Setting New Word Records

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If you are looking for comfortable reassurance in a world of headlong heedless change, there is always the English dictionary. There are few more firmly established and dependably stable institutions. Some of the reasons for this are less reassuring.

New dictionaries are extremely expensive to produce. Even starting with generations of expertise and rich collections of data, Merriam-Webster had to invest $3,500,000 in their most recent full-scale dictionary, the *Third International* of 1961. And equally unlike the magnificent government-funded *Trésor de la langue française* at Nancy, the other major dictionary enterprises in the English-speaking world (Random House and Heritage in the United States, for example; Oxford and Longman in Britain) depend on success in the market-place to recoup investment. And with so much to recoup, it is understandable if tried and trusty models are retained and the heady spirit of adventure firmly discouraged, as the industry sells hard to achieve (with considerable success) its goal of getting a dictionary into every home. Dictionary A cannot afford to omit information of the kind in Dictionary B: cannot even risk getting out on a thin commercial limb by treating it too differently.

This, of course, has the reflexive effect of establishing even more firmly in the public mind what is to be expected of and in a dictionary—even to arcane symbols indicating parts of speech and etymologies which it is hard to believe the average home attempts to decode. The time-hallowed format helps to place it mentally with the Bible (alongside which it is likely to find itself physically), and the advertiser's warning that "no home should be without it" finds a ready response in the natural awe that we rightly have for our language faculty and further contributes to the implicit belief that the dictionary is one's linguistic bible. Implicit? Explicit often enough, as in the review of *Third International* by the Right

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Reverend R. S. Emrich, who claims that Webster has forsaken "its post as the guardian of our language." This is quoted by J. H. Sledd and W. R. Ebbitt in *Dictionaries and That Dictionary* (1962), which analyses the (largely hostile) reception of the *Third International* and contributes one of the few examinations that we have in English of the dictionary as an institution and of the criteria by which dictionaries can be assessed.

Having thus, over a couple of centuries, striven to make the public dictionary-conscious, lexicographers are now in a sorcerer's apprentice situation, with a public demanding buckets to be refilled with the same sort of material in the same way.

If this is not bad enough, the third reason for the stability of the dictionary model is that, bluntly, there has been insufficient development in lexicological theory since the time of Samuel Johnson and Noah Webster (or indeed their predecessors) for radical change in lexicography to be worth contemplating.

J. R. Hulbert, Craigie's collaborator on the *Dictionary of American English,* wrote in 1955 of lexicography as being "more enjoyable" than most research because "one does not devote days, months, or even years to testing an hypothesis only to decide that it is not tenable." Does not: and, tacitly, has no need to. This has great advantages for continuity, of course: Hulbert is right that the great *Oxford English Dictionary* is "all of a piece" precisely because the technique was to apply an approach "which in all essentials was to prove quite satisfactory for the work of fifty years."

In brief, the theory is this. A language has at a given time a finite inventory of words, the meanings of which are revealed in the course of general usage. Since the lexicographer is as liable to be as deviant as the next man, he must have recourse to the usage of as many people as he can—in print. This last phrase embodies the proud ideal of descriptive objectivity; his citations (and interpretations of them) are publicly verifiable. True, in some cases it is possible to infer the meaning from the etymology (*bibliophile* for example, if you know the Greek *biblion* "book" and *philos* "loving"), and this is one of the reasons that dictionaries always supply etymologies. It also helps to account for one of the most pernicious of popular *idées fixes*: that this gives you the "real" meaning and that if it differs from modern everyday usage, it only goes to show how corrupt the language has become. But for the professional lexicographer, definitions are based not on etymology or "on an editor's idea of what words ought to mean but rather on the meanings actually given to words by [those] who use them" *(6,000 Words)*.

The constraints and limitations of this practice are no less obvious than

its advantages. Print represents an infinitesimal fraction of language use: new words, new senses, special nuances usually occur first (perhaps only) in speech. But the sentence heard in a bar is not verifiable: the printed example has scholarly respectability in having a quotable accessible source. So a century after sound recordings (thirty years after cheap recording on tape and the like) became possible, the lexicographer continues to restrict his sources to the tiny printed sample. Common sense of course often ensures that a lexicographer who "knows" a word or meaning will embark on special searches of the printed record to make sure it gets in—but, needless to say, this is turning the theory on its head.

