community. Unable to maintain control of the central budgets and that of the school system, several white-dominated areas began a series of incorporations in the city suburbs. Finally, the city itself was divided into two cities by another white- and wealth-dominated area who gerrymandered their boundaries to exclude minority populations and absorb and consolidate the most viable economic sectors. For some scholars and laypersons, these societal challenges reek of America's long history of attitudes concerning race; for others, race is not considered a factor (Schools, 2021).

Religion has also been shown to be the source of some of these attitudes towards racial segregation. White churches have led the way in leaving their communities to avoid changing populations (Christerson, Edwards, & Emerson, 2005). According to Michael O. Emerson and Christian Smith (2000), religion still plays a role in white people's attitudes toward Black people (Emerson & Smith, 2000). For Charles H. Long and other Black scholars, religious influence is not limited to organized religion, nor for that matter does it require gods, creeds, or social institutions. Long defines religion as a means of organizing, making sense of, and finding one's place in the world (Long, 1999). By Long's definition, the ritualistic consistency in the shooting of young Black men and women in the modern era appears to build on the ritual nature of lynching in the sense that lynchings maintained the status of white people as subjects of history, who were dominant, and of Black people as objects (Pinn, 2003).

Consequently, the meaning white people gleaned from lynching and the ritualistic and generational communion it involved made it a deeply religious and spiritual experience for the white people who engaged in it. Indeed, James Cone argues for the reading of the meaning of Christianity in America through black

people on the lynching tree as a metaphor for Jesus on the cross (Cone, 2011). Although reference to religion in the United States most often refers to Christianity, the doctrines of white supremacy that led to rituals like lynching were practiced by members and leaders of the white Christian church, or with their knowledge, silence, and consent (Harlow 1990, 2007).

So deeply has racial identity been associated with the Christian religion that most people still attend a church of predominantly one race today (Chaves, 2017). Seventy-five percent of the more than 300,000 congregations 75% were constituted of 90% one race (Mohamed et al., 2021). Chaves (2017) notes decreases in these sorts of churches and increases in multiracial congregations by 2012 (Chaves, 2017). It should be noted that a so-called increase in diversity in any given congregation is not the same as inclusion, particularly in the case of Black congregants in congregations where Black people do not constitute the majority of the membership or the leadership.

Research has also shown that 63% of Black Christians want to be in a church where people share their race messaging and relate to Black Lives Matter (Mohamed et al. 2021)! Less than half of Black Republicans (43%) attend majority Black congregations (Mohamed et al., 2021). Black Republicans are more likely to attend a majority white congregation than Black Democrats by 22% to 11% (Mohamed et al., 2021).

Many see the trend towards multicultural churches as a good model for racial reconciliation (DeYoung et al., 2003; Emerson & Yancey 2011). Predominantly white churches are more likely to become multiracial than predominantly African American congregations (Chaves, 2017). While whites are very reluctant to serve under Black leadership, Black people are far more open to white leadership. However, the majority of Black Christians believe opposition to racism is an essential part of being a Christian and hold the black Church in high regard for their stance in this area (Mohamed et al., 2021).

Not everyone agrees, however, that multiracial congregations are the answer to the race issue. Scholars like Michelle Oya-

kawa see multiracial congregations as a possible suppressive force against Black voices for social justice (Oyakawa, 2019). Oyakawa's work shows that emphasis on unity and evangelism causes pastors to silence minority concerns about social ills, explaining the lack of attention it commands from many multiracial churches (Oyakawa, 2019), an idea that William R. Jones calls "quietism," a focus on the hereafter that circumvents work to make this world more just and equitable (Jones, 1997).

Racial inequities and injustices are the residual effects of ideas and attitudes like the narrative of racial difference and white supremacy, which originated in part from the historical and contemporary doctrines and religious practices of white churches in America (Harlow, 1990, 2007; Tisby, 2019). Emerson and Smith (2000) write that they are still a part of some religious groups' current attitude (Emerson & Smith, 2000). Therefore, until these ideas no longer have resonance among many within the white community, hopes of a just and equitable nation may not be possible.

RELIGIOUS RACIAL RECONCILIATION: CENTERING THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

There are arguably two key issues which increase the likelihood of fostering better race relations between self-proclaimed Black and white Christians in the wake of high-profile racial events, including the role of social capital in building and doing business in American society and the impossibility of building social capital without meaningful social interaction (Emerson & Yancey, 2011). This is not possible if Black people and white people live and worship in isolation (Emerson & Yancey, 2011). Hence, religious and political reconciliation can play a major part in bridging that gap. Emerson and Yancey are arguing that while the removal of race as a disproportionate predictor of so much ill will and so many obstacles to American progress would benefit both Black and white people, being trapped in their individual perspectives on racial categories robs Black and white people of

the potential benefits of mutual accommodations and resolutions (Emerson & Yancey, 2011). In other words, white people no longer gain unearned benefits, such as wealth, status, and power, while Black people are forced into a perpetual generational feedback of inequality, misery, and despair.

Much focus has been placed on the manifested consequences of racial inequities for Black people, for example, by sociologists; however, not as much focus has been placed on the religious roots of the racialized society or on those who are using reconciliation as one of the toolkits for addressing these inequities (Ellison & Powers, 1994). Additionally, while a lot has been written on race and religion, not much is documented about efforts at undoing the damage, the multi-layered complexity of multigenerational racial, religious, and socioeconomic intersection, or the theories and methodologies used in modern reconciliation efforts (McNeil, 2015; Hill, 2017).

For example, studies of racial reconciliation have not centered African Americans and their experiences and anticipated outcomes but have often assumed that African Americans would be uncritically welcoming of such efforts. The present study supports the argument that African American Christians may have more nuanced views of their Christian identity, which in turn affects their views and involvement with racial reconciliation. Further, while many white Christians may see reconciliation as the sole Christian response to issues of race, Black Christians see reconciliation as only one of many options. Black Christians are more likely to look to institutions beyond the Church to include social institutions, such as the government and the law.

The process of religious racial reconciliation centers around the beloved community of the universal church as an imperative for the transformation of society (Wilson-Hargrave, 2008; Harper, 2008). Reconciliation as the responsibility for the Church began in the middle to late twentieth century, primarily by African American preachers (Emerson & Smith, 2000). Even then it was not widely practiced among Black churches and was mainly

ignored among white churches. It appeared to have reached its peak in the 1990s (Emerson & Smith, 2000). As a result of being confronted by the high-profile race-dominated events like police shootings and disaster responses, many Christians and churches felt pressured into action to help solve the race problem in America as evidenced in the creation of new organizations that were intentional about reaching out to participants from diverse backgrounds (Roach, 2020; Nagar-Rothe, 2015). The extent to which such organizations could serve as a catalyst for transformational racial change is not inevitable.

SOCIAL CAPITAL, CONTACT, AND RELIGIOUS RECONCILIATION

To further examine the possibility or potential for religious racial reconciliation, an understanding of social capital theory and contact theory are important because both may help explain opportunities as well as challenges for racial religious reconciliation, in this case, between Black and white people in this study and beyond.

Social capital that leads to action is a necessary tool or outcome in any discussion or process of race relations, racial conciliation, or reconciliation (Ellison & Powers, 1994; Powers & Ellison, 1995; Emerson et al., 2002). The term *social capital* is not easily defined, largely because of the difficulty in fully understanding the history of the term (Farr, 2004). Indeed, the concept of social capital has been around for a long time, going back as far as Adam Smith and Tocqueville, and is later linked to Durkheim, Marx, and Weber, but is not necessarily defined as a concept (Watson & Papamarcos, 2002; Farr, 2004). In modern times the concept has come to be associated with three primary scholars: Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam (Claridge, 2004).