Yet this is now taken so much for granted, self-evidently the only respectable lexicographical procedure, that while proclaiming the truism that a dictionary must "keep up with the living language" *(6,000 Words)*, it seems no contradiction a page or so later to find a word's getting "into the language" equated with meeting it "in print."

A further advantage of print however is sometimes argued. While wanting to be up to date, a lexicographer is aware that many usages in ordinary conversation (a daring metaphor, a slipshod substitute for the *mot juste* that refuses to come to mind at the required moment, a slip of the tongue, a word used in a sense special to a family or other private group) never become widely established in the language. Wait for them to get into print, the argument goes, and you can tell the men from the boys. Quite apart from there being no clear idea of how *widely* established a word has to be, or of what "established" means, the argument of course is very shaky. Given the prestige conferred by originality, print is a positive and highly convenient breeding-ground for words or meanings that were never heard before they were written. Given further the tendency to take citations from the more prestigious authors, it is not difficult to see the danger of a highly skewed lexicon emerging from principles designed precisely in the interests of objective generality. Thus the *OED Supplement* (1972) has a policy of "liberally representing the vocabulary of such writers as Kipling, Yeats, James Joyce, and Dylan Thomas," even though this means entries for *hapax legomena* like Beckett's *athambia*.

But then arises a further argument in favour of print. Back to "widely established" again. Although no dictionary can afford to parade this very prominently, the aim is not really to record *all* the words and meanings current in English: no attempt is made to include local dialect, much of the slang, occupational specialities (though those of the miner and bricklayer are more likely to fall under this restriction than those of the doctor or artist), and so on. For the most part, print aims at being communicable across dialectal and professional boundaries and is thus a safer

source of data. The further this line is pressed, of course, the shakier becomes the claim that modern lexicography provides unbiased description, far from the normative, subjective hand of Grundyism: it is self-confessedly selective, biased, tending to describe (and hence, for the user, prescribe) the norms not of the language at large but of writers and editors who are deliberately aiming at their *idea* of norms.

Nor can restriction to printed sources avoid the dialectal, slang, and occupational terms which it is not the purpose of the dictionary to register: every dictionary needs to have labels like "colloq.," "sl.," "legal," etc., to specify the limited currency of such items that have leaked in through print—since of course print includes novels and plays, which in the interests of realism contain their authors' filtered views of norms in these areas. The dangers of moving still further from an objective linguistic record are again obvious, and R. W. Burchfield mentions his entries of dialect words from Lawrence (e.g., *barkle*) and Joyce (e.g., *baw-ways*) in the *OED Supplement.*

Now when a novelist, trying to mime uneducated speech (not, let us hope, entirely from his imagination), writes "'I ain't got no dough to buy a ticket' said the urchin," the lexicographer who is working to rule ties up *urchin* (perhaps also *ain't*) with the double negative, and feels justified in appending some such label as "slang" to this use of *dough* (with *buy,* as distinct from *bake*). It is a poor source for contemporary slang, but let that pass. But when Dwight Macdonald, knowing (as a native speaker knows) just how slangy the word is, none the less interpolates it into an otherwise fully orthodox sentence, he intends the stylistic misfit to be noticed. The lexicographer (still working to rule) feels obliged to ignore his own private sensibility and records this as an apparent instance of *dough* "money" being no longer slang. In this (a true story: see Sledd and Ebbitt, page 261), we see how insecure are the foundations of modern lexicographical procedures.

Let me make it clear that I am not knocking dictionaries. I love them; I own dozens; I am proud of the achievement of the English-speaking countries in this great industry; I inspect with delight each major new model as it rolls off the production lines. I admire the well-organized enterprises and their intelligent dedicated staffs. I am not even particularly jealous that reviewers give so much more space to *dictionaries* than to *grammars* of English. I can truthfully say that many of my best friends are lexicographers. I am old enough to have a pathetic belief in progress and in the advancement of science (in linguistics as in the improvement of hair sprays). But looking for progress in lexicography over the past century or so does little to sustain such faith.