For many white reconciliation participants and scholars, social capital is merely the existence of associations and relationships, but for Bourdieu and others, social capital is an institutional concept endowed with many benefits for those fortunate

enough be well capitalized (Farr, 2004). Reconciliation's relevance for many black people focuses on the reality that "tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of a people—namely goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families, who make up a social unit, the rural community, whose logical center is the school" (Farr, 2004). For communities and organizations to grow, there had to be an accumulation of capital.

The early understanding of social capital centered on a more formal connectivity to community action. Contrast that with the modern understanding of the concept above, or as articulated by Putnam, "Social capital is built on a foundation of trust, neighborliness and familial bonds" (Watson & Papamarcos, 2002). This is a view not necessarily held by all, but not dissimilar to most. Nonetheless, we are interested in how social capital translates into actions which benefit the in-group. In-group actions have been a part of how America works from the very beginning (Emerson & Yancey, 2011). Accordingly, African Americans have been the historically marginalized group for so long that it is impossible for many not to think in those terms (Cornell & Hatman, 1998; Emerson & Yancey, 2011; Morten, 2018).

Emerson and Yancey point out, "European Americans are still at a privileged position in our society. Modern forms of racism ensure that they will remain there" (Emerson & Yancey, 2011, p. 26). By this, Emerson and Yancey are validating what critical race theorists regard as the second tenet of critical race theory (CRT), "interest convergence" or "material determinism." (Delgado & Stefanic, 2017, p. 20). Delgado and Stefancic in their book, *Critical Race Theory*, explain that "because racism advances the interest of both White elites (materially) and the working-class Whites (physically), large segments of society have little incentive to eradicate it" (Delgado & Stefanic, 2017, p. 9). Contrary to the individualistic frame that many white people may prefer, America has become so racialized that the structures of racism do not require individual action to generate harm (Emerson & Smith, 2000).

Emerson and Yancey use the multicultural church as an example of the mutual-obligation concept they advance. As we will discuss, research into these congregations has shown some of their approaches to be a problem. Nonetheless, as an illustration of an environment which fosters social capital building, this example may be far less convincing or reassuring for Black people. According to a *New York Times* report, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 caused an exodus of African Americans from multiracial churches, especially so-called multiracial churches that were predominately white (Robertson, 2018). Their report quoted Michael O. Emerson as saying, "the election itself was the single most harmful event of the whole movement of reconciliation in the last 30 years" and predicted the dismantling of the process (Robertson, 2018). The near universal consensus on the George Floyd tragedy, and the early condemnation of systemic racism and police brutality in response, by major Evangelicals like Rod Parsley, Andy Stanley, and Robert Morris, whose Gateway church Robertson's *New York Times* article singled out for criticism, may open the door for renewed hope in holistic reconciliation and social capital generation.

The outcome of attitudinal changes, racial harmony, social capital, and prosocial actions, which people who are engaged in religious racial reconciliation hope for, is a deliberate attempt to bring about results, which the contact hypothesis asserts as casual contact or informal and formal opportunities for engagement between diverse groups. Participant scholars see contact theory and to a lesser extent the "love thy neighbor" hypothesis, as the best means of theorizing about religious racial reconciliation (McNeil, 2015).

DATA AND METHODS

The current study is part of a larger qualitative inquiry into the effectiveness of after-tragedy religious reconciliation efforts, from the 2016 Alton Sterling police shooting to the killing of George Floyd. It is a grounded study, using traditional and video eth-

nography, involving participant observation, field notes, video interviews, field surveys, audio recorded interviews, social media posting, radio commentary and official organizational statements. Interviews were planned for the spring and summer of 2020, with reconciliation participants in Prairieview, Texas and Ferguson, Missouri, because religious reconciliation efforts were introduced there in the wake of police shootings. Dozens of Black and white church leaders from traditionally Christian denominations participated in the meetings. We focus here on some of the responses that are helpful in exploring our research questions.

Field notes are an important tool for beginning the capture of local knowledge and indigenous understanding (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, 2011). Field notes were captured and translated into memos and codes. The notes were added to the general data collection to generate into code. Data was also collected using video ethnography at a series of meetings.

For example, a member of the research team attended a Unity Breakfast. The monthly breakfast consisted of four parts. The meal was presented by a different host each month. This was followed by a discussion ritual in which the participants were separated into small groups and given the topics or questions for the day's discussions. Beginning as a sort of ad hoc gathering, these small-group discussions became more organized over time as leaders began to emerge from the groups, which started being moderated by participants, who had shared before and showed some signs of having progressed in their own journey of racial reconciliation.

These discussions became more difficult to capture with field notes, as the participants opened up more and the conversations became livelier and freer flowing. Also, each meeting and each small group developed its own dynamic, which was not always forward-moving but always unique. Progress interviews were conducted with the religious leaders of the Unity Breakfast movement to compare their assessment of the effectiveness and progress of their efforts with leaders of other reconciliation efforts around the city, comparing their methodologies and results against that of the Unity Breakfast.

Other data was generated from 47 comprehensive responses to an online survey, around which active interviews were conducted with other reconciliation principals. Consistent with Kathy Charmaz's findings, the nature of grounded theory did require repeated returns to participants for clarification and meaning (Charmaz, 2014).

Our research approach also included the use of interviews. The use of interviews is a staple of qualitative research and represents the most important measure of people's opinions and attitudes about the issue and practice of reconciliation. For safety and privacy reasons, participants were promised the destruction or encryption of the audio files after the transcripts were made. They were also assured that before its destruction or encryption, access to it would be limited to very few people. Given that video ethnography involves using recordings generated to be used in documentary or clip fashion, participants were always asked about the use of the video camera, gave on-camera authorization to be filmed, and were told how the videos may be used. Very few participants expressed concern or refused to do on-camera interviews. We used two different interview styles, the interactive-relational approach and the interactive oral history. The active interview works very well in situations where the collaboration surrounds the interview itself. In a long-term ethnographic environment, as a participant observer however, interaction is a little more difficult to maintain. Conversations important to data collection occur over longer periods of time and often not in a traditional interview dynamic. The data presented here should lead to additional research about the challenges and opportunities for reconciliation at the intersections of race and religion.

Specifically, we examine how much racial religious reconciliation efforts increase in the wake of high-profile racialized events? What are the experiences like for African American Christians who take part in religious racial reconciliation? What factors create opportunities for success? Are there barriers that may never be overcome? In the next section we analyze selected comments

from prominent group members engaged in the racial religious reconciliation efforts.

FINDINGS

Most participants interviewed, or recorded in small group discussions, said they became involved with racial religious reconciliation because of the events this research examined, particularly the shooting of Alton Sterling. As a result, long-term and substantive relationships have been formed, but not for many participants. I also asked whether employing the "Love thy Neighbor" and contact theory's sustained "intergroup contact" in the wake of racialized events increase the opportunities for success?

Consistent with the literature and the theory, sustained intergroup contact increased opportunities for success but could not overcome the persistent racial divide. In other words, the core identities of the church presented a challenge to reconciliation, because engaging in reconciliation which does not include acknowledgment of the structural nature of race in America represents a betrayal of its community for the Black church, while its inclusion represents the same for large segments of the white church, of which white evangelicals are a prime example.

While Evangelicals may be broadly defined as an example of the evangelical tradition in the Christian church, or according to the teaching of the Gospel, this term has been associated politically to describe many white conservative Christians who are often supportive of members of the Republican party who claim to share similar values reflected in their often overlapping political agendas.

While Evangelicals are not the only Christian group that has embraced what is termed "biblical reconciliation," this group is the main proponent of the concept. The largest Evangelical group in the United States is the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), whose beliefs and practices around engaging in issues of race directly oppose those of the Black church and Black Evangelicals. In fact, the Southern Baptist Convention is well known for its unwillingness to engage with others across denominational

lines, for what might be considered the public or general well-being of the community. Famous for their apology for slavery and Jim Crow practices in the nineties, this group is not only one of the most influential Evangelical groups in the U.S.; it is also the fastest growing segment in the African American community. This has caused some to speculate about whether this is the chief motivation for the apology.