I still possess the first dictionary I ever saw—an Ogilvie in a prominently trumpeted "New Edition" of 1895 by Annandale (in fact basically of much older vintage) and certainly regarded as still new enough to be the domestic dictionary in a thrifty household through the 1920s. Dr. Ogilvie had in fact given British lexicography a decisive new direction about 1850 by importing features from the American tradition. I was captivated by nice grey illustrations of such mysteries as *gabions, oak galls,* and *galvanic batteries.* There were nine fascinating lines incapsulating *Darwinism*; contrast the laconic line and a half in the latest *Concise Oxford,* 500 pages longer; but of course Darwin means much less in the 1970s than it meant for Ogilvie-Annandale.

It contained *piss* ("To discharge urine") but not *shit* or any of the other ordinary names for relevant parts, functions, or operations that one was finding of increasing interest. It later transpired that *vulva* was there (and *anus*: "inferior opening of the alimentary canal"), but how was a semi-literate boy of ten to know? The defining strategy was sometimes heavy going. "*Coquettish a.* Pertaining to a coquette or coquetry" necessarily involved looking up *pertaining,* which wasn't in, and then *pertain, "vi";* after five lines of inflection and etymology (referring me to Latin *teneo* "whence also *tenant, contain*") this began the list of meanings with "to belong," which was less than helpful. There were enthralling appendixes giving such data as the currencies of every country on earth and telling me how to address "ceremonious communications" to a state governor in the United States, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (quite intricate), or an MP (easy, since "Not specially recognized").

It is worth noting that even the 1971 printing of the latest unabridged Webster still contains such information, including the arresting injunction which I quote in its mysterious entirety:

duke's eldest son's eldest son use grandfather's third title

And apropos of illustrations, although all but half a dozen of the full-page ones were dropped between 1961 and 1971, two of these are devoted to ships: incredibly, both to the intricacies of *sailing* ships—schooners and fully rigged three-masters.

Such deliberate (or merely unconsidered?) conservatism contrasts oddly with strident claims to "newness," as insistent with the latest models of Webster, *Chambers* (1973) and *Concise Oxford* (1976) as it was with Ogilvie-Annandale (1895). In what, when we get down to it, does the newness inhere? Well, for one important thing, there is great progress in readability: typography and layout are more attractive and more efficient. And a great deal of valuable thought has been given to refining the policy with definitions. Where Ogilvie-Annandale has *appalling* as

"adapted to appal," Dr. Sykes in the new *COD* (its predecessor had no separate definition) has the limpid "shocking, unpleasant": though for *anus* he is stodgily Latinate with "terminal excretory opening of alimentary canal."

Again, new editions are quick to incorporate the latest information on etymology (especially now in the light of C. T. Onions, et al., *Oxford Dictionary of Etymology,* 1966). They are in general more careful and more sensitive with "usage labels" (Dr. Sykes calls the use of *appalling* that I have quoted "colloq."), but this is itself a sensitive issue and in recent years the Webster dictionaries have sought to play down their prescriptive role by using such labels very sparingly: the *Third International* and the derived *Eighth Collegiate* (1976 printing) leave *appalling* without any stylistic restrictions. Even *wop* "Italian," which *COD* labels "derog.," is more tentatively restricted in the Websters as only *usually* "used disparagingly."

This is part of a more general development: the striving towards objectivity and descriptive humility, weaning the public from their search for magisterial authority in a dictionary. It is doubtless most obvious in the way no lexical censorship is any longer exercised, and lexicographers point proudly to their liberal admission of all the naughty words that Dr. Johnson archly accused his lady critics of searching for. But this permissiveness is in fact little to boast of. In the first place, it results from no deepthroated roar at the barricades: lexicographers are merely following, from the secure distance of a decade (still more cautiously in the United States), the licensed admission of these words in fiction and other printed as well as oral material. In any case, no new lexicological principle is involved, indeed no "new" information is being revealed; and it could even be argued that dictionaries are now merely pandering to current waves of full-frontal fashion. Unevenly at that. A. M. Macdonald's *Chambers* (1973) and the new *COD* list the more notorious items, but not necessarily all the colloquial periphrases: no *hard-on,* for example, which is in the Webster *Collegiate.* Webster themselves, however, seem to be in considerable sexual disarray. Already in the 1961 printing of the *Third, cunt* was included; but *fuck* was not, and it did not appear in the Addenda of 1971 or in the new separately published supplement *6,000 Words* (1976). The *Seventh Collegiate,* derived from the *Third International,* had neither *cunt* nor *fuck* in 1972, but the *Eighth* had both in 1973. It appears that the *Seventh* is in fact being kept in print for supply to institutions that don't like their dictionaries to mix up bed and board. By contrast, Oxford spelled out with scholarly precision its new policy in relation to such taboos in an article by R. W. Burchfield (*TLS,* October 13, 1972).