Rev. William Lane is uniquely placed to comment on where the Southern Baptist Convention stands on issues of racial reconciliation. He holds the distinction of being the pastor of both an African American SBC and another church in the National Baptist Convention (NBC). Commenting on the absence of SBC leaders and churches in the post-Alton Sterling efforts at racial reconciliation, he answered:

> Here's what I've discovered about SBC. We are disconnected from the community. We are a church community unto ourselves and we are not engaged in the community at all. That's both at the local level, as well as the state level. We aren't! We're very paternalistic. We keep to ourselves. You can't name one Southern Baptist Church in this area that is a member of any community group. Not one. As a federation of churches and synagogues, they're not there. Regarding Together Baton Rouge, they're not there, okay! The other coalitions around town, you won't find one SBC church. Maybe a Black one but not a White one, no. They just disengage with the community altogether.

His statement, "Maybe a Black one but not a white one," indicates that like his African American Southern Baptist Church, other Black churches, despite their SBC identity, behave as typical Evangelical Black Baptist churches do, but universally not the white ones. The model of reconciliation Evangelicals and other churches espouse works better in the controlled environment of the church.

When asked about how the racial dynamic works within the Southern Baptist Convention, Lane is far more optimistic, because according to him, the apology is genuine as far as racial integration within the Convention and, to a lesser extent, the congregation, but not much farther.

> That's right. The integrated fellowship stops at the church door, okay? I hate to say it, but it's true. Stops at the church door. And, look and they're wonderful inside the church, but beyond that, no, no. It doesn't… And it's not just true here, it's true across the board with SBC. It's true across the board, you know.
>
> One of the things that SBC recognizes, particularly in Louisiana, is that the growth of SBC is with the minority community, not the white community. So, all of their… all the tools are not from the heart. It's from the understanding of where the growth is. Makes sense?
>
> So, as in integrated churches, multi-racial church conventions very seldom adopt or even acknowledge the traditions, histories, unique needs of their minority populations. For them, growth and evangelism trumps every other consideration, which can be painful for minorities within the ranks. . . . Now, what pains me, one of the things that pains me, is that the denomination that I'm a part of, won't join those discussions [Faith led Community uplift]. It pains me.

As Lane and others observe, this approach is becoming more and more counterproductive, as the recent mainstream shift in youth response to George Floyd's death in May 2020 has shown. But at the time of this interview Rev. Lane did not yet know about the Floyd event when he gave this answer to one of my questions about the possible negative long-term effect of this for the convention.

> Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Especially among the young people, okay? Especially among young people. And if we don't change the way we do business and say, "We have done wrong at the national level," if we don't change the way we do business, that decline is not only going to continue, it's going to accelerate.

So, while Rev. Lane accepts the effort of the SBC on race as genuine, he sees it as far from adequate going forward, and this inadequacy, to him, presents a danger for this group he loves. Yet as consequential as Lane sees the entrenched practices as a danger for the convention going forward, he sees the new alliance between major parts of his fellowship, as a major sell-out and compromise for the Evangelical church, as evident in this comment.

> And what has happened on the political scene has not helped that at all. These Evangelicals who have sold out to Trump, man, they're not helping us. Man, I couldn't believe what Jeffress said, pastor of the First Baptist Dallas and Trump repeated his tweet that if Trump is impeached, there may be a civil war. This is a pastor of a mega church. Can you believe that?

For Rev. Lane and others who are involved in the work of racial religious reconciliation, the Evangelical alliance with President Trump seems to offer a major setback that appears surprisingly crippling. But it has, in turn, caused many Black Evangelicals to question the basic assumptions they have made about the nature of race and racism within the church. White respondents, on the other hand, have a far greater fear of other unfolding events and movements occurring in the country, many of which are ultimately linked to secularization and even survival.

The twenty-first century Christian Church in America sees itself as facing existential threats, if not to its existence, then certainly to its fundamental beliefs and doctrines. Black and white Christians are as divided on this as they are on race. But this

explains why it's easy for white churches to encourage evangelism and growth among minorities without feeling any obligations to their temporal state, as Michelle Oyakawa found. Because of this, they view African American Christians' discourse on social justice or issues of race as a form of betrayal in the face of what they consider the real threats, or worse, another example of their superiority to Black men when it comes to Christian devotion. Even in the face of critical race-laced occurrences, white Christians most often see such events as disruptive to unity, or opportunities for the priority of evangelism or spiritual outreach. Luke Liston is a member of the Baton Rouge clergy but is best known for his work with men and is co-founder of the Unity Breakfast. He sees reconciliation as being of mutual benefit in amending the racial divide.

> I would like to see one of the outcomes for the church again, to band together to reach out and offer these young men some proper mentoring-appropriate engagements, that bring them to a better place in their life, whatever that might be. It might be to give them a foundation for what I would call Christ-esteem, Christ in them, who they really are; but also, to give them opportunities that are close to them right now. That could be education, could be training, could be a variety of things. I think the church has all the resources necessary to do that. Now the reason I raise that in the context of this conversation [is], I believe that as we start doing that, that we will see some of the social ills shift. But I think they're going to shift, and I think they're going to shift in a way that will ameliorate some of the tensions that create the racial divide.

Liston is an example of how the white majority is positively benefiting from reconciliation efforts, and at first glance his appears to be a constructive thought, with which few can disagree. Liston's underling argument here is that there is an equal responsibility on both sides, for the existence of the issue of race which led to the slayings like that of Alton Sterling, which is reminis-

cent of Donald Trump's comments after the horrific racial event in Charlottesville (Finley et al., 2020). Secondly, while improving some of the tensions of race is noble, these tensions exist as symptoms of deeper structural problems which cannot be solved by these heretofore unused resources of the church. In other words, it is not possible for the church to treat the symptoms, as a way for it to avoid dealing with its history and current practice of race. It is not simply an opportunity to engage in outreach.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of the killing of George Floyd it appeared to some that racial reconciliation might be possible given the collective outrage from many Black and white people in America and around the globe. Cashing in on the social capital of many white people in America who had historically been on the sidelines during ongoing racial injustices was something that long-term social justice advocates thought might finally become a reality. Some thought this would even be possible among various faith-based communities, including between Black and white self-identified Christians. While the number of racial religious reconciliation efforts and contact between Black and white participants in the present study increased, increasing the quantity of interactions did not necessarily increase the quality.

Moreover, our findings suggested that the experiences of Black Christians, and for many white Christians, is far more complex than much of the literature in the sociology of religion would imply. Further research is required in this area and should include discussion involving groups beyond selected Christian denominations and consideration of other social characteristics, including gender, region, and socioeconomic status.

Nevertheless, because race and religion are such important factors in contemporary America, as they have been in the past, racial religious reconciliation may be more aspirational than attainable. While the current study is not generalizable, it does ask important questions, which contribute to the ongoing debate

about whether or not the subordinate status of Black people in America is indeed permanent, as Derrick Bell (Martin, 2022) and others have argued, or whether an age-old racialized social system can be dismantled through racial religious reconciliation.

REFERENCES

Alexander, M. 2010. *The New Jim Crow*. New York: New Press.

Allport, G. W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Binder, J., Zagefka, H., Brown, R., Funke, F., Kessler, T., Mummendey, A., Maquil, A., Demoulin, S., & Leyens, J.P. 2009. "Does Contact Reduce Prejudice or Does Prejudice Reduce Contact." *Journal of Personality And Social Psychology*, 96(4) 843-856.