But the chief criterion of newness is the number of new words recorded, and setting new records in this direction is rather like putting the weight, with each competitor free to decide what weight to throw. Here is where the market competition and the absence of advanced lexicological theory interact with the worst effects.

In 1973 Clarence Barnhart and his colleagues produced a *Dictionary of New English 1963-1972,* containing "words" not previsouly recorded in standard dictionaries (except those omitted for reasons of delicacy: the morality of this book—if not its catholic source materials and its projected market—is essentially transatlantic). As a dictionary, it was unkindly rated by the *TLS* (April 5, 1974) "the silliest yet," and you can see what the reviewer meant. Though providing in the introduction a valuable summary of current lexicographical method, even spelling out to some extent the criteria adopted for recognizing an entity as one of the (new) "words," it exposed through its very explicitness (and above all by necessarily excluding all the normal words of English) the shaky foundations on which it rested.

Nevertheless, Merriam-Webster have paid Barnhart the compliment of producing a strictly similar volume on a similar scale: *6,000 Words* (1976)—comprising all the "new words" admitted through their filing and screening system since the 1961 *Third.* Many of the entries seem not so much to bring readers up to date as Merriam themselves: *chutzpah* (Burchfield's *Supplement* has citations from 1892) and *buzz off* (Burchfield has citations from 1914), for example. They even include the time-honoured but not style-honoured *codswallop*—but without a slang label. Of course the 6,000 include many very welcome entries such as *hadal, nebbish, neuristor,* but an embarrassingly high proportion suggest that the numbers game has got out of hand. Totally predictable items involving regular affixation processes help to swell the statistics (*demystify, depollute, denuclearize,* and the like). One is grateful not to find a host of "new" *un*-words also, if left uneasy at the apparent absence of a principle. Again, there are derivatives like *Chomskyan* and *Kafkaesque,* where the only reason for inclusion is the suffixation, though ironically that is the only part that needs no explanation. The semantic interest of such items of course wholly resides in the work of Chomsky and Kafka: but these are people, not words, and their work is material for an encyclopedia not a dictionary.

But the entries that really seem contrived are the scarcely naturalized foreign words such as *Karatzu* (ware), *jun* (a North Korean coin), *objet trouvé,* with nary a theoretical glimpse of the alchemy by which they become part of English; and above all, perhaps, menu items such as

oysters Rockefeller and the "compounds" like *gang bang, palazzo pants,* and *sudden infant death syndrome.* New? English? Words?

This should not be read as a criticism of the Merriam team alone but —as is my recurrent theme—of the complacent assumptions in current lexicography. Identical or comparable examples could be given from Barnhart's 1973 dictionary and equally from the first volume of Burchfield's *Supplement.* As well as in *6,000 Words, depollute* is in Barnhart but not in Burchfield, though *denuclearize* (surely a form of depollution) is in all three and in the new *COD* as well. *Watson-Crick,* though a peculiarly British-made "compound," is in both *6,000 Words* and Barnhart but not in *Chambers*; nor is it in *COD,* whose only *Watson* is Sherlock Holmes's friend, scarcely more at principled ease in being listed and glossed as a lexical item. Burchfield has no *Chomskyan,* but he has *Bloomsbury* on the strength of such citations as a D. H. Lawrence letter which speaks of Bloomsbury "enjoying itself in Paris." Surely again a linguistic generalization is missed here—not to mention its implications. Where do we stop? "Watford is peaceful" (place), "Watford is rioting" (people of Watford), "Watford is moving up the league" (football team).

Despite this open-house policy, some solemn thinking gets done—and goes wrong. One new "word" since 1961 that might occur to a reader is *streak* (*-er, -ing*), which is in the new *COD* (though not in *Chambers*). But in their prefatory matter, the Merriam editors explain that it takes more than just a year or so's currency and a well-defined meaning to get into Webster: *streak* is excluded as being among those words that "enjoy a brief vogue . . . then disappear." Within days of my reading this, the papers were full of the streaking episode at the Montreal Olympics, and even in Bloomsbury I could feel the glow of Springfield's red faces.

But this example does highlight the problem inherent in Barnhart and *6,000 Words,* and very much in the foreground for general dictionaries like *COD*: what sort of currency must a word or meaning have before speakers of the language recognize it as established? There is something gross about a lexicography which demands *n* occurrences over *t* units of time and which has no means of formally recognizing the misty penumbra that ordinary people are thoroughly conscious of ("if I may so term it," "sort of ——, as you might say"). The Larousse group (Giraud, Pamart, Riverain) had at least a better metaphor for their volume that is analogous to *6,000 Words* and Barnhart: *Les mots dans le vent* (1971).

And if we are dissatisfied with the admission of new words and meanings, we have every reason to feel likewise over the means by which obsolescence is noted. Again, little explicit theory or even detailed observation is available, but one would expect the death-rate of words

and meanings to be rather similar to the birth-rate. In some areas of lexicon, this seems to be an inescapable truism (*landau, victoria, brougham*—out; *convertible, coupé, limousine, fastback*—in).

If a dictionary has as its policy the keeping of a historical record, then of course a word once admitted can never be excluded: since someone may read the (Chaucerian, Miltonian) text in which now obsolete words occur, it is necessary that a dictionary should be to hand that explains them. Thus we have the thirteen volumes of the great *Oxford Dictionary*. The policy of the unabridged Webster is equally clear in this respect. It is meanings from 1755 to the present that will be recorded, but in addition are included those "found in . . . a few major writers" such as Shakespeare: in the light of which principle, of course, the cool-run sense of *streak* should have been included in the *6,000* since its place in the printed literature at some time since 1755 overrules the (inaccurate) claim about its present obsolescence.

It is with the shortish desk dictionary of current English that the problem is acute. Should "current" refer only to the vocabulary in productive use, or should it comprise items in literature (Dickens, Pope, Shakespeare) that members of our current culture are liable to read? The latter position is the one taken up—if a little equivocally—by Dr. Sykes in *C O D*. But this carries an editorial obligation to label as obsolete any words that are retained for the purposes of reading older literature. Sure enough, *brougham* is both included in *COD* and duly labelled, though *vesta* and *lucifer* (both "match") are included with no indication that they have long since become obsolete. In some cases, discrimination seems ill-motivated: the beer-measure sense of *pin* has gone from *COD*, but *firkin, hogshead, kilderkin, tierce, puncheon* (which, I am assured by the Brewers' Society, are all rarer than *pin*) are still included. Miss Macdonald's *Chambers* (1973), despite the *Twentieth Century* in its title, provides more striking examples. The entry for the adjective *sad* begins with the meanings "sated," "steadfast," "constant," "staid," "sedate," "serious," "earnest." A poor tenth comes "sorrowful," with no indication that this meaning has a better twentieth-century track record.

But leaving aside individual editorial slips, my point is that, apart from common sense, there seems no reliable practice of lexical geriatrics, and dictionary makers remain better registrars of births than of deaths. A few hypotheses and experiments in elicitation techniques and informant reactions might well have resulted in disappointment, but (*pace* Professor Hulbert) it is certainly not the case that they have been unnecessary. Both the new *Collegiate* and the *COD* have *graffito* as head-word without mentioning that *graffiti* is usual as an invariable non-count noun.

Reviewing these handsome new volumes and comparing them with their predecessors of a century ago (and more), one is in fact struck more by the high quality of the old than by the higher quality of the new. Real improvement, real progress there has been: but it has been largely peripheral, and numerous central problems remain virtually untouched. What is a "word"—or at any rate what should constitute the lexical entry item? (Should *bat an eye-lid* be one entry or three or four? Since *Lombard Street* is in *COD,* why not *Charing Cross Road*?) What are the conditions under which definition slides between ostensive, synonymic, analytic, and implicative? What options are open in developing a special metalanguage for expressing definitions? Is Paul Imbs making better use of modern semantic theory in his *Trésor* (Volume I, 1972) than lexicographers in the English-speaking countries? Is it best to order the meanings of polysemous items historically (the Webster principle), on the basis of currency frequency (Barnhart and Sykes), or in terms of semantic explanation?