Blascovich, J., Mendes, W. B., Hunter, S. B., Lickel, B., & kowai-Bell, N. 2001. "Perceiver Threat in Social Interaction with Stigmatized Others." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 253-267.

Braithwaite, V., Huang, H.-F., & Reinhart, M. 2013. "'Love Thy Neighbor' Values, Need, and Willingness to Participate in Restorative Justice: A Survey of Australian and Japanese Victims and Offenders." *Restorative Justice* 1:1, 91-121.

Buras, K. L. 2015. *Charter Schools, Race, And Urban Space*. New York: Routledge.

Chaves, M. 2017. *American Religion*. 2nd Ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Christerson, B., Edwards, K. L., & Emerson, M. O. 2005. *Against All Odds*. New York: New York University Press.

Claridge, T. 2004. *Social Capital and Natural Resource Management: An Important Role for Social Capital*. Brisbane: University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. Retrieved from Social Capital Research and Training: https://www.socialcapitalresearch.com/literature/evolution/amp/#noteff78d6a42870c27e4357a528f72b675b

Cone, J. 2011. *The Cross And The Lynching Tree*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books.

Cornell, S., & Hartman, D. 1998. *Ethnicity and Race*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.

Delgado, R., & Stefanic, J. 2017. *Critical Race Theory*. New York: New York University Press.

DeYoung, C. P., Emerson, M. O., Yancey, G., & Kim, K. C. 2003. *United By Faith*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ellis Jr., C. F. 1996. *Free Atlas? The Gospel in the African-American Experience*. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.

Ellison, G. C., & Powers, D. A. 1994. "The Contact Hypothesis and Racial Attitudes Among Black Americans." *Social Science Quarterly*, 385–400.

Emerson, M. O., & Smith, C. 2000. *Divided By Faith*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Emerson, M. O., & Yancey, G. 2011. *Transcending Racial Barriers*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Emerson, M. O., Kimbro, R. T., & Yancey, G. 2002. "Contact Theory Extended: The Effect of Prior Racial Contact on Current Social Ties." *Social Psychology*, 745–761.

Farr, J. 2004. Social Capital: A Conceptual History. *Political Theory*, 32(1), 6-33. Retrieved February 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4148167

Finley, S. C., Gray, B. M., & Martin, L. L. 2020. "The Religion of White Rage." In S. C. Finley, B. M. Gray, & L. L. Martin, *The Religion of White Rage* (p. 10). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Forbes, H. (1997). *Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture and the Contact Hypothesis*. Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Hackett, E. K. 2020, March 25. *Why I Stopped Talking About Racial Reconciliation and Started Talking About White Supremacy*. Retrieved from WWW.Inheritancemag.com.

Hall, D. L., Matz, D. C., & Wendy, W. 2010. "Why Don't We Practice What We Preach? A Meta-Analytic Review of Religious Racism." *Social Psychology Review* 14, 126–139.

Harlow, L. E. 1990, 2007. Slavery, Race, and Politician Ideology in the White Christian South Before And After The Civil War." In M. A. Noll & L. E. Harlow, *Religion And American Politics From The Colonial Period To The Present* (p. 290). New York: Oxford University Press.

Harper, L. S. 2008. *Evangelical Does Not Equal Republication or Democrat*. New York: The New Press.

Harvey, J. 2014. *Christians, Dear White*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.

Hill, D. 2017. *White Awake*. Dovers Grove: InterVarsity Press.

Jones, W. R. 1997. *Is God a White Racist? A Preamble to Back Theology*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Kutner, N. G. 2007. "Health Needs, Health Care, and Katrina." In D. L. Brunsma, D. Overfelt, & S. J. Picou, T*he Sociology of Katrina: Perspectives on a Mordern Catastrophe* (pp. 203 - 216). Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield.

Long, C. H. 1999. *Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of Religion*. Davies Group Publishers.