Note that the historical principle can give precedence to archaic senses (as with *sad* in *Chambers*). Webster (unabridged and *Eighth Collegiate* alike) give the noun *pipe* its musical sense first, and even the "two hogsheads" sense precedes the pipe-smoker's pipe; yet, tacitly admitting that there is something unsatisfactory about this, the unabridged opens the entry with a picture of the tobacco pipe. And though Dr. Sykes begins with the general tubular sense (which probably well accords with his frequency principle as it certainly would with a semantic principle), he actually interposes not only the musical sense but a specifically labelled archaic sense before we get to parson's pleasure. Nor, of course, if we were to take the frequency principle seriously (as apparently Dr. Sykes does not), have we any idea how best to establish frequency: there must be many types of discourse in which the commonest sense of *ticket* is "summons for a parking offence."

The foregoing by no means exhausts the basic problems which one would like to see tackled by an advanced lexicological theory. Even when the nature of lexical items is satisfactorily understood, is an alphabetic organization of them the most revealing one? Is it even the most useful for ordinary users?

The only serious breakthrough in this respect takes us back to Bloomsbury again—and is hardly recent. Peter Mark Roget was born nearly 200 years ago and his association with Jeremy Bentham dates from the early years of the nineteenth century. Yet his semantic presentation of the lexicon has remained the only serious contender with the traditional alphabetic one. Now Mairé Kay of the Merriam staff has produced

a very interesting combination of the Roget insights with the convenience of the alphabetic dictionary, the *Collegiate Thesaurus* (1976). It is the kind of work whose success can be judged only after prolonged use, but first reactions are on the whole pleasing. Trying to imagine how I would arrive at *collusion* (if this was the *mot juste* at the tip of my tongue but refusing to get further), I found a number of plausible routes quite easily (via *plot,* for example). On the other hand, starting from the notions "rather off-handed," "just for form's sake," "a bit half-hearted," I found no easy way to end up with the required *perfunctory.*

Nor, imagining myself wanting to write to a doctor or government health department and needing the technical or merely "polite" words or periphrases for intimate physical matters (surely a fairly common need?), could I seem to get any help at all. In other words, there is nothing like an "inside-out" match between the two eponymous companion volumes, the *Collegiate Thesaurus* and the *Collegiate Dictionary.* Still less can we expect to solve such problems with the much shorter *Reverse Dictionary* of T. M. Bernstein, where the idea is to have meaning paraphrases arranged in alphabetical order and then be given the word that corresponds: e.g., "small sum of money: PITTANCE." Here you must start from "small"; there is no lead under "money."

Even with more serious and exhaustive attempts, such as the new Merriam *Thesaurus,* it is clear that we have a long way to go in semantic analysis before real progress can be made. At present, a thesaurus can be only as good as the conventional dictionary resource on which it is based, since its semantic diffusion can scarcely be expected to go beyond the ways by which the meanings of all the words concerned are specified in traditional dictionaries. But there is a chicken-and-egg problem here: dictionary definition itself is in need of overhauling through the very insights that the semantically organized thesaurus approach can supply.

A single example will suffice to show that neither dictionary nor thesaurus as currently devised can reflect the lexical sensibilities inherent in even the most ordinary user's awareness of his language. The participle *damaging* has acquired an abstract sense as an adjective, something like "hurtful to reputation," which is not particularly recent but which is difficult if not impossible to extract from the latest Websters or *Chambers* (though *COD* pinpoints it excellently under the verb *damage*). But in addition to this modern sense, *damaging* has a modern collocative tone, a *schadenfroh* tinge, such that I am unlikely to refer to "a damaging review" of one of my own books. Clearly, this aspect of the *mot juste* would be of great relevance to a thesaurus-user, but he will search in vain. Nor, given the constraints of present lexicographic method. can he expect confirma-

tion of suspected tone by consulting the dictionary entry for such a word.

This in itself is a small point, but it is symptomatic of the way the lexicographer's needle seems to have got stuck. The man who "busies himself in . . . detailing the signification of words" has never of course needed to be merely a "harmless drudge" ("I give this as it stands in Johnson," says R. G. Latham—also symptomatically—in his "new" edition of 1866). But equally one would not necessarily become a mischievous playboy by engaging in some exciting hypotheses and challenging the largely implicit theories on the nature of words and meanings. Perhaps we shall get genuinely new developments only when universities show more interest in lexicology, undertake serious research in it, and develop some teachable approaches to lexicological theory.

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