Martin, Lori Latrice. 2022. *Racial Realism and the History of Black People in America*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Matthews, D. R., & Prothro, J. W. 1966. *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

McNeil, B. S. 2015. *Roadmap to Reconciliation*. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.

Mohamed, B., Cox, K., & Gecewick, C. 2021, February 16. *pewforum.org*. Retrieved from Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life: https://www.pewforum.org/2021/02/16/faith-among-black-americans/

Morten, F. 2018. *Stolen Life*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Mutz, D. C. 2002. Cross-cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice. *American Political Science Review*, 111–126.

Nagar-Rothe, E. 2015. "Dialogue As a Tool for Racial Reconciliation: Examining Racial Frameworks." *Journal of Dialouge Studies*, 3(1).

Oyakawa, M. 2019. "Racial Reconciliation as a Suppressive Frame in Evangelical Muntiracial Churches." *Sociology of Religion*, 1-22. doi: 10.1093/socrel/srz003.

Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. 2011. *When Groups Meet: The Dynamics of Intergroup Contact*. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Pettigrew, T. F., Tropp, L. R., Wagner, U., & Christ, O. 2011. "Recent Advances In Intergroup Contact Theory." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 271–280.

Pinn, Anthony. 2002. *The Black Church in the Post-Civil Rights Era*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books.

Pinn, Anthony B. 2003. *Terror and Triumph: The Nature of Black Religion*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Pittinsky, T. L., Rosenthal, S. A., & Montoya, M. R. 2011. "Liking Is Not the Opposite of Disliking: The Functional Separability of Positive and Negative Attitudes Towards Minority Groups." In *Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psychology*, 17(2), 134–143.

Powers, D. A., & Ellison, C. G. 1995. "Interracial Contact and Black Attitudes: The Contact Hypothesis and Selectivity Bias." In *Social Forces*, 74(1), 205–226.

Roach, D. 2020. Most Pastors Speak Out In Response to George Floyd's Death. *Christianity Today*. https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2020/june/pastors-george-floyd-racism-church-barna-research.html

Robertson, C. 2018, March 9th. "A Quiet Exodus: Black Worshipers Are Leaving White Evangelical Churches." Retrieved from *New York Times*: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/us/blacks-evangelical-churches.html

Robinson, C. J. 1983. *The Making of The Black Radical Tradition*. London: Zed Press.

Saguy, T., Taush, N., Dovidio, J. F., & Pratto, F. 2009. "The Irony Of Harmony: Intergroup Contact Can Produce False Expectations of Equality." *Psychological Science*, 20(1), 114–121.

Schools. 2021, March 23. Retrieved from St George: http://stgeorgelouisiana.com/schools/

Shen, M. J., Haggard, M. C., Strassburger, D. C., & Rowatt, W. C. 2013. "Testing the *love thy neighbor hypothesis*: Religiosity's association with positive attitudes toward ethnic/racial and value-violating out-groups." *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality,* 5(5), 294–303.

TBN. 2020, 06 30. Retrieved from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0NRYq6wRO8s

Tisby, J. 2019. *The Color of Compromise*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.

Tropp, L. R., & Pettigrew, T. F. 2005. "Differential Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and Cognitive Dimensions of Prejudice." *Social Psychology Bulletin* 31(8), 1145–1158.

Truth Table. 2020, June 30. *Facts About Lacrae*. Retrieved from www.podastery.com: https://soundcloud.com/truthstable/lecrae

Walker, L., & Smith, H. 2001. *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development and Integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Watson, G. W., & Papamarcos, S. D. 2002. "Social Capital and Organization Committment." *Journal of Business and Psychology*, 537.

West, C. 1983. Race Matters. Boston: Beacon Press.

Williams, E. E. 1944, 1994. *Capitalism and Slavery*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Wilson-Hargrave, J. 2008. *Free To Be Bound*. Colorado Springs: NavPress.

Ewart Forde, Louisiana State University
Lori Latrice Martin, Louisiana State University
Stephen C. Finley, Louisiana State